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



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**MORADABAD**  
**(India)**

**VOL. XXXVIII**

**JANUARY 1998**

**NUMBER 1**



## DEDICATION

*This 149th issue of the Darshana International  
is most respectfully dedicated to*

**Dr. Jacques Vigne**

*who has been trained as a Medical Doctor, Psychiatrist and  
Psychotherapist in Paris and in India in Indology.*

*Dr. Vigne has experienced the Guru-disciple relation.  
He has written books on Spiritual Psychology and now de-  
votes his time to spiritual practice. His writings are a con-  
tribution to a better understandings of East and West as well  
as between modern psychology and spirituality. He resides  
in India near Haridwar.*

*May he live long to serve the promotion of spiritualism  
in world.*

**ANURAG ATREYA**  
Managing Editor



# DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An International Quarterly

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychological  
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& Sociology

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## *Editorial:*

### *A New Aspect of the Un-conscious*

R. N. Vyas

Modern psychology is grateful to Freud for introducing the concept of the unconscious. The presence of the unconscious has explained many riddles of mental life. Although a person is not aware of its presence, it is dynamic in nature and directs and controls the behaviour of an individual. Its existence is clear from the following facts :

1 Sometimes the problems which cannot be solved in one's conscious life are solved by the unconscious life mind. The solutions come rather surprisingly.

2 If one decides to wake up at a fixed time, one gets up at that time.

3 The success of hypnotism indicates its presence.

4 Post hypnotic suggestions (activities) too prove its existence.

5 Mental diseases too point to its presence.

6 Dream analysis too confirms its presence.

7 Somnambulating activities too can be explained through it.

8 Slips of memory etc too indicate its presence.

9 Feats of memory too prove its existence.

Freud had accepted three aspects of mind viz. conscious, unconscious and sub conscious.

Jung has, however, stated that there is what he calls Racial mind too. He writes;

"Every civilized human being, whatever his conscious developments, is still archaic at the deeper levels of his psyche. Just as human connects us with mammal and displays numerous relics of early evolutionary stages, so the human psyche is likewise a product of evolution which when followed to its origins shows countless archaic traits". But I shall like to differ from Jung in this direction.

In my opinion every individual is basically an individual. His race or family or environment may influence him. But this influence works with his consent known or unknown. His individual being accepts only those influences which are selected by him or tolerated by him. Hence, there cannot be any Racial mind.

Instead of Racial mind, one should accept the factor of subtle impressions of his previous birth as the influencing agency to an extent. Of course, there are many persons who may not accept the phenomenon of rebirth. But Indian wisdom has always accepted it.

Now is it possible to accept that the subtle effects of the activities of an individual spread up in his entire life are totally destroyed with the death of physical body? Even when one burns a wooden



stick, the ashes remain. Even when one gets angry, its after effects remain, Even when a rose-flower is destroyed its delicacy persists in the environment. Even when the 'achar' kept in a pot is thrown out, its subtle smell persists.

In the same way, the subtle tendencies of a previous birth are present and influence a person from the depth of unconsciousness. We may call it Previous Impression Mind. Indians rightly believe that an individual has two types of bodies—one physical (stula) and the other subtle (Sukshma or linga deha). After the destruction of the physical bony, the Linga Deha is not destroyed and accompanies the soul in the next physical birth. Some instances shall prove this point. Let us take the example of Hitler. He was a stubborn Nazi Dictator who killed innumerable Jews and destroyed many people in the Second World War. Why was he so? The German race is not so cruel. His childhood incidents may not be satisfactory. But there are innumerable persons who live in worse kind of childhood experiences, but still are not as cruel as Hitler was. It may be said that he was much influenced by the theory of Superman presented by Nietzsche.

Some typical statements of Nietzsche are stated herein below:

1 "I teach you the superman. Man is something that is to be surpassed".

2 "Morality in Europe today is herd morality".

But thousands of readers must have read Nietzsche. No body except Hitler was influenced to a deep extent. Under the circumstances, most probably, his Ling Sharira-Mind was responsible for his cruelty. Now we can take just opposite case of Mahatma Gandhi. He came from a middle class Vaishnava family. His mother was a religious lady. But in India we have many religious hearted mothers. Hence, we can say that Gandhi's childhood or perusal of certain works were not the only cause of his unique nature. His Ling Sharira-Mind was responsible for his extra-ordinary personality. The Bhagavadgita (VII-19) too talks about the growth of personality in course of many births.

We can explain the birth of a Kalidass or Shakespeare, Ravindra nath or Tulasidas, nay every person with the help of Personal Unconscious, and Lingadeha Unconscious.

In astrology, this factor of Linga Deha Unconscious is manifested to some extent. That is why if a horoscope is correct, it is possible to give some predictions which come out true. Of course, it needs the help of intuition too.

Historically speaking, Akbar, the Great, was famous for his liberal religious views. At the time of Akbar itself, some seers had declared that he was a Hindu in his previous birth. That is why he was so liberal in his attitude and had confidence in Hindus like Birbal Gang and Mansingh.



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Rasa Khan, a Muslim, became a devout devotee of Lord Krishna and wrote beautiful poetry in His praise. He yearned to be born in Brijin his next birth. He was a devout Pathan. This love for Krishna can be explained only with the help of Ling-deha Mind. I have myself seen some Hindu persons who have an inclination Pirs and Mazars. Similarly, there are some Muslims who have faith in Hindu shrines.

Why does a person fall in love with another person not acceptable to his community? Nobody wants conflict with his community. It is because Linga-Deha Unconscious., which propels a person to move towards another person who is chosen out of all other people.

Modern science may not have accepted the fact of rebirth. But various cases which come in light at times show that re-birth which is possible because of transmigration of Linga Deha is a fact. It is a case of implication. Just as when a person who returns one day to find that his house is lying open, the cash is missing, valuables which were there are not there, he comes to the conclusion that some theft has taken place, in the same way, some events of this very life indicate the presence of previous births.

Some researches about re birth, too, have established this fact that when physical body dies, the Linga Deha transmigrates to the next birth of the soul. Dr. Kirtisvarup Ravat of Faridabad, U P., India who is M A. in Philosophy as well as in Sociology and has retired from the Kekari District Bhinmal, Rajasthan, in 1994 got his degree of Ph D in 1987 on the topic 'Punarjanms Ki Sambhavana Ka Vaijnanik Vishleshana' (Scientific analysis of the possibilities of re-birth). He collected 514 cases of rebirths and came to the conclusion that rebirth does take place. Dr. Stevenson of the U. S. A. and S. Lonard of Sweden too have drawn this very conclusion on the basis of their research work. Hence, it is quite logical to conclude that Linga-deha Mind does influence a person.

Dr. Jung talks about the Racial Mind, but there cannot be any Racial Mind, because mind is always individual. How can there be Racial mind? Genetic influence of race are acceptable. It is evident from the features of people belonging to a race. But this influence is physical.

Zygote is responsible for this influence. It means that genes are responsible for the physical features. But the significant fact is that the cases of uncommon intelligence and low intelligence cannot be explained through this theory; It is said that it is just a case of chance that a person is a genius or an idiot. But invoking chance implies that the theory is unable to give right explanation of such cases. The reasonable attitude seems to be that soul and mind are not transmitted. For example, the foremost philosopher-thinker of India viz. Shankara lived only for thirty two years. But his achieve-



ments were simply outstanding. He gained mastery over Vedic literature in the age of 7: He became a Sanyasi in the tender age of 9. He gained enlightenment in the age of 12. He wrote his marvellous works before 16. He established Mathas in four directions and defeated his opponents in Vada-vivada. The genetic theory is simply unable to explain it.

In the modern period, we can take up the case of M. K. Gandhi, who has been accepted as the Father of Indian nation. He came from ordinary parents. But his achievements were very outstanding. He defeated Governments of South Africa and India through his matchless struggles. He forced the British Government to leave India through his non-violent struggle.

Hence the theory of subtle body (Linga Deha) has to be accepted, which indicates that an individual brings his specific attitude and possibilities from his previous birth.

Patanjali has stated that a person can arouse the memories of his previous birth through a specific form of meditation Sankaraskhatkaranat purvajatiijnanam (Yoga sutra 3/18).

It is said about Gautama Buddha that he knew all his previous births (vide Samanaja-Sutra). Lord Krishna declares in the Bhagavad-gita to Arjuna that both Krishna and Arjuna had many previous births. But while Krishna knew about them, Arjuna had no knowledge (Bhagavadgita 4/5). Individuality is thus previous birth rooted.

Mind is not transmitted to an individual by his parents. He brings it through his previous birth to an extent.

This does not mean any denial of the influence of environment and education. But there is no science which can make all individuals alike in every way.

Modern theory of Existentialism emphasises the fact of 'existence subjectivity'.

Let us remember 'In general, by existence, the existentialists comprehend human existence, not in its biological sense but in the sense of its perennial freedom'.

Ramakant Sinari writes about Marcel, a noted existentialist "Man's existence involves an individuality, or as Marcel puts it, 'an act of creation', whose nature is not only transcendental but also spiritual".

In modern psychology, it is accepted that every individual has his specific nature which is studied in the Individual psychology, a branch of psychology.

In the ancient Indian philosophical thought we find Vaishika philosophy which accepts Vishishta particularity existing in everything and enables us to perceive that things differ from each other. It is the distinctive feature in each.

This fact of difference existing in every individual is because of transmission of Linga-deha-mind from the previous birth, which exists in the unconscious and influence a person at times. If we accept this, there is hardly any need to accept the existence of Racial mind.



# I

## A Wittgensteinian View of Human Liberation: Freedom from Grammatical Confusion And Linguistic Entanglement For Philosophers and Nonphilosophers

Thomas T. Tominaga

What we call "liberation" and what we are liberated from can be viewed in many different ways in Western and Oriental culture, societies, religions, theologies, and philosophies. In general, when we speak of liberation, we usually mean or imply that a person or group of people wants to be free from something or somebody oppressive, intolerable, and undesirable. In particular, when we speak of liberation from a Wittgensteinian perspective, what we have in mind is an attempt "to free people from a view of the world",<sup>1</sup> which has held them captive and be witched, and "to free (them)" from entanglement in the net of language and the metaphysical orientation towards existence."<sup>2</sup>

Such a captivating and bewitching view of the world stems from and irresistible tendency toward the referential use of language. It manifests itself when we identify and equate the meaning of a word with an existing thing-in-itself (nameable referent) whose existence can only be assumed or postulated. What this tendency imposes on us is an unfounded and misleading conviction. Namely, the one-sided linguistic belief that the only necessary and indispensable use of language is the one that pictures or depicts how certain things or objects must exist in the world, or else our language and the way we

- 1 Chris Gudmussen, *Wittgenstein and Buddhism* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977), p. 68.
- 2 Glen T. Martin, *From Nietzsche to Wittgenstein; The Problem of Truth and Nihilism in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1989), p. 250.



communicate about human existence and the world around us would be cognitively meaningless.

With reference to such a view of the world, our emerging Wittgensteinian view of human liberation can be characterized by Gudmunsen with Wittgenstein's help as follows :

Wittgenstein certainly offers liberation : 'A picture held us captive'—'What is your aim in philosophy ?—To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.' (*Philosophical Investigations*, 309).<sup>3</sup>

The liberation is from a spell cast by obsession of certain pictures of how things must be, as suggested by grammar: 'Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'. (*Philosophical Investigations*, 109). 'Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert on us'. *Blue and Brown Books*, p. 27).<sup>4</sup>

Implicit in these remarks is our emerging Wittgensteinian view of human liberation which we can state more explicitly as follows. For a Wittgensteinian view of human liberation, when we philosophers and non-philosophers are involved in the activity of liberation, we need to free ourselves from grammatical confusion, linguistic entanglement, metaphysical illusion, and personal disquietude caused by our obsession with certain mental pictures imposed on us by the picturing influence of language based on the name-referent model. In order to free ourselves from such obstacles, we need to carry out the following suggestions :

- (a) initiate self-mastery so that we can live and speak the truth about the way we experience the world;<sup>5</sup>
- (b) cultivate and show a clarity of understanding of the inner workings of our diverse everyday uses of language so that we can see and describe the world clearly;<sup>6</sup>
- (c) find and employ new ways of thinking and different ways of doing philosophy 'like different therapies' so that we can stop doing philosophy when we want to and have peace of mind; and
- (d) show and live a marked change in our way of viewing the world so that our experiences of the world would not be separated

3 Gudmunsen, *Op. Cit.*, p. 69.

4 *Idid.*, p. 69.

5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, tr. Peter Winch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 35e.

6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, tr. D. F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul and New York : The Humanities Press, 3rd impression, 1966). p.151.

7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1968), Section 133, p. 51e.



from the events and life situations in the world and so that we can be aware of and make clear the presence and force of "the ethical" and "the mystical".<sup>8</sup>

In our ensuing discussion, I will develop and illustrate these suggestions regarded as guidelines for human liberation from a Wittgensteinian perspective. By doing so, I hope that our emerging Wittgensteinian view of human liberation can be made more coherent and more defensible. In the end, I plan to draw some conclusions, which, I hope, would be justifiable.

From a Wittgensteinian perspective, our first suggested guideline for human liberation is to initiate and achieve some semblance of what the great Chinese philosopher Confucius recognized over 2,000 years ago as "self-mastery",<sup>9</sup> which is similar to what Wittgenstein himself also recognized as "self-revolution"<sup>10</sup> viewed as a crucial starting point for human liberation. The task of initiating and achieving an acceptable degree of self-mastery involves two closely related acts. The first one is the linguistic act of speaking the truth about who or what one is. The second one is the normative or axiological act of living the truth about who or what one is. The former (linguistic act) in that it is only when one has already lived regularly the truth about one self that one can be in a legitimate position to speak the truth about oneself.

This dependence of the former on the latter means that it is not one's cleverness or competency in any spoken language, but it is one's consistent fulfillment of an existential commitment that can reveal the truth about oneself. To this effect and characteristic of a person who is on the verge of achieving a legitimate portrayal of self-mastery, Wittgenstein remarks as follows :

That man will be revolutionary who can revolutionize himself.<sup>11</sup>  
No one can speak the truth; if he has still not mastered himself. He cannot speak it; — but because he is not clever enough yet.

<sup>8</sup> Martin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 320.

<sup>9</sup> Confucius, *Analects* 12:1 in Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, tr. Wing-tsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 38: "Yen Yuan asked about humanity, Confucius said, 'To master oneself and return to propriety is humanity. If a man (the ruler) can for one day master himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will return to humanity. To practice humanity depends on oneself. Does it depend on others?'"

<sup>10</sup> Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 45e.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45e.



The truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home in it; not by someone who still lives in falsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards truth on just one occasion.<sup>12</sup>

Upon the achievement of self-mastery or self-revolution, the prospects for human liberation can be greatly improved if we can understand and overcome how some uses of language tend to mislead, confuse, and entangle us by imposing an unfounded view of the world. What is involved here is the lack of a clear understanding of how our language actually works in everyday life, which is addressed by our second suggested guideline.

According to our second suggested guideline, if human liberation from our indiscriminate and misguided use of language is to come about, we need to cultivate and show a clear and consistent understanding of the inner workings of our everyday uses of language. In so doing, we don't get grammatically confused and linguistically entangled by the surface grammar<sup>13</sup> of words and expressions that would seem to refer to some non existing referents. To some of us, trying to get a clear understanding of the inner workings of our everyday uses of language seems to be a waste of time and a trivial exercise, since such a boring activity is predicated on what is too obvious and too familiar. However, it is precisely our coming to grips with the obvious and the familiar inner workings of our everyday uses of language that is greatly needed for the liberation of philosophers and non philosophers from their grammatical confusion and linguistic entanglement. By paying close attention to the depth grammar<sup>14</sup> shown by the inner workings of our everyday uses of language, philosophers and non philosophers would be able to see and understand that their grammatical confusion is due to the overemphasis on the surface grammar (the way words sound when they are pronounced and look when they are written) of the words they use as if such words must refer to some objects that are not clearly identifiable.

Moreover, philosophers and nonphilosophers would also be able to see and understand that their linguistic entanglement is due to their uncritical acceptance of the central but unfounded assumption of the name-thing model of the referential theory of meaning. Namely, a word or an expression must name a corresponding object of reference whose existence can only be postulated or assumed, or else such a word or an expression would have no meaning. Of course, this alleged lack of meaning need not come about, since we regularly

12 *Ibid.*, p. 35e.

13 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Section 664, p. 168e.

14 *Ibid.*, Section 664, p. 168e.



put words and expressions into many different uses without any corresponding objects ready at hand and without being preoccupied with a fruitless and endless search for them.

At close range, we can see that what stands in the way of the liberation of philosophers and nonphilosophers from their grammatical confusion and linguistic entanglement is no other than what is called the referential theory of meaning or some version of it. Recognized and advocated partly or fully by such renowned philosophers as Plato, Augustine, Hobbes, Husserl, Russell, and Frege, to name a few, the referential theory of meaning relies heavily on the name-object model. What is noticeable about the name-object model is that it is so magical, attractive, and irresistible that it can and does lure philosophers and nonphilosophers to presuppose and uphold what is called a metaphysical or an ontological premise. Namely, there must be objects of reference out there or somewhere in the universe for our words and expressions to refer to if they are to be meaningful. Otherwise the lack of such objects of reference would make our words and expressions absolutely meaningless.

In order to place in perspective and to be on the alert for the grammatical confusion and linguistic entanglement inflicted upon philosophers and nonphilosophers by the referential theory of meaning and the name-object model, we need to pay close attention to the specific setting or what Wittgenstein calls the depth grammar as opposed to the surface grammar<sup>15</sup> of our everyday uses of language. Doing so can produce at least two important consequences. The first consequence is that we can begin to understand that it is the surface grammar, which is composed by the sound of spoken words and appearance of written words, that confuses and misleads philosophers and nonphilosophers. Philosophers and nonphilosophers are tempted by the surface grammar of their words and expressions into creating and adopting uncritically the unfounded worldview, according to which the world must be populated with objects of some kind that would function as the meaningful referents for their words and expressions.

The second consequence is that we can begin to recognize and acknowledge our everyday uses of language for what they are without being tempted "to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard...of ways."<sup>16</sup> However, our everyday uses of language can serve therapeutically as helpful reminders in the following way. Once philosophers and nonphilosophers have reached

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Section 664, p. 168e.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* Section 133, p. 51e.



the limits of language and meaningful communication as indicated by the depth grammar of our everyday uses of language, they can leave behind or transcend our everyday uses of language so that they can see the world more clearly and more directly without any mediation or interference.

Metaphorically speaking, philosophers and non-philosophers can use our ordinary language or any human language as a ladder to climb to the top of the wall from which they can view the world with a higher degree of clarity of vision. To call our attention to the therapeutic value of such a clarity of vision for the liberation of philosophers and nonphilosophers from the unyielding but transcendable limits of language, Wittgenstein, towards the end of his pivotal work, *Tractatus* remarks as follows :

6.54. My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)<sup>17</sup>

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.<sup>18</sup>

7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.<sup>19</sup>

Whether a philosopher or non-philosopher, who may be an ordinary person, is able to see the world aright with such a clarity of vision, we can say conditionally that such an individual is on the verge of liberation from going against the limits of language. What is significant about such a philosopher's or nonphilosopher's struggle for liberation from the limits of language is at least one revealing psychological or moral implication. Namely, something has tormented and transformed the philosopher or nonphilosopher, or some fundamental change has taken place in the mind and behavior of the philosopher or nonphilosopher. If so, what could this be and how would it impact on the philosopher's or nonphilosopher's life?

In order to deal adequately with these key questions, we need to discuss and apply our third and fourth suggested guidelines. Based on our third suggested guideline, the philosopher, more so than the non philosopher, needs to look for and allow, observe, and learn from the implementation of new ways of thinking and different ways of doing philosophy "like different therapies"<sup>20</sup> that are specifically

17 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 151.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 151.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 151.

20 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Section 133, p. 51e.



suitable for particular philosophical problems. Implicit here is an important and timely cross-cultural, multicultural, interdisciplinary, multiphilosophical, and multicognitive mandate. Namely, new ways of thinking, new ways of reasoning, new ways of viewing the world, new ways of living, new ways of learning, and new ways of doing philosophy can and should be discovered, recognized, supplemented, implemented, and shared within a more inclusive world of philosophical discourse can emerge and become a reality by the dawn of the next millenium, it would cut across different people, different cultures, different disciplines, different logics, and different worldviews. Viewed in such a constructive and mutually beneficial manner, all of these different groups, modalities, and frameworks are intended to provide philosophers and non philosophers with different approaches and different examples for the illustration of philosophical problems and with alternative ways of understanding and resolving or dissolving philosophical problems, analogous to the diagnosis and treatment of particular medical diseases or illnesses. Concerning the recognition of alternative methods and varied examples indicative of the therapeutic or healing approach to philosophy needed for the (non) philosopher's struggle for liberation, Wittgenstein compares the treatment of a philosophical problem or question to the treatment of an illness as follows :

A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet : one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example.<sup>21</sup>

The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.<sup>22</sup>

There is *not* a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.<sup>23</sup>

What is emerging from these interesting and insightful remarks is the aspect of our Wittgensteinian view of liberation that applies more to the philosopher and less to the nonphilosophers. Namely, it is the therapeutic strategy of our Wittgensteinian view of liberation that just as there are different therapies for the treatment of medical illnesses, so there are different philosophical methods or ways of doing philosophy applicable to the treatment of philosophical problems. With this added aspect of our Wittgensteinian view of liberation, we can begin to see that indeed something important or a fundamental change has taken place or can take place in the philosopher's mind, with a significant impact on his life. As to what it is I would venture to say preliminarily that it seems to be some

21 *Ibid.*, Section 593, p. 155e.

22 *Ibid.*, Section 255, p. 91e.

23 *Ibid.*, Section 113, p. 51e.



kind of transforming experience that is instrumental in the philosopher's struggle for his liberation from the limits of language and from his preoccupation with some important philosophical problems as if they are treatable by only one philosophical method.

The impact of such a personal transforming experience on the philosopher and his life is twofold. The first impact is that the philosopher is able to free himself from his linguistic entanglement in the highly specialized and technical language of doing philosophy. He can do so by curtailing and setting aside his doing philosophy viewed as an unwanted and counterproductive activity for the philosopher's struggle for liberation. The philosopher's curtailment of doing philosophy is more preferable to any continuation of it, since his continuous involvement in doing philosophy can only entangle him in more conceptual and linguistic knots brought about by seemingly and initially untreatable but subsequently treatable philosophical problems and by the apparently unsurpassable but transcendable limits of meaningful discourse.

The second impact is that the philosopher is able to have peace of mind and live a peaceful and happy life. This preferable outcome presupposes that the philosopher was psychologically affected and personally tormented by some "deep disquietudes"<sup>24</sup> that are related to but are separate from some unsolvable, deep philosophical problems. What is significant about this second impact is that the roots of the philosopher's deep disquietudes associated with some equally deep corresponding philosophical problems and questions do lie deep within the philosopher's mind as well as in the misleading forms of our language due to the problem associated with surface grammar.

That these two impacts are noticeable in the philosopher and his life upon his forthcoming moment of liberation is recognized and articulated by Wittgenstein as follows :

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. — The one that given philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question.<sup>25</sup>

The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as great as the importance of our language.<sup>26</sup>

Although the first and second sets of Wittgenstein's quoted remarks are more applicable to the philosopher's quest for liberation

24 *Ibid.*, Section 111, p. 47e.

25 *Ibid.*, Section 133, p. 51e.

26 *Ibid.*, Section 111, p. 47e.



than to the nonphilosopher's quest for liberation, the second set of remarks seems to imply that some kind of marked change can be had by both the philosopher and nonphilosopher, without being restricted to the realm of philosophy. If so, what is this marked change? How can it be had? How does it impact on the philosopher and nonphilosophers? In order to deal with these central questions in a coherent manner, we need to discuss and apply our fourth and last suggested guideline.

According to our fourth suggested guideline, the philosopher's and non philosopher's quest for liberation is contingent on cultivating and living a marked change in their way of viewing the world. The marked change can be seen when they view the world in a holistic, dynamic, and interrelated manner, instead of viewing the world from a solipsistic, dualistic, and divisive perspective. In order to cultivate and live such a marked change in viewing the world, the philosopher and nonphilosopher are obligated to express in their everyday lives and experiences of the world what can be called "the ethics of truth-telling and commitment" implicit in their achieved or achievable self-mastery.

Briefly stated, the ethics of truth-telling and commitment implicit in self-mastery requires that a person with genuine self-mastery can and must speak the truth about who he is and what he does only when he has actually and regularly acted out and lived the truth about who he is and what he does. This requirement represents the ethical aspect that is characteristic of the philosopher's and nonphilosopher's quest for liberation. By virtue of the ethics of truth-telling and commitment, we can see and understand that the philosopher's and nonphilosopher's quest for liberation is not simply the overcoming of the unyielding but transcendable limits of language. It is also and perhaps, even more so, the consistent fulfillment of complementary extralinguistic tasks by the philosopher and nonphilosopher in order to show that their liberation is a genuine expression of their achieved or achievable self-mastery.

One of these tasks is to interrelate and unify their dynamic and holistic way of viewing the world with their personal experiences of the events, phenomena, and other realities observable in the world. The other task is to become more aware of and to make demonstrable the presence and force of "the mystical" in the world.

A successful performance of the first task by the philosopher and nonphilosopher does not mean that their quest for liberation is an attempt to escape from the world. Rather it means that their quest for liberation is an attempt to integrate and harmonize their



experiences and perceptions of the world with what cannot be said but can only show itself. This is because what cannot be said, the mystical or the unsayable, lies outside of the limits of language.

A successful performance of the second task by the philosopher and nonphilosopher can make their quest for liberation not only a struggle to be delivered from the limits of language. It is also an ongoing effort to discover how the mystical can help them overcome the limits of language.

In order for the philosopher and nonphilosopher to overcome the limits of language, they have to be sensitive to and tolerant of the presence and force of the mystical which can be understood in three senses. In the first sense, the mystical can be understood as the fact that the world simply exists.<sup>27</sup> In the second sense, the mystical can be understood as the viewing and feeling of the world as a "limited whole."<sup>28</sup> And in the third sense, the mystical can be understood as those "things that cannot be put into words" but "they make themselves manifest" in the world.<sup>29</sup>

In their quest for liberation, the philosopher and nonphilosopher can overcome the limits of language in one or more of these three in which the presence and force of the mystical can be made manifest. In the first sense of the mystical, the philosopher and nonphilosopher can overcome the limits of language by realizing that the actual existence of the world points to the mystical which transcends the use and limits of language. In the second sense of the mystical, they can overcome the limits of language when they view with their heightened clarity of vision and when they feel, without any recourse to the power of language, the world as a limited whole which makes manifest the presence and force of the mystical. And in the third sense of the mystical, they can overcome the limits of language by realizing that the mystical is expressible through objects, realities, or experiences whose content or quality is unsayable but showable, without being forced to go against the limits of language. Unsayable but showable realities can include the logical form of propositions, the transcendence of God, the solipsism of the ego subject, the experiential content of mystical experience, the point-instant or moment of enlightenment in Zen Buddhism, the felt quality of a tooth ache, and so on.

27 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.44, p. 149.

28 *Ibid*, 6.45, p. 149.

29 *Ibid*, 6.522, p. 151.



Based on our preceding discussion and illustrations, I wish to draw four conclusions. First, as I have tried to show in a modest effort, I believe that our Wittgensteinian view of human liberation is not only applicable to philosophers who are preoccupied with certain pictures of the world, but it is also applicable and can be extended to nonphilosophers or ordinary people who are trapped by certain mental pictures or conceptual representations of assumed or postulated objects due to their uncritical or unconscious acceptance of the referential theory of meaning and the name-object model.

Second, I believe that our Wittgensteinian view of human liberation, if implemented with a moderate degree of success, can be therapeutic and beneficial to philosophers and nonphilosophers in an unrestrictive, global, inclusive, interdisciplinary, cross-cultural, and multicultural manner. In this way, human liberation in the Wittgensteinian sense, can be achieved by any philosopher and nonphilosopher in any society, culture, discipline, race, or profession. This is a welcoming and timely prospect for human liberation, especially now that human liberation is needed by people all over the world as they are preparing to begin the new millenium in the year 2,000, which, for the sake of peace and freedom, can be viewed as the millenium for the quest for human liberation.

Third, I believe that our Wittgensteinian view of human liberation can help philosophers and nonphilosophers achieve and live not only a life of clarity of vision and understanding of how human beings can be trapped by grammatical confusion and linguistic entanglement due to the preoccupation with the surface grammar of our everyday uses of language, but also a life of understanding of and sensitivity to the human situation or condition described by existentialist philosophers (such as Kierkegaard, Sartre, Camus, and others) as a life of struggling, despairing, and tormented individuals.

And fourth, I believe that our Wittgensteinian view of human liberation can also help philosophers and nonphilosophers narrow the gap or dualism between our experiences and perceptions of the situations, events, phenomena, challenges, threats, disasters, and other realities that we confront in everyday life on the one hand and their concrete existence in the world on the other hand. By doing so, the philosopher's and nonphilosopher's struggle for liberation from the limits of language can be aided by the emergence and manifestation of the mystical in the world, given that the mystical can manifest its presence and force in at least three different but related ways.



## 2

## *Epoche of Edmund Husserl and in Maya in Samkara's Vedanta— A Comparative Note*

*Sanchita Bora*

### **Edmund Husserl's Epoche :**

That subject is unobjective can only be ascertained by knowing it from within—and this is the core of Husserl's phenomenology: Husserl's basic problem was to unite the plurality of our possible perspectives on reality with his belief in the essential unity of reality. Though at natural empirical level the object seems to be independent and prior to the subject and it is believed firmly to be so, but it is the subject which is the prius of all experience. The key doctrine is the radical change in standpoint and it is brought about by withdrawing ourselves from the naturalistic belief or by the phenomenological reduction. This reduction changes the very character of I and also of its correlates, the world and this is the technique called bracketing or epoche. It is the phenomenological 'switching off' of the metaphysical implication of the natural world view. Husserl says about the consequence of reduction— "I am no longer a human Ego in existentially posited world, but exclusively a subject for which this world has being". Apperceived in the natural manner, the self is the psychological ego, but when grasped in the attitude of reduction. The self appears to be the transcendental one.

By means of epoche' or phenomenological reduction Husserl goes from facts to essences and finally discovers absolute subjectivity as the original basis of all being and experience. Phenomenology for Husserl is the science of self—evident. The self evident alone is presuppositionless. And the search for it lead Husserl to his transcendental idealism. It is not the case that phenomenology rejects the natural empirical attitude as wrong. The world as the correlate of the natural empirical attitude is merely bracketed.



**Samkara's Maya :**

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in "Eastern Religions and Western Thought" writes—"Maya is a term employed to indicate the tendency to identify ourselves with our apparent selves and become excited from our spiritual consciousness with its maximum of clarity and certainty".

Samkara accepts the idea of Maya for the explanation of the empirical world. Brahman is the only reality. The jiva (individual self) and the world are not the real transformation (parinama) of Brahman. They are the appearance (vivarta) of Brahman.

As the rope appears to be the snake in rope—snake illusion, so also Brahman appears to be the world. Due to avidya (ignorance) we project the unreal world on the real Brahman. Brahman is the ground (adhisthana) of the world and it is our ignorance that makes him appear as something namely the world. Maya has two functions—concealment (avarana) of reality and distortion (viksepa) of it into something else. Maya conceals real Brahman and makes it appear to be the world.

The world is experienced by us all, and this world experience lasts until the intuition of Brahman is attained. When the individual realises its identity with Brahman, the world appearance melts away. Husserl and Samkara

In Husserl's phenomenology epoche discloses the transcendental ego, not the psychological ego. Epoche' does not mean an outright denial of the existential reality of the objects posited in the natural attitude. The epoche' relativities the world and co-relatively gives us a true understanding of consciousness. As natural human beings we live and grow in the natural world. So long as we are in the natural standpoint, the natural world is the central object of our concern. The world is presented to us in adequate evidence in perception. Thus there is no room for either doubt or denial of the world as a whole.

In Samkara, world as such, world in relation to itself is real, we have to overcome it to attain pure subjectivity—Brahman. "So long as we are in the world of Maya and occupy a dualistic standpoint, the world is there, standing over against us, determining our perceptions and conduct". (Eastern Religions and Western Thought—Dr. S. Radhakrishnan p. 87). The world appearance is false mithya in the sense that it is unreal in comparison with Brahman. The world of our experience is the empirical reality, not transcendental. It is real for practical purposes (vyavaharika sattva).



Husserl seeks to establish the science of consciousness. *Epoche* opens a way to a unique reign of being pure or transcendental consciousness. For Husserl consciousness is not a subjective phenomenon only. Rather consciousness is a phenomenon which embraces subjectivity and objectivity. The structure of consciousness is both static and dynamic. Its dynamic character is intention. We cannot distinguish the subjective component of the structure of consciousness (*Ego cogito*) from the objective component (*cogitatum*).

For Samkara Brahman is the nature of existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ananda*). Multiplicity disappears on the realization of Brahman. Pure consciousness is the nature of self. It is the centre of mind, senses and world of external objects. The meaning of the objects depends on their relation with this centre. The subject is the witness of the universe.

In Husserl's thought the object as meant rather than the object as real constituted the subject matter of phenomenological investigation. The whole universe is constituted by our intentions or acts of objectification. There is a content to every act of our consciousness; But whatever be the form of objectivating consciousness or the content intended, consciousness is exhausted neither by the forms nor by the content.

In Advaita Vedanta of Samkara the world is a projection (*adhya*, *yasa*). From the empirical standpoint Brahman the only transcendental reality is the material cause of the world. But from the transcendental point of view there is no creations, no world. Maya is the principle of change. The world is constituted by projective activity. The greatest discovery of Vedanta of Samkara was the principle of identity of the self with Brahman.

Husserl says that only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically the meaning of Absolute Being—, it only is non-relative, relative to itself whereas the real world indeed exists in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing reality only as the intentioned meaning—product of transcendental subjectivity.

For Samkara the world is not independent and self-sufficient. It carries no explanation of itself; so, it is not transcendently real. For Brahman, Maya is a power to create the appearance. Maya as a power indistinguishable from Brahman. For the wise persons, who not deceived by the world show, they perceive in the world show nothing but Brahman. The world is neither real as Brahman nor unreal as the flower of the sky. So, its character is not determinables (*anirvacaniya*).

In Hurrerl's phenomenology we find three types of ego—



## Epoche' of Edmund Husserl and in Maya Samkara's Vedanta— 15

- (1) The world immersal ego
- (2) The transcendental ego
- (3) The epoche' performing observer.

A man is an empirical ego so far as he is a concrete psychological being. He is the transcendental ego in so far as his intuitive and intentional functions involve universal logical structure. He is also the observer in so far as he brackets the world and conceives of himself as a self-revealing function of consciousness. Husserl also accepts the community of transcendental egos.

Samkara brings out clearly the distinction between the absolute self, the divine person and the human individual. The unconditioned self is designated as 'not this', 'not this' (neti-neti). It is Brahman. When self has the limitings adjuncts of the body and organs which are characterised by avidya (ignorance), desire and work is called individual self, and when the self has the limitation of the creative power manifesting through eternal and unlimited knowledge; it is called divine person. Samkara accepts the jivanmukti or embodied liberation.

Both in Husserl and Samkara the same transcendental analysis of experience is there leading to the discovery of layers of subjectivity and their corresponding objective world which is formers projection. Transcendental subjectivity is the metaphysical object in both. In phenomenological treatment of Husserl and Samkara we find the metaphysical method which we must adopt to do justice to our tradition of metaphysics and to ourselves as human beings.

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## Psychoanalysis : A preventive Science and A Restorative Art

*Charles. P. Alexander*

Freudian Psychoanalysis has captured the attention of many serious minded people, because, despite hairsplitting debates, Freudian Psychoanalytic concepts have been the major source of wisdom and the guiding star for modern theoreticians in propounding their theories. However, I am not amazed at the paradox that on the one hand psychoanalytic working-concept of unconscious looms as the basis of their theories while on the other hand they discard psychoanalysis with a claim that it is unscientific. It will be lucid to any open minded researcher of psychotherapy that it's all only a matter of different arcane (Jargon). For example, Transactional analysis puts forward new set of jargons such as parent, adult, and child, in place of conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious. But the matter is same; may be with a little difference i.e. P. A. C. can be accommodated into Cs, Pcs, and Ucs but not vice verse. Whatever one experiences as a child; be it instructions from parents and elders; be it rebuke or appreciation, they are all, after having cognitively assessed, being registered in the brain, along with the then feelings. This cognitive assessment pattern (the unconscious cognitive language pattern) that one learns and adapts as a child lingers on, even after one becomes an adult. When the child is instructed by his parents that 'you ought to keep up promises', s/he first of all enquires for the reason as to 'why s/he ought to keep/up promises'. The next step that the parents take in responding to this curious question makes him or her assess the statement that the parent made, positively or negatively. Over the years this idea gets established in the child's response system. As an adult s/he may keep up the promises, not because s/he acts from the 'adult ego state', but it is just the reflection of the response pattern that s/he had learned and adopted as a child, of which s/he is at the moment up-conscious.



What psychotherapists need is workable procedures and not jargons. The trouble with therapies infested with jargon is that the therapists practicing such therapies will have the practicing to fix deep rooted psycho-social experiences of the patient in the therapeutic frame. This kind of therapy becomes so much mechanical and monotonous. In the process of evaluating psycho-social experiences of the patient, against their jargon, they miss valuable and profound socio-cultural moorings associated with individual human existence. Hence, the paradigm of an effective psychotherapy is the process and procedures that is being used in treatment, but not endeavours at fixing psychological experiences to the jargonised system. Psychoanalysis is the paragon of scientific psychotherapy, not only in developing theories but also in treatment set-up. It is indubitably true that Freud offered the world community a scientific law i.e. *The Law of dynamic-unconscious*. He arrived at this law by collecting data, by talling it with other data and by intuitively connecting them; in other words by the systematic study of human psyche.

To move on a step further, I think it is right time for us to withdraw from the negligible and insignificant issue concerning the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Any therapy, may it be medical or psychological, is an art and a science. It is an art because the therapists prime concern while treating a patient, in either of the systems, is to enhance the patient's immune system. To restore Homeostasis and to mobilise the psychic-energy to an optimum level is the primary responsibility of the therapist. This end can be obtained only by the means of intricate understanding of the whole person. The therapist has to be, in this regard, compassionate, discerning, empathetic, imaginative, and insightful. Each therapeutic intervention might either ameliorate or worsen the condition of the patient. If so, there is no harm in claiming that any therapy, may it be medical or psychological, is an art of restoration (if not cure). In the practice of this art the therapist, like an artist, becomes as it were one with the patient; the empathetic and compassionate therapist as it were stands on the shoes of the patient.

However, while an insightful therapist systematically manoeuvres with his therapeutic procedures for the restoration. S/he would also look for strange but generalisable symptoms in the patients to incorporate into the preventive therapeutic system. In doing so s/he stands detached from the patient and regulates his observation unemotionally and objectively. This objectivity of the therapist distinguishes one as a scientific researcher. This intuitive, insightful and objective understanding of the subject matter of his observation



may open up new frontiers by providing him with unique data which permits him to adopt a new procedure and a methodology for research. But, that does not make him unscientific, rather it only indicates prevalence of yet another unique science with its procedures and methodology. This is true of psycho-analysis too. Psychoanalysis is an art of restoration as well as a science of prevention. It helps the patient gain insight into causative factor responsible for his/her troubles, while it reminds humanity about the possibility of such similar repressed packages that we have within us. Thus, it works as a restorative therapy and a preventive therapy. This does not mean that psychoanalysis is a closed system, but it certainly means that psychoanalysis is not a dead science. It is an openended science which is capable of providing psychotherapists and social scientists with significant data about the nature of *human being and the predicaments of being human*, provided they are not oblivious of psychoanalytic methodology and procedures.

However, my defence of psychoanalysis should not be misunderstood as a sanction of psychoanalysis as a panacea for all psychosomatic disorders; nor do my critique of transactional analysis aims at refutation of TA, but only in pointing out the common fundamental features that it shares with psychoanalysis. The efficacy of other psychotherapeutic systems like neurolinguistic programming (NLP), Logotherapy, Transpersonal psychology, Psycho-synthesis etc. cannot be over looked. What I intended to state is that as a scientific psychotherapy psychoanalysis is a systematic analysis of the unconscious language pattern. This is obvious from Freud's writings, specially about *slips*. Transactional analysis is, no doubt, an effective communication technique, let alone counselling technique. Crux of the matter is that all psychotherapeutic systems have the same source of origin. One cannot ignorantly brush aside, the pioneering works of the creative predecessor Friedrich Anton Mesmer on animal magnetism and the offshoot hypnosis schools—Nancy and Salpetriere. They are the foundation on which all therapeutic dynasties exist in indebtedment.



## Problems of Professional Ethics in the Present-day Society

*Girish Baruah*

Before going to discuss professional ethics, we wish to first define what ethics is. Ethics is generally defined as the science of good conduct or ideal science of human behaviour. We study here human conduct with reference to highest good or summum bonum, which is regarded as the ultimate standard of all moral judgements.

It is to be remembered that all moral actions are not good actions. By moral action we mean voluntary action i.e. action done with one's independent will. What is done with our own will is the moral or voluntary action and only a moral action can be good, not a non-moral action.

With this point of view we shall now discuss professional ethics. A professional ethics is one which is concerned with a particular profession. Every profession has special codes and conducts, and a person choosing any such profession has to observe them.

We shall now discuss professional ethics in the context of the present-day society. Specially we shall confine our discussion to its problems and solution there-to, that too only in a general line.

Ethics or morality, as we use the term in common parlance, is at present, the most hated word. We generally follow a religion; but we are reluctant to follow or adhere to the moral principles involved in it. No religion teaches vice. But we often indulge ourselves in sinful activities, even though we follow a religion most fanatically. It is a contradiction in our practical life and what we mostly overlook or ignore is this contradiction.

Religion is regarded as practical morality. If we want to be religious, we must practise the moral principles involved in a particular religion. But do we generally do so? — let us ask ourselves. It is



meaningless to engage oneself in religious practices overlooking or ignoring the moral rules involved in them:

In our society there are different professions like those of politicians, teachers, traders, agriculturists, industrialists, engineers, doctors, civil servants, military men etc. These professions, over and above having institutional rules, have also ethical rules. All of us follow institutional rules, for if we do not follow them, there is the risk of dismissal from service. The independent traders may, however, not have such risks, but if they do not follow them, they may incur loss in their business.

The problem arises specially as to the moral codes and conducts. At most times, although we break the moral rules, we are not liable to professional punishment nor to legal action. While a professional or legal rule is external, the moral rule is an internal one. The moral rules are primarily concerned with virtue, which is the sum-total of all our merits, i.e., the good qualities to be possessed by a man in respect of both being a man with human qualities and being a professional person. The problems of professional ethics generally arise in the present-day society as we mostly ignore the moral rules involved in being a social being and in being a professional man.

We are bound to choose any of the professions mentioned above so that we may live or exist at least. To live at least, we may choose the professions of a dacoit or a thief. We may engage ourselves in professional robbery, burglary, pick-pocketing. These professions are deemed to be illegal, and there is the police force to control them. Even these professions have some rules imposed by the gang-leaders or so. These are not only illegal but also immoral. If one follows sincerely the religious or moral rules, one does not choose such professions.

What I feel is that to be good is a natural quality of man, i.e., such a quality is inborn. By it I do not mean that a man born of good parents may be good. What I mean is that when a man takes the first conception as a foetus in his mother's womb, his future is determined, i.e., what his physical and mental qualities will be, what his biological and intellectual aptitudes will be etc. This will also determine his moral set-up, whether he will be a good or bad man. The environmentalists may, however, not support me in this regard; but it is to be remembered that I am not following wholly the hereditary line.

If I hold so then it may follow that no education, no moral teaching, no religious sermon can mould a person's moral well being. That education cannot produce what is previously not in a



person. This view is held by Satkaryavada, a causal theory advocated by the Samkhya and Vadanta systems of Indian philosophy. Education cannot build a house out of nothing. It can simply bring out or develop what is already there. It can make the implicit explicit. So a tendency to be a good person must be already there in a person, and that tendency may be developed through moral or religious teaching. Ethics and religion are simply external means which can channelise what is already there in a person as a moral tendency. So these are simply supplementary means which may enable a person to give outlet to his potential tendencies through practical activities he undertakes to perform with a view to spending his livelihood.

According to Marxism that a man does bad things, for that he himself is not responsible; the social system, under which he exists, is responsible. All our actions are determined by external causes; so we cannot help what we do. Marxism does not admit that morality is an expression of some eternal moral law.

Morality is required to regulate our mutual relations and activities in society. But morality has no compulsion as legality has. Man is free either to observe or violate moral rules. Morality tells us, this you ought to do because this is good; this you ought not to do because this is not good. It is upto us whether we do the good or the bad.

In this context we are to discuss the question: What does drive us to do an action? Generally a desire drives us: A desire may either be tinged with instinct or reason. Ethics wants that our actions should be guided by reason or conscience. We find a famous proposition in Socrates as; Virtue is knowledge. This statement speaks of what we have stated above that ethics wants that our actions should be guided by reason. In the opinion of Socrates, one who has real rational knowledge cannot do a bad action. We do bad actions because we are mostly run by instinct and emotion and not by reason.

Professional morality cannot be above general morality. One who follows general morality finds no difficulty in following one's professional morality. Man in general is acquainted with these rules of morality which are ordained by a particular religion. A religion speaks of reward and punishment depending on good and bad actions respectively. Thus a man should abstain from bad actions fearing punishment either in this life or afterlife. But he generally does not abstain from bad actions. Why? Because the antidote is prescribed in the same religion practised by him to nullify the results of bad actions. One can escape punishment or sin by



praying or worshipping God. This anti-dote has made all the moral rules ordained by a religion ineffective.

Then what is the way out? It is, however, difficult to suggest a way out. The human behaviour is a very complicated phenomenon and there is no straight road to the solution of the problems connected with this behaviour. I, however, do not admit that the present-day society has become more complicated than the erstwhile societies. The virtues and vices of the Ramayana or the Mahabharata societies are still there. Man is still after wealth and enjoyment. The degree may have increased due to the increase of population. But thereby it should not be understood that the society has become more vicious than that of the by-gone days.

Man has lived as *homo sapiens* at least for five thousand years as a moral being. We have religions lasting for a period ranging from five thousand years to two thousand years. They are still preaching us moral lessons. But still we are vicious. Why? Because we learn these lessons quite mechanically and, literally, without going into the spirit or inner meaning of them. So religions have become ineffective in making us good. Some people, therefore, suggest for establishing compulsive societies to impose laws on man, the slight break of which may lead to harsh punishment. But such a compulsive society may not last long, for man's desire for freedom does not allow it to survive.

We think that vices will not altogether vanish from the earth. So long as man survives all his tendencies—virtuous and vicious—will also survive. But with our social efforts we may diminish immoral actions. We think that socialism, in its true form, may bring us a congenial atmosphere, when man can live in peace and tranquillity. I, however, do not say that vices will altogether vanish in such a society. But I am sure that it will be at least able to do away with the capitalistic vices. We may have a Ramrajya, but still vices will remain as they remained in the erstwhile Ramrajya. I am not, however, a fortune-teller to predict when exactly socialism will come; but if everybody of us tries to evolve such a society and work for that end we can at least hope for a better society than the present one, although to think of the best of all societies will be quite wishful.



## *The Ethics of Violence : A Christian Perspective*

*C. O. Uchegbue*

### A. INTRODUCTION :

The reality of one form of injustice, oppression, exploitation and unfreedom or the other in every community today, and the world-wide realization of the utility and profitability of constructive change to every society, are two major indisputable social facts of our generation. As a result of this social reality and realization, the dominated and oppressed peoples today, whether nations or classes within a nation, are agitating for a revolutionary change in their subjugated or dominated position which they see as being contrary to basic human rights. This revolutionary trend in contemporary times is seen in family life; industrial relations, class conflicts; gender, racial and ethnic conflicts; and the world-wide struggle between the rich and poor. The demand for change is so much tied-up with the idea of violence today that when we hear (as we often do) of 'revolutionary theology', 'revolutionary Christianity', 'revolutionary students', movements, 'revolutionary freedom movements', 'revolutionary women liberation movements', etc., we quickly understand that they are more or less talking of violent actions. The tendency to solve the social problems of oppression and other forms of social injustice by violent means is therefore getting more and more wide spread in our generation.

Secular opinions like Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and others advocate the doctrine of revolutionary violence with the conviction that "violence generates liberation".<sup>1</sup> Franz Fanon, for example, is quoted to have argued in support of this position that :

It is through violence that man comes to stand on his own feet to realize his own dignity, and it is through a shared act of

<sup>1</sup> Stan Windas, "Peace and Revolution", *The MONTH* Vol. CCXXXI, No. 1242 (Feb., 1971), p. 41.



violence with his fellow men that he realises a new kind of human community.<sup>2</sup>

Also in his famous book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon maintains that: "You do not turn any society, however primitive it may be, upside-down... if you are not decided from the very beginning... to overcome all the obstacles that you will come across in so doing". This according to him, will entail being "ready for violence at all times".<sup>3</sup>

It is significant to consider that, apart from these secular opinions, many of the revolutionary movements within Christianity itself uphold violence as the authentic, indispensable and inevitable means of bringing justice to a situation of structural injustice. A good example of this is Liberation Theology some versions of which uphold the use of violence, as the last resort, to counter official violence.

The question we need to ask at this juncture is : Is violent action a necessary, indispensable, inevitable and authentic means of achieving the desired liberation or revolutionary change ? Obviously, the question of the Christian position on the issue of violent action in situations of inevitable structural change has been an issue for long and protracted debate. Although the subject of violence can be approached from different view points, this paper discusses it as an ethical problem. Ethics deals with the question of what is right or wrong in human behaviour, or with how one should behave in a given situation. In this case, should violent actions be embarked upon in a situation needing a change ? This paper seeks to answer this question in respect to Christian ethics. Christian ethics is concerned with the rightness or wrongness of human actions or behaviour on the basis of the moral teachings of Christianity. We will also proceed to discuss the alternative of non-violent action as being both more pertinent to Christian ethics and a more effective way of social change.

#### B. THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE :

That there is quantitative increase of violence in society today cannot be denied. The social and moral problems posed by this increasing phenomenon of violence vividly come to mind when we consider some recent and strange aspects of it as reported often in our news media. For instance, such unpleasant phenomena as hijacking of aeroplanes, kidnapping, raping, terrorism, armed robbery, assassinations, exploitation and repression are unimaginable aspects of vio-

2 Ibid, p 41.

3 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1967, pp 28 29.



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lence prevalent in contemporary times which we all would generally condemn, whatever our positions or schools of thought may be. Considering, as Charles West points out, the fact that the innocent and uninvolved are usually victims of such ugly experiences, and that any of us may be the next victim of these happenings, we usually develop an understandable feeling of indignation, revulsion and a desire for effective counter-measure. However, when human feelings are allowed (as often done) to control and impur human reason, the understanding and sense of judgements of the real issue at stake are dulled. The result is usual the adoption of common measures or solutions which, rather than reducing or effectively eliminating violence, often tend to actually increase the quantity of violence in society.<sup>4</sup> In this respect, we see that the option of violence in social transformation seems to gain wider support in our times than the practice of non-violence. In ethics, however, actions are judged to be morally right on the basis of how much they enhance man's ultimate happiness, self-fulfilment and general well being. The corollary to this is that actions which are debilitating to man's progress, happiness self-fulfilment and general well being are judged to be morally wrong.<sup>5</sup> In keeping with this, we need to examine the ethics of violence on the basis of how it affects human life.

The term 'violence' and the variety of issues connected with it are so complex and ambiguous that a discussion of this nature would need some clarifications which will enable us to fully realize its dangers. Many advocates of violence will never dare to be involved in violence when the word is properly understood. Moreover, many others that condemn violence will discover that they are perpetrators of the very violence they deny and denounce. Charles C. West has rightly observed, along this line, that ;

We live in a world where the greatest violence may be done by those who most condemn the word, and contrariwise, where the rhetoric of violence may cover the softest hearing and the most ineffectual actions...<sup>6</sup>

Before proceeding in the discussion, therefore, we need to clarify the true meaning, nature and implications of the word 'violence'. This will help to remove the air of ambiguity that sorrounds its use and reveal the seriousness of the phenomenon.

<sup>4</sup> Charles C. West, *Ethics; Violence and Revolution* (New York: The Council on Religion and International Affairs, 2969), p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph I. Omoregbe, *Ethics: A Spstematic and Historical Study*, Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publications Limited, 1932), p. IX.

<sup>6</sup> Charles G. West, *op. cit.*, p. 8.



## I. WHAT IS VIOLENCE ?

The different definitions of violence use the term in a derogatory sense as something evil and they make emphasis on the difference between force and violence. Alistair Kee, for example, defines violence as 'excessive, unrestrained or unjustifiable force'.<sup>7</sup> He maintains that although there could be no violence without power or force, the difference lies in the fact that while power and force, are neutral things that can be used for good or evil, violence can never be neutral, but is by definition an evil thing. Adam Curle goes further to define violence as 'action which damages or jeopardizes the possibility of human growth, development or fulfilment, whether physical, psychic, material or cultural'.<sup>8</sup> According to him, the word etymologically implies violation, rape, the unlawful use of force. In agreement with Adam Curle's definition is the definition of violence in editorial to the same issue of *the Month* as "The violation of the human person" which, apart from physical torture, includes economic oppression.<sup>9</sup> While Monik Hellwig sees violence in line with Kee as 'the force that operates outside the accepted patterns of normalcy'<sup>10</sup>, Charles C. West defines it as 'harm done to another outside the rules of conflict which such a society sets up'.<sup>11</sup> In the view of the revolutionary, however, 'whatever delays the liberation... whether or not it has been institutionalized by society'<sup>12</sup> is also violence.

From these complementary definitions, we can identify, along with Adam Curle, three dimensions of violence :<sup>13</sup>

(i) **Pathological violence** : By this is meant all kinds of senseless killings and unlawful private brutalities like armed robbers do in order to rob people. That every one condemns such act of violence is self-evident.

(ii) **Institutionalised violence** : This is also known as structural violence. This form of violence refers to violence perpetuated by or with the assent or backing of the State. This type of violence occurs when the State uses its force and power in violently oppress-

7 Alistair Kee (ed.), *A Reader in Political Theology*, (London : S.C.M. Press Limited, 1974), p. 134.

8 Adam Curle, "Varieties of Violence", *The MONTH*, Vol. CCXXVI, No. 1295 (September, 1975), p. 229.

9 Editorial, "The Dimensions of Conflict", *The MONTH*, Vol. CCXXXVI, No. 1295 (September, 1975), p. 227.

10 Quoted in Charles C. West, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

13 Adam Curle, *op. cit.*, p. 229f.



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ing, exploiting and repressing the weak masses rather than using them for self-defence, punishment of wrong doers and protection of the law-abiding. This type of violence is obviously condemned by all lovers of humanity. Examples of institutionalized violence include the brutal and repressive measures of former apartheid South African against the South African blacks and the Communist governments' hostilities against religion in former Soviet Union and other places.

(iii) Ideological Violence : This may also be referred to as revolutionary violence. Most defenders of violence refer to it as counter violence which is necessary to counter the institutionalized violence of the status quo in order to bring a change. This form of violence will include violent actions like bloody protests or rampages, coup d'etat, guerilla warfare, etc. The Russian, French and Cuban Revolutions are examples of this form of violence. While it is quite easy to see and accept that pathological and institutionalized violence are unethical and condemnable, very many people seem to see nothing wrong with the revolutionary violence of the oppressed because of their claim to its functional necessity for social transformation. Pointing to the impossibility of change in the world by a natural course, defenders of revolutionary violence maintain that the inescapable imperative for revolutionary change necessitates violence. Fanon argues in this regards, that:

Colonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat, ... colonialism is not a thinking machine; nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.<sup>14</sup>

Along with Fanon, defenders and exponents of this position argue that;

...armed revolt is the only means which appears appropriate in areas of such un-redeemed servitude. The oppressors' control is too absolute for other solutions to succeed...<sup>15</sup>

In spite of the plausibility of the above argument, counter arguments from practical, moral and christian considerations tend to invalidate the foregoing conclusions. Whatever the cause may be, violence, viewed from a moral perspective, especially from a christian moral point of view, is never justifiable. While the theological and moral claims to the need for christian participation in social transformation cannot be refuted, the use of violent methods is to be vehemently rejected because of its discrepancy with Christian moral teachings and its destructive and debilitating social implications.

<sup>14</sup> Fanon, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>15</sup> Editorial, *op. cit.*, p. 227.



## 2. VIOLENCE VERSUS CHRISTIAN MORAL VALUES :

From a christian perspective, we can establish the moral wrongness of violence from a good number of premises:

(a) Theologically, violence is incompatible with christian values, principles and practices. Firstly, it is incompatible with the christian values of love, faith, patience, forgiveness, gentleness, long suffering, temperance, etc. Violence contradicts the basic christian concept of love, forgiveness and non-retaliation of the sermon on the Mountain (Matt. 5: 38-46).

To advocate violence inevitably is to advocate hatred. Moreover, violence promotes fear and eliminates faith in God. It exhibits the fear and anxiety either in the oppressed of being crushed by evil structures of injustice or in the oppressors of being overthrown by the agitated masses of the oppressed. Reuben Alves clearly points out that "the fear of the future gives birth to violence", for while the violence of the appressed arises out of fear of being crushed by the oppressors, "those who so possess the present as to fear change use their power to make sure that no tomorrow comes to threaten today".<sup>16</sup> The use of violence also shows that we lack confidence in God to direct the social order towards bringing the cohesion, conservation, restoration, reconciliation or transformation needed in society at any given time. Secondly, violence is practically opposed, not only to the teaching of Jesus Christ but also to the life of Jesus Christ. Since Jesus Christ is our perfect example and standard of morality as Christians, then any lifestyle or doctrine which is in contradiction to His, is non-Christian. That is not to say, however, that Jesus Christ was a pacifist, but to emphasize that Christ's attitude to the social and political conditions of His time was different from the attitude and approach of the contemporary activists—the Zealots. Christ's repudiation of the violent model both challenges and condemns any Christian who wishes to take up arms in the name of the Gospel, no matter what provocation. On this note, it is pertinent at this point to clarify that the claim that Jesus was a "revolutionary" can be accepted only in the true sense of the term since He stood for standards and values antithetic to those conventionally accepted in the society of His day. Jesus was, however, not a 'revolutionist' in that while He criticized the unjust power structure of his contemporary times, He did not take arms or join with the 'guerilla groups' of the Zealots. His caution to Peter against his violent action of smitting off the ear of the high priest's servant at Gethsemane is a very illustrative and validating proof: "Put up again thy

<sup>16</sup> Reuben Alves, quoted in Alistar Kee, *op. cit.*, p. 138.



sword into its place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword' (Matthew 26:52). Therefore, while it is the duty of every Christian to work to eliminate unjust and oppressive conditions, it must be acknowledged, as Ernesto Cardenal does, that "in doing so holiness (should) flourish in time".<sup>17</sup>

(b) Sociologically, violence is dysfunctional and disruptive. Violence brings a situation of social chaos which impedes progress, peace and the common good and happiness of members of the society. Although advocates of violence justify their action by pointing to the common good of the masses as their cause, it is incontrovertible that these masses are always the losers in and victims of violence. Moreover, we discover in recent times that delinquency and hooliganism often result from violent demonstrations, and in most cases the target of such demonstrations—the ruling class—never share in such misfortunes that result. Also the change desired never comes as the protest is easily suppressed by the repressive machine guns and armoured cars. Thus we discover that the interest of the poor and oppressed masses which violent revolutionists claim to protect always turns out to be jeopardized during any violent action. Verkuyl insists that :

Chaos is the worst enemy the poor and oppressed could wish for (and) violent revolutions have seldom brought about a genuinely better condition for the poor people, and in fact are for the most part a demonic impulse.<sup>18</sup>

It is not surprising, therefore, that the ideology of violence rather offends than appeals to people after an unpleasant experience of a bloody revolutions and its attendant problems of impoverishment and desolation.

(c) Logically, the social implications of violence reveal the self-contradictory and self-defeating content of the arguments of the defenders of violent revolution. Both the violence of the leftists and that of the rightists are usually justified on the basis of each being a means of eliminating the violence of the other. But in the actual sense they only increase the quantity of violence. Helder Camara has drawn our attention to what he describes as the 'Spiral of Violence'. The first violence, according to him, is the deprivation suffered by the masses who are robbed of their property and rights by a privileged elite. This produces the second violence, which is the violence of rebellion; and this in turn generates the third violence—the

17 Editorial, *op cit.*, p. 228 (Parenthesis mine).

18 Johannes Verkuyl and H.G.S. Nordholt, *Responsible Revolution* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), p. 34.



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violence of repression.<sup>19</sup> The point is that violence breeds and begets violence. Therefore, if violence is bad and needs to be eliminated, then it is wrong to use violence to eliminate violence because such a solution will only increase the quantity of violence in the society. In justification of this argument, it is commonly said that 'Two wrongs cannot make a right'.

Hannah Arendt, in *On Revolution*, carries this position further in her observation that;

Most violent revolutions have been morally indefensible. Bloody revolutions are usually mad adventures that lead to anarchy and sadistic aggressiveness. They exchange one group of scoundrels for another group of scoundrela. Instead of introducing a new era of justice, they give birth to anarchy... men can be so intoxicated by the passion of revolution that they destroy what chances there are of real social achievements.<sup>20</sup>

From these and other possible considerations we can establish that violence is morally bad and should be shunned and condemned by every well-meaning Christian.

It is important, however, to emphasise that, contrary to the common impression our position may seem to give, the condemnation of violence is not necessarily tantamount to supporting non-commitment to the cause of justice. Non-commitment itself would amount to encouraging institutional violence of oppression, exploitation and domination which is the primary violence that ignites the other forms. Our concern at this point is to establish, first of all, that violence is not morally right as a means of social transformation. But having addressed the issue of whether violent revolution is a morally acceptable model for social transformation or not we now shift our focus to that of examining how unjust and oppressive structures can be transformed without bloody revolutions.

### C. THE PATH OF NON-VIOLENCE RECOMMENDED :

In consonance with the Christian moral perspective and the realization of the necessity for change in most societies today, there are three primary basis for recommending the course of non-violence;

- (i) Compatibility with Christian Teachings;
- (ii) Effectuality in Achieving concrete social Transformations;
- (iii) Practicability in the Most Difficult Situations Today.

#### (1) COMPATIBILITY WITH CHRISTIAN MORAL TEACHINGS:

Non-violence is compatible with Christian morality. Non-violent commitment to the cause of justice is the only prospect for change

19 Helder Camara, Quoted in Stan Windas. *op. cit.*, p. 42.

20 Hannah Arendt, Quoted in Johannes Verkuyl and H.G.S. Nordholt, *op. cit.*, p. 34.



from a Christian ethical perspective. Non-violent revolution can follow the patterns of education and conscientization of both the oppressor and the oppressed; the revitalization of democracy, conciliatory negotiations and dialogues; opposition by word and action, for example, press releases and other forms of artistic demonstrations in attack of or to caricatures the evil systems. The prophetic indictments of and remonstrations against the current political, economic and religious policies of Judah and Samaria by Jeremiah and Amos respectively and the apostolic warnings against existing social orders, like that of James (James 5: 1-6), etc., are biblical examples of non-violent means of transforming society. In the course of church history also many have demonstrated the authentic spirit of Christ by upholding this course of non-violence. An example is Francis of Assisi who followed the path of non-violence rather than the violent methods of Innocent III during the Crusades. Those who follow the path of non-violence reflect the Christian spirit more than other Christian groups that embark on violence.

## (2) EFFECTUALITY IN ACHIEVING CONCRETE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS:

The second basis for recommending the path of non-violence is the effectuality of the method in social reforms or transformations. The major criticism against and the major reason for the rejection of the non-violence alternative by defenders of violence is the claim or fear that injustice is so institutionalized and structuralized that no soft approach can break it down. Both history and present day experiences around us tend to disprove this claim or fear. In modern times, there are Christian and non-Christian personages who have effectively or successfully championed and still champion the course of non-violence. Among such figures are Mahatma Gandhi of India, Martin Luther King of the United States of America, Don Helder Camara of Latin America, Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. These men have effected some changes in their respective societies through non violent methods. The change in the white attitude to the black in the United States, for example, owe considerably to the non violent campaigns of Luther Helder Camara. the Catholic Archbishop of Recife, also, has been able to effect small scale reformations in Brazil which prepares the people for larger and more significant changes. He achieves this change while choosing the method of non-violent resistance on the consideration that it is both the morally justified option and the most effective strategy of change.

## (3) PRACTICABILITY IN THE MOST DIFFICULT SITUATIONS OF TODAY

The above examples do not only show how effective the non-violent approach can be, but also that it has been practised by men



in social situations and contests that may even be more difficult than the ones most advocates of violence may be addressing. Thus, the third basis for recommending the path of non-violence is that it is practicable in the most callous and difficult contexts of today. The most recent dismantling of the iron curtain of communism in former Soviet Union and Eastern Germany and the structures of apartheid in South Africa all by diplomacy, dialogues and negotiations rather than violence are very convincing demonstrations of both the practicability and effectuality of the non-violent approach to structural change. All these examples prove that meaningful changes can take place even within the most callous structures of today by applying this Christian ethics of non-violence.

#### D. CONCLUSION :

From our discussion, we can conclude that non-violent approach to social revolution rather than violent methods stands as 'a moral means of reaching moral ends' which have 'the best long-term chance of success in most of our societies'.<sup>21</sup> Non-violence is compatible with the spirit and teachings of Jesus Christ. Besides, violence, more often than not, only leads to new forms of despotism and tyranny. Violence as a means of transforming society is, therefore, morally wrong and alien to Christian teaching. It should hence be condemned and rejected both by Christians and all lovers of human peace and progress. Helder Camara's position on violence and non-violence fully illustrates the Christian stand:

My personal vocation is that of a pilgrim of peace ... personally, I would prefer a thousand times to be killed than to kill.

This personal position is based on the gospel. A whole life spent trying to understand and live the gospel has produced in me the profound conviction that if the gospel can, and should, be called revolutionary it is in the sense that it demands the conversion of each of us... We Christians are on the side of non-violence, which is by no means a choice of weakness or passivity. Non-violence means believing more passionately to the force of wars, murder and hatred.<sup>22</sup>

From all these, we conclude, both from the ethical incompatibility of violence with Christian values, its gross lack of social utility in a moral community; and the logical invalidity and inconsistency of its authenticating or legitimizing arguments, that violence is morally wrong. Conversely, from its compatibility with Christian moral teachings; its effectuality in achieving its noble goal of liberation and transformation; and its practicability in the most difficult situations of our contemporary times (as seen from few examples above) we affirm that non-violence is both ethically and pragmatically a better option.

21 Johannes Verkuyl and H. Nordholt, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

22 Alistair Kee, *op. cit.* p. 391.



## Glimpses of Gandhian Techniques of Social Change

*Vivekanand Pandey*

Of course, twentieth century has witnessed at least three major revolutions— The Russian, The Chinese and The Indian. The oppressed millions have been schooled in these great revolutions and the impact of which on the world is creating ideas of revolutionary change in the world. Revolutions by violence have ended in counter-revolution and have resulted in unwanted cruelty, barbarism and suppression of people. Hence, many of the champions of the violent revolution have been disillusioned and are in search of a new way. Gandhi paved that new way of social changes.

Gandhi's life is demonstration of revolutionary struggle for peaceful social and political change. He employed the dynamics of consent, the instruments of change of heart and the weapons of educational revolution and also a wide spread scheme of constructive programmes.

Gandhi was not against state ownership but he was quite aware of the dangers of the state capitalism. Similarly he was socialist enough to advocate voluntary poverty and the vow of non-possession. All land belongs to Gopal and all wealth belongs to God were his mantra — Gandhi stood for a classless society but it must come without violence. This has led to the formulation of the Doctrine of Trusteeship as a weapon of non-violent economic change.

Gandhi struggled all through his life to change society as he found it. In fact, he reached against every injustice and exploitation wherever it be of men or machines, modernism or orthodoxy. He was in this sense the greatest activist of his age. He found the city exploiting the villages, the land owner exploiting the actual tiller of his land; Mill's owner exploiting the worker, the upper casts Hindus exploiting the lower casts, Harijans and Adivasis, the white exploiting the non-whites and so on. Gandhi wanted to change all these in



order to make all social, economical and political relationship between human beings or groups of human beings based on justice which was in his view the basic law of life. However, he did not believe change simply for the sake of change. It is change in accordance with the laws of life aiding man in future course of evolution towards a more human existence. He had no faith in the straight line theory of change, also called the Dialectical theory of change, nor had he any faith in the circular theory of change which has positive hatred for the Dialectical theory. Nor could he contribute to the idealistic or spiral theory of change. To him, change at one point of life should correspond with changes elsewhere also. Unbalanced superficial or partial change is the source of all social disequilibrium. Hence, the direction of change should neither be arbitrary nor senseless. Any change in the organisation, structure, functions and working of the society must fulfil the supreme test of its possible effect on life and the course of the higher evolution. On viewed thus, the change must be peaceful, natural and self adjusting as opposed to violent and unsettling change. The speed of change can not be at a running or over running speed, it should be an effortless change at natural pace, not a forced change at few years speed over running all sublime value of humanity for the temporary success. Here, Gandhi's theory of ends and means lays down a sound and safe rule for bringing about a natural change in natural manner.

This was precisely Gandhi's main difference with his contemporaries. Gandhi thought in the choice of methods of change. He thought that new society that he was to bring in would be qualitatively as different from all existing social order that a completely new approach was required for its establishment. He did not consider it necessary and appropriate to use hate to end all hatred, to use conflict to end all conflicts. In short, he did not decide to fight violence by new violence. In fact, he believed that a genuine and permanent social change or revolution cannot come out of the coils of violence and much less it can be identified with violence otherwise every act of murder or every bloody war however unjust they might be will be called revolution. Gandhi knew that real revolution means a fundamental change in our ideas and ideologies, ethos and values of life, and it is foolish to think that we can change anybody's ideas or values through some external force on a permanent basis. On the other hand, it generates a counter reaction. So we can say that the more of violence the less of revolution. History has seen the hazards of violent the social and political changes where only rulers change and the power never comes to the people at the working bases. Moreover violence leads to unending spiral of counter revolutions



## Glimpse of Gandhian Techniques of Social Change

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and civil war in which all human considerations of love, sympathy and fellow-feeling are forgotten. Thus, whatever we will be able to establish will be destroyed by counter violence. Thus, violent social change carries the seed of its own destruction. The worst casualty of a violent social change is that of individual freedom and democracy, because the political power is usurped by the political thugs, pindaries and other un-scrupulous power-loving politicians, who ultimately drive out the reformers and idealists and entrench themselves into the authority forever. Lastly, mass action and mass participation is not possible in a violent social change because of the grave risks of counter violence by the powers of the Modern States. Moreover, if we depend upon external violence for the vindications of our cause, then one who can yield greater violence may claim that justice lies in his side.

Gandhi insisted on purity of means in revolution and rejected violence and conspiracy, and evolved a technology of non-violence and the revolutionary weapon of SATYAGRAH. The world has yet to see the efficacy of the Gandhian technique of social and political change but this much is certain that when we have entered into a thermonuclear age we have to find out a technique of social change without violence because violence in this atomic era will lead to total annihilation and the extinction of human race. This requires a programme for awakening the spiritual and moral power of man, a dynamic peace, education and research in peace-action.



# On the Distinction Between Creative Idea And the Creativity

Subrata Roy

## I

### Introduction

A creation, of a poem or a piece of art, is dependent particularly on two factors, for example, power to create and the act of creation. The former is also famous in the name of creativity, the latter, for many, is an extension of the former. But there is another factor involved in the creative process which is no less important, perhaps more important, than the above two factors, and that we like to call as the 'creative idea'.

And, interestingly enough, historically, this creative idea is always seen as a synonym of or equivalent to creativity, which, we will see, it is not. The characters and qualities of one are quite mistakenly used as characters of the other, for example, freedom is so far said as the basic quality of creativity when it can be seen that only creative idea is really free and creativity is a slave to it. Creative idea has always a separate and independent existence, and any identification between creative idea and the creativity would be a great mistake which needs to be corrected. So to unravel the full story of this creative idea—its nature and status, its difference with creativity and also with the act of creation, its identification as a distinct step in the creative process, is the main concern of this paper.

## II

### Main Thesis

In the pursuit of creating something new and original we often produce insignificants. We can only make, through our planned efforts, whatever is already known or old, and so boring. However it also happens that suddenly we receive a signal of an extraordinary



and enlightening idea, when we are least prepared to receive that.<sup>1</sup> This happens occasionally. And there is a strong belief that this sudden idea—new and enlightening, must have some causes, may be indeterminate, for nothing comes out of nothing—*ex nihilo nihil fit*. Indeed there must be some previous thoughts and ideas of nearly the same kind; the point, however, is, the 'new idea' is in no way connected with any of the thought flowing at that very moment. The new idea emerges suddenly, out of the ocean of consciousness, and, most remarkably, with a new colour and form. A new idea is in every way a result of permutation and combination of the already possessed ideas. It's new because its standpoint is new, its angle is different; it has a wholeness-point of view for which it becomes unique and can stand alone. This new idea is the creative idea.

Further, it is nothing new to experience that one cannot create even when one possesses both creativity and is ready to undertake the act of creation. One still waits for something more—a fresh air of thought, an extra energy, a favourable situation to create; and the creative idea represents nearly all these elements. Hence the existence of the creative idea, as a distinct factor in the creative process, should be accepted. There may be another reason (for creative idea), for creativity and the act of creation themselves, cannot explain the whole of creative process, they rather, leaves a huge gap unexplained or half-explained. For example, how to answer the question, what makes one suffer mental pain while making creations. Is it that one welcome suffering for the act of creation itself, or for creativity? Surely for neither of the two. There must be some other thing, a mental state—intense and forceful that overwhelms all other less-powerful elements and drive an individual towards creation—through hours, days and months. The attractions of name, fame and ambition however, are also there, though they have a secondary role. And that intense and forceful mental state is the creative idea in man which, along with creativity and the act of creation, can only explain the creative process more consistently and clearly.

- 1 'No man when conscious attains to true or inspired intuition, but rather when the power of intellect is fettered in sleep or by disease or dementia.'—Plato, in Will Durant's *The Story of Philosophy*, Washington Square Press, 1953, p. 25.
- 2 Our belief becomes stronger when we observe that the creations of famous creators are mostly determined by their individual psycho-physical conditions. Generally human beings cannot create anything which is alien to their nature. For example, Tagore, who received an artistic and spiritual bent of mind contributed mainly to idealism. — A.



However, it may not be that a creative idea must be always new and original; a new (second) realization of something already known and old may also take the same status. Moreover, creative idea maintains a category difference from creativity and creation. Creativity is a faculty, the act of creation is a psycho-physical activity, when a creative idea is a state of mind. Creativity and the act of creation can be brought under a single bracket, they are very close, one is an extension of the other, and one also proves the existence of the other. Creativity is the inner form, when the act of creation is the outer manifestation of the same creative spirit. Without the act of creation one's creativity has no meaning. The number and quality of one's acts of creation determines, to a very great extent, the depth and expansion of one's creativity. Similarly, the opposite is also true, though in a different way. The act of creation without one having creativity is quite incomprehensible.<sup>3</sup> It involves a degree of contradiction also. Creative idea, on the other hand, has altogether a different existence. The numbers and qualities of the acts of creations very rarely correspond to the numbers and qualities of creative ideas. As it has been said, creative ideas cannot be regulated but the creative faculty can. A poem or a piece of art can be created artificially, with minimum or no inspiration, through the sheer force of creativity and the act of creation; on the otherhand, a creative idea artificially made is a contradiction in terms, one can only try to revive, through memory, one's creative idea received earlier, but one cannot create a creative idea.

Although creativity is famous in the whole story of creation. Every one regards it as something very special and precious, gifted selectively to individuals. Most people think that in exercising creativity, man becomes really free which, of course, is not the case. In fact, it cannot be said that a creator exercises his (her) absolute freedom when he (she) creates. A creator, when creates, is completely under the spell of the creative idea. But the creative idea is never under anybody's beck and call; it is indeed connected, though not directly, with our wishes and different states of mind. And when it appears, to a creative man, it deluges everything—mental barriers, rules and regulations. Creative idea has thus an overwhelming effect. The act of creation, on the other hand, is an arduous and difficult process; a creative idea is not so. However there is also a pain connected with a creative idea, for example, in the holding of it (creative idea) inwardly, and in the desire of sharing the idea with others.

<sup>3</sup> However, a computer creating various designs without itself being creative can be easily imagined. But that must have a different interpretation. — A.



A creative idea, in itself, is never painful, pain (or joy) is attached to it as an association. The creative idea is accidental, inspiring and beyond and calculation. So striving for it, to some extent, has no meaning. Whatever be the depth and expansion of one's knowledge, one cannot command any creative idea. It's nature is, to a very great extent, extraordinary, strange and peculiar.

A creative idea is also an insight, though they have their—differences. Insight is 'a sudden comprehension (without use of previous experience) of important relationships and the structure of the situation as a whole which makes it possible to find an intelligent solution to a problem.'<sup>4</sup> When a creative idea is much wider. A creative idea commonly gives something new and original, for example, a theory or an art, having the nature of wholeness. It also gives insights into various problems. Whereas insight is more relative or dependent to intellectual problems, unlike a creative idea, and is more fragmentary and limited in its scope. Though insights can have separate and independent existence than a creative idea, but a creative idea always takes some insights into its fold. It, however, is difficult to say exactly how a creative idea appears in the mental stage and how it subdues all other thoughts and feelings by its sheer presence and force. Moreover, any calculation has a remote, not direct, link in bringing out a new idea. Calculation<sup>5</sup> only helps during presentation of a creative idea. A creative idea is an idea, there is nothing great or small about it. Greatness etc., lies in its (idea's) demand and exhibition. Selfishness or utilitarian motive plays a secondary role, and never a dominant role when a creative idea is in process. Moreover, the creative idea has a psycho-physical effect, when it appears it mesmerizes the whole body, mind and heart<sup>6</sup>. They then act together in the same wave length. This is a distinct character of a creative idea.

Nevertheless, the origin of creative idea, as it has been already touched, is quite strange and peculiar. It is out and out a state of

4 *A Concise Psychological Dictionary*, ed. Petrovsky Yaroshevsky, Progress Publ. 1987, p. 144.

5 Reason 'helps to enlighten and purify the aesthetic instincts and impulses, but it cannot give them their highest satisfaction or guide them to a complete insight. It shapes and fulfils to a certain extent the aesthetic intelligence, but it cannot justly pretend to give the definitive law for the creation of beauty or for the appreciation and enjoyment of beauty.'—Sri Aurobindo, *The Human Cycle*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1985, p. 134.

6 *Rasaveśa* (involvement in aesthetic sentiment),—Abhinavgupta (see Dr. K. Krishnamurthy : *Dhvanyaloka*, Motilal, Delhi, 1982, p. XL).



mind, a flow of idea, a product—of a different quality—through permutation and combination of the existing concepts in the mind. It is a result of the activity of our unconscious mind, and is neither a product of a head-breaking thought and analysis nor of a severe calculation of our conscious mind. Doubts can be raised whether any and every creation of great creators which is done out of pressure or of external necessity can be called as the product of creative idea; Perhaps not, and the creators themselves would accept that, though it is very difficult to establish the distinction between a deliberate conscious activity and the spontaneous inspiration. These creations, driven by particular motives (where motive regulates creation), may be named as second grade creation. A creative idea, which is a state of mind, never comes out of necessity. Though resides in the bottomless ocean of consciousness and probability, creative idea appears out of its own sweet will, and disappears if the receiver is not properly prepared. Hence the necessity of sensitivity and preparation. Sensitivity helps detection of creative idea that it is so, and preparation helps presentation of the idea. However, when it (creative idea) appears it overpowers and overwhelms all other mental conditions, and brings with it its own reason and words (terminology).

Creative idea is independent of creativity in regard to its origin, but it is also dependent to creativity when creation as a whole is concerned. Creativity means power to create, having qualities like sensitivity and imagination etc. Through sensitivity a creative man may receive creative ideas, but there may not be any necessary connection between the two. Creativity, as we already know, is a faculty, and creative idea is a state of mind which is impermanent, unstable, fluctuating. Creativity helps creative idea to come to light, a pure subjective element thus gets its objectivity through the creative power. When Ratnakar (Valmiki) uttered the *sloka*, "*ma nisada pratistham...*" etc., cursing the hunter (*nisada*) for his tact of killing one of the curlew couple during their copulation, it (*sloka*) was, no doubt, a spontaneous overflow of a powerful feeling. Ratnakar, himself was supposed to be astonished—how theme all (systematic poetic outburst) happened to him, who was, in every way, a dacoit a few minutes ago. Ratnakar must be endowed with creativity, and that incident—the pathetic cry of the female bird, seeing its partner perished and killed, stirred his creative imagination, with a creative idea, so tremendously that he spontaneously uttered a *couplet*, in a verse form (*sloka*), and that was not made through any calculation or by great effort. However: that incident, of killing of the *kronca* (male bird) and the crying of its partner, was a mere accident—a fact among millions, but the important thing is—the poetic expression of



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that pain which gave the poem a universal touch and made it a piece of 'first grade creation'. When we said, 'first grade creation' it also means, that there can be second or third grade creations; though we have already decided to limit our discussions upto the second grade creation. Any piece of creation, lacking any original or overwhelming idea, which only the author or the poet of that particular piece can claim, may be called a 'second grade creation'. And there may be plenty of such instances of creation.

A creative idea is always a meaningful state of mind. It has generally a comprehensive, though not conspicuous form, where the beginning and the end, the whole picture of a theory or of a creation can be visualized, for a time period.

A question, however, may be asked, whether there can be any way to creative idea. Experience says, sensitivity sometimes serves as a way. A sensitive man, who is most alert, observes everything silently, keeps open all the portals of mind and sense organs, has always a better chance of coming across creative ideas. And great creators, generally, are the most sensitive people.<sup>7</sup> Sensitivity is also very deeply attached to creativity and the act of creation. It (sensitivity) is, thus, important in the whole process of creation—in receiving creative idea, in stirring up of creativity, and in the act of creation; but they, these three factors, individually, cannot be identified with sensitivity itself. Sensitivity has a far more greater role to play in the lives of human beings.

However, to give perfect shape and size to creative idea, we need to separate it at least from two things, 'practice' and the 'genius'. Practice cannot produce creative idea. Sensitivity, the way to creative idea, is not practice, on the contrary, it is a liberating process from practice and discipline. True, practice makes one perfect, perfect in respect of expression or presentation of a creative idea. Perfection through practice leads to perfection in creation. But practice cannot necessitate creative idea when the opposite is always possible.

Genius, like creativity, is a faculty. It cannot rightfully claim the place of creative idea which is a mental state. We call him or her genius who has created something new and original, for genius is a quality of mind who can both receive as well as express creative ideas effectively. To use an analogy, genius is like a good television set which can both receive and telecast well. In a way, genius is more close to creativity than it is to creative idea.

7 "The fundamental condition of genius is an abnormal predominance of sensibility and irritability over reproductive power," Schopenhauer (See Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, Washington Square Press, 1953, p. 334).



Sometimes the subject of 'inspiration' too is confused with the notion of creative idea, and they are thought as identical, which surely are not. One gets inspiration—to sacrifice oneself...etc., or one is inspired to compose a poem or to write an essay, from a creative idea. So inspiration is always dependent, it needs a third factor to become effective. On the other hand, a creative idea is independent, free. Moreover inspiration can have many ideas. A creative idea is related only with creation; inspiration, on the other hand, is related not only with the creation but also with many other things, for example with sacrifice (inspiration to sacrifice), killing, rebellion and so on. Also inspiration can be regulated, artificially made, but creative idea has no such regulation, it has its own chemistry.

The status of creative idea is, to some extent, mystical. There is a little bit of mysticism in everyone's life. Creative idea certainly adds to that. Creative idea cannot be regulated, though regulation in respect of resistance to or presentation of a new idea always has a great value in regard to public appreciation. A creative idea, on the other hand, by the nature of its force and extension, stirs—tremendously or gently, one's creativity, and thereby always determines it (creativity). Creative idea is mystical because it is free, it is purely subjective and selective, its origin or causes are not specifically known or cannot be exactly pinpointed. It is mystical because a finished creation can never be claimed as the true-copy of a creative idea; often a creation (finished) misses many points of a creative idea.<sup>8</sup> So there always remains a theoretical gap between the world of creative ideas and of creations. For creation can be known, examined or judged, but the same is not true with the creative idea. Further, since creative idea is subjective and the proof of its existence in others is purely inferential, any correspondence between the two—a creative idea and the creation of a poem or so, is very difficult to claim or to establish. Also, creative idea, as a state of mind, is temporary, and so if not prepared or sensitive enough an idea may be lost for ever. Samuel Taylor Coleridge's poem 'Kubla Khan': "In Xanadu did Kubla Khan/A stately pleasure-dome decree..." as it goes, is a perfect example of a creative idea, which bears the stamps of both temporariness and mysticism.

8 "mane yaha chila have gela ar...", my poem has taken a different shape from what I desired. — Rabindranath Tagore, poem 'Sadhana', in Sanchayita, Visva Bharati, p. 231.



## III

## Conclusion

By now, it must have been clear that there is something—a very special mental state, in some of human beings, whom we called creative idea. In the creative process, this creative idea comes first, chronologically, and is independent (for its origin) of other two factors—creativity and the act of creation. We have also established, in course of our discussion, that the creative idea and the creativity are categorically different, for creative idea is a state of mind and creativity a faculty. Also we have shown their relationship of dependence; We indicated that if creativity (along with the act of creation) is compared with a human body then creative idea becomes the soul, or better, if creativity is a musical instrument then creative idea is its music, for both are closely related in creation.

We have also shown that creative idea demands a separate and distinct treatment because it has a unique place, though it, at the first instance, resembles many other activities of the mind e.g., insight, inspiration and so on. Creative idea, also, is very close to intuition. In a way it is an intuitive knowledge, a knowledge of the whole of anything without the mediation of any reason or analysis. But there is a difference: in intuition there is no inspiration, no drive towards creation whereas that's a must in a creative idea. Intuition, which is a special ability of mind, ends up in observing the whole body of truth. when creative idea, a mental state, progresses further, it has its own creative drive.

Again, creative idea inspires someone to create, but it is not inspiration itself. Creative idea is not genius either, for genius is a faculty of mind, but creative idea is a mental state. A genius is a genius because he can create; a creative idea occasionally appears only before a man of genius. In fine, creative idea has a world of its own; It has a distinctness which surpassed the periphery of creativity and the act of creation; and cannot be known only by understanding the latter's nature and activities. Thus the introduction of Creative idea as a unique element in the creative process makes the study of creation more complex and, in a way, more interesting. The subject, therefore, deserves greater illumination.



## Henuri Bergson's Concept of Religion

*Madhuri Verma*

There are two sources of morality and religion and they are the reason and the mystic experience according to Bergson. Reason constructs the religion as religion is found only in human being, the higher beings. There is no religion in animals. The mind is Static, conceptual, self-egoistic or self-centred and narrow or limited. It is the imagination of the mind, which constructs religion. Therefore, the religions are also narrow and self-egoist as the intellect is narrow and self-egoist. All religions are, limited and imperfect and hence cannot be universal religion. Because intellect cannot think without being selfish.

Religion is dictated from the mind. Instinct and intelligence both play their role in human actions. The acquired actions of society are instinctive. It is the intellect alone which invents religion. In the primitive age the society was instinctive in type. Religion was there nothing more than the discharge of social duties. Thus religion started as invention of mind against the dangers.

Since religion is based on intellect and intellect invents thoughts which are religious; many beliefs, superstitions are found in religion. The intellect is very quick in formulating this belief. Bergson has explained the causes for the inventions of the mind also. According to him religion has threefold usefulness. Religion is the invention of the mind, because mind perceives three kinds of dangers; the danger of death, uncertain future and the one caused by selfishness.

Religion counteracts the feeling of person as Bergson conceives that religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence. The intelligence helps man to their evil actions as intelligence is selfish and egoistic. Intelligence disregards the society and it does violence. In order to check all these the intellect invents many religious beliefs and superstitions Religion thus counteracts the individual passions.



Secondly, it counteracts the fear of death as Bergson conceives that religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the representation by intelligence, of the inevitability of death. Reason observes the inevitability of death which makes life tasteless. Death is very disappointing phenomena. In order to counteract the idea of death, the reason invents superstitions of rebirth, ancestor-worship, heavenly life after death, communion with God etc. Superstitions are believed by reason. Man gets satisfaction when he superstitiously believes in paradise or next life etc.

Thirdly, religion develops faith or belief in God, which gives security against the uncertain happenings of the future as Bergson's conceives that religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the representation by the intelligence of a depressing margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired. The security against the future is given by religion. Religion gives us belief in God. God will ensure better, prosperous and happy life to the virtuous. He will give us reward or punishment for our deeds. Law of Karma is propounded by the religion. We require some faith and that is given by the religion. According to Bergson, religion gives us faith and power to work against many arts and obstructles.

Intelligence realises its ignorance. The whole world gives us the idea of littleness of mind. We have, therefore, nothing to counteract except inventing superstitions. These religious beliefs have bearings upon human life. It gives peace, solance and inspiration to mankind. Though religions are to be taken as false by modern thinking, religion's usefulness cannot be denied. It is wrong to say that intelligent men are not superstitious. They are rather more superstitious. Even to-day the intelligent minds not only accept religion but also invent some new beliefs, which show the importance of religion.

After discussing the nature and importance of religion in his book "The two sources of Morality and Religion" Bergson has explained the two types of religion based on the two sources of knowledge. The static religion is derived from nature where as the other type of religion, the dynamic religion is derived from the mystic intuition. Static religion may be called as natural religion as Bergson conceives that static religion is a defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence. At the origin of religious belief there is the defensive reaction of the nature against the disengagements. The beliefs help men in reconciling against the dangers that befall on man as static religion is the invention of the mind. The mind perceives the danger of death, unexpected future and egoism; and reacts to them. It begins to have the beliefs, super-



stitutions and myths by its imagination. Mind imagines a religion which has belief in immortality, salvation, heaven and ancestor-worship. Man gets solace and remains happy even when the idea of death haunts his mind. The mind imagines of a theory of reward and punishment and invents the conception of God. He imagines that God is justice, kind and merciful who gives us security against the unexpected future. Thus religion is the invention of mind, the intellect. In static religion there is the process of myth making. The intelligence invents myths to preserve the natural order, social integrity and individual security. Religion is born of the myth-making function of the mind; a function which resembles more instinctive activity than conscious plan. It is a kind of activity by which hallucinations and phantasies are created in the mind. The images and ideas which check the depressing effect contribute to the formation and growth of religion. The myth of God is created for punishing the egoists and rewarding the altruists. It has two functions namely, the preservation of the society and the emancipation of the individual.

The Static religion based on myths cannot be universal. It works in the most mechanical manner. It evolves a mechanical relation between the individual and society. An individual has to conform to the rituals and customs in the most mechanical and mythical manner. Static religion has dogmas, rituals, customs, beliefs and superstitions. The society is dogmatic, ritualistic and superstitious. These beliefs remain limited to the closed society. Thus the intellect forms the closed society and closed religion. Again; Static religion is narrow and egoist. Man cares for himself and not for others. He has the dogmatic belief that his religion is superior to other religions. This close religion has some purpose, that is the individuals are united together on the fixed religious principles. But it does not help building in society. The universal outlook is not possible from this intellectual religion. Further, the intellect calculates the future events, but there is no certainty about the future.

The Static religion is thus born of the myth making function of the mind. Religion originating from such social need is infra-intellectual, because it arises from the instinctive level of the mind. It is called static because it tends to promote social solidarity and keep man confined to the closed society. Being narrow and closed it does not advance progress or create the open, free and universal society. While myth-making is important for preservation of society, it offers only Static religion. But society is not only to be preserved it



has to be evolved. This evolution of society is not done by mythical religion. This function of religion is done by the dynamic religion.

The dynamic religion is the higher, the superior type of religion. The purpose of dynamic religion is the social and cosmic evolution. The evolution of society is done by this religion. Dynamic religion is born of mystic experiences. It is supra-intellectual. When the mind develops and grows critical it refuses to be led by the myths of traditional religion. The human genius goes beyond the social order and intellectual view of things. Bergson observes that the dynamic religion is the religion of future when there will be the evolution of mystic beings who will remain identified with the vital force or creative energy. It will be a new type of religion. All dogmas, beliefs, rituals will have no place in it. It will be a cultless and formless religion. It will be a universal religion. The mystic beings identified with the creative force will evolve a deeply spiritual religion. For dynamic religion is based on mystic experience where there is the contact of an individual with the *elan-vital* or God. The life force is God. When one identifies with creative energy, the individual becomes creative. The mystic beings identified with GOD will create creatures similar to Him and thus will form a mystic religion. Thus in mysticism there is the evolution of human beings.

After the contact with GOD the individual gains infinite energy, omniscience and omnipotence. There comes a boundless joy within him. Bergson distinguishes two kinds of mysticism, incomplete and complete. In complete mystic experience one has the experience but not the life. This is found according to him in the mystics of Greece and ancient India. Hindu mysticism is passive. Greek mysticism has much emphasis on reason and hence becomes dogmatic and incomplete. In Hinduism there is the conception of salvation, rebirth, immortality which has nothing to do with life. The complete mysticism according to Bergson can be found in the great Christian mystics. In Christianity contemplation and action go together. There is the complete identity with the vital force or GOD in the individual. Bergson says that St. Paul, St. Teresa, St. Catherine, St. Francis and Plotinus were great mystics, their experiences were perfect mystic. The Christian mystics are dynamic in nature. For their experiences resulted in actions for mankind. Thus according to Bergson the mystic religion is not passive. The individual gets the infinite energy after the contact with *Elan-Vital* and the works of redemption remains ceaseless. Everything is flooded with joy, life and force. The Philanthropic and social works become indispensable for the mystic beings. There remains no difference between God and the mystic beings. Bergson observes



that the love of the mystics for men is actually the love of GOD for them. Thus the aim of mysticism is the action done for the good of mankind.

The dynamic religion is the religion in the wider sense. There is no way from static to dynamic religion. In actuality dynamic religion includes in itself all the differences of static religion. It is a combination of all religions. According to Bergson the future of religion is the dynamic religion. But this does not mean that the lower forms of religion will extinct. Just as, in the process of evolution the higher species have evolved the lower one, the higher religion will include the existing static religions of to-day. Bergson repeatedly says that GOD is love. The quality of love is manifested in the dynamic religion. All mystic beings will be united with one GOD. Though it is difficult to describe the future form of dynamic religion, we can say this much that it will have love, action and creation as the three essential characteristics. There will be the creation of new human social and spiritual values.

Bergson is critical of intellectual religion which cannot fulfill the purpose of religion that is duty for mankind. But Bergson has disconnected the static religion from the dynamic religion. In fact every religion is a combination of both these forms. Secondly, Bergson's concept of religion is based on his faith on the evolution of higher species superior to human being. It is difficult to wait for the future for the true religion to evolve for us. Thirdly, Bergson has not presented the exact form of dynamic religion that will emerge in the future. As positivists hold, mysticism is incomplete, uncertain and unverifiable, which has no practical approach and are not practically useful. Again many people have realised the divine communion by simple methods of beliefs like prayer, worship and meditation. Hence Bergson's view of religion cannot satisfy the masses of man.

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## Philosophy, Language and Understanding

G. D. Azumbar

It is pertinent to ask the question Does Philosophy clarify language or does it confuse us ?

Another way of putting the above question is, to ask whether it is language that helps philosophy or philosophy that helps language ? The answer to this question cannot be simply this way, or that way. There are a lot of considerations that are pertinent before an answer can be given. We have to understand what philosophy is all about and what language is. This will include understanding what purposes they serve. It is after this is done that we will examine philosophy's need for language and language's need for philosophy. I always believe that in every relationship, no matter how bad, cannot be hundred percent parasitic but will have some measure of symbiosis. There is always a give and take. Though the percentage of exchange may not always be obvious and this could create room for the apparent zero-sum gameness of some relationships, that is, where a party in the relationship due to overwhelming presence may subdue the contribution of the rival partner. But in this work our attitude is to approach the matter with an eye on the symbiotic potentials of the relationship between philosophy and language.

Philosophy apart from being defined as the love of wisdom, has been variously defined as the handmaid of clarification; as the search for the ultimate meaning of sentences, and it is also seen as consisting in critical thinking, reflection and analyses of concepts. It tries to analyse and to make sure that concepts are well used. Philosophy is therefor seen as conceptual analysis. And from the semantic perspectives philosophy is seen as the study of the relation



of the words in our language to the world we use language to talk about.<sup>1</sup>

Language on the other hand, according to John Dewey is a communicative art between the speaker and the hearer. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, language is defined as "the whole body of words and methods of combination of words used by persons, a nation, a race etc; including methods expressing thoughts, feelings, wants, by words or signs. It also sees language as the human and non-instinctive methods of communicating ideas, feelings and desires by means of a system of sound and sound symbols"<sup>2</sup>. Language could generally be seen a general term that is applied to a system of sounds, signs, symbols and in a sense useful and meaningful gesticulation or movements that communicate ideas. Hence we talk about the language of gymnastics, language of nature, language of the blind, language of drama, language of stars, etc., what is common to all these is that in each, there is an aggregate of objects whether they be marks, sounds gestures, looks or stars, and these objects or certain combinations of these object are meaningful.<sup>3</sup> K. T. Fann in his book *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy*, defines language as a set of activities or practices defined by certain rules namely the rules which govern all the various uses of words in the language<sup>4</sup>. For E. Von Savigny, language is a social activity and there is a conventional meaning that is governed by rules.

With the foregoing, it is easier to examine whether it is philosophy that needs language or whether it is language that needs philosophy. In a simple way we have seen that philosophy has as one of its semantic purposes that of clarifying and analysing concepts. This means that language needs philosophy in order to reach clarity. On the other hand, philosophy if its major task is linguistic analysis, needs language in order to justify its existence. One other disturbing issue is that language exists prior to philosophy and this means that the existence of language is not dependent on philosophy. The straight forward argument is to say that language since not needing philosophy to attain its primordial form, has already achieved the necessary structures and features that make it possible

- 1 John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, p. 1.
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for it to achieve its function. And if the function of language is communicative, we only need to seek to find out whether this function is adequately fulfilled. If it is, then language does not need philosophy. The immediate reaction is to say that language fulfils its communication function and as such does not need philosophy. To support this position is the Berkeleyian argument that "the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high road of plain common sense are to the most part unperturbed". We find that language is like proverbial state of innocence of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden which became polluted through the intrusion of the devil. Language naturally, it would appear, was good until philosophers entered into its vineyard.

H. H. Prince in his *Clarity is not Enough*, put forward an analytic conception of philosophy which he says develops naturally into therapeutic conception. The therapeutic conception holds that the philosophers job within language is to cure us of muddles or headaches generated by language, either by every day language, or by the technical language of some science. Price is quick to comment that it would appear that nobody could suffer from headaches of that particular sort unless he were already a philosopher.<sup>5</sup> He boldly says that philosophers cause the headaches which they eventually turn round to cure. This position is in accord with the traditional view that language is made up of words and that words name or picture facts in the universe and that atomic units of language picture atomic facts in the world. This perspective is also in accord with the rule version of language. If language follows a standard rule, all that we need to do is to understand the rule and we go ahead to apply the rule in algorithmic fashion and derive our meaning.

Max Black, a strong advocate of the rule version of language makes his point by asking "If there are no rules in language, can we call adjectives nouns in defiance of the rules? By grammar he means a classification of meaningful units of speech like morphology, together with rules for the correct arrangement of such units in sentences otherwise called syntax. This means that the syntax and the semantics together with the phonetical aspect of language inform the meaning of words.

Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus*, supporting the above line of argument, appear to say that the essence of language is the essence of the world. He gives a picture theory of language. Words as sharing

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5 H. H. Prince "Clarity is not enough" in H. D. Lewis' *Clarity is not Enough*, p. 18.



a one to one correspondence with facts, atomic linguistic unit representing atomic facts, while molecular linguistic unit represent molecular facts and so fourth. However, he did not end his programme without realizing the difficulty that confronts such a position. In his *philosophical investigations*, which is a later work, he argues that the *Tractatus* is only a ladder which must be discarded after the summit of its 'nonsense' is attained. He proposes a "Use-Version" of language in his linguistic theory. For him language is made up of words, and words are like tools in a tool-box that can be put to different uses. In the language game, there are guiding rules that regulate the use and meaning of words. The meaning of a given word in one language game, may not be the same in another language game. At this level, words are still regarded as the basic units of meaning. But with the coming of J. O. Austin's 'eye opener' in his *Philosophical Papers*, we come to agree with him that sentences and not words are the true bearers of meaning. He says that words on their own do not refer but only does, or become meaningful as part of other words in the sentence. If sentences form the basic unit of language, we begin to witness a crack in the walls of the traditional conception of language. The corollary will be that, there may after all not be a hard and fast way of eliciting meaning as the variations in the arrangement of words are bound to affect the meaning of words and sentences. This begins to pave way to the problem that has come to dominate the philosophy of language, that is, the problem of indeterminacy of reference, meaning and translation. This view was popularized by M. V. O. Quine who in his epoch-making work, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", denies the veracity of the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements, and also denies reductionism, the type Carnap tries in his *Logical Structure of the World*, wherein he tried to reduce all statements to their physical equivalents i.e. moral, mathematical, metaphysical, scientific, etc, to protocol or physical statements. For Quine, such distinction is not possible because things do not have a definite 'meaning bundle' that is exclusively theirs, and nothing is the 'case' come what way. What is the case may be made not the case if drastic enough adjustments are made in the entire system of a field of force to which it belongs. This means that language far from being a picture theory of the world is much more complex than we have thought at the outset. It begins to dawn on us that philosophy is not the cause of the problem in language. Language could then be seen as inherently sick without knowing it. This reminds us of the proverbial

6. Max Black "Language" in Gilbert Ryles *Contemporary aspects of Philosophy*, p. 170.



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 allegory of the cave supplied by Plato. The men in the cave due to their long stay in the cave have become accustomed to the cave, and when an attempt was made to get them to see the light, of the day, resisted it. The fact that they were satisfied with darkness does not make darkness preferable to light. It is only a case of ignorance. A man may be sick without knowing it, and his not knowing it does not remove the sickness, neither is it right to attribute the cause of the sickness to the medical personnel who eventually points it out. The argument here is that, though language in the circle of the illiterate bulk of mankind does not generate the type of controversy it does within the circle of the philosophically literate, does not make philosophy or the philosophers the cause of the problem of language.

Having now identified that there are inherent problems with language, it becomes more obvious that language needs philosophy. The problems ranged from vagueness or lack of clarity, indeterminacy, the place of sense, reference, meaning in the construction of grammar, the issue of psychological entities as against behaviouristic components of language, we have also the problem of abstraction, universals and individuation etc. philosophy's task is to clarify language. It tries to make sure that language fulfils its function of communication and at the same time, it tries to show what the limits of language are. However, there is no gain saying the fact that philosophy by commission or omission has added more problem to language in the process of trying to provide a prophylactic against linguistic abuses.

For example, in philosophy, we have the problem of philosophical language ostensibly introduced to clarify language, meaning, reference, which have in turn obfuscated meaning. Philosophy instead of using physical object language has introduced what is called sense-datum language. And as Max Black has remarked, "although the term 'Sense datum' has been in common use for forty years, its meaning is not altogether clear even now". This has made some scholars to identify the limitations of sense-datum language with the limitations of philosophy and language. The sense here is that if language was adequate, comprehensive and clear, philosophy would not have been entrapped in the snare of sense-datum language. In a way it is true that though language had the dust on it, it was philosophy that raised the same dust and has come complaining or not being able to see. In part, philosophy's vain glory in trying to fathom the depth of reality, in showing that appearance is different from reality, in showing that there is a deepness, a profoundness in man's epistemological or in showing a distinguished ability or ca-



opacity to scrutinize which is peculiar to the philosopher, all these and more have made philosophy more a source of confusion than of clarity as it relates to language.

The question now is has philosophy been able to achieve its mission of sanitizing language, if not why and what work is philosophy of language in particular doing to achieve this objective. One would say that philosophy merely sighted the problem in language as a small star in the orbit of heavens only to recognize at a closer look that it is a huge object. The problem of language is compounded by the fact that there are many factors that interfere with language. We have the variation in rules, we have the diversification of the use of language eum language games, the generation of new words and sentences, the renting of the veil of ideas which has brought in the problem of indeterminacy and proficiency in the use of language. Ian Hacking in his *Why does language matter to Philosophy*, has traced the terrain that language has traversed in its development. Starting from John Locke's conception of language, to Berkeley, to Bentham and finally to Wittgenstein, Russell; Chomsky, Strawson, Davidson and Quine. He records that the problem of language instead of abating has continued to compound. Philosophy to settle the problem of language has to contend with the forces of language rules, indeterminacy, the reality of physical fact and the problem of perception. We must perceive rightly, must know the language in order to carry out the definition, clarification, analysis or explanation of the object under examination. While Chomsky for instance talks rather about generative grammar, Davidson talks about a middle ground between indeterminacy and determinateness while Quine takes the extreme course of indeterminacy.

The problem of form of presentation can also be responsible for opacity or otherwise of grammar. For example, ideas can be expressed philosophically, proverbially, symbolically satirically, idiomatically cynically, ironically, paradoxically, ostensibly, apothegmically, or plainly, that is, commonsensically. The choice of form of language can affect communication.

For example, when we talk about sense-datum language, we are referring to a form of language that is meaningful within philosophical understanding. The language of philosophy generally will pose a problem to a lay man but as one grows in philosophical knowledge, he begins to master the rudiments of philosophical language. To this extent we say that philosophy has not helped us in having better handle on language and its purpose, communication. The assertion, is philosophy a source of confusion to language, is better asked



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thus, whether it is language as used by philosophers or outsiders. To philosophers, philosophy has better clarified language and pointed out areas of inadequacy of inherited language and the possibilities for improvement are also highlighted. To the outsiders, philosophy has confused us rather than clarified us. But as one gets deeper into the linguistic world of philosophy, he is able to say like the liberated prisoner "it is all liberty everywhere"—perhaps it is this sense of linguistic liberty that has bedevilled philosophy. We talk about abstraction and we see how philosophers in their speculation indulge in a wild unregulated speculation which has brought in metaphysical terms the sort of which caused the logical positivists of the early twentieth century to ask for the expunging of metaphysics. Berkeley earlier, had identified abstraction especially as Locke presented it as the cause of the confusion we have in philosophy of language. He holds that a situation where qualities are abstracted from the objects in which they inhere and given independent existence is the sure source of confusion.

Berkeley attributes all our intellectual problems arising from doubtfulness, uncertainties, absurdities and contradictions to abstraction. For him it is abstraction that leads us to reflect on the separate existence of things apart from our perception. To Berkeley it is a manifest contradiction to talk about ideas existing independently of the perceiving mind. Although we can imagine hands, legs, fingers, hairs, arms, etc., existing apart from the body, we never can imagine these parts without the qualities of colour, solidity, extension, etc., John Locke had said that extension, motion, figure, solidity, rest, number constitute the primary qualities that are inseparable from the objects while taste, colour, sound, hardness (touch), and odour (smell) constitute the secondary qualities which can exist independently of objects. To Locke, we can have general idea of colour that does not have any resemblance to any colour, that is, a colour that is neither red, yellow, pink, green or orange, etc. Berkeley disagrees with this view, and states that every colour is a particular colour. The concept of colour cannot be divorced from the discrete particular colours of individual objects. For Berkeley therefore, so called primary and secondary qualities are clearly interwoven. By the same token, Berkeley discountenances Locke's assertion that there exist a material substratum in which the qualities inhere. All that exist are for him minds and their ideas. This shows us that philosophy provides us with the needed critical insight into what otherwise would have been taken at its face value. But because every position contains reality—truth to a degree, language can also only convey truth-reality to a degree. The problem of language is



56 natural, arising from human limitation. The philosopher's attempt to use language to redress language is only paradoxical. A meta-language will not also do being itself part of language.

Finally, accepting that this task has not been exhaustive, we feel that we have been able to throw light on the different areas that have made philosophy's business in language a "mixed blessing". We have seen philosophy's mission to sanitize language which inexorably led to the aberration—The mission to confuse, which has in turn necessitated the mission, to cure, (therapeutize) which has opened the gate to linguistic liberty and the current bid to natural language.

However, philosophy still deserves a well done for leading us into these compartmental possibilities:

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## A Critique of Rorty on Epistemology

Yunusa Kehinde Sa'ami

### Introduction ;

The aim of this paper is to show that in spite of Rorty's stated intention to argue epistemology has outlived its usefulness, and that there is no need spinning any theory of knowledge or of truth, Rorty has not succeeded. Rorty is still not able to divest himself of the normative feature of traditional Epistemology. Indeed, he still ends up offering an epistemology of a kind.

### Rorty On Epistemology :

Rorty sees the works of epistemologists as attempts to defend our claims to knowledge from the skeptical challenges. For the skeptics, knowledge implies certainty, but we can not know with certainty, so knowledge is impossible. Confronted with such an argument, Rorty construes epistemology as a normative discipline which tries to prescribe a natural starting point, like the Archimedean point, for the defence of knowledge-claims. He considers various epistemological answers as attempts to set some criteria of knowledge, the conditions which a claim must satisfy to qualify for knowledge.

Rorty attempts to undermine philosopher's confidence in knowledge as something about which there ought to be a theory, and as something which has foundation. He does not seek an alternative way of answering epistemological questions as traditionally posed; rather he thinks that these questions should no longer be raised.<sup>2</sup>

Unlike Quine who remains convinced that there is something to be said concerning how inquiry may best proceed even after the de-

1 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980) p. 7.

2 Rorty Richard; "Pragmatism and Philosophy" in Kenneth Baynes, Bohman James and McCarthy Thomas (eds.) *After Philosophy End or Transformation?* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987) p. 26.



mise of traditional epistemology.<sup>3</sup> Rorty denies that such speculations serve any positive purpose. Indeed, he maintains that such philosophising only fosters what he calls "dehumanization". He strongly holds that there is nothing to be gained by speculating about how to perpetuate the success of science.

Rorty's challenge to epistemology is, in a sense basically historical. Looking at the various attempts in history by different schools of epistemology to find a foundation or a starting point of knowledge. Rorty sees different schools building their own 'foundations' in order to destroy the starting points or foundations built by others:

For him, the history of epistemology is a concatenation of positions and counter-positions on what the adequate foundation of knowledge is, or should be.<sup>4</sup> For instance, while Plato and others like him thought that the starting point of knowledge is something transcendental. Rorty sees scholars such as Hobbes and Marx as arguing that space and time make only reality there is, and consequently, he says, Hobbes and Marx make the starting point a correspondence to that reality. It was disagreements of this sort, which, according to Rorty, led to transcendental/empirical, rationalist/empiricist, idealist/realist, analytic/synthetic, a priori/aposteriori, distinctions, and so forth.

Given the various disagreements that typify traditional epistemology on the question of a starting point, Rorty argues that there is really nothing which can serve as a foundation of knowledge. Thus he assumes that it is a sheer waste of time and energy engaging in any attempt to provide such a foundation. Rorty holds that the futility of traditional epistemological outlook is exemplified by the multitudes of disagreements among epistemologists about what actually constitute a foundation of knowledge.

Based on this argument, Rorty urges epistemologists to move to a post-epistemological and, by extension, to a post-philosophical culture, in which there will not be such strict distinctions between what the traditional epistemologists would call "first-rate-truth-by-correspondence-to-reality and second-rate-truth-as-what-it-is-good-to-believe".<sup>5</sup> He thinks that there should be an abandonment of "the

3 See Quine W.V.O: *Ontological Relativity And Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University, 1969), Quine W.V.O. *Theories And Things* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1981). Kornblith Hilary (ed.); *Naturalizing Epistemology* 2nd ed. (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994), among others.

4 Rorty Richard: *Consequences of Pragmatism* (minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) pp. XIII-XXI.

5 Rorty Richard: *Consequences of Pragmatism* p. XXXVII.



Platonic attempt to sift out the merely contingent and conventional truths from the truths which were something more than that".<sup>6</sup>

For Rorty, epistemological issues such as truth, knowledge, justification, perception etc. are not the sort of things one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. So, in Rorty's view, rather than involving any general theory about the nature and scope of knowledge (as traditional epistemologists try to do) the subject should be changed. He rejects the idea that there are, or, could be, some propositions which are true throughout all generations. He sees all criteria as nothing but temporary resting places constructed for specific utilitarian ends.<sup>7</sup> In fact, Rorty maintains, in agreement with James and Dewey that "the sort of thing philosophers typically have said, that truth is some sort of correspondence to or accurate representation of, reality; seemed empty and pointless..."<sup>8</sup>

Rorty advises that philosophers should refrain from the traditional epistemologists' business of spinning theories, and that philosophy must resign any dream of privilege access to "objectivity" not open to ordinary humans.

Rorty takes "objectivity" simply as a "property" of theories which having been thoroughly discussed, are chosen by a consensus of a community of rational discussants.<sup>9</sup> Literally, Rorty seems to be saying that by calling a statement "objective" we are only signifying that it conforms with the consensus of participants in a rational debate. For Rorty not some epistemic theory but the community is the source of epistemic authority. So also, at least so he argues, what justifies our knowledge claims is not a special relation between ideas and objects. Rather, what he claims to justify a knowledge-claim is 'Conversation' and social practice.

For Rorty:

"...there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones...no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow inquirers".<sup>10</sup>

6 Rorty Richard; *Consequences of Pragmatism* p. XXXVII.

7 Rorty Richard; *Contingency, Irony And Solidarity* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 4.

8 Rorty Richard; 'Is Truth A Goal of Enquiry? Davidson Vs Wright', in *The Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. 45, No. 180 July, 1995: 281.

9 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature* p. 338.

10 Rorty Richard; *Consequence of Pragmatism* p. 165.



Although Rorty fails to specify his conception of "Conversation," I think he uses the concept of conversation to mean rational discussion. Thus, unlike the traditional search for an indubitable foundation, Rorty's claim amounts to saying that what justifies a knowledge-claim are rational discussion and social practice. In his pejorative usage of the term 'epistemology', epistemology inhibits conversation by "freezing" or "fixing" according to some prescribed routine, the direction which a conversation can take. Conversation rules out epistemology because, according to Rorty, epistemology is incompatible with letting conversation go its own way. According to Paul Roth for instance, the sort of conversation which Rorty believes ought to be encouraged is not to be constrained in advance by any admonition about what may or may not be challenged or subject to revision.<sup>11</sup>

Rorty, who is an acclaimed pragmatist, seems to hold a relativist thesis. Relativism is suggested by Rorty's tendency to base the justification of knowledge-claims on the agreement among rational discussants. On this reading, it may be assumed that whether or not a belief is justified at a particular time depends on what rational discussants, as at that time, agree on. Thus there is no set of propositions which can be taken to justified at all times. In other words, there is no basic belief, no "foundation", and so, the traditional epistemologists' search for the foundation of knowledge" ... may be simply apologetics, attempts to eternalise a certain contemporary language-game"<sup>12</sup>.

If relativism is thus granted in Rorty's thesis, we cannot refer to any set of knowledge-claims as being an unshakable foundation on which other propositions are erected. Based on this reading, there follows a denial of the traditional foundationalist<sup>13</sup>. So, there is no need to erect any edifice on the traditionally supposed unshakable foundation.

But, can we justified if we take Rorty to be espousing epistemic relativism? if we take Rorty to be expressing epistemic relativism,

- 11 Roth Paul A; *Meaning And Methods In Social Science* (ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987).
- 12 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature* p. 10.
- 13 The traditional pre-occupation of epistemology and epistemologists was a search for the absolutely certain or absolutely secure beliefs such that the absolute can serve as foundation on which other less privileged beliefs can be rested for justification. All this results from the attempts to meet the skeptical challenge that knowledge is impossible or that we cannot know. Traditional epistemologists set out to stop the epistemic regress of justification.



we would seem to be accepting a too simplistic interpretation of Rorty's work. Perhaps, it would be more accurate of us to understand him to be holding, not that truth is defined as consensus, but, as was interpreted by Gallagher, that, in attempting to determine the truth-status of a proposition, he have nothing at our disposal but the methods of justification which a consensus provides for us.<sup>14</sup> Rorty, according to this reading, does not claim that social practice is an evidence for the truth of a statement; he could be understood as saying that only social practice is the source of what it means in a given instance to find evidence for the truth of a proposition.<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless, Rorty follows Wittgenstein and others in refuting the notion that knowledge is accurate representation 'made possible by special mental process, and intelligible through a general theory of representation'. Rorty states categorically that:

the world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak.<sup>16</sup>

Rorty jettisons the view that beyond the language of human beings, there is something which these languages and the users themselves must try to mirror. This, I think agrees, with Gabe Eisenstein's view that a sentence can refer to what is out there, just in case, the 'language—game' to which it belongs at once establishes what kinds of things can be said to be (out there) and what counts as referring to them. Thus Gabe concludes, in line with Rorty, that we can speak of discovering knowledge not in the sense of finding a ready made proposition, but of experimentally creating a set of satisfactory responses to the natural and cultural environment in a historical context.<sup>17</sup>

14 Gallagher K.T. "Rorty On Objectivity, Truth, And Social Consensus" in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24, 2 (1984): 111-116.

15 Rorty tries very much to exonerate his view from relativism. While he holds to pragmatism, he is of the opinion that his pragmatic thesis does not entail relativism. For more of this, see Rorty Richard; *Objectivity, Relativism And Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 22-24.

16 Rorty Richard; *Contingency, Irony And Solidarity* pp. 6 and 21, for more of this discussion, see Rorty Richard; "Pragmatism And Philosophy", p. 55 and Rorty Richard; *Objectivity Relativism And Truth* pp. 1-17.

17 See Eisenstein Gabe, "Contingency And Pessimism: Rorty on Creativity and Understanding" in *The Philosophical Forum* 23 (1992): 181-182, and also Rorty Richard; "Pragmatism and Phi-



My reading of Rorty in this regard is that, contra traditional epistemology, Rorty denies that there are such beliefs so certain as to be free from all epistemic defects. While he may agree that some beliefs are more secure than others, he denies that some are absolutely secure. Here, Rorty would want us to think of 'rational certainty' as a matter of victory in argument rather than of relation to an object.

Rorty's objection to traditional epistemology then is that: Our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a matter of interaction with non-human reality. So we shall not see a difference in kind between "necessary" and "contingent" truths. At most, we shall see differences in degree of ease in objecting to our beliefs. We shall be looking for a tight case rather than an unshakable foundation.<sup>18</sup>

Rorty, I presume, accuses traditional epistemology of asking for such foundations which are as certain as mathematical truths. Rorty condemns traditional epistemology and its foundationalist program which, for him, is like engaging in a futile exercise of looking for such paradigmatically necessary truths as the axioms of geometry which are supposed to have no need of justification, of argument, nor of discussion.

In Rorty's view, traditional epistemology is wrong in asserting that, (1) knowledge is a relation between the proposition in question and other propositions from which the former may be inferred or (2) both knowledge and justification are privileged relations of propositions are about.<sup>19</sup>

To accept (1), according to Rorty, it is not necessary to end the infinite regress of justification. There shall be no need to keep conversation on the subject going once everyone among the rational discussants is satisfied. That is, the problem of regress of justification does not arise.

However, if we take (2) Rorty seems to take traditional epistemology to be stating that there would be no need to go beyond the level at which both knowledge and justification correspond to an object in the external world. Such, for Rorty, is "...a situation in

philosophy" p. 60. The point should be made at this point that Rorty is greatly influenced by pragmatism. In fact, Rorty emphatically identifies himself as a pragmatist. For this, see Kenneth Baynes et al (eds.); p. 63 Ftn 21. See also Rorty Richard; *Contingency, Irony And Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 41.

<sup>18</sup> Rorty Richard; *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature* p. 157.

<sup>19</sup> Rorty Richard; *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature* p. 158-159.



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which argument would be not just silly, but impossible".<sup>20</sup> To reach that point in traditional epistemology, according to Rorty, is to reach the foundations of knowledge.

Standpoints (1) and (2) above succinctly describe the rationalist coherence theory and the empiricist correspondence theory respectively. Rorty maintains that his pragmatism is neutral to both standpoints.<sup>21</sup>

However, despite his intention to be neutral, Rorty seems to accept (1) above. This is because Rorty thinks that the thorough discussion of the evidence for the knowledge-claim may make the rational discussants agree at a point where there would be no reason to warrant further debate or disagreement.

Rorty strongly challenges (2) above. His main point here is that any account of 'epistemic foundations' in form of (2) should be discarded, and epistemology needs to be:

Separated from psychology by being viewed as a study of the evidential relations between basic and non-basic propositions, where these relations are viewed as a matter of "logic" rather than of empirical facts.<sup>22</sup>

The consequence of this is Rorty's attack on the view that knowledge is 'an assemblage of accurate representations'<sup>23</sup>. Rorty thinks that if we take knowledge as an epistemic relation to an object, there would be one right way of describing and explaining reality. This, to him, is objectionable because it calls up "the notion of having reality unveiled to us... with some incorrigible immediacy which would make discourse and description superfluous"<sup>24</sup>.

This objection stems from Rorty's belief that all the various candidates for the position of 'natural starting point' of thought, which

20 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature* p. 159.

21 Rorty Richard; pp. 178, see Rorty Richard: "Is Truth A Goal of Enquiry? Davidson Vs Wright" in *The Philosophical Quarterly* 45, 180 (1995); 281—300, Blackburn Simon, "Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism" in *Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy* Vol. 107 No. 425 (1998): 157-181, Wright Crispin "Comrades Against Quietism: Reply To Simon Blackburn On Truth And Objectivity" in *mind* Vol. 107 No. 425 (1998): 183-203, and Rorty Richard; *Objectivity, Relativism, And Truth: Philosophical Papers Vol. 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 12-14

22 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature* p. 162.

23 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature* p. 163 Rorty Richard; *consequences of Pragmatism* p. 165, Rorty Richard; *contingency, Irony and Solidarity* p. 41 and Rorty Richard; *Objectivity, Relativism, And Truth* pp. 23-24.

24 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature* p. 375.



are prior to and independent of the way some culture speaks or spoke, have failed. The objection is also based on Rorty's view that there is no such reality to which various texts are trying to be adequate, and also on his understanding of objectivity as social consensus.

For Rorty, the most that we can find in the realm of empirical discourse is how some beliefs are comparatively more reliable than others. No empirical proposition can be known with that Degree of certainty which, as traditional epistemologists assumed, is characteristic of mathematical or geometrical axioms.

Rorty argues that there is no notion of truth which would enable anyone to make sense of the claim that if we achieved everything we ever hoped to achieve by making assertions we might still be making false assertions, which fails to "correspond to something". That is, truth is not a matter of correspondence with reality, but a matter of what can be said.<sup>25</sup>

#### Assessment of Rorty's Attack on Traditional Epistemology

It is interesting to note that Rorty's challenge so far suggest that traditional epistemology and its attendant foundationalist program make discourse and description superfluous. Rorty thinks foundationalism must be jettisoned in all its entirety. The point, however, is that the more modest versions of traditional-epistemology need not fall into the same pit as the traditional foundationalist program.

Rorty errs in generalizing his criticism to all forms of foundationalism. For instance, apart from traditional foundationalism which requires that epistemologists provide absolute and indubitable foundation in order to justify claims, there is the more modest version which relaxes the requirements of traditional foundationalism to make foundationalism less restrictive than the traditional.<sup>26</sup> As Gallagher argues, modest foundationalism should not be conceived as:

25 Rorty Richard; "Pragmatism and Philosophy" pp. 38-39. For a very related point, see Lewis C.I. *Mind And The World Order* (New York: Dover, 1956) pp. 22-24.

26 This distinction between the traditional and the Modest versions of foundationalism is well discussed in both Yunusa Kehinde Salami "A critical Assessment of Epistemic Foundationalism" (Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, Nigeria, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1988) and Yunusa Kehinde Salami "Towards A Marxist Epistemology" (Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, Nigeria, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, 1995). For more on this, see Pappas G.S; and Swain M. (eds); *Essays On Knowledge And Justification* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1978). Alston W. P. "Two Types of Foundationism" in the *Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1976); 165-185, Boujour L; "Can Empirical Knowledge Have A Foundation?" In *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 15, 1 (1978)



"making one right description" acceptable or as doing away with all discourse. It is not that which makes thought unnecessary, but that which makes it possible, and we cannot treat the fact that all truths arise for us through conversation as precluding the possibility that some of the truths which so arise may be necessary truths.<sup>27</sup>

Given Gallagher's argument, one can argue that Rorty's wholesale rejection of foundationalism is wrong. It shows that the modest foundationalist thesis can be freed from Rorty's objection. In fact, Rorty's pragmatist thesis can be further shown not to vitiate modest foundationalism.<sup>28</sup> Goldman's position becomes relevant in this regard. According to Goldman:

Standards for judging beliefs to be justified, or judging them to be pieces of knowledge; are socially evolved. But what these social standards or linguistic conventions require often involves accuracy of representation or appropriate processes of belief causation. Hence, knowledge is (partly) accuracy of representation, though its being so is a matter of there being a certain socially evolved concepts.<sup>29</sup>

Following Goldman, justifiedness is contrary to Rorty's view, partly a matter of mental causes. For Goldman, Rorty is wrong in saying that knowledge is a matter of what society 'lets us say'; because, if a proposition is true and a person has an appropriately formed belief in it, then he does know, no matter what his peers think.

This point is also emphasized by Putnam. For Putnam, although a claim's been right and someone's being in a position to make it are relative to the sort of language we use and the context we are in, yet, this does not mean that a claim is right whenever those who employ the language in question would accept it as right in its context. For Putnam, while it is true that "talk of what is 'right' and 'wrong' in any area only makes sense against the background of an inherited tradition, traditions themselves can be criticized".<sup>30</sup>

An extension of this point is that the internal "standards" adopted by a society or a culture cannot define what a reason is, since the standards themselves presuppose reason or reasonableness for

27 Gallagher K. R. "Rorty On Objectivity, Truth, and Social Consensus": 118-119.

28 Gallagher K. R. 124.

29 Goldman A. I., "Review of Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature" In *The Philosophical Review*, 90 (1981): 426-427.

30 Putnam Hilary; "Why Reason can't be Naturalized" in Baynes Kenneth et al (eds.) *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* pp. 227-228.



their interpretation. After all, it is not our task to mechanically apply cultural or social norms "as if they were a computer program and we were the computer"<sup>31</sup> Rather, it behoves us to interpret them, to bring them and the ideals that inform them into what Putnam called the "reflective equilibrium".

Another interesting aspect of Rorty's work is on his professed denial of epistemology and all kinds of general normative theory. For him there is no need spinning any theory of truth or of knowledge. The question is, can epistemology or all normative theories be successfully denied? For Putnam, to embark on such a denial is to commit a mental suicide.<sup>32</sup>

There is a legion of problems associated with such a denial. For instance, a denial of the normative nature of epistemology amounts to a postulation that there is no need for any general epistemological theory for determining which of our beliefs qualifies for knowledge, or what constitutes an epistemic justification. However, such a postulation is itself a normative position. It merely sets the norm that no theory should be normative. This is problematic because, such a theory, if it is right, then, it is false.

Contrary to Rorty, Henderson maintains that since epistemology is to provide us with a set of hypothetical imperatives with the purpose of improving our epistemic practice, then "epistemology is properly a normative discipline".<sup>33</sup>

Even if we take Rorty's favorite definition of philosophy in his positive, post realist sense as "an attempt to see how things in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term",<sup>34</sup> Rorty may still not be able to divest himself of the normative feature of traditional philosophy which he derives. after all, the greatest problem with which traditional philosophy is confronted and which it aims to resolve, is how to make conflicting ideas hang together. For instance, how can we hang atheism together with theism or materialism with idealism without being normative in our position? In this regard, Rorty has not suc-

31 Putnam Hilary: "Why Reason can't Be Naturalized" pp. 234.

32 Putnam Hilary: "Why Reason can't be Naturalized" p. 241.

33 Henderson David K: "Epistemic Competence And Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is not Just The Poor Person's Coherentism" In *The Journal of Philosophy* Vol. XCI, No. 12, (1994): 627.

34 Rorty Richard; *Consequences of Pragmatism* p. XIV, See also Gowans Christopher, W: "Intuition And Argument In Philosophy: A critique of Chisholm And Rorty" In *International Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (1984): 136.



ceeded in fully disengaging himself from the traditional conception of epistemology.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, Rorty indeed offers a general and a normative theory of knowledge. He can be located within the general traditional epistemological framework. His work expresses a coherentist thesis. Rorty's view is coherentist to the extent that he makes both truth and rational acceptability dependent on an agreement with a system of beliefs accepted in a linguistic and cultural community. It is not by accident that Rorty abandons the idea of 'conformity' and takes justification as "a relation between the propositions in question and other propositions from which the former may be inferred".<sup>36</sup>

#### Conclusion ;

The paper has examined Rorty's arguments for the denial of epistemology as a normative enterprise. A critical examination of Rorty's position that epistemology has outlived its usefulness is found to be confronted with some serious problems. Moreover, Rorty, as the reading shows, offers a general and a normative theory of knowledge.

35 See for example, Gowans Christopher W; "Intuition And Argument In Philosophy: A Critique of Chisholm And Rorty" In *International Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (1984); 138-140.

36 Rorty Richard; *Philosophy And The Mirror of Nature* p. 159, See also Gallagher K. R. "Rorty On Objectivity, Truth and Social Consensus"; 114.



## II

*Salat and Human Nature**K. A. Balogun***Introduction ;**

Islam is distinguished from other religions in that it prescribes salat-ritual prayers five times a day, in addition to the weekly congregation of Friday-jumuah service. This naturally leads to worship in public places such as in schools, places of work, hospitals, etc. Today, one of the widely accepted notions of salat among the generality of the people is that it consists of a variety of postures—standing, bowing and sitting—verbal declarations, recitations of verses and at-Tashahud during the observance of salat, this may be true to some extent. But in reality, salat consists of something deeper in meaning and message than what we can physically grasp.

The extent to which we can understand depends on our understanding of the root of Salat in our human nature. Salat, as it will be argued in this paper, has its root in human nature. It articulates the presuppositions of human existence and the necessary functions of human beings in the world.

Admittedly, there are millions of Muslims the world over who perform the daily prayers and the weekly jumuah service. Unfortunately, however, it appears that only a very insignificant proportion of the worshippers actually understand the meaning and significance of this act of worship. One cannot but be alarmed at the lack of divine wisdom which salat ought to have inculcated in the minds of many Muslims, when one looks at the frequency with which they observe their daily prayers and the multitude that turn out for every jumuah service.

The main reason for this lapse is that many worshippers have lost sight of the need to experience Allah daily in their prayers. Hence, the desired effects of this all important worship are hardly reflected in the conduct of many a worshipper. This paper, therefore, attempts to examine;



(i) Salat and human nature

(ii) The compatibility of salat with human nature, and

(iii) The effects of correct performance of salat.

But, before we proceed, let us define some terms used in this paper:

## DEFINITION OF TERMS

### The Term Salat

The term salat, according to Cowan, (1976:187), derives from the root salat which means "to pray" or "to worship". therefore, Salat means 'prayer' 'worship'. According to Hughes (1964:125) the word Salat is the liturgical form of prayer which is observed five times a day. Salat, it must be pointed out, is one of the five pillars upon which Islam is built. Fezul Karim (Al Hadis: 1938) records the Prophet Muhammed as having said:

Islam is built upon five pillars; the acknowledgment that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His Messenger, performance of prayer, payment of Zakat, fasting in the month of Ramadan; and pilgrimage to Makka by those who are able.

While a believer in Allah prays, Allah alone remains his object. this explains why the believer who observes salat is referred to as *abid* (a servant of God or a worshipper). While Allah, the object of such worship is referred to as *mabud* (the served/the worshipped).

### The term human nature :

The term 'human nature', as it is used in this paper, has little to do with the philosophical issue of 'personal identity' which has been influenced by at least five philosophical theories of human nature—the rational view, the religious view, scientific view, the existential view, and eastern view (Barry: 1980: 37ff). Rather, our concern here is what is technically known in Islam as *fitrah* i.e. something that is natural in man, According to the Qur'an, "the nature of man is designed by Allah who has made mankind" (Q. 30:30). Commenting on this verse, Abdullah Yusuf said:

As turned out from the creative hand of Allah, man (by his nature) is innocent, pure, true, free, inclined to right and virtue, and endowed with true understanding about his own position in the Universe and about Allah's goodness, wisdom and power. That is the true nature (The Holy Qur'an: English translation of the meanings and commentary: 1186).

The term, *fitrah*, is further elucidated by the following tradition of the Prophet. It reads:

There is no child who is not born upon the natural religion... (Fazlul Karim: 191).

Therefore, salat, in this context is being looked at as a natural way of worship which Allah, the Almighty, has given man right from birth,



## THE COMPATIBILITY OF SALAT WITH HUMAN NATURE

Salat is conceived by the true believer in Allah as being in agreement with human nature in many respects; first, our coming to this world is involuntary. He who has brought us into existence is God and the purpose of bringing us is to come serve Him. In the Qur'an, Allah says;

Surely, I am Allah, there is no god but I, so serve Me and keep up prayers (salat) for the remembrance of Me (Q. 20:14).

No wonder, therefore, that Allah has practically demonstrated to us that the posture of *sujud* (prostration) which is a major aspect of salat is the position a new child assumes in finding its way out of its mother's womb.

Scientifically, it has been proved that when a baby is ready to be born the announcement of its coming is usually made by the bursting of "the bag of water" with a resultant gush of fluid from the vagina. The coming of water at this point in time is what the medical doctors refer to as "rupture of the membranes" (Jones, 1993: 206). After the gush of this water, the contraction increases and the increase in this contraction pushed the baby down and at the appointed moment, the forehead of the baby touches the birth-canal and a baby is born!

It is pertinent to draw attention to the relevance of "the water" which announces the birth of the baby and 'the forehead' of the child that touches the ground to salat. 'The water' symbolises the water with which the Muslims perform ablution to purify themselves in readiness for prayer. And the prostration posture—which is the natural posture of any new baby indicates the baby's pledge of total submission to the will of Allah. This is the highest level of submission! (When the most precious part of the body—the face—kisses the most lowly of all things—the dust of the earth). This cannot be due to any other being except to Allah, the Creator of all things. The Qur'an in its characteristic clarity expatiated on this in the following words:

Whatever beings there are in the heavens and the earth do prostrate themselves to God (acknowledge subjection) with good-will or in spite of themselves; so do their shadows in the morning and evenings, (Q. 13:15)

Similar details can be obtained from other verses of the Holy Qur'an such as: Qur'an 16:49; 22:18. We must hasten to stress that this posture of prostration is not adopted for any creature of God either for the purpose of worship or for showing respect for anything created by God. The Holy Qur'an, in its characteristic perfect guidance, says:



Among His signs are the night and the day, and the sun and the moon. Adore not the sun and the moon, but adore God, Who created them, if it is Him you wish to serve (Q. 41:37);

It is evident from what we have said that prostration which has been equated with salat is the first assignment a baby does on its first day of existence on earth. In this, therefore, is an eloquent indication of the leading role which salat is designed to play in the spiritual well-being of the baby when it grows up. This explains why Allah commands thus:

O you who believe, bow down and prostrate yourselves and serve your Lord...(Q. 22:77).

Secondly, it has been established that man naturally turns to a power greater than himself or for help when a calamity befalls him. Consciously or unconsciously man's ultimate recourse is inevitably ALLAH. When the going becomes rough and everything seems dark without hope, man cannot but affirm God's presence.

Let's illustrate this point by the unconscious use of the Language of faith which an unbeliever uses during the time of danger. The moment an unbeliever is faced with danger he naturally calls on God to deliver him. There are many conclusive proofs in the Qur'an to corroborate this point.

In the Qur'an, 10:12, for instance, we read:

When trouble touches a man, he cries unto Us (In all postures) —lying down on his side, or sitting or standing. But when We have solved his trouble he passes on his way as if he had never cried to Us for a trouble that touched him!...

Summarizing the point that man will naturally call on Him and pray to Him in times of danger Allah asks rhetorically;

Say, Who is it that delivers you from the dark recesses of land and see when you call upon Him in humility and silent terror. if He only delivers us from these (danger), we shall truly show our gratitude? Say: it is God that delivers you from these and all (other) distresses; and yet you worship false gods! (Q. 6:63-64).

Thirdly, salat is an expression of gratitude by the created to the Creator. We have been told in the Qur'an that everything God created glorify His name and performs worship regularly to Him. We are further informed that even the non-human creatures perform their duties to God in their own ways although other creatures may not understand their language of worship. In the Qur'an (17:44) Allah declares:

The seven heavens and the earth and those in them declare His glory, and there is not a single thing but glorify Him with the praise, but you do not understand their glorification.



The picture one gets from the above is that the non-human creature are always in the service of God. No rest and no break. If non-humans can serve God in this form, man, who is created to be the controller of these creatures, should serve God the more as a mark of gratitude to Allah through *salat*. Achieving this goal is of a practical possibility if only we understand what we do in the various postures of *salat*. For instance, each time we recite *suratul-fatihah* during each and every rak'at of *salat* we declare our gratitude to Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful saying: *Al-humdulilahi Rabil-Alamin*. The following *hadith* summarises the expression of honour and gratitude the believer shows during this *salat* while reciting the *Fatihah*: the Prophet Muhammad was quoted to have said that Allah, the Exalted, has said;

I have divided (*salat*) the prayer' into two halves between Me and my servant, and My servant will receive what he asks. When the servant says: Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, Allah says: My servant has praised Me. And when the servant says: the Most Compassionate, the Merciful, Allah says; My servant has lauded Me: And when the servant says: Master of the Day of Judgement, He remarks: My servant has glorified me. And when the worshipper says: You alone do we worship and from You do we seek assistance. Allah says; This is between Me and My servant and My servant, will receive what he asks for. Then when the worshipper say: Guide us to the right path, the path of those to whom you have been Gracious-not those who have incurred your displeasure, nor those who have gone astray. Allah says; My servant will receive when he asks for (Muslim, 1972:215).

It is clear from what has been said in this *hadith* that all forms of worship performed by the lower creatures of God are contained in the recitation of *suratul-Fatihah* alone in the *salat*. It is equally evident that observance of *salat* in Islam is not just a set of rituals imposed on the Muslims, but practical ordinances prescribed for believers with certain clear-cut goals in view, among which is to regulate the individual's relations with his Creator as Allah has done with other non-human creatures.

Lastly, the same *Sujud* (prostration) posture with which man has come into this world is the same posture he will be asked to maintain before Allah when the hour of judgement arrives on the Day of Reckoning. According to the Qur'anic account, every man and woman born into the world in the natural prostration posture—will be raised up again, and gathered together and will be called upon to prostrate in adoration before Allah, the Almighty. On that day those who had not observed *Salat* in their life—time will find it difficult to bend down and carry out the prostration order and the conse-



quence would be perilous for them. But those who had regularly done it during their life-time would find it easy because they were already accustomed to kneeling down before their Lord while on earth. The holy Qur'an has given a vivid summary of the picture of that Day:

The Day that the Shin Shall be laid bare, and they shall be summed to prostrate but they shall not be able. Their eyes will be cast down, ignominy will cover them; seeing that they had been summoned aforetime to bow in adoration while refused. (Q. 68:42-43).

Evident from the foregoing is the fact that if salat is not correctly and regularly performed on earth it will be difficult for to man to perform the required sajdah (prostration) on the Day of Reckoning.

### THE EFFECT OF SALAT'S CORRECT PERFORMANCE

Much of what is gained in Salat is determined by how it is observed; how the worshipper shapes his thoughts, feelings, actions and perceptions during the exercise. So crucial and important are these things to make salat dynamic, purposeful and result oriented. The holy Qur'an advise the Muslims to approach Salat in a devout frame of mind. This is because true worship does not consist in the mere form of salat without the heart and the mind being earnestly applied to seek the realisation of the presence of Allah; Allah, in this wise, declares:

So, woe to the worshippers who are neglectful of their prayers, those who (want but) to be seen... (Q. 107:4-5).

The Prophet, on him be peace, said; "A man gets credit only for that part of his prayer of which he is conscious (al Ghazali, 1983:34).

Therefore, efforts must be made by the worshippers to concentrate during salat to obtain its maximum benefit. The following are to be strictly adhered to in observing salat.

- 1: Knowing the meaning and deep implication of reciting *surah-l-Fatihah*.

This becomes necessary because *Fatihah* which is invariably recited in each and every rakat of a salat, sums up our gratitude to Allah, emphasises Allah's unrivaled Greatness, affirms our praises for Him and our faith in Him as well as our hope and aspirations in things that matter in our life.

The moment the surah is recited the worshipper must have done three major things: namely, that Allah, being the Creator and Lord of the universe, deserves not only his praise but also his obedience. Secondly, that because the worshipper realises Allah's superiority,



he, the worshipping, would worship none except Him and would seek assistance from none but Him. Lastly, that guidance will only come from Him alone.

2. Knowing the meaning and the implications of some, if not all, the surahs we recite and other utterances we make during salat.
3. Performing the acts of salat gradually and calmly and in full awareness. Ibn'Abbas once remarked.

Two moderate cycles of prayers, performed in full awareness, are better than a whole night's vigil when the heart is inattentive (al Ghazali, 1983:30).

Apart from these abstract aspects of salat, the meaning and implications of the following physical aspects of salat must be fully appreciated. They are:

### 1. Performance of Ablution

If ablution is done in the right manner, the purification of the body and soul would have been achieved. For this to be achieved, efforts must be made by the person performing ablution to relate every physical act of ablution to his thoughts. There is no doubt that ablution performed five times daily correctly and in the right manner will wipe out most if not all evil ways of the performed. This explains why Prophet Muhammed had said:

He who makes ablution and makes it in the best way, his sins leave his body, even from beneath his body (Khan. IV:280).

### 2. AT-Takbir

At the beginning of salat, after the worshipper might have made his intention, he would raise his hands to the level of the ears say: "Allahu Akbar"-Allah is most Great. He then lowers the hands again. This act must be related in the inner meaning in his thoughts, namely, that the worshipper, by raising up his hands, has surrendered to Almighty Allah. this act represents the very basis of Islam-submission to Allah's will.

### 3. Ruku

When the worshipper bends his trunk and grips his knees with his hands, he is expected to keep the posture for some second to recite some hymes before he straightens up and remains erect until all the body joints have resettled in their usual positions prior to going down to prostrate before his creator, Allah. Beside the demonstration of the worshipper's humility and respect before Allah, the act also promotes good health and vitality through a simple but systematic physical exercise for the body (Muhammed, 1980:23).

Perhaps the most eloquent verbal declaration is what the worshipper proclaims on rising from the bowing position. He declares thus: *Sami'a' Ilah liman hamidah*; "Allah listens to the servant who



praises Him". Undoubtedly, this is a re-affirmation of the worshipper's beliefs in the fact that Allah is Ever present, hears whatever he says and sees whatever he does. Truly, if only the worshipper could appreciate what he said during this posture he would certainly attain perfection.

#### 4. Sujud (prostration)

According to a tradition of the Prophet Muhammed (SAW) (Bukhari, II:285) "The servant is never closer to God, than when he is prostrating himself in worship" In addition to having closeness with Allah in this posture, the act has a physical effect on the worshippers body as exercises for the arms, hands, spines, waist, stomach as well as knees.

It is clear that all the acts of salat, if properly performed, will have a considerable impact on the spiritual and moral state of the worshipping Muslims. Salat, it must be pointed out keeps the worshipper in constant touch with the source of his existence. Salat also makes him realise that should he go astray in his worldly life he would be ashamed of himself when he is called upon on the Day of Reckoning to give an account of his stewardship. Consequently, Salat keeps on reminding the worshipper of Allah's do's and don't's, because if the worshipper's bowing and prostration in prayer do not deter him from disobeying Allah, then, they are of no use. As the Qur'an has asserted:

... and established regular prayer (salat) for regular prayer restrains from shameful and evil deeds... (Q. 29:45).

#### CONCLUSION

It is clear from the foregoing that salat, being a natural worship is the first assignment performed by a new born baby on its first day on earth. it is also the last assignment to be performed on the Day of Reckoning. Furthermore, it is the duty expected of everybody. The paper has also established that salat when performed correctly will produce constant God-consciousness in the worshipper. it has been observed that not much effect of salat is seen among the Muslims. We are of the opinion that in view of the tremendous spiritual, moral and social values of salat concerted efforts should be made by every Muslim to observe salat correctly. this is the only way by which we can ensure that Salat serves the noble purpose for what it is meant,



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## DEDICATION

This 150th and 151th combined issue of Darshana International is most respectfully dedicated to the only contributor of this Journal Prof. Dr. John O. Nelson, Dept of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder, U.S.A., who happens to be the member of the Editorial Board of Darshana International since its inception.

The Editors of Darshana International are grateful for his valuable contributions in the field of Philosophy. He is a great thinker and an eminent scholar of International repute. He has always been a source of encouragement to us.

ANURAG ATREYA  
Managing Editor



## EDITORIAL

THE role of an editorial is to extol virtue, condemn evil, and raise questions. The present editorial will extol truth and raise a question.

It may be objected by our positivist friends that in extolling truth we shall be extolling a semantical nonentity, a verbal cipher signifying nothing. Their contention will be, and has been, that " 'p' is true" amounts referentially to no more than "p"; that, in short, 'p' is true = p.

And so indeed it seems (we grant) when one looks at the isolated assertion, "p' is true." It then does appear that no more is meant by "p"; is true" than "p"; that instead of affirming, for example, "The proposition, 'The moon is bright,' is true," we might without the slightest loss in sense affirm simply, "The moon is bright."

What this experiment really shows, however, is not that the word 'true' is an empty cipher but that is bad philosophy to look at anything-and especially a proposition-in complete isolation from other things. If 'p' is true = p and that is the end of the matter semantically we should be able to eliminate the word 'true' (as well as 'truth') from any sentence in which it occurs merely by dropping it out and asserting the resulting sentence or some grammatical expansion of it. But let us now try to apply this formula beyond the narrow confines of "p' is true." How, for instance, are we to assert, without using the term 'true' or some synonym, "p' is more true than false" (a proposition-form that we might use in characterizing some person, e.g., "The proposition, 'Harry is charitable,' is more true than false")? Or how are we to express the positivist's own verification for them?" Will it suffice to say, "Utterances purporting to assert matters of fact are meaningless unless we can conceivably assert them"? Clearly not. But in addition to these more particular difficulties there is this very general problem to be considered: we speak meaningfully of persons striving for the truth ; we praise those who persevere in this struggle; we pledge ourselves to it, If " 'p' is true = p" is an adequate analysis of the concept of truth, then to strive for the truth, to pledge ourselves to it, amounts to no more than pledging ourselves to strive to make assertions. And that is obviously absurd ! On the other hand, it is clear that any adequate theory of truth must make sense of the fact that truth is something esteemed (in a way that mere assertion is not).

How then are we to account for the esteem in which truth is held? Plainly, to get a tenable answer, we must broaden the base of our analysis and observations to include, not merely isolated statements



of the form, " 'p' is true," but the human situation in which " 'p' is true" has its inception. We must take account of the long and toilsome history of Man , who commencing in benighted ignorance, falsehood, superstition, and illusion-----certainly an inauspicious and pitiable beginning which barely promised survival, much less grandeur--today inhabits those sun-lit towering cities of concept and experiment which we call the sciences. This sublime elevation in man's state has not been accomplished without effort and daring. Although the penalties are great, the easy thing to do is to rest content with old answers, ancient error, and venerated deception. Although the rewards are correspondingly great, the difficult thing to do is to question and disagree with old answers, ancient error, and venerated deception. But some men--indeed most men--have questioned, and by questioning and disagreeing, have winnowed philosophy, psychology, sociology, parapsychology, religion, and mysticism from incantation, magic, and myth. This vast enterprise of spirit and intellect, and the methods that have been developed to forward it, might be compared to a world-wide and ages old association of craftsmen, all of whose products, which get identified by a certain mark, are known for their durability, precision of workmanship, and reliability. And we might then say that when we use the word 'true' we signify in part that what we call true---- whether a belief, sentence , proposition, or theory--bears, as it were the stamp of this illustrious enterprise, much as silver of a certain degree of purity and reliability is stamped "sterling." To say " 'p' is true" is therefore to say more than "p" and to imply more than "p". It is to say, in terms of our analogy, "I, as the sponsor of this proposition, affirm that is a product of the association previously referred to and I affirm that I am here acting as a member of that association." Of course, these claims made and responsibilities taken and traditions invoked are mere overtones--indeed, practically inaudible overtones--in most of the conversations of daily life. When we assert passing matters of fact like, "It is true that Tom owes Bill four dollars," which have only the most distant kinship to the titanic efforts that have catapulted mankind from abysmal ignorance into the broad daylight of science, we do not call into play and we have no need to call into play immense forces. But there are times when we do; when the word 'true' is needed to serve notice of high resolves and great purposes and past glories: when, for instance, we are called upon to testify to important matters at personal peril; or when we propound new theories that challenge old beliefs; or when, in general, we use the noun "truth" in place of the corresponding adjective.

If our analysis of the concept of truth, partial though it is , can lay claim to being itself true, we have not only established the existence of truth as something more than a semantical nonentity but in the process we have already extolled truth. For in explaining why truth is esteemed we have a fortiori presented its virtues, and to present the virtues of a thing is by definition to extol it. So we might very well have ended this editorial with the last paragraph, and we should have, except that one



question remains to nag us, which we want now to air with as much honesty as we can.

Professor Atreya has pointed out, in his editorial in the second issue of *Darshana*, that tolerance of other views ("also-ism") is more proper to Man's metaphysical condition than intolerance ("only-ism"), as well as immeasurably more beneficent. Our present inquiry would appear to confirm this view from the perspective of truth-theory. So far as we were able to see, the enterprise of truth-achievement (as it might be called) had, as one necessary condition of its origin, disagreement with ancient error and delusion. To maintain that the existence of disagreement therefore remains a necessary condition of truth-achievement would be to fall into the genetic fallacy. But there does exist evidence on this score. What evidence we possess certainly suggests, for instance, that today's scientific theories will be corrected by next year's as to day's correct last year's. Nor can there be envisaged any end of this process--at least not at the plane of most general theory. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that disagreement does remain a necessary condition of truth-achievement; and in turn this means that the failures of others to agree with us should be treated, not as malicious intransigencies to be extirpated or punished at the stake or its modern equivalents, but as honest endeavors which no less than ours serve in the cause of truth. The nagging question that arises is not, then, should there be toleration and indeed even esteem of disagreement: there should be, it is clear. How far such toleration and esteem should be extended: here the question awaits an answer.

On the face of it, theoretic tolerance should be extended to all those who also tolerate theoretic disagreement, no matter how sure we may feel that the persons in question are ignorant, superstitious, or deluded. But what about those persons and powers who brook no disagreement--who if, given the opportunity would, on their own testimony or practice, silence all theoretic opposition and stamp it out? Such persons and powers are not seekers of truth. They can hardly, therefore, be champions of truth, though this is often their excuse for suppressing disagreement. Obviously, neither they nor their repressive policies deserve the sincere truthseeker's esteem. Nor do they deserve even his toleration. But should toleration nonetheless be extended them? And if it should be to what extent and in what ways and if it should not be, what form should the truth-seeker's opposition take? Should it take the form of ridicule alone, for example? Or in the case where the forces of suppression reign supreme should it, perhaps, take the form of that nonviolent but unyielding resistance which Professor Atreya has described in this article on ahimsa-employed, let us say, by the overwhelming mass of scholars, scientists, and theorists, rather than isolated individuals? This question or cluster of questions is one, we fear, that our Era has not as yet found a clear answer to. Out of the give-and-take and self-correction of disagreement, however, it seems certain that a solution will be forthcoming.



## I

## A REPORT ON SOME NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

A very recent and possibly important development in linguistic philosophy is the application of comparative grammar to an examination **on analytical lines** of the question, "Are philosophical theses relative to particular languages?" Illustrative of this new technique are Tsu-Lin Mei's two articles, "Chinese Grammar and the Linguistic Movement in Philosophy" (henceforth to be referred to as CGLMP), **The Review of Metaphysics**, March, 1961 (pp. 463-493) and Predicate, A Grammatical Preliminary," (henceforth to be referred to as Subject and Predicate), **The Philosophical Review**, April 1961 (pp. 153-176).

In these articles Tsu-Lin Mei attempts to show, through specific analyses and comparisons of Chinese and English grammar, that at least certain philosophical theses are purely "grammatical." In terming philosophical theses grammatical Tsu-Lin Mei means to claim that what ever appearance of validity or importance they possess depends entirely on the accidental features of some natural grammar, so that to remove or alter those features of grammar results in eliminating the appearance of validity or importance possessed by the theses in question. In support of his contention, he cites two sorts of evidence.

On the one hand, he cites philosophical theses that appear important to English-users and that do not appear important to Chinese-users due to the fact that various morphological and syntactical features are present in Chinese that are lacking in English. To English-users, for instance, Ryle's distinction between task and achievement verbs seems important and worthy of note. Paralleling the importance that Ryle's distinction has for English-users is the fact that in English no morphological distinction is made between verbs like "look" (which are designated by Ryle task verbs) and verbs like "see" (which are designated achievement verbs). In Chinese, however, grammatical marks differentiate achievement verbs from task verbs: "Briefly, tasks.



achievements, and dispositions are expressed by Chinese verbs whose morphological structures are respectively of the form T, Ta and TteA.,

Where T is a verb; A and te are suffixes. Thus it is possible to tell by the morphological structure of a Chinese verb alone, whether it stands for a task, an achievement, or a disposition." (466 CGLMP). Tsu-Lin Mei therefore concludes that "When the object-language is changed from English to Chinese... the value of the philosophical these of ...Ryle... undergoes drastic depreciation ..... (because) .... the words expressing tasks and achievements, instead of being systematically misleading, are systematically illuminating" (466-467 CGLMP).

The second sort of evidence cited consists in philosophical theses that appear valid to English-users but that appear invalid to Chinese-users because certain morphological and syntactical features are present in English which are lacking in Chinese. As an instance Tsu-Lin Mei cites Frege's thesis that predicates are incomplete or unsaturated objects whereas subjects are complete objects. This thesis, which has a certain amount of plausibility to English-users, is paralleled by the grammatical fact that third person present tense singular predicates in English, e.g., "is wise," "smokes," do not occur alone, as in lists, commands, and so forth, but only in conjunction with subjects forming propositions, e.g., "John smokes," "John is wise," while subjects, John, Socrates, dog, can and do occur alone or without prepositional ties, as in lists, commands, and so forth (491 CGLMP). Tsu-Lin Mei points out that the Chinese counterparts of "smokes" and "is wise" can also occur alone or without prepositional ties: "Yu-tang ch'ouyen means "Yu-tang smokes.; this qualifies ch'ouyen as the counterpart of 'smoke'. But ch'ouyen 'smokes' can be completed into many kinds of remarks (or clauses), all of which are non-propositional, for example, ch'ouyen can be a subject, Ch'ouyen puhao 'smoking is not good..', a part of an adjective, Ch'ouyen ch'ang shengping 'He who smokes frequently gets ill.': or an imperative, Ch'ouyen! 'Smoke! (490 CGLMP). The plain import of Tsu-Lin Mei's discussion is that because the morpheme 's' attaches itself conjunction with subjects, while no distinctive morphemes attach themselves to third person singular verbs in Chinese, Frege's thesis that predicates are unsaturated possesses a certain amount of force for English-users but none at all for Chinese-users.

Concerning the more extended claims that Tsu-Lin Mei wants to make, some obscurity remains. Does he, for example, intend to claim that all philosophical theses are relative to the grammar of particular languages-that the esse of every philosophical thesis is, so to speak, a grammatical percipi? At the beginning of CGLMP he gives that impression; for to the questions. Is the importance of a philosophical thesis relative to language? and Is the validity of a philosophical thesis relative to language? he says, "The answer to both questions is 'yes' (CGLMP 463). At the conclusion of CGLMP he seems to suggest, on



the other hand, that it is just certain philosophical literature seems to be saturated with (them)" (492 CGLMP), and this appears too to be his thesis in Subject and Predicate. Another ambiguity that characterizes Tsu-Lin Mei's discussion centers on the question whether he means to hold that the validity or invalidity of a philosophical thesis is simply relative to particular languages or whether, in some sense independent of grammar, philosophical theses are false and true, so that it may be held that some natural grammars instigate or reinforce philosophical error and others help us find our way to philosophical truth. The latter certainly seems to be Tsu-Lin Mei's view when, for instance, he says, "What happens if there are no misleading expressions? Is philosophy out of business then? Let us consider the situation in which systematically misleading expressions in English have, as their counterparts in Chinese, expressions that are systematically illuminating." (465 CGLMP). But over against this and similar assertions that are made stands the claim that philosophical theses are simply relative to grammar, for this claim implies that we have no right to talk of systematically misleading or systematically illuminating expressions.

The ambiguities in Tsu-Lin Mei's particular discussion need not, however, concern us beyond pointing up the fact that the proponents of comparative grammatical analysis (As we might term the method under discussion) have still to arrive at several fundamental decisions. In the present commentary we are concerned with the importance that comparative grammatical analysis may possibly have for philosophy rather than discovering what minimal truth it may possess. But the importance that it can have for philosophy is directly proportionate to how extreme are the claims that can be made for it. Thus whether anyone is actually willing to make extreme claims for this form of analysis or not, it is such claims that we shall want to examine.

One such claim (suggested by Tsu-Lin Mei) is that grammatical analysis shows that all philosophical theses are relative to the grammars of natural languages. This claim amounts to the bankruptcy of philosophy. For if philosophical theses are merely the product of particular grammars, what are we doing when we philosophize except contemplating grammatical illusions? And what point then can the philosophical enterprise have, unless it is to invent some artificial grammar lacking the power to produce the illusions in question? But what point can even that undertaking have? Once we know that the source of our philosophical theses and problems is the grammar of our particular native language and so recognize that in philosophy we are dealing only with empty illusions, the most fitting and most direct course of action to take is merely to abjure philosophy and philosophizing.

A second claim that bears on the status of philosophy is the claim (also suggested by Tsu-Lin Mei) that natural grammars in varying degrees mirror or fail to mirror the structures of philosophical truth.



So that whereas the grammar of one natural language may impel us to adopt a false or even nonsensical philosophical thesis the grammar of another natural language may impel us to adopt a true philosophical thesis. This claim, it is obvious, assumes that philosophical theses are not simply relative to grammar but are independently true or false. Thus, it speaks of systematically misleading expressions and systematically illuminating expressions.

The implications of this second claim are as favourable to the philosophical enterprise as those of the first were unfavourable. It we can grant the second claim, for instance, then we can suppose that by judiciously applying the methods of comparative grammatical analysis we shall be able to collect together from the grammars of natural languages the morphological and syntactically misleading, and eliminating the latter, form an invented language or "symbolism.....which obeys the rules of logical grammar --- of logical syntax" (Tractatus, 3. 325). That is to say, granting the second claim, the possibility presents itself of forming a language which ensures that its users will adopt philosophical truth and reject philosophical error. In turn, this would mean the end of the age old battle between philosophical schools, and perhaps it might mean even the beginning of common understanding and agreement among men throughout all the spheres of their activities. For suppose that the philosophy of Marxist communism embodies both truth and falsity and suppose the philosophy of Lockean democracy contains both truth and falsity, but that a language obeying the rules of logical syntax ensures that its users adopt philosophical truth and reject philosophical error: obviously the users of that language will neither advocate Marxist communism or Lockean democracy but they will all agree on some set of doctrines combining and excluding elements of the two. Now it is a well-known fact that people who agree on political matters are not prone to engage in political conflict. Thus, supposing that present wars are largely political wars, we can see the possibility of philosophy's roviding the conditions for peace and the elimination of war, even as some philosophers like Hobbes have thought (for the computation of causes in Hobbes finally amount to linguistic analysis and synthesis).

Presented with such momentous consequences, both favourable and unfavorable for philosophy, it behooves us to ask which claim, if either, is tenable, the first or second. This we shall now do, though the answers we give - it should be said at once - are intended to provide only the outlines and beginnings of a more exhaustive inquiry.

The most immediate objection that presents itself against the first claim is expressed in the question: And is that claim itself a thesis relative to grammar? If it is then of course it lacks any real title to our assent. But on the face of it, the claim that all philosophical theses are relative to grammar cannot be itself a mere reflection of grammar, nor can the philosophical discussion that inquires whether it or the second



claim is valid and sets forth the pros and cons of the matter (as we are now doing). For example, how can grammar possibly dictate either the thesis that some grammatical expressions are systematically misleading and others systematically illuminating, or a contrary thesis? Plainly, it cannot. Even if we could show that every traditional philosophical thesis was paralleled by the presence or absence of grammatical structures in various languages the question would remain open and find no parallel in those grammars: "And are these philosophical theses merely a reflection of grammatical structures or do these grammatical structures mirror or fail to mirror philosophical truth"? Whatever the answer to this question may be out philosophical discussion of it must proceed at a level transcending the presentations of grammar. Thus, it cannot possibly be the case that all philosophical theses are merely grammatical theses in disguise.

With respect to the second claim there are at least two questions that call for a hearing. Let us grant that there is indeed such a thing as philosophical truth and falsity which is independent of grammar (as our previous discussion seemed to indicate), and that the particular grammars of natural languages mirror or distort philosophical truth. And let us grant that, these things being so, a symbolism obeying logical syntax is theoretically possible. We shall want to ask: (1) Would not studies in formal semantics and syntactics, rather than comparative grammatical analysis, provide a surer and more direct route to the construction of a symbolism obeying the rules of logical syntax? (2) Of even more importance, we shall want to ask how we are to tell which philosophical theses are true and which false, and thus which expressions in a language are systematically misleading and which systematically illuminating. Tsu-Lin Mei, for example, assumes that certain theses are in error and others are not. For example, he seems to assume that Frege's thesis of unsaturated predicates is untrue and that Ryle's thesis distinguishing between task and achievement verbs is true. But on the grounds of comparative grammar alone could we not assume the very opposite? That the attachment of the morpheme 's' to third person present tense verbs illuminates a fact about the world that Chinese grammar does not illuminate but hides, namely, that predicates are really incomplete objects and subjects complete objects? And on the other hand, might we not suppose that the grammatical marks in Chinese grammar which designate verbs like "look" task verbs and verbs like "see" achievement verbs project a difference where there is no real difference, and that English grammar, in not distinguishing morphologically between see and look, projects the metaphysically true state of affairs? As I said how can grammatical considerations alone give us the answer as to which of these sets of assumptions is correct? So far as I can see it cannot. But that means that before we can apply comparative grammatical analysis to the construction of a perfect language or a language free of theses are true and which false using the traditional methods of philosophers.



## II

# A REFUTATION OF THE HUMEAN ANALYSIS OF CAUSALITY

Wherever the terms 'causality' and 'cause' occur in the following pages they will be understood to stand for the terms 'physical causality' and 'physical cause'.

By "the Humean analysis of causality" I shall understand that analysis, found in Hume, Russell<sup>1</sup>, and others, which reduces causality to a mere regularity of events, or in Hume's exact words, "An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and continuity to those objects that resemble the latter,"<sup>2</sup>

By "ordinary conception of causality" I shall mean that conception which commonly expresses itself in opposition to humean analysis in such sentences as, "Hume's causes lack any push and pull", "Hume's causes do not do anything." and so on. A more precise account of the difference between these two conceptions is, however, possible, and if we wish to raise the question, "Which is right, the Humean or the ordinary conception of causality?" it is essential. Since it will be my aim in this paper to answer the last question I shall begin by trying to clarify what distinguishes Hume's analysis of causality, which I shall refer to by the abbreviation HC, from the ordinary conception of causality, which I shall refer to by the abbreviation OC.

There are two sets of differences between HC and OC that I want to call attention to. Both appear, at first glance, to be trivial differences. But on further examination both prove to be extremely significant, the one set prohibiting and the other permitting the predication of the very property that lies at the heart of OC and whose presence and absence constitute the essential difference between HC and OC.

Hume, it will be noted, approaches the analysis or consideration of

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, chapter ix.

<sup>2</sup> Hume, *A Treatise of human nature*, ed. Selby-Bigge, p.170.



causality from a visual standpoint. He observes the motion of one body and another and "instead of an impulse" find "only that the one body approaches the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but without any sensible interval."<sup>3</sup> He holds an object up to his eyes and discovers nothing in its known qualities on which cause and effect depend.<sup>4</sup> These are typical instances of the purely visual framework to which Hume confines his inquiry. Indeed, in that Hume reduces all things to impressions and ideas and consistently treats impressions and ideas in terms of visual perceptions, one might fairly contend that the visual standpoint from which he analyses causes represents not merely a rather plausible choice of method (for most of what we learn is through our eyes), but an ontological commitment. But however that may be, the visual orientation of HC is the first feature of it that I want to point out. The second is Hume's practice of describing causality in terms of a binary relation,  $A(R)B$ , or complexes that can be reduced to a binary relation, e.g., the sequence of A's followed by B's what will concern us here is the numerical part of the description: the fact that Hume, following no doubt the grammatical division, cause and effect, decomposes causality into a two membered relation.

In what way, with respect to the above two features of HC does OC differ? First, when Hume describes some causal happening, E.G., the motion of one Billiard ball causing the motion of another, he intends in this, not to be asserting that this billiard ball causing the motion of that one, but to be resolving the concept of causality into its essential parts. In considering causal situations from a visual standpoint, and indeed, from a standpoint that interprets everything in terms of visual perception's Hume therefore limits our understanding of causality to visual terms. On the other hand, when a person ordinarily describes some causal happening, e.g., "A stone caused the window to break," he is not attempting to describe what the concept of causality consists in: he is merely asserting that there is a cause. That is, he is applying the concept of cause to something. Thus, even though his description may happen to consist of visual terms, he is not limiting our understanding of what is described to visual terms. The stone he mentions, for instance, is the stone that we all know not merely as something seen, but something that has weight and hardness, and when thrown, a good deal of bruising power if you get in its way; the last of which we have learned, not by looking at stones, but handling them, throwing them, getting in their way.

The second respect in which I wish to say that HC and OC differ is the following. HC, we have pointed out, describes causality in terms of a binary relation,  $A(R)B$ , or complexes that reduce to a two-membered relation. In the sense that HC takes as fundamental the decomposition

3 IBID., pp. 76-77

4 IBID., pp. 77



of causality into a two-membered relation and so aims at descriptions containing two and only two individual terms, where individual terms are understood to refer to things existing or seeming to exist through durations of time. I shall speak of a numerically fundamental description of HC, "There is the perception of a falling stone followed by the perception of a splash," but this statement is: "The perception of a falling stone followed by the perception of a splash," but this statement is: "The perception of a falling stone is followed by the perception of a splash." What I wish to say, then is that, where by 'numerically fundamental description of OC is meant something analogous to 'numerically fundamental description of HC' the numerically fundamental descriptions in OC do not describe causes in terms of a binary relation,  $A(R)B$ , or complexes that reduce to a binary relation. The numerically fundamental descriptions of causes in OC contain at least three individual terms and express, at the very least, a ternary relation,  $(R)abc$ .

In saying that the numerically fundamental descriptions in OC contain at least three individual terms I mean to say that they always do, and this claim, it may seem, is contradicted by the facts. Descriptions like, "Lightning causes thunder," "The explosion causes the windows to rattle," are commonplace in OC, and unless we are willing to maintain that the word 'cause' in these descriptions stand for an individual term--and this Hume, in his failure to find a simple impression for the idea of cause demonstrates we cannot plausibly do--we shall have to say that two and not three individual terms compose the descriptions in question. And so, indeed, they do. But what I deny is that these descriptions are numerically fundamental descriptions in OC. My point is that although descriptions containing only two individual terms do occur in OC, and even frequently occur there, they are never considered complete descriptions; we are always entitled to ask for an elaboration: and this elaboration requires the presence of three or more individual terms. For instance, if you say, "Lightning causes thunder," and I ask, as I may, "How does it cause thunder?" you are obliged to answer something like, "Lightning causes thunder by splitting the air," or if you do not have any answer at hand, still you will know that an answer like the last is what is called for. That is, whenever we assert in OC a proposition of the form, "A causes B," we are tacitly committed to also asserting a proposition of the form, "A causes B by C," whether we know what value to give C or not.

This will have to do for the clarification of the two sets of differences between HC and OC which I am interested in. Whether these differences appear, as I claimed they would, trivial or not is something that cannot be demonstrated, though I think it highly likely they must for the very reason that great numbers of philosophers have, in the past, accepted HC with no signs of conceptual anxiety or distress. It has seemed to them, I believe, that in passing from OC to HC they were taking a very



innocent and inconsequential step, just as it has often seemed to philosophers that in calling colours 'objects' or thoughts 'entities' they were really making no serious alteration in concepts. As our natural impulse to complain that HC leaves out push and pull suggests, however, the step we take from OC to HC is anything but innocent and certainly not inconsequential. The seemingly trivial differences we have mentioned have this effect: the set belonging to HC prohibit us from predicating, those belonging to OC permit us to predicate, action of causes. And that for a good many philosophical reasons, is about as profound and as important a difference in conceptions as there can be. But let me now present my evidence for these contentions.

First of all, to show that when we restrict our understanding of causal situations to visual terms we ensure a conceptual absence of action, we might imagine what would be the case if our understanding of things was entirely limited to sight. Imagine, for instance, that we are brought up in such a way that we are completely insulated from all external bodily contact and we are completely immobilized. We are able, however, to contemplate the world with our eyes. Under such conditions, we see one thing happening and then another, a stone passing before our eyes and then the dissolution of a pane of glass, and so on. We have no trouble, therefore, arriving at the notion of one thing following another. But can we ever arrive at the notion of one thing acting upon another, given this starting point? Manifestly, we can not, any more than Hume is able to. The same result is, of course, guaranteed when we theoretically restrict descriptions to visual terms.

Still again, the same end is reached, though in a less obvious way, though the numerically fundamental form that HC imposes on its descriptions. While the analysis of causality into a binary relation does not a fortiori eliminate a reference to action, for sentences like the following remain possible, "His action in the affair caused me sorrow," it does eliminate any possible reference to an action between cause and effect or an action of the cause. The reason for this is purely numerical. In describing causal states of affairs we must, if we are to lend any plausibility at all to our descriptions, include a reference to a cause and a reference to an effect. But this means that we have already used up the two references to individuals allotted us by the numerically fundamental form of HC. Thus, the only possible translation of "A causes B that we can make is, "A, the cause, B the effect". This serves well enough to express what we get when we reconceive causal situations in purely visual terms; "A, followed by B, or perception of A followed by perception of B. It is indeed not unlikely that HC employs a binary fundamental form just because of its prior commitments to a visual analysis. One could argue, however, that the binary fundamental form exerts independent attraction of its own. When we assert, "A causes B by C," it may appear that the phrase, "by C," refers to something extraneous to the causal situation itself, and this may seem to be the



case because a participial clause does not grammatically appear to be quite so integral to a sentence as the subject and predicate. But whether a binary fundamental form is employed in HC mutually reinforce one another in excluding action from the realm of causal discourse. Thus once we undertake a description of cause according to the prescription of HC we must fail, by virtue of the very form of our analysis alone, to discover any action in causes. Our analysis in a way, ensures its own self-confirmation. Just as the numerically fundamental form and the units of description of HC prohibit the predication of actions to causes, 1) the numerical fundamental form of OC and 2) its units of description, plainly permit the predication of actions to causes. "Lightning causes thunder by splitting the air" is an obvious case in point in the first instance; with respect to the second, it is an obvious datum of experience that material things, persons, and physical states can act upon one another and do. We are entitled, however, to go a step further and maintain not only that OC permits the predication of action to causes but that it requires it. We can see this if we apply Mill's canon or method of difference to any causal situation in OC. Consider the following hypothetical case. First, Imagine that we believe that the moon exerts some force or action upon living things and that we notice that after nights of full moon potatoes sprout. Given these conditions we certainly do not find it conceptually impossible in OC to maintain that the moon causes potatoes to sprout; in fact, we are strongly impelled to affirm the last proposition. Second, let us now imagine that, by some angelic dispensation, we know absolutely that the moon exerts no force or action upon growing things. Then, even though we notice that potatoes always sprout after nights of full moon causes potatoes to sprout; we have to be content with affirming the general, non-causal rule that whenever the moon shines full, potatoes sprout. This general regularity, we shall have to say occurs for no reason; it is just a happenstance; and we shall have to admit, as Humeans have had to admit concerning any event in the future, that there is neither a certainty nor even a probability that the conjunction of full moon and sprouting potatoes will be observed to hold tomorrow.

At the very least, then, the presence of action, real or imagined, is a necessary condition for maintaining the existence of a cause in OC. But here again we may go still a step further and assert that the presence of action is not only the necessary condition but also, if the action is productive of changes in things, the sufficient condition for asserting the existence of a cause. This is demonstrated by the fact that given a description which simply names two individuals and a productive action of one upon the other we are entitled immediately to translate that description into a causal description. For example, "The stone shattered the window" is immediately convertible into "The stone caused the window to shatter." The essence of causality according to OC thus comes, roughly speaking, to action. In denying action to causes, HC



therefore denies the essence of OC. This means that we cannot argue that both HC or OC may be right; or that one is wrong and the other right but with a few alterations the one that is wrong can be made right. If we are talking about one and the same thing when we speak of causality in HC and causality in OC, and I shall assume that we are, we must suppose that one of the two, HC or OC, is indefeasibly false. The possibility of both being false, which may seem to remain over, is excluded by the fact that the question of which is true or false really comes down to the question whether there exists, or there does not exist, action between things, and these alternatives are contradictories.

Now it seems to me that there can be no doubt at all about the answer to the question whether HC or OC is false, and that the answer is that HC is false. Proponents of HC will object, of course, that it is OC that must be false because OC ascribes action to causes and there is really no such thing as action in the world, as the Humean analysis shows.<sup>5</sup> But on several scores this objection may be entirely discounted. For one thing—as we have already pointed out—the fundamental form and units of description which are prescribed by HC ensure by themselves the absence of action in the world of our discourse. That is, we cannot discover action in things when we employ the Humean analysis because that analysis does not permit us to. But that no more proves that there is not action between things than by wearing colored glasses we prove that there is no such color as white. For another thing, if we do not restrict ourselves to the fundamental forms and units of description of HC we do discover action in things. The whirlwind that bowls me over, for instance, certainly acts on me. To reply that I am deceived when I say this is simply incredible. How could I possibly come to think that a whirlwind was bowling me over if it were not? And if it were bowling me over it would obviously be acting on me. Moreover, if there exists no such thing as action, how we may ask, does it come about that the proponent of HC possesses an idea of action? Either he must say that the idea of action is a kind of fiction, like the idea of griffon, composed out of more simple ideas or that it is an innate idea. Attempts to show that the idea or concept of action can be formed from more fundamental concepts must, on the face of it, fail. Ex nihilo, nihil fit. On the other hand—where by 'innate ideas' are meant ideas that have no corresponding impressions—the doctrine of innate ideas is itself excluded by the Humean analysis.

The main reason for asserting that HC must be false, is, however none of these. HC, as we previously indicated, attempts to depict the concept of causality, to tell us what the concept consists in. It attempts to do this even when it seems to be describing some concrete causal

<sup>5</sup> It is sometimes claimed that the idea of action arises from reflection upon the will and willed actions. But even if there existed action between the will and one's willed action the Humean analysis (as is well known) must dissolve it into a sequence of events. Perceptions, etc. thus the present argument can be understood to apply to both physical and mental causes.



situation. In OC, as we indicated, a person does not attempt to depict the concept of causality, but to apply the concept to the sort of things and circumstances he has learned to apply it to. While these applications form a body of understandings, which one might draw descriptive fragments, as in teaching children we say, e.g., "Causes come before effects; one cannot say that shattered window caused the flying stone, "they do not form a portrait of what the concept of causality consists in; they are what it consists in. Insofar, therefore, as HC is in disagreement with OC, HC must be false, in the sameway that if a portrait does not conform to the sitter, it is the portrait that is false, not the sitter. Since HC and OC are, roughly speaking contradictory, and since HC must be false, it follows, then, that OC must be true. Or more strictly speaking, since OC comprises the concept of causality and not a depiction of the concept, OC cannot be either true or false, any more than a sitter to a portrait can be true or false. But we might take both the following propositions to be intended depictions of OC, "Causes do not act," and "Causes do act,"<sup>v</sup> and if we do, we shall be able to say that the first proposition is false and the second true. because, in fact, causes do and indeed must act according to OC.



### III

## WHY SHOULD THERE BE DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL ?

THERE are several different questions one might have in mind when asking "why should there be *Darshana International* ?" But certainly the most natural and important question these words suggest is this: "what Justifies the existence of *Darshana*?"

Now the question that I am asking is a species of the last question. It is a rather peculiar species of it. To come to the point at once, I am asking: 'From the standpoint of a contemporary American philosopher, what-if anything-justifies the existence of *Darshana*?' I shall try to answer this question (taken in the sense I have outlined) as honestly as I can.

On first considering the question that I have asked a great many contemporary American philosophers would be inclined. I think, to answer in the negative. They would feel like saying. "Not only is there no reason for *Darshana* to exist-there is good reason for it not to exist." What would motivate this sort of response would not be anything lying outside philosophy but purest philosophy itself. What would motivate it would be a definition of philosophy.

The term 'philosophy' possesses in contemporary American philosophical a connotation that is both exceedingly circumscribed and firmly entrenched. Certain sorts of inquiry and only certain sorts (more easily recognized than defined), constitute philosophy and nothing else does. This very circumscribed view of the nature of philosophical comes not at the beginning but at the end of a long historical process, and consequently it seems to its adherents to constitute a discovery rather than a mere operating principle. For example, they will say that in the European Renaissance almost anything counted as philosophy and in almost any admixture: theology, natural science bona fide and non-bona fide (astrology, alchemy, black magic), metaphysics, mysticism, logic (bona-fide and purely fanciful), psychology, psychical research, etc. They will say that the major thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries perceived and made it clear that theology, the non-



bona fide natural sciences, mysticism, psychical research, etc., did not belong to the proper domain of philosophy; that the thinkers of the 19th century disclosed or had disclosed to them the fact that the natural sciences did not either (but were either above or below philosophy); and that today the question even arises as to whether metaphysics and logic belong to it or not. In short, the current American view concerning the nature of philosophy is something like this: philosophy possesses a pure essence. In the past this pure essence was encrusted with all sorts of accidental attachments and excrescences. One of the tasks and triumphs of Western thinkers has been to separate the pure essence of philosophy from its encrustations of the non-philosophical. Precisely what this pure essence consists in remains perhaps a 'mystery wrapped in an enigma'; but at least it is now pretty clear as to what it does not consist in; and those are most of the things that are listed on the cover of Darshan. This, I say, is the way that many-perhaps the majority of-professional philosophers in America now conceive the nature of philosophy. And they do so, even though in some cases it is at the expense of some inconsistency with their own premises. For instance, many contemporary American philosophers would agree with Wittgenstein in his claim that particular things (e.g., particular games) do not form sorts or kinds (the class, game) because of some common essence which they possess but because of family resemblances. At the same time, these same philosophers can be found maintaining as vigorously as any others (indeed, sometimes even more vigorously) that philosophy possesses a pure essence and that all philosophizing must lie within the boundaries of this pure essence.

Now when an American philosopher first considers Darshana (as I was saying) he will tend to view the journal in the light of the definition of philosophy which I have described above, and hence, he will be inclined to say, "But look at all these odd bed fellows Darshana puts in with philosophy: psychology, psychical research(!), religion(!!), mysticism(!!!), and sociology(!!!!!). How shameful! And look at all the odd sorts of philosophy -where there is philosophy-one finds in its pages, and sometimes even mixed up with those other things." And he will go on to say to himself, "Every discipline should be kept pure and apart from others. Darshana has no modesty whatsoever; the journal is perfectly promiscuous. Should it exist? I should say not!"

It can be seen, no doubt, that I am in part poking fun at the current dogma concerning the nature of philosophy which most American philosophers subscribe to. But please let it be understood; first, that in doing so I am poking fun at myself too (for what I have written above is just as autobiographical as descriptive of other minds); and second, I am not suggesting, in doing so, that the current American view is necessarily wrong. I myself am inclined to think it is right; and that philosophy is a very peculiar and special sort of discipline, which is different from other disciplines and should be kept distinct from them



(and I am also inclined not to think this way too). What I am poking fun at is the doctrinaire, unquestioning acquiescence that many American philosophers, including myself, give to our narrow definition of philosophy. Our definition of philosophy. Our definition may be correct; but the point is-it is certainly not clear that it is and we are rather presumptuous in acting as if it were clear. Orthodoxy is not necessarily odious or wrong; but a supercilious and smug orthodoxy is; and I am afraid that the latter describes our present American orthodoxy on the nature of philosophy.

It is exactly in this connection that I would now like to maintain that, from the standpoint of an American philosopher, the existence of Darshana is justified. The definition of philosophy that Darshana embodies (and, I imagine, that most Indian thought embodies) is characterized by its permissiveness, its readiness to treat anything that purports to be philosophy as philosophy, to put philosophy into bed with all sorts of bedfellows, not surreptitiously (which often enough happens in America), but deliberately and publically. It is thus a definition of philosophy that is at the very opposite pole from the current American definition.

Nothing could be more absurd than to suggest that American philosophers give up their narrow definition of philosophy (which most of us, for various reasons, find true and rewarding) for the much broader definition embodied in Darshana and Indian thought. But it is not absurd to maintain that, looking over the shoulder of Darshana (as it were), American philosophers might also find this broader definition rewarding; and that, in any case, they ought to look over the shoulder of Darshana. And here I should like to borrow a thought from Professor Hocking's penetrating article in the January (1963) issue of Darshana. "The Values of Variety and the Necessities of Unity." Professor Hocking suggests that we define "a nation as an experiment in law-making" (p.5). if we do, his point is then we can understand the value of their existing different bodies of laws. To begin with, each nation possesses its own peculiar institutions and customs ("Their is no such thing as a word custom"), so that 'a suitable body of laws' is best conceived in national terms (for laws will have to take into account customs and other particular features of national existence). At the same time, certain laws that a particular nation proposes as the answer to its peculiar problems may turn out to provide a solution to the problems of other nations or even all nations. Hence, if each nation keeps its eye on the law-making experiments of its neighbours it may profit in ways that it could not if it did not remain cognizant of the law-making experiments of other nations and groups or if no such experiments were taking place.

It seems to me that a similar argument might be made with respect to the definitions that particular nations and groups arrive at concerning the nature of philosophy. One might at least maintain that since it is



not certainly known what is the correct definition of philosophy, extant but different definitions should be construed as experiments in philosophizing. Viewed from this perspective, the philosophizing (broad definition) that goes on in Darshana should be of interest to American philosophers (however narrow their own definitions of philosophy), for conceivably, they might (but need not) discover elements of philosophizing which they would want to incorporate in their own philosophizing.

We might then conclude that, with respect to definitions of philosophy, it is not a matter of "The king is dead; long live the new king," but rather something like this "Vive the American and English definitions of philosophy! Vive the continental European definition! *vive* the subspecies that fall under these: the logical empiricist, the existentialist, the phenomenologist, the scholastic, the personalist, the rationalist, the idealist, the materialist's! And *vive* the Indian definition of philosophy (*Darshana*)!"



## IV

## ARE NECESSARY CAUSAL CONNECTIONS POSSIBLE ?

If the view that causal connections cannot be necessary connections is to lay claim *de jure* and not merely *de facto* to the wide acceptance it has received in empiricist quarters it must show this justification: either (A) that it is self-evidently true, or (B) that it is supported by sound arguments. In the following pages I shall endeavor to demonstrate that neither of these conditions holds; that in the first place the doctrine is not self-evidently true but indeed to judge by the immediate appearance of things the very opposite; and in the second place that the arguments supporting the doctrine are entirely specious.

In making these claims I am using the term "necessary connections" in the same sense that those who deny there can be necessary causal connections have usually had in mind. Following Hume, it is roughly this: X has a necessary connection with Y without altering our conception of X.<sup>1</sup>

While on the subject of Hume I might explain the frequent citation of passages from that philosopher in succeeding paragraphs. The doctrine that causal connections cannot be necessary connections, which for the purposes of reference I shall call "the empiricist doctrine," is generally traced back to Hume.<sup>2</sup> The difficulties associated with interpreting Hume's scepticism extend, of course, to interpreting his views on necessary causal relations. But there can be no doubt that the followers of Hume and that is to say, typical empiricists deny in a straight-for-ward manner the possibility of necessary causal connections<sup>3</sup> and that the grounds for their denial lie in the arguments developed by Hume. Both then, as the alleged parent of the empiricist doctrine and as the source of its widespread influence it seems only appropriate to take, so to speak, Hume as our text.

1. Hume, 'A Treatise of Human Nature,' BK.I part 3, Sec. 1, pp. 69-70. Selby-Bigge Oxford edition. All reference to this work will be to this edition and will be abbreviated THN.

2. For instance, Ayer, 'Language, Truth, and Logic,' Dover edition p. 150

3. For instance, Feigl, 'Notes on Causality,' Readings in the Philosophy of Science,' ed. Feigl and Brodbeck, pp. 415-416



The plan of the present paper therefore runs as follows. After showing that the immediate appearance of things does not establish the empiricist doctrine I shall endeavor to show that the arguments of Hume do not either, being one and all specious. These arguments I shall arrange in an order of what I consider to be increasing power and persuasiveness, the most powerful and persuasive coming last. My reasoning here is that the more powerful and persuasive a fallacious argument is the more penetrating and complete must be the analysis that attempts to lay bare and disarm the fallacy. If I am right in this surmise it is essential in refuting the Humean arguments to proceed in the manner outlined. In addition, the final outcome of such a procedure must be, if successful, to provide a fairly accurate description of the concepts under investigation. And this, it seems to me, is the ultimate desideratum of any philosophical inquiry.

I should like to add one further note prefatory to carrying out the present project. For the purpose of indicating several broad divisions in the classes of argument under examination I have here and there set down a number. I shall not be concerned to defend the accuracy of these division. Indeed, I shall not be surprised if where I saw a natural division the reader sees none, and vice-versa. The arguments in question overlap and criss-cross in many directions. Any division of them must therefore, I fear, be some what impressionistic at best.

#### A. THAT THE EMPIRICIST DOCTRINE IS NOT SELF-EVIDENTLY TRUE

Consider the following instance, We are building a house and we are asked why we are bracing the walls. We truthfully answer, "When the wind blows it causes a pressure on walls." Here we infer as an effect of blowing wind a pressure upon walls. According to our previous specifications there exists a necessary connection between a wind blowing on a wall and pressure upon the wall if when we conceive there to be a wind blowing on a wall we must also conceive there to be a pressure on the wall or else alter our conception of a blowing wind. But clearly when we try to conceive a wind blowing on a wall without there being some pressure exerted on the wall we utterly fail.

#### B. THAT HUME'S ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE EMPIRICIST DOCTRINE ARE SPECIOUS

1. It is maintained by Hume as a general principle that all existences are discrete or separable.<sup>4</sup> Obviously, if we agree to this tenet we cannot plausibly maintain that there exist necessary connections between events or existences, in that then we shall have to maintain both that one event must accompany another and at the same time that it need not do so (being separable).

4. THN. p.10 There are not any two impressions which are perfectly inseparable.



But why should we give credence to the tenet of separability? The immediate appearance of things, according to which causal inferences do sometimes depict necessary connections, certainly seems to refute it. Our only reason for accepting the doctrine must be still other principles or arguments; and since those principles and arguments are essentially the same that are advanced for denying necessary causal connections, in overthrowing the one we overthrow the other. What follows, therefore, may be construed as serving both ends.

2. It is argued by Hume that the inseparability or necessary connection of objects is gainsaid by the fact that we can conceive "any objects to be non-existent this moment and existent the next."<sup>5</sup> But while we can think of there being walls and then no walls, wind and then no wind, pressures and then no pressures, we do not seem to be able to think of there being a wind blowing on a wall and no pressures exerted. Clearly, then, arguments that intend to show that we can conceive an individual, isolated thing existing or not existing as we please do not demonstrate that there are not necessary connections between existences (plural).

3. It is argued by Hume and others that there cannot be necessary causal connections because when we observe events we find nothing contained in them or between them which goes by the name of necessity (we find no impression of necessity as such). When we look for what the term "necessity" (or "power") represents (for the impression of the idea) we find at most repetition of events and a feeling in our minds. Hence, "necessary causal connection" can only mean repetition of events or a feeling in our minds.<sup>6</sup>

In effect, Hume and those who follow him here are pretending that the term "necessity" is a name standing for some simple quality or complex object, like the words "green" and "chair". First, a search is instituted for the simple quality; this perforce failing, a search is made for the complex object. The very nature of the last enterprise intrinsically ensures that we shall equate any experiences that are related to necessary or causal connections and that might possibly bear names, e.g., repetition of events and a feeling in our minds, with the meaning of "necessary causal connections." But in this we are tacitly assuming that all nouns and adjectives function like names. Minus that assumption our argument has no more force than an unexamined hypothesis and surely-in the light of Wittgenstein's investigations-that is just what we shall want to call.

5. In the passage cited Hume, to be sure, is specifically intrested in showing that the proposition, 'Whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence,' is not intuitively true or demonstrable. But he believes that in establishing this point he also shows the separability of objects see 'THN', p. 80.

6. See 'THN', sec. 14 esp. pp. 161 ff. The same sort of reasoning appears to underlie much contemporary discussion of the subject. See J. Kemeny, 'Aphilosopher Looks at Science' (van Nostrand, 1959) pp. 48-49 as an example.



When we examine the actual use of the term "necessity" the comparison suggests itself, not with naming words, but with a grader's application of the marks A, B, C, etc., to examination 'B.' He does so, not because he finds some queer property in the examination called B but because the examination meets certain material requirements for being called B. These material requirements, furthermore, are not general to B examinations and to look for such general material requirements would palpably lead one into all sorts of nonsense and confusion. If the examination is in history, the requirements to be met are one thing, e.g., does the student give a good account of the Reform Bill of 1832; if in English, another; if for freshman, one thing; for graduate students, another, and so on. But is not something similar the case with respect to our application of the term "necessary" (or "must") to causal states of affairs ? when we say that a blowing wind must produce a pressure on a wall we obviously do not do so because we find some property called "must" (or "necessity") in these things or between them, but because the requirements for our saying "must" are met. These requirements do not, as in the example of marking examinations B, consist in particular specifications conceived by us; but they do have their basis in particular, non-general elements, namely, our knowledge of this or that particular X and Y. For instance, I say that a 100 ton rock falling 100 feet squarely on a man must produce his death; that is, on the basis of what I know about rocks, weights, distances and men, I consider the requirements fulfilled that entitle me to say "must". But must 100 tons of water falling 100 feet squarely on a man kill him ? I cannot say, not having enough knowledge of the properties or falling water to go by. In either case, my use of the term "must" is not the naming use (the impression of an idea). We have here a different use of words. Therefore, the charge that there cannot properly be said to be necessary causal connections because we can find no impression in thing which goes by the name "necessary" may be dismissed. The charge is of course true, but it is irrelevant.

At this point, however, it may be argued: even granted that the word "necessary" is not a name for an impression, analysis shows that the meaning of "necessary" precludes there being necessary causal connections. For when we say the requirements are fulfilled that entitle us to say that X must cause Y, these requirements, by our previous admission, are that X cannot be conceived without Y except by altering our conception of X. When this formal requirement is satisfied and only when it is we are entitled to say that X must cause Y. The impossibility of conceiving X without Y is therefore both the necessary and sufficient condition for asserting that X has a necessary relation to Y, and what else then can we mean when we apply the term "necessary" to X and Y ? If, though, the meaning of the term "necessary" consists in the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the term, and these in turn are the impossibility of conceiving X without Y,



then the term "necessarily" certainly does not signify some characteristic of events but a subjective condition of our minds. Hence, strictly speaking, causes cannot be necessary; and when we speak of them being so we are speaking in a very misleading fashion.

Not it must be admitted that in science a thing (element, etc.) is sometimes equated with its theoretically necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, heat is defined as the movement of molecules. Interpreting this definition we say that, theoretically, there cannot be heat without the movement of molecules, not the movement of molecules without heat. Since philosophy aims at being a science of some sort it is tempting in philosophical inquiries to treat all biconditionals as similar to the theoretical biconditionals of science. If we have already committed ourselves to treating "necessary" as a name (which we have, when we ask what the impression of the idea is), we are not merely under the temptation, but indeed we are forced by the very logic of our commitment, to treat the biconditional, X must cause Y if and only if we cannot conceive X without Y, like a theoretical biconditional of science. But this is an error and it is an error precisely because it requires us to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the term "necessary" with the meaning of "necessary".

Biconditionals like, "X necessarily causes Y if and only if we cannot conceive X without Y," "An examination is a B examination if and only if it meets the requirements conceived by us for B examinations." or "A person may legally vote if and only if he has been properly registered," I shall call, "biconditionals of entitlement." While it would not be improper to maintain that such biconditionals express, like theoretical biconditionals, necessary and sufficient conditions, it is clear that they do not, like some theoretical biconditionals, express identities or "real natures". Thus if I am properly registered to perform. And in general it may be said that in matters of entitlement necessary and sufficient conditions for an act are not, as in some theoretical biconditionals, equatable with the act. They confer the right to the act, but not the act itself. Thus on the face of it, we may deny that "I vote" is identical with "I am properly registered to vote" or that "This examination meet the requirements conceived by us for calling an examination a B exam" is identical with "This examination is a B examination" or that "I cannot conceive X without Y" is identical with "X is necessarily related to Y"

A further point that needs to be made in the present connection is that if, in our philosophical discussions, we do equate biconditionals of entitlement with the meanings of the terms involved what we logically accomplish is tantamount to the case in which we refuse in ordinary life, to go beyond asserting the biconditionals of an entitlement. But consider now the case where the necessary and sufficient conditions of entitlement are present and we refuse to exercise the right they confer on us. For example, we are willing with respect to an examination to



say no more than, "This examination meets the requirements conceived by us for calling it a 'B'." Clearly, we then imply either some doubt concerning the validity of our criteria or the suspicion that the examination met our requirements dishonestly or improperly. Excluding the latter alternative (which has no bearing on the present discussion), we at once suggest that the grade 'B' which is indicated rests on a subjective basis. This consequence follows from the fact that once we reject criteria of entitlement by refusing to exercise the rights they confer on us a subjective basis is all that we can lay claim to. On the other hand, when we exercise the rights that biconditionals of entitlement confer on us we ipso facto signify acceptance of our criteria and so remove them from any question or doubt they no longer comprise another topic in addition to their application. That is to say, in applying them we are left with only pure descriptions of fact. It is in this way that moral attributions, e.g., "He is a good man," possess the character of pure descriptions of fact, but only so long as we make (i.e., exercise the right conferred on us by certain biconditionals) those attributions. But let me illustrate what I mean by an example. Take the assertion, "This examination is a 'B'". In making this assertion we in fact exercise the right conferred on us by certain biconditionals of entitlement: and thus no question is left over as to the validity of the criteria employed. Since, therefore, these criteria are not in issue they vanish, both logically and psychologically, from consideration and view, with the result that our assertion has the status and sense of an objective statement, a statement characterizing the examination and nothing else.

What I have been saying concerning the marking of examinations holds for the application of the concept of necessity (our use of the term must). To express the necessary and sufficient conditions for asserting "X is necessarily related to Y" is not the same thing at all as to assert that X is necessarily related to Y. To say no more than, "we cannot conceive X separated from Y" is on the face of it, to make a partially subjective statement; to suggest some question as to the validity of our powers of conception, etc., whereas to exercise the right that is present and assert, "X is necessarily related to Y," is to make an objective statement concerning X and Y; no question of our powers of conception is implied; and hence we assert, in effect, not that we cannot conceive X separated from Y but that X cannot occur separated from Y. But plainly the sense of a subjective statement is not the sense of an objective statement; and consequently it cannot possibly be the case that the meaning of "X is necessarily related to Y" may be equated with the necessary and sufficient conditions entitling us to that assertion.

Concomitantly, no valid question arises as to our rights to proceed from the necessary and sufficient conditions for asserting "X is

8. This is a point we have discussed at more length in 'Knowledge of Remote Existence,' *The Review of Metaphysics*, June 1958, pp. 574 ff.



necessarily related to Y" to that assertion itself, since those conditions themselves constitute the right. Thus being unable to conceive a 100 ton rock falling 100 feet on a man without killing him, I have the right to say that the rock must kill him; and exercising this right, I say with as absolute propriety as is mine in marking an examination B, "The falling rock must cause the death of the man". Obviously, then it cannot be impossible for there to be necessary causal connections, if this is meant to be a question of the proper application of the concept of necessity (the proper use of the term 'must' or "necessary"). Nor from what was said before, can it rightly be maintained that in asserting necessary causal connection between existences we are not really asserting necessity but something else or that we are not really asserting a necessary connection to hold between the existences but are merely describing some internal impression or repetition of events—that is the necessary and sufficient conditions for asserting necessary causal connections.

4. There is an argument that Hume uses to show that the discernment of necessary causal connections cannot rest on a priori reasoning but must rest on experience. This argument might be rested to omit reference to the specific issues of the a priori and at the same time bear generally on the question of the separability of events and necessary causal connections. We might argue: Adam looking for the first time at a billiard ball hitting another might as likely conceive one motion as an other, or none at all, and so for all other existences or phenomena. Therefore, existences or events are separable and not necessarily connected.<sup>7</sup>

The undeniable force that this sort of argument exercises on our minds, so that the more we contemplate it the more we are convinced, would seem to lie in our human knack and propensity to put ourselves in the place of others. Putting myself in the place of Adam, indeed I do discover that I now as easily conceive a 100 ton rock not killing a man as killing him when falling on him from 100 feet a billiard ball going in one direction as another and so on. It seems therefore that what I said I could not conceive I can and hence that I must give up asserting the necessary causal connections that I have been asserting and all others.

But here a psychological trick is being played on us. No doubt at all, in the role of Adam, we can conceive all existences whatsoever as separable from all others. We can also suppose, however, that Adam, when presented for the first time with addition, added two and two to be five, three or anything else. Are we to conclude from this that two plus two may not make four? We might as sensibly believe that because, by turning quickly in circles we can make the world seem to spin around us, it is in fact spinning around us!

7. Hume, 'An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding', section four, part one.



The point is : our attribution of necessary causal connections between existences rests on our knowledge of those particular existences. Thus, the real question at issue is not : can we or can we not conceive X without Y, but can we or can we not conceive X without Y on the basis of what we know of X and Y. Naturally, if we replace knowledge with ignorance, as we tacitly do when we put ourselves in Adam's place, we eliminate a fortiori every possible attribution of necessary causal connections. But is this not a perfectly incredible thing to do ? In treating Adam ignorant as the arbiter of truth and Adam knowledgeable as in error, we propound the amazing doctrine that the truth lies in ignorance and falsehood in knowledge. Even Adam, it may be presumed, gave up that pretense just as soon as he acquired some knowledge, and having learned about billiard balls and addition found it no longer conceivable that when struck billiard balls should fail to move or that two plus two should make five.

"But are we not all the wisest of us just as much as Adam - fundamentally ignorant ?" It may be retorted. "We say, 'These billiard balls striking in this way must take those directions. 'How can we know though, that in the immediate future billiard balls and other things will not be have in ways completely different from the ways that we now envisage ? We cannot. Thus as far as we know, the billiard balls may move in any way whatsoever or no way at all when struck; cloth when sprinkled with water may not become damp, and so on. But clearly it is impossible to maintain both that the billiard balls and other things must behave in certain ways and yet that they may behave in any way whatsoever."

Now as long as we insist on contemplating the above argument we must again find ourselves, as with the Adam argument, impelled to give our assent to it. In asking ourselves questions which we cannot answer, like "How can we know the future will be like the past ?" we must always produce in ourselves feelings of doubt and ignorance; and these feelings, in turn, must leave us psychologically reluctant to assert necessary causal connections. But such feelings do not themselves constitute evidence.<sup>8</sup> We still want to ask : Is the argument in question sound - is the conviction that it produces warranted ? And to this question the answer is negative.

In the first place, we might relevantly point out that real ignorance as opposed to mere feelings of ignorance is determined by empirical and not logical inability. We are ignorant, for instance, of what the surface of Venus looks like because as yet we have been unable to get hold of certain empirical data. But while we are unable to square the circle or write down the largest integer we are not ignorant of how to square a circle and we are not ignorant of what the largest integer is.

<sup>8</sup> This is a point we have discussed at more length in "Knowledge of Remote Existence. The review of *Metaphysics*, June 1958. pp. 574 ff.



Inability here is a logical inability and hence does not count for or against ignorance. It has nothing to do with ignorance.

Our inability to answer the question, "How can we know the future will be like the past?" is clearly not an empirical inability. It is not the case, for instance, that we have certain powers of clairvoyance which we are not using. Since every particular prediction of the future rests on past experience the generalized proposition, "The future will be like the past, is logically (not empirically) cut off from all evidence or grounds of prediction. By the same token, our inability to answer how we can know the future will be like the past is a logical inability and thus no more a sign of real ignorance than is our inability to square the circle.

In the second place, even if there is no logical impossibility in knowing the future will be like the past, e.g., we might want to say that an omniscient Being like God knows that the future will be like the past, there is certainly a human impossibility in it. If then we grant what the argument asks us to, namely that we are ignorant, we do so on the basis of a standard that cannot possibly be used to distinguish ignorance and knowledge in human affairs. Offhand we should say : a standard that can not count in human affairs does not count in them. But in case this seems too short an answer to the argument in question, we might consider these further consequences of assenting to it. If we make some humanly impossible standard, e.g., omniscience, the criterion of human knowledge and ignorance, then we must grant that we know nothing. Logically, this concession entails not only that we give up asserting necessary causal relations but that we replace our present envisagements and understanding of things by mere question marks. For as long as we retain our present envisagements and understanding of things, we do possess knowledge and consequently we are entitled to assert necessary causal relations. Thus, we must now ask; can we give up our present envisagements and understanding of things for mere question marks ? Obviously, as a practical matter, we cannot. We should perish in a moment if we tried. But even if we decide to ignore practical considerations, we are surely obliged, as rational beings, to answer why we should give up our present understanding and envisagements of things for mere question marks. What warrant is there ? have we, for example, suffered a breakdown in our present system of understanding and conceptions ? Certainly not. Will we be better off giving up our present system for a mess of question marks ? As we have already pointed out, certainly not ! Is it reasonable to give up something valuable and hard-won for something of no value because we arbitrarily can or think we can ? Certainly not. What reason, then, can be provided for assenting to the argument in question ?

The one reason that can, it seems, be provided is that we are able to conceive things behaving in ways different from those that we want to say they must behave in ways different from those that we want to



say they must behave in we can for instance conceive billiard balls when struck not moving in the ways we want to say they must, and so on. And clearly, unless we are falling into some fallacy, to concede that we can conceive these things is incompatible with maintaining necessary causal relations between them.

But falling into a fallacy-specifically, a fallacy of ambiguity-is precisely what we are doing in the preceding paragraph. When we say that we can conceive billiard balls when struck moving in all sorts of odd. ways e.g., rising fifty feet straight up in the air, we are using the term "conceive" as synonymous with "From a mental image." Because of their abstract nature, philosophical disquisitions tend to employ the terms "conceive," "envisage," "picture" in this peculiar and impractical way. Thus, in such discussions it will be said that one can conceive a cow jumping over a twenty foot tree, or a billiard ball when lightly struck moving 50 feet straight up into the air, and so on. In actual practice, however, we should all want to say that it was inconceivable that a cow jumped over a twenty foot tree (suppose that we were told by a child that he had seen such a thing) or that an ordinary billiard ball, when lightly struck, jumped fifty feet straight up into the air. And the reason is this: in actual practice, the term "conceive" ("envisage", "picture") is used in such a way that we assert "X can be conceived separate from Y" only if our knowledge of X and Y and other things can be harmonized with "X is separated from Y, "and much the same specifications hold for our use of "inconceivable" ("unimaginable"). Thus, we say that it is inconceivable that a cow can jump over a twenty foot tree because that proposition cannot be harmonized with our knowledge of cows, gravity, and so on; we say that it is conceivable that a cow should be born without a tail because this proposition can be harmonized with what we know, or think we know, about the skeletal structure of cows.<sup>9</sup>

The question arises, consequently: which sense of "conceive" is to be appealed to in deciding whether or not we have the right to assert necessary connections between existences-the practical or the philosophical sense, as they might be called ? If we were previously correct in appealing to Adam knowledgeable over against Adam ignorant, and certainly we were correct, we must take the practical sense of "conceive" as the basis of our reasoning. For strictly speaking, to conceive philosophically is no different from ignorance, in that the forming of mental images save for one qualification that we shall immediately discuss rests solely on will or volition. Thus even if we were able to conceive philosophically what the septic's argument asks us to, we were able to conceive philosophically what the sceptic's argument asks us to, we should still want to deny that it was thereby

9. For a more extended discussion of this and the following question, see my article *Conceivability and Scepticism*, 'DARSHANA, January, 1961, pp. 4-11.



demonstrated that we had no right to assert necessary causal connections.

5. We have said: that which determines whether we can philosophically conceive a thing or not is whether or not we can form a mental image of it. But what determines, in addition to mere will or volition, whether we can form a mental image of say, X separated from Y? The answer appears to be: definition. If it is logically impossible to separate X from Y- that is, if by definition Y is contained in X-then we cannot form a mental image of X separated from Y.

Now this logical fact ties in closely with another argument that is leveled against our right to make assertions of necessary causal connections. The argument, simply put, is that there is no contradiction in conceiving one existence apart from another: hence, there can be no necessary connection between existences, causal or otherwise.<sup>10</sup>

What the above argument illegitimately does is to treat causal necessity according to the very same specifications that define verbal and syntactical necessity, and them, because these specifications are not satisfied, it concludes that there is no such thing as causal necessity. Ostensibly the argument makes this uncalled-for identification whenever the term "contradiction" is understood as applying only to propositions or words. If we agree to that stipulation and at the same time suppose that necessity is definable in terms of contradiction, a fortiori we restrict necessity to verbal or syntactical necessity (logical necessity). We win our case by definition. And by the same token, we are not likely to convince anyone who does not wish to be convinced.

But the same purposes are much more subtly served, and the same ends reached, if we understand the term "contradiction" to mean "cannot form a mental image of." For reasons already discussed, in making these identifications we make logical necessity the criterion of causal necessity as surely as if we explicitly equated necessity with definition. And still more subtly and invisibly the same purpose are served where the argument says that we can conceive one existence apart from another. We need to remark here that two existences are made the turning point of consideration, one existence and another. For while two existences or things serve very well to exemplify logical necessity, they do not serve at all to exemplify causal necessity. By definition we can link one thing to one other, e.g., triangle and three-sidedness. Natural however, do not flow from simple causes. Water does not produce damp cloth; a falling rock does not produce a crushed man. Effects flow from the actions of one thing upon another: water sprinkled on cloth produces dampness in the cloth; a rock falling on a man

10. VIDE Hume, 'An Inquiry Concerning Hume Understanding,' part one, section 4: The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible because it can never imply a contradiction."

11. See my article, 'A Refutation of the Humean Analysis of Causality,' DARSHANA, August, 1962. pp. 95-101.



produces the death of that man. In short, it takes at least three things or existences to exemplify causal connections: X acting on Y and the effect Z.<sup>11</sup> To say, therefore, that we can conceive one existence separated from another, e.g., falling rocks from crushed men, water from damp clothes, is very true indeed. That we can, though, illustrates only the fact that two existences do not exemplify causal connections. It does not show, as it purports to and tempts us to think, that existences never possess necessary causal connections.

There is another side to this coin, however. Instead of supposing that causal necessities do not exist because they do not meet the specifications or some other basis of logical necessity into them. Thus we might argue that, if we are inclined to say that water sprinkled on cloth must cause it to become damp, it is solely because the definition of water includes dampness in it, as yard includes three feet.

In spite of appearances, it is not. The trouble is this. When we say that one thing causes another, we purport to be asserting propositions whose verifications can be made by reference to experience; we purport to be describing matters of fact (in Hume's terminology). When we say that a proposition is true by definition we purport to be referring to conventions of word-usage; we purport to be speaking about propositions whose verifications are made not by reference to experience, but reference to dictionaries or our auditor's acquaintance with some language, e.g., propositions like "A triangle has three sides" or "A saffron rose is yellow." Such propositions, it is clear, do not describe matters of non-linguistic fact. If therefore, we maintain that it is proper to assert propositions like "X necessarily causes Y" or "X must cause Y," but that the necessity we refer to in them expresses a definition, we really deny our original claim that one and the same connection between existences can be both causal and necessary. For if in the proposition "X necessarily causes Y," the term "necessarily" does not refer to non-linguistic matters of fact and the term "causes" does, we obviously cannot be using the former term to describe what the latter term refers to, and since those are causal connections we cannot really mean that causal connections are necessary. And such a conclusion is certainly not grist for our mill !

That a theory does not agree with a claim of our own does not, of course, mean that it is disproved. We shall therefore now want to show that definition is not the basis of the necessity that belongs to necessary causal connections. But if definition is not their basis, what is?" it may be asked in tones that suggest, "What else can be?" Hence this question too we shall want, if possible, to answer.

The following considerations, it seems to me, not only show that causal necessities do not rest on definitions but illustrate the true nature of their basis, that being a knowledge of particular things gained



through experience, and an impossibility to conceive which rests on that knowledge.

(a) If the proposition "X must cause Y" (or "X necessarily causes Y") both describes a non-linguistic matter of fact and expresses a definition makes an a priori and an a posteriori claim at one and the same time: Now there are perhaps propositions that do just that, e.g., one might plausibly hold that the following proposition does, "The monkey is a mammal that is found as far north as Greenland." In the latter case, however, two predictions are being made of the subject, monkey: first, that it is a mammal, and second that it is found as far north as Greenland. In the case of "X must cause Y" or "X necessarily causes Y" only one predication is being made of the subject, X namely, that it necessarily causes Y; and this one predication is being claimed to both describe a matter of non-linguistic fact and to express a definition. That one predication can make two such opposed claims at once appears on the fact of it impossible. Therefore, since the predication of "cause" makes an a posteriori claim we may assume that the entire predication, i.e., the predication of necessary cause, does also.

(b) It is not at all difficult to find true propositions of the form "X necessarily causes Y," of which it would be absolutely incredible to maintain that they expressed definitions. Take for instance, the true proposition, "An atom bomb now exploded in this room must cause the death of that fly on the wall there." Certainly by no stretch of the imagination can one say that killing a fly, much less this fly on the wall there, is part of the definition of an atom bomb. Nor is it credible either to maintain that, while not expressing a definition, we are here computing from a definition, as we do when we assert that all the radii of a Euclidean circle are of equal length. For in fact we may not know what the definition of "atom Bomb" is; we may not know what the definition of "fly" is. Indeed, if asked for the definition of these terms, we might very well be unable to answer. Nonetheless, if familiar at all with instances of atom bomb explosions and flies, we should still want to assert that an atom bomb now exploded in this room must cause the death of that fly on the wall.

(c) We might note that logical necessities, e.g., take the ones expressed in "Every point on the circumference of a circle must be equidistant from the center" or "A saffron rose must be yellow," possess a very different kind of force—indeed a very different "feeling," one might say from causal necessities, e.g., take those expressed in "A wind blowing on a wall must cause a pressure on the wall" or "An atom bomb exploded in this room must cause the death of the fly on the wall there." There is something artificial in the force conveyed by the first proposition. We do not seem to be confronted with realities that can crush and overwhelm us, but with necessities whose existence somehow depends on



our own say so. And this is patently the case. It is only so long as we commit ourselves by an act of will to certain conventions and constructions of human ingenuity-Euclidean geometry or the English language-that we need grant, e.g., that every point on the circumference of a circle must be equidistant from the center (But that is Euclid's definition, "we can only say, if pressed) or that a saffron rose must be yellow (But saffron means yellow in English" we can at most explain, if pressed). Remove these commitments: all necessity vanishes. The second set of propositions, on the other hand, conveys the force of realities that can crush and overwhelm us; that do not depend in the slightest on our say so. To be sure, it is a matter of convention that we use the words "wind" "atom bomb", "fly", and so on to refer to the things that we do. But certainly we do not think for a moment that any act of volition or convention will banish that fact that an atom bomb exploded in this room must cause that death of that fly on the wall there, or that a 100 ton rock falling 100 feet on a man must cause him to be crushed to death, or that a wind blowing on a wall must cause pressure on the wall.

(d) Finally, if someone doubted, e.g., that saffron roses must be yellow, or some other necessity resting on definition or conventions of English usage, we could only refer him to a dictionary or to the authority of speakers of English. On the other hand, if someone doubted that, e.g., water sprinkled on a cloth must produce dampness in the cloth, or a wind blowing on a wall must cause a pressure on the wall, or some other causal necessity, we might it is true, wonder whether our auditor understood our words and so refer him to a dictionary. But we could also refer him to experience. Thus, we might have him handle water and cloth, dip the latter in the former, etc., and then when we felt that he was sufficiently familiar with these things, ask him if he did not now perceive that water sprinkled on cloth must cause it to be damp. In short, what we should be concerned with in the case of causal necessities would not be the person's familiarity with words but his familiarity with things. And this illustrates the fact that when we ascribe causal necessities, as opposed to logical necessities, it is on the basis of our words, not our knowledge of the latter. Thus, we all know perfectly well the meaning of the words "Water," "1 ton," "100 feet," "rock," "man," "death." If causal necessities rested on definitions or our knowledge of the meaning of words we ought to have no more hesitation in asserting that a ton of water falling 100 feet on a man must cause his death or need not cause it that we do in asserting that a 1 ton rock falling 100 feet on a man must cause his death. But we are uncertain as to whether a ton of water falling 100 feet on a man must cause his death or not. What then accounts for the difference in the two cases? Is it not simply the fact that we do not know the properties of a ton rock falling? And is not this lack of knowledge only to be remedied, not by dictionaries, but by experience and observation?



6. The last and most powerful argument that might be made against the thesis we have been defending rests on our own arguments. So far we have maintained these views: On the basis of experience and experiment we acquire knowledge of, say X and Y. In terms of that knowledge and our knowledge of other things, we cannot conceive X acting on Y without producing Z. The fact that we cannot conceive this constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition of our right to assert that X acting on Y must cause Z. Now previously we contended that in exercising this right we ipso facto depict an objective state of affairs (as we would not if we refused to go beyond asserting the necessary and sufficient conditions of the right). But here it may be objected: certainly it is not by arbitrary fiat that we take our inability to conceive X acting on Y without Z as the right to assert, "X acting on Y must cause Z". It is surely for some reason that, given these conditions, we want to say must instead of something else, e.g., will probably." What then is the source of our impulse to say must in such cases? Is it not that in trying to conceive X acting on Y without resulting in Z we find that we cannot harmonize the proposition "X acts on Y and there is no Z" with our knowledge of X and not of things. Therefore, when we assert, "X acting on Y must cause Z," does not the word must really depict a feature of our minds and not of things? Is it not the case, as Hume says, and others say, that "as it is usual for us to transfer our own feelings to the objects on which they are dependent, we attach the internal sentiment to the external objects"?<sup>12</sup>

Now although it is true that our inability to conceive X acting on Y without Z is the occasion for our asserting that X acting on Y must cause Z, this inability is to, in turn, autogenous. What makes us unable to conceive X acting on Y without Z is our knowledge of Z and Y and other things. But knowledge is not something that colors what is known. X known is X. Hence, to say that our knowledge of X and Y other thing cannot be harmonized with the proposition that X acts on Y without causing Z is essentially the same thing as saying that the natures of X and Y other things prevent X acting on Y acting on Y without Z occurring. And to say that our knowledge of these things prevents us from conceiving X acting on Y without Z occurring is essentially to say that the inseparability of X, Y, and Z prevents our conceiving their separation. Thus when people assert, as they sometimes (not always) do, "X acting on Y must cause Z," they quite rightly do not take themselves to be depicting a state of their minds but properties of external things. For that, of course, is precisely what they are doing.

12. Hume, Letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 'The Letters of David Hume,' ed. Greig pp. 155-156. Hume is discussing causation. Although he does not mention the idea of necessity it seems clear that this is what he has in mind.



## V

## CHOOSING OTHERWISE

*There would seem to be three possible theories concerning choice:*

(a) choice exists but there does not exist the possibility of choosing otherwise than we do; (b) choice exists and there does exist the possibility of choosing otherwise than we do; and (c) there does not exist choice. It may be demonstrated, however, that theory a contains an inconsistency and so must be rejected. The inconsistency is this: circumstances where we cannot help doing a thing are precisely the circumstances where we have no choice. To say, therefore, that we can choose but we cannot choose otherwise than we do is to deny the very existence of choice while at the same time asserting its existence.

Later in this paper I shall demonstrate the impossibility of asserting, as a critical judgment, that there is no such thing as choice, i.e., theory c. Thus, theory b, it seems, must be true. If it is true, however, there is certainly no general agreement that it is. On the contrary, when philosophically considered, theory b is likely to appear the least plausible of the above alternatives and one that we cannot possibly want to maintain. And to show that we cannot do so three important sorts of argument might be advanced<sup>1</sup>. In the order in which I shall discuss them the first of these arguments states that it is impossible to conceive a power to choose otherwise. The second holds that the methods and concepts of science necessitate the acceptance of determinism or some form of theory c and the denial of b. And the third and last says that to claim we can choose otherwise than we do is to claim what cannot in the nature of things ever be known, and hence affirmations of a power to choose otherwise must be purely empty of content and idle.

These three arguments, which I shall term respectively the conceptual, scientific, and epistemological arguments are all extremely plausible when set forth in detail and have even the appearance of

<sup>1</sup> I shall not pretend that these are the only arguments, or even the only important arguments, that can be advanced in opposition to b. They are not. In a more theological Age, a number of arguments involving Divine Attributes would demand discussion, and in any very extended work on choice would still merit it. I do not, however, believe that theological arguments any longer play a great role in discussions on choice (though it may be true that they ought to), and because of limitations of space, we shall have to restrict our examination to those that do.



conclusiveness. In spite of this appearance, the conclusion they share, that *b* must be rejected, has been frequently attacked and rejected on extrinsic grounds. It has been argued, for instance, that the existence of morality implies that we possess the power to choose otherwise than we do; the existence of morality is certain; and consequently the arguments in question must be fallacious. But this method of rebuttal is obviously two-edged. One might with as much justice contend that the arguments in question are irrefutable; consequently the existence of morality must be denied.

The aim of this paper is two-fold. It is, first, to demonstrate that the three arguments above are intrinsically untenable; that is, they merit on their own account rejection. And second, its aim is to demonstrate in some sense of the term "demonstrate," that the power to choose otherwise does in fact exist and that we can know that it does. The relevance and importance of such a demonstration for ethics is evident.

For brevity's sake and because the problems of choice and freedom are inextricably connected, I shall generally refer to the power to choose otherwise than we do as "metaphysical freedom."<sup>2</sup> Thus, this paper might be thought of as an attempt to establish on a philosophical foundation the possibility and existence of metaphysical freedom.

### I. *The conceptual Argument: that it is impossible to conceive metaphysical freedom*

On the face of it, the claim that it is impossible to conceive metaphysical freedom is contradictory; for in saying that such freedom cannot be conceived we presumably have already admitted a conception of it. A more just understanding of this claim would therefore interpret it as saying that however we try to describe the nature of choice (or the concept of choice) we shall find it impossible to include as a consistent part of our description a power to choose otherwise than we do.

So understood, the claim made by the conceptual argument seems absolutely correct. The plain truth is: **however we try to describe the nature of choice we do find it impossible to include as a consistent part of our description a power to choose otherwise than we do.** This may appear to be a wholly dogmatic statement. It is obvious that we cannot examine, nor can we have examined, each and every such

2. It will no doubt be observed that "metaphysical freedom," according to my definition, is fairly close in meaning to what Adler and others have termed "natural freedom" (see Adler, *The Idea of Freedom*, Doubleday, 1958, part Two, Chapter 8; Part Three, Chapters 20-25). It might seem, therefore, advisable to employ the latter term instead of complicating terminology by a superfluous addition. Various reasons, however, have dictated a contrary course. (a) It has sometimes been made a condition for the use of the term "natural freedom" that it signify "a freedom that I all men possess and 2 only men possess" (Adler, op. cit., p. 152). The question whether all men possess what I have defined as metaphysical freedom and whether only men possess it are questions that are open, it seems to me, to argument. Since I do not wish to examine these questions in this place I do not, by the same token, feel justified in using the term natural freedom." (b) The term "natural freedom" has been identified with the concept of "self-determination" (see Adler, op. cit., pp. 400 ff.). For reasons that will be gone into in the text of this essay it would seem misleading to so identify "metaphysical freedom".



description. But we need not carry out a complete enumeration of descriptions. It will suffice (1) if we can specify a particular element, say Y, which must occur as an element in any description of the nature of choice and (2) if the presence of Y alone precludes the possibility of metaphysical freedom. But just such an element is what might be termed "that-in-which-choice-consists." For if there is such a thing as choosing, and choosing possesses a nature which can be described, then there must be "that-in-which-choice-consists" and "that-in-which-choice-consist" must be an element in any description of choice. If, though, any such description of choice is true then demonstrably there cannot be such a thing as metaphysical freedom. Let us, as an illustration, suppose that "that-in-which-choice-consists" is an act of choice. Let us imagine that some act of choice now takes place, namely, the choice to raise my arm and that my arm now rises. By hypothesis I did not choose that this act of choice should occur (for we have said that choice consists in an act of choice and not the other way around). This act of choice, therefore, either A simply occurred, or B it occurred through antecedent causes, or C it itself chose to occur. These seem to exhaust the possible alternative interpretations of Y (as presently conceived). Now whatever else may be true about these interpretations of Y, according to none of them can I really R be responsible for my arm rising; but D, if I had exercised metaphysical freedom, I would have been responsible for its rising (that is, if I had chosen to lift my arm and I could have chosen otherwise). In short, A, B, and C imply R is false; D implies R is true. Consequently, since  $Y = A \text{ or } B \text{ or } C$ , Y precludes the possibility of D being true; and that is to say, metaphysical freedom is inconceivable (as we have decided to use the term conceivable and inconceivable). Thus, depending on how we look at the matter, the words "Power to choose otherwise than we do" must stand either for a self-contradictory notion (such as philosophers sometimes ascribe to non-philosophers) or a fatuous sound or a falsehood that pretends to describe reality but which an accurate description of reality excludes.

At first thought it may seem that any possible rebuttal of these conclusions lies, and lies only, in adding or subtracting from the description of choice which we have used to illustrate the conceptual argument. We might try replacing "act of choice" by "act of self-determination" or "self-causation" or something similar. But this way of seeing the matter is a sheer delusion. The only escape from the conclusions we have fallen into lies in a much more fundamental consideration, which seems always to get overlooked.

Tacitly, we assume in the conceptual argument that it is due to the nature of the world or to some internal inconsistency in the idea of metaphysical freedom that descriptions of the nature of choice exclude the possibility of a power to choose otherwise. Like the rabbit which is already in the magician's hat and then gets produced, this presupposition of the conceptual argument then gets produced, as a conclusion. Actually, however, the logical state of affairs is this: any description of the nature of choice not only does but must preclude the



possibility of metaphysical freedom and it must solely because of the nature of our undertaking. Specifically, the description of a nature imposes a conceptual scheme upon our discourse which per se excludes the conceptual scheme of metaphysical freedom. Thus, the conceptual argument operates somewhat analogously to our putting green spectacles on and so finding everything green, and as little as that proves that everything is green, just as little does the conceptual argument, in spite of appearances, prove that metaphysical freedom does not or cannot exist. But let me now substantiate these claims with something more than their utterance.

As we have already noted, when we describe the nature of something, we are forced by the very terms of our undertaking to conceive it in this manner: X consists in Y. Now where X is an object composed of parts, Y, it is perhaps possible to replace X by Y without any logical miscarriage taking place. But let us instead of a mere object take the case of a person, for when we speak of describing the nature of choice it is really a person choosing that we are speaking about, and not a choice choosing (which would be nonsense). We have said that the nature of X, a choice, consists in Y. Two logical consequences immediately follow. We are now treating a person choosing as some sort of whole containing parts. One of these parts is "choice" And at the same time we are treating a person's choosing as if it were related to him as an object is related to a perceiver. Let me try to make the last sentence clear by drawing a parallel. If when I move my hand before my face I abstract what I see, i.e., the series of visual appearances of my hand, and I say that my moving my hand consists in those appearances, then I am describing my moving of my hand exactly as I might describe your hand moving before, me and it is this transposition of logic that I would be trying to depict in saying that I have treated my moving of my hand as if it were related to me as an object is related to a perceiver.

Now by reason of these two logical consequences the request for a description of the nature of choice can be fulfilled only at the cost of eliminating the possibility of a person's choosing, and therefore, a person's choosing otherwise than he does. First, we have redefined choice in terms of an object perceived. This redefinition makes it impossible for a person truly to assert, "I choose", he may only say, "When I asserted, 'I choose', such and such is what happened and in which my choosing consisted". Secondly, in abstracting choosing from the realm of persons and lodging it in the realm of perceived objects, we have at once ensured that there really can be no such thing as choice and hence choosing otherwise. For objects cannot choose, any more than objects can feel pain or be conscious. And thirdly, we seal this result shut by imposing a division upon the person choosing. When a person's behaviour or actions are accounted for in terms of parts into which that person has been analyzed, the very concept of choice prohibits our attributing choice to his behaviour or actions. For



example, if we say that a man's actions result from a tumor in the brain or from a phobia we may not say that he chose those actions. In attributing a person's actions to something which happens within him and which we say his choosing consists in we fall under the same prohibition.<sup>3</sup>

We see; then, that in attempting to confirm it, not because there cannot be such a thing as metaphysical freedom, but because the very task we set ourselves, to describe the nature of choice, precludes by its own terms the possibility of conceiving such freedom. It must, however, be remarked that in showing this we have not as yet shown either that there is anything wrong or illicit in the request for a description of the nature of choice or that metaphysical freedom can exist. We have only shown that the conceptual argument does not prove what it seems to prove. What I want now to show is that (A) we do commit a grave logical error in attempting to describe the nature of choice and (B) that once we refuse to accede to the demand made on us by the conceptual argument to provide such a description we shall find no difficulty in conceiving, in some appropriate sense of the term "conceiving", metaphysical freedom. I say "some appropriate sense of the term "conceiving" "because it is obvious that we can no longer mean by "impossible to conceive" something like "impossible to provide a description of the nature of choice which permits metaphysical freedom", the presumption being that we have already rejected as logically inadmissible all such descriptions. But certainly the following might be taken as a workable and appropriate sense of the term "conceive", agreeing as it does both with ordinary and philosophical usages. We might say : metaphysical freedom is conceivable if it is possible to attribute metaphysical freedom to a person without falsifying the attribution of other properties unquestionably belonging to a person, e.g., predictability of action, the existence of appetites and character, motives, rationality, and so on. And we might say : metaphysical freedom cannot be conceived if its attribution is inconsistent with those other attributions. And this, in fact, will be the sense in which I shall henceforth use the term "conceive" where speaking of the possibility of conceiving metaphysical freedom.

(A) It is manifest, I think, that if we describe a concept, C, as if it possessed the character, X, whereas in fact X is incompatible with the concept, we have blundered and any argument based on our blunder

3. Intimations of these logical consequences are to be found, not merely in recent writings (where they occur frequently and explicitly), but at least as far back in the history of philosophy as Berkeley. Consider, for instance, Berkeley's objection to the partition of the self which Alciphron has employed in order to enforce his attack upon metaphysical freedom (Euthphron, in *Alciphron* dialogue seven, section 18) : "It I should suppose things spiritual to be corporeal, or refine things actual and manifold parts, I do not know what may follow..." But so far as I know these logical consequences have not been connected, as they should be, with the request for a description of the nature of choice. For until we see this connection the desire to provide a description of choice will continue to haunt and corrupt our discussions of choice.



is absolutely worthless (for on such a basis we could prove, if we wished, that snakes were dogs by pretending that snakes had four legs and barked). But the attempt to describe the nature of choice entails just such a logical blunder. In describing the nature of choice we are forced, it has been seen, to treat the concept of a person as the concept of something divided. But qua person, a person cannot be divided. For instance, in punishing a person we cannot (as a conceptual matter) punish his hand, or a part of him termed the will, or something present which did not exist in the past. We can only punish him (one and indivisible). And we, who punish, fall under the same conceptual restraints. We do not and cannot intelligible suppose, for example, that our hand does the punishing but not us; or that any part of us will be responsible for doing the punishing and not another; or that any part of us will be responsible. Since, then, the request for a description of what the nature of a choice consists in necessarily attributes to the concept of a person a characteristic incompatible with the concept, i.e., division, we may without further ado reject it, along with the conceptual argument in which it is embedded.

(B) The following demonstration, it seems to me, is perfectly conclusive in showing that metaphysical freedom is conceivable; that is to say, that it may be attributed to a person consistent with the attribution of predictability of action, appetites, motives, rationality, and so on. Before proceeding with our demonstration, however, it is important to mention a possible point of misunderstanding. This is the idioms in which we commonly talk about our choices and their ground, e.g., "I chose X because of such-and-such reason," "I chose X because I liked X", "I chose X because of caprice," and so on. It may be tempting to read these idioms as if they said that a certain part of us, e.g., will, reason, appetite, caprice, were a causal element producing choice. Any such interpretation, however, plainly violates the concept of a person as something indivisible and so a fortiori eliminates the very possibility of choice (as we have already seen). Thus, as long as we are speaking of a person choosing, we must mean by our citations of different grounds of choice, e.g., "because of appetite," "because of such-and-such reason," a relation that in no way violates the indivisibility of the person choosing. How this relation is to be further described, or whether it can be further described, need not concern us in this place.

Let us take, the, case of a friend who likes cheese and dislikes pickles, and who is invited to a party where he will be served both appetizers. It is clearly part of our conception of this typical situation that our friend will probably or even certainly take the cheese and not the pickles (predictability of behaviour). It is a further part of our conception that although he has an appetite for cheese (the person as possessing appetites) he is, nonetheless, under no compulsion to take the cheese; that he can choose the pickles instead (metaphysical freedom); and that he can do so either for given reasons (rationality



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and motivation) or for no reason at all (e.g., he "just decided to"). Finally, it is part of our conception that when our friend chooses the cheese it is necessarily he and not some part of him who chooses to take the cheese (the person choosing as indivisible). But now, if we do not tamper with our conceptions of the things referred to, do we find any incompatibility between them? Assuredly we do not. The entire fabric of attributions holds together and does so for any number of similar instances in human affairs. In short, as long as we conceive choice in terms of persons choosing (and not objects) metaphysical freedom proves to be perfectly conceivable.

**II. The Scientific Argument: that we must accept determinism for the sake of science**

It may be argued that although metaphysical freedom can be conceived, there are, nonetheless, good reasons for rejecting the notion; and these good reasons have to do with science. Specifically, it may be argued that if we are to apply science to human conduct—indeed, if we are to suppose that there is any homogeneity between human events and other events—we must reject the picture that persons possess the power to choose otherwise than they do and consider all human conduct as causally determined. Only by doing so shall we be able to achieve an exactness rigor, and unity in our predictions of human behaviour that merits the title "scientific."

Since this view point favouring causal determination has directly or indirectly inspired the triumphs and methods of the physical sciences it cannot be lightly dismissed. Even at the expense of discarding the moral category as a superstition (which we should have to do), it might seem profitable to subject all human action to causally based analyses and thus provide ourselves with a power and knowledge over human affairs that we currently lack. For though—as we have seen—we can make predictions, and even certain predictions, concerning the behaviour of persons, qua person, the certainty permitted is not of a sort that lends itself either to the objective demonstrations of highly developed science or to unified theory. When, for instance, we assert that it is certain that our friend will choose cheese instead of pickles at a party but limit our substantiation to purely personal terms, e.g., "He does not like pickles," "He has never chosen pickles before," etc., our evidence is what might be termed "impressionistic." Others may go along with us; but they are not forced to. Thus someone might object, "But I don't see from his having always previously chosen cheese instead of pickles that it is certain he will do so this time."<sup>4</sup> If, however, we could interpret our friend's behaviour in terms of a causal complex of objects, then we would be able to demonstrate in non-impressionistic ways that he would certainly take the cheese, just as it can be

4. Reference is not being made to the philosophical problem of induction but to the usual differentiation that we make between human behavior and that of causally determined notions.



demonstrated objectively that the moon will pass in front of the sun at such-and such a time, given such and such figures and Newtonian mechanics. Indeed, it might even be possible by reducing human behavior to purely causal interpretations to elevate psychology to a branch of mathematical physics, a beatification that many psychologists seem to devoutly pray for.

In spite of the high stakes that beckon, however, there are two very good reasons for not acceding to the above arguments. The first reason is that whatever evidence we actually have suggests that voluntary human conduct does not lend itself to rigid causal-type predictions. If, then by an abstraction or turn of logic we form a causally-based picture of human conduct, that means we are dealing with a chimera and not a reality; a chimera, furthermore, that, unlike the ideal systems used in physical science, can apparently never be applied with profit to actual affairs. When we apply an ideal causal system in physical science to phenomena we do so by introducing further causal factors, e.g., friction of bodies, into our computations. In the case of this ideal system of psychology which we have imagined, we shall somehow have to introduce a causal calculus into a non-causal state of affairs. How is this to be done? It might be answered perhaps, that some statistical connection could be established, based on the sort of statistical predictions concerning choices that we already possess, e.g., "Seven out of ten persons will choose a red-colored fabric over a blue-colored fabric. "But how are these statistical predictions which we already possess to be made more exact and rigorous by extrapolating others from an ideal causal system that logically falsifies actual conduct? One should think that the resulting predictions would be less reliable than those we now have, which are based on tabulations of the actual behavior of persons.

But even supposing that statistical predictions could be improved, from the viewpoint of metaphysics the really crucial objection to the program of reducing all personal behaviour to causal complexes of objects remains. If we are to be consistent, we must suppose that our very decision to reconceptualize the self as a causal complex of objects belongs to some causal complex. Strictly speaking, however, in a world consisting only of causal complexes there cannot exist decisions, considered judgment, responsible evaluation, or any of the other related concepts of critical assessment. Because, say, certain electrical impulses have the effect of making my mouth fly open and utter the sentences, "I decide to reconceptualize the self as causal complex," that does not mean that there has been a decision; on the contrary, it precludes there having been a decision. Moreover, suppose now that as the effect of various causes, another person's mouth opens and utters the sentence, "That is the correct thing to do," and still another person's mouth opens and utters the sentence, "That is not the correct thing to do." As mere effects of causes, does one utterance merit more credence than the other? If, as persons, we could examine the causal apparatuses in question and if we discovered that one was in good working order



## CHOOSING OTHERWISE

and the other not. then we might sensibly maintain that one utterance merited credence and the other not. But it should be remembered that we are now also to be conceived as mere causal complexes of objects; we too are a causal apparatus of some sort. Does, then, the fact that our mouth opens and utters the sentence, "The first speaker's utterance merits credence" itself merit credence? Again, it only can if we introduce, somewhere along the line, a person who inspects and deliberates on our causal apparatus. Generalizing, then, it seems clear that when we propose the reconceptualization of the self as a causal complex we must be prepared to do away with the entire category of critical assessment, along the various concepts contained in it, e.g., decision, considered judgment, etc., and this means that our very proposal itself can pretend to no critical backing. It can amount to no more than mere noise. The only possible way, therefore, that a person can critically propose that there exists complete causal determination in human affairs is by excepting himself from that generalization. But on what grounds can the proposer of that generalization do that? There are obviously no grounds. Moreover, in having to admit the possibility and existence of metaphysical freedom in his own case in order to provide for himself the basis of critical assessment, he cannot consistently maintain that the methods and concepts of science necessitate the denial of metaphysical freedom and the acceptance of absolutely universal causal determination. For by definition science is a form of knowledge resting on critical assessments.

### III. *The Epistemological Argument : that the existence of freedom cannot be known.*

Whatever else has or has not been shown (it may be said), it has not been shown that we know their to exist metaphysical freedom. We may have established that its existence is not inconceivable, in the sense that there is no real incompatibility between its attribution and the attribution of predictability and motives to human conduct. And it may have been established that if there are to exist critical judgment there must exist metaphysical freedom.. But even if these conclusions have been incontrovertibly established, it does not follow from them that metaphysical freedom does exist. A stubborn determinist, for example, might still argue : "Because a thing may exist that does not prove it does exist. And if the denial of metaphysical freedom entails that all that I am now saying constitutes mere noise, then mere noise it must be, and the impression that it is not-that there is taking place critical assessment and judgment-is simply an illusion which I am causally compelled to under go". And this stubborn opponent to metaphysical freedom will demand, before he accepts the existence of such a thing, that there be some proof of its existence.

What I have termed the epistemological argument has its inception in this or some similar challenge to prove that metaphysical freedom does exist, or in the question, "How do we know it exists?" In either case, our natural reaction is to turn to inner experience for an answer. The reasons and analogies that guide us in direction seem as



unexceptional as common sense. If we are asked to find out whether it is true that there is a chair in a certain room, we go look and see. But if we are to believe our own words, choices are initiated and occur in the mind. We say, "I viewed this and that in my mind and then decided", or "At the same time I was smiling at him I decided to doublecross him", and other persons say that they do not know whether we have come to a decision or not they cannot tell from our expression; and in other ways they and we seem to imply that behind our visages choices are taking place. It seems the plainest truth, therefore, that if we are to confirm or disconfirm the existence of metaphysical freedom we must somehow do so through an immediate observation of our inner experiences. But when we introspect it is always with the same outcome. We discover no possible basis for confirming or disconfirming any sentence of the form, "I could have chosen otherwise than I did", or "I can choose otherwise than I do". On the contrary, on the basis of what we can observe in inner experience, we are forced to conclude that when we speak of a power to choose otherwise we describe or report absolutely nothing. For how can we confirm affirmations of metaphysical freedom when we cannot even discover in our experiences anything that could possibly pass for choosing? For instance: introspection may discover to us a sequence of images, internal debates, feelings of uncertainty or instability changing into a posture to move in certain directions, the utterance of the words, "I choose to do X." But it is manifest that these things do not comprise a choice, either taken individually or all together. We might imagine, for example, the identical sequence of happenings taking place against our consent and will. In this admittedly queer psychological state we should certainly want to ask, "What is happening to me?" or, if some action emanated from the sequence of happenings, we should certainly want to assert, and we should be entitled to assert, that it was not in the least due to our willing it.

Now our failure to discover anything like metaphysical freedom or even mere choice in our inner experiences would be a grave matter indeed if we were right in looking for them there (or any other place). It would then truly constitute a great mystery that we ever thought and talked as if there were such things and were should have to admit that our words "choice" and "choose otherwise than we do" were the merest noises. The whole point is, of course, that we are wrong in attempting to confirm or disconfirm assertions of choice and metaphysical freedom in our inner experiences. In requesting us to do so the epistemological argument is of one piece with the conceptual argument that we discussed in section one. It asks us to do what must, as a matter of intrinsic logic, preclude our inquiry's having any other than a purely negative conclusion. We do not discover an absence of choice and metaphysical freedom because there is an absence of them, but because the nature of the experiment we are engaged in that is, introspection-conceptually guarantees their absence, as putting on green glasses (to repeat a previous simile) guarantees that what we see will be green, whether it really is or not.



When we attempt to confirm a first person psychological assertion through introspection -for example a statement affirming the power to choose otherwise-we are necessarily placed in the role of observing ourselves or our internal experiences; and that is to say, we effect a division in ourselves as persons, becoming both observer and object observed. Moreover, since the terminus of our self-observation is the self as an object, we must always in this experiment end up viewing ourselves as an object. It is consequently, really no mystery why metaphysical freedom seem to be entirely empty or reference when we seek to locate the former or confirm the latter through internal observations. In doing so, we replace persons by objects; and no more then we can discover choice in stones can we discover it in any other objects; neither in sequences of images, utterances, bodily motions, nor the entire landscape of our activities, no matter how elaborately and minutely spread out.

If, though, there are senses of 'confirm' and know' in which we cannot confirm or know that we possess metaphysical freedom, it does not follow that there are not other senses in which we can. Indeed, in some sense of these terms it is obvious that we can confirm and we can know that we possess the power to choose otherwise. Consider this sort of situation. I have said that I am choosing the down-payment and pay in twenty years plan; But do you not know that you can choose a no-down-payment and pay in fifty years plan?" I am asked. Plainly, in this very common sort of situation, I might reply, "Yes, I know I can choose the no-down--payment plan, but I do not wish to" or "I know I can choose otherwise than I am, but I shall not" "No, I didn't know I could choose otherwise. Are you sure I can"? And in reply to the last question this sort of confirmation might be adduced, e.g., I might be shown the small print of the policy which says, "The buyer may also, if he chooses, use the no-down-payment plan".

Norman Malcolm in "Knowledge and Certainty" argues convincingly that if S (a sentence) has a correct use then it can express a true statement<sup>5</sup>. In the above case, we were certainly using the terms 'know' choose' and choose otherwise correctly. If Malcolm is right, and I cannot see how he should not be where S expresses a psychological first person statement the statement above can be true. If they are true it follows at once that metaphysical freedom exists and can be known to exist. Is it possible, then, that our statements above are not true? I fail to see any grounds for maintaining that they are not except the ground that they our statements above are not true? I fail to see any grounds for maintaining that they contain hidden contradictions. For clearly no empirical evidence weighs against their truth. But they cannot contain contradictions, since then they could not be true (and we have seen that they can be true). Therefore, metaphysical freedom does exist and is known to exist.

5. Norman Malcolm Knowledge and certainty (Prentice-Hall, Englewood, Cliffs, 1963). p.179



## VI

## PLATO'S CAVE AND THE COURSE OF ARGUMENT IN THE REPUBLIC

The customary interpretation of Plato's parable of the Cave in the Republic is in incontestably correct as far as it goes : namely, that the parable presents us with "the progress of the mind from the lowest state of unenlightened to knowledge of the Good." What may be disputed is whether the customary interpretation goes far enough. For example, commentators sometimes connect the story of the Cave reflexively with the description of the program of studies that follows; that is, they point out that the sortie of the cavedweller into the outside world and his perception of reflections and finally the sun correspond to the various stages of instruction and knowledge that the candidates for philosophical kingship will pass through in their 'higher education', culminating in dialectic.<sup>2</sup> It has also not been uncommon for Plato's commentators to correlate the figure of the Cave with the figures of the Sun and divided line which precede it.<sup>3</sup> But they do not point out that the story of the Cave may also be interpreted reflexively as describing the entire course of argument that has previously taken place in The Republic.<sup>4</sup>

It is this which I now intend to do. In other words. I shall argue that the story of the Cave not only presents us with Plato's theory of knowledge and its connection with the higher studies of the philosopher kings but that it presents us with Plato's assessment of what has been

1. Francis M. Cornford, "The Republic of Plato", Oxford University Press, New York, London, 1945, p. 227

2. See, Davies and Vaughan, *The Republic of Plato*, Macmillan and Co., London 1935, pp. xxv-xxvi. See also, R. L. Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*, ed. Benson, Macmillan and Co. London, 1910, chapter XI, "The Four Stages of Intelligence," pp. 238-258.

3. See, J.E. Raven, "Sun, divided Line and Cave," *Classical Quarterly* III (1953), pp. 22-32

4. In his *Plato's Mathematical Imagination*, (Indian University Press) Fig. 43, p. 101, Robert Brumbaugh sketches out a reflexive account of the Divided Line (not the Cave). The results are rather different from our own. Whereas we correlate different aspects of the Cave with different segments of The Republic, Brumbaugh correlates different segments of the line with the argumentation of different individuals : Noesis, with no one; Dianoia, with Glaucon and Adimantus; Pistis, with Thrasymachus; Eikasia, with Cephalus and Polemarchus. Cf. also P. Desjardins, "The form of Platonic Inquiry," *PH. D. diss., Yale*, 1957.



accomplished so far in *The Republic*, in the way of ascertaining the definition of Justice, and what has not been accomplished; what methods have been pursued, and what their status has been along with what further methods need to be pursued. According to my contentions, therefore, the story of the Cave not only provides us with a key which to unlock Plato's theory of knowledge but a key with which to unlock *The Republic itself*. what the substance of this last claim amounts to I shall try to make clear in the concluding paragraphs of the essay.

The inquiry into the nature of Justice in *The Republic* falls, broadly speaking, into three parts. It will be important for our purposes to set down those parts, which I shall designate, Inquiries A, B, and C.

**Inquiry A.** In book One inquiry takes the form of what might be termed 'first level dialectic.' Definitions are asked for, examined, and discarded as leading to contradiction. But no connection is systematically established between the definitions presented and examined. Furthermore, when these definitions are exposed as false it is on the basis of the unexamined opinions of the discussants. In other words, the entire inquiry in Book One or Inquiry A, is carried out in terms of just the opinions which the discussants have amassed, willy nilly, in the course of their lives. We might say therefore that Inquiry A, or first level dialectic, i.e., the dialectic of Book one of *The Republic*, gets us no further than, and certainly not beyond, unexamined, probable opinion.

**Inquiry B.** In Book Two a second and different sort of inquiry into the nature of Justice is initiated. This inquiry does not resemble dialectic, except in the superficial sense that questions are sometimes posed and answered. It would however, make no real difference to the inquiry being carried out if we entirely replaced the questions and answers which occur with straight forward exposition. For, essentially, the inquiry initiated in Book Two, or Inquiry B, resembles what might be termed a 'controlled experiment.' A rudimentary State which constitutes Justice.

When we are not able to, political and economic additions are made with the aim of forming an ideal State, the explicit assumption being that in an ideal state the various virtues, which include justice, will manifest themselves most plainly. As each political and economic addition is made to the rudimentary State we are supposed to watch carefully to see the when Justice appears and thus identify its cause, just as a chemist might add various elements to a mixture, one by one, to see which would cause a particular reaction.

Although this Platonic experiment is conducted only in thought or imagination, it is like an experiment that we might conduct in physical fact. We might actually form a rudimentary State with living persons



(or so it seems), observe their relations, and see if Justice enters them. We might then build up the rudimentary State, political and economic addition by addition, until we had an Ideal State. Clearly, therefore, the immediate subject-matter of Inquiry B consists in visible and temporal entities, and not mathematical objects or Forms : in men in certain visible relations, behaving through periods of time.

This is brought out in Plato's contention that at least a close approximation of the ideal State might possibly be 'realized' in fact-granted several unlikely but possible eventualities.<sup>5</sup> It is also brought out in the definition of Justice which is finally arrived at in Inquiry B. When Justice is Identified within the soul it is identified as a cause of observably just actions and relations, much as the movement of the hour hand of a clock might be traced back in its causes to springs and wheels inside the clock case. As a cause of observably just actions and relations which is lodged in the soul Justice is conceived as a 'hidden' mechanism enduring through time and exerting effects through time.

**Inquiry C.** A third sort of Inquiry into the nature of Justice is outlined but not undertaken in *The Republic*. This is dialectic proper or what might be called 'second level dialectic' this is the science which the Philosopher Kings will employ in their determination of the nature of Justice and the Good. Since its employment presupposes a complete command of not only harmony and astronomy by mathematics we may suppose that second level dialectic, or Inquiry C, synthesizes and incorporates those sciences, and particularly mathematics, in its hypotheses. Thus we might imagine the definitions that it presents having a mathematical character and being ordered and systematized according to mathematical considerations. Consequently, Inquiry C, or second level dialectic, will be very different indeed (we must suppose) from the hit and miss canvassing of ordinary opinion, proceeding willy nilly as fancy suggests, which comprises the dialectic of Book One, or Inquiry A. Nor will it resemble the controlled experiment initiated in Book Two, or Inquiry B. For its immediate subject-matter according to Plato's description) will be the intelligible Forms themselves, with no admixture of the visible or temporal.<sup>6</sup>

Consider, now the states of cognition which are depicted in the story of the Cave. The first and lowest state of cognition is pictured in terms of persons chained to benches, unable to look around, gazing up on images reflected on a wall in front of them. Since the viewers of these images possess no knowledge of the real, temporal causes of the images we might compare them to persons whose understanding of things is based upon mere hearsay and unexamined opinion. One might, for instance, compare them to persons who believe that whiskey is good for snake-bite without determining by any sort of experiment or systematized observations whether it is good or not for snake-bite. Call this : state of cognition. 1

5. See Cornford, op.cit. pp.251 ff

6. See Cornford, op.cit.p. 178



A second and higher stage of cognition (cognition<sup>2</sup>) is depicted in terms of some of the viewers of the well - images unfastening their chains, arising, turning about, and ascertaining that the images on the wall are caused by performers holding various objects moving upon a parapet before a fire. Since these ambulatory viewers are still in the Cave, and since everything within the cave belong to the realm of visible and temporal objects, we may compare them to persons who, no longer relying upon mere hearsay, submit their opinions to empirical experimentation and test. They are thus provided with an understanding of the temporal causes of effects. They are what we should today refer to as empirical scientists.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, some of the ambulatory viewers leave the Cave, and after a period of adjusting their vision by looking at reflections, i.e., mathematical objects, they raise their eyes and behold the Pure Forms which have no approximations in the visible, temporal realm, e.g., Justice. Now it is only this third stage or cognition 3. that Plato designates knowledge of Justice involving as it does the immutable alone. The two previous stages of cognition are equated with opinion, and as such are said to provide us with only probabilities (at best), not certainties; approximations, not exactnesses<sup>8</sup>.

It can be seen that the three stages of cognition depicted in the story of the Cave correspond precisely with the three inquiries into the nature of Justice which are presented in *The Republic*<sup>8</sup>. The first level dialectic of book one, or Inquiry A, corresponds to cognition based on and restricted to unexamined opinion or cognition 1. The conclusions reached are correspondingly unreliable. Thus, at the end of Book One Plato has Socrates tell us that "The whole conversation has left me completely in the dark; for so long as I do not know what justice is, I am hardly likely to know whether or not it is a virtue, or whether it makes a man happy or unhappy."<sup>9</sup> And again, at the commencement of Book Two Plato has the discussants refer to "common opinion" and the views of "most people" as still remaining unrefuted, even where describing justice as being something tiresome in itself and good only for the rewards it brings, or of wrong-doing as being in itself desirable. In the light of what is shown later on these are major falsehoods; and that first level dialectic has not permitted us to see through them or expose them as such indicates not only the limitations of first level

7. What I have termed cognition 2' would also include, but not be limited to, the sort of right opinion entertained, e.g., by the auxiliaries concerning things to fear and not to fear. This sort of right opinion, which is not based upon empirical observations, has its foundation in the knowledge and authority of the philosopher kings. It is therefore, a sort of right opinion or belief that can only exist where there exists the ideal State, and hence cannot represent a state of cognition occurring in the course of argumentation in *The Republic*.

8. I have telescoped together mathematical knowledge and the knowledge of the pure forms. These are kept apart, both in the story of the Cave and in the program of studies for the Philosopher kings. For our purposes, however, it is not necessary to retain this division, since neither method of inquiry is incorporated in the *Republic*.

9. Cornford op. cit., p.40



dialectic, or Inquiry A, but how very slight has been our advance by the end of Book One toward a knowledge of the nature of Justice.

The results of Inquiry B are admitted by Plato to be in some sense reliable. This would correspond with the sort of knowledge-like opinion that is possessed by those who, having unfastened their chains, perceive the temporal causes of the images upon the walls. At the same time Plato makes it plain that the conclusions arrived at through Inquiry B are only partially reliable. They do well enough for the determination of temporal causes, and so correspond to cognition 2, but they fail to provide us with certain and exact knowledge. Consider, for example the following dialogue between Socrates and his auditors :

Do you also remember my warning you beforehand that in order to gain the clearest possible view of these qualities we should have to go round a longer way, although we could give a more superficial account in keeping with our earlier argument. You said that would do; and so we went on in a way which seemed to me not sufficiently exact; whether you were satisfied, it is for you to say.

We all thought you gave us a fair measure of truth.

No measure that falls in the least degree short of the whole truth can be quite fair in so important a matter what is imperfect can never serve as a measure; though people sometimes think enough has been done and there is no need to look further.

For you have often been told that the highest object of knowledge is the essential nature of the Good, from which every thing that is good and right derives its value for us. You must have been expecting me to speak of this now, and to add that we have no sufficient knowledge of it. I need not tell you that, without that knowledge to know everything else, however well would be of no value to us...<sup>10</sup>

**Inquiry C**, or the second level dialectic outlined in the program of studies to be pursued by the philosopher kings, ostensibly corresponds to cognition 3. In both, the subject matter of inquiry consists in Pure Forms immutable and invisible; and in both the conclusions arrived at are exact and certain .

Summing up our evidence then, we see : First Plato's description of cognition 1, 2, and 3 apply directly to Inquiries A, B, and C. Second, the evaluations that are applied by Plato to cognition 1, 2, and 3 are the same evaluations that are applied to Inquiries A, B, and C. Unless, therefore we suppose that Plato composed philosophy like a rhapsodist, saying more than he was conscious of and this would be highly unlikely indeed, we must conclude that the story of the Cave describes and was intended to describe the course of argument in *The Republic* and not merely the general progress of one's soul toward a knowledge of the

10. Cornford, *op.cit.* pp. 214-215.



Good. But this is not all. These further corollaries may be derived from our present conclusion :

(i) It is tempting to suppose that the definition of Justice set forth in Book IV, that is, the definition that says that Justice is minding one's own business is "Plato's definition of Justice." But this is not exactly true. If we take the parable of the Cave seriously we must understand this definition to represent merely the best results that can be obtained by empirical study. We cannot suppose that it represents the final word on the nature of Justice or that Plato thinks it does. In short, we must suppose that Plato views this definition of Justice in much the same way that he has Socrates view the parable of the Cave itself :

My dear Glaucon... You will not be able to follow me farther, though not for want of willingness on my part. It would mean that, instead of illustrating the truth by an allegory, I should be showing you the truth itself, at least as it appears to me. I cannot be sure whether or not I see it as it really is; but we can be sure that there is some such reality which it concerns us to see. <sup>11</sup>

(II) The reader of The Republic who agrees with Plato's arguments may be inclined to suppose, when he has completed Inquiry B, that he possesses a knowledge of the nature of Justice. But this plainly not so. In order to possess such knowledge he should have to complete the course of studies that is outlined for future Philosopher Kings in Books. Seven. Obviously, he has not completed such a course of studies.

Appropriately, therefore, Plato, locates the story of the Cave between inquiry B and the outline of Inquiry C. What is indicated is our real location vis-a-vis our attempt to define Justice. At the point of the introduction of the story of the Cave we have exhausted every inquiry that can be carried out in the realm of visible and temporal objects. These inquiries have carried us onward to an enlightened opinion of what justice is. They have not provided us with a knowledge of the nature of Justice. In terms of the parable of the Cave, we are at the threshold, separating the temporal from the non-temporal, the visible from the non visible. Our next step must consist in leaving the Cave of temporal, visible entities. But this we cannot do in The republic itself. We can proceed no further than we have (for to proceed further would require that there existed an ideal state and that we passed through the entire educational regimen of that state). Thus our inquiries in The Republic leave us in a position somewhere between Appearance and Reality : we are at the point of leaving the Cave but remain still within its confines, viewing "behind this parapet...persons carrying along various artificial objects, including figures of men and animals in wood or stone or other materials, which project above the parapet. Naturally, some of these persons will be talking, other silent. <sup>12</sup>

11. Cornford, op. cit. p. 253.

12. Cornford, op. cit. p. 228.



## VII

THE ONTOLOGICAL EMERGENCE OF  
FACT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The question that I wish to raise and answer in this paper requires some historical scaffolding.

Prior to the present century one finds a great many things designated by philosophers as the fundamental units or principles of reality: various common physical stuffs (e.g., fire, air, earth, water), substance and accident, consciousness and idea, atoms and void, impressions, concrete universals, Platonic forms and matter, monads, God, and so on. But one does not find among these candidates for ontological supremacy facts. Facts are given a secondary but significant role in epistemology and ethics; they are given no role at all in metaphysics.<sup>1</sup> Figuratively, one might say that the concept, fact like Cinderella in the first part of the story, sits in ontological ashes, neglected, unsung, uncourted.

Just before the turn of this century in America, and in the second decade of this century in England, particularly in the philosophy emanating from Cambridge and its intellectual environs, a dramatic change occurs. Like Cinderella in the second part of the story fact is suddenly transported (one might say) from the chimney corners to the very presence room of metaphysics. As early as 1896, Pierce refers to fact as one of the three categories of elements making up phenomena, the other two consisting in quality and thought.<sup>2</sup> In Moore's lectures of 1910 - 11, fact is again referred to as one of three categories of ontological being, the other two consisting in particulars and universals.<sup>3</sup> Several years later, in his lectures entitled "The philosophy of Logical Atomism" (1918), Russell not only maintains that "the world contains fact"<sup>4</sup> but that "it is with the analysis of facts that one's consideration of the

1. See, for instance, the discussion of fact in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, 1901.

2. C.S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, Harvard Univ. Press, 1931 Vol., 1 secs. 423 ff.

3. G.E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1953, 372.

4. Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in Bertrand Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*, ed. Marsh, Allen & Unwin, London 1956, p. 182.



problem of complexity must begin. not by the analysis of apparently complex things."<sup>5</sup> In Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* composed about the same times, these themes are carried to their farthest extension. Says Wittgenstein: "1. 1. The world is the totality of facts, not of things 1. 13. the facts in logical space are the world."<sup>6</sup>

The question that I wish to examine may now be profitably posed. It is this: How are we to account for the sudden ontological emergence of fact around the beginning of this century? Why should it be that, when it never did before, fact should suddenly seem to various philosophers to constitute one of the primary "entities"<sup>7</sup> composing the world, and in the metaphysics of some the primary ontological entity? This may seem to be a merely "curious" (as Hume would say) question. Even as such, it should command some study. Actually, however, very far reaching philosophical issues are involved. One might conceive our question as framing a crucial experiment. Just because the ontological emergence of fact is sudden and abrupt, the causes of that emergency may be identifiable. But if we can identify the causes of the emergence of fact as an ontological entity we may have identified at the same time the sources of other ontological emergences, e.g., the emergence of substance and accident as primary ontological entities. To be more specific: suppose our present examination showed that the ontological emergence of fact occurred contemporaneously with the imposition of a new form of expression upon the English and other natural languages. On the ground that the ontological emergence of fact did not occur until the imposition of this new form of expression upon natural languages, and that with its imposition it did occur, we might (applying the inductive canons of Mill) infer that the imposition of this new form of expression was the cause of the emergence of fact as an ontological entity. We might then argue with some amount of credibility that the more particular character this cause took was the hypostatization of the form of expression in question.

Now these inferences, which are sometimes generalized as the doctrine that metaphysics is simply a projection of syntax, do seem to be confirmed by an examination of the question that I have raised. We do find, in the early nineteen hundreds, new forms of expression imposed upon the English language and other natural languages. We can point out between these new forms of expression and the ontological emergence of fact a direct relation of this sort: if those forms of expression are hypostatized they fit the logical description of fact. But these claims now need to be substantiated.

What precise change in linguistic expression is it that occurs contemporaneously with the ontological emergence of fact? Urmson in his

5. *Ibid.*, p. 192. Russell's italics.

6 Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Paul, trench, Trabner, London, 1922

7. See Russell, *op. cit.* p. . 191 for the use of the word "entity" to describe fact.



recent study Philosophical Analysis provides a possible answer when he tells us that we can get to logical atomism by another route. Now we start from mathematical logic."<sup>8</sup> Logical atomism is the particular metaphysics in which fact first emerges as a principia Mathematica upon English and other natural languages. In following Urmson's injunction, therefore, we would seem to be striking close to the cause or causes of the ontological emergence of fact. Urmson's specific analysis of these conditions does not, however, take us to the answer we want. He notes that the metaphysics of logical atomism is reductionistic; he correlates this reductionism with the reduction that Russell effects upon mathematical entities in Principia Mathematica.<sup>9</sup> But this analysis in no way explains why the reduction in question should have concluded with fact as the basic ontological entity rather than with something else. Indeed, prima facie, it would appear that it ought not to have concluded with fact. For with numbers and other mathematical objects get 'reduced to' in principia Mathematica are expressions employing symbols like,  $(x) fx$ ,  $(Ex) fx$ ,  $x=y$ , etc.,<sup>10</sup> and these expression in no way suggest an ontological realm of fact when they are imposed on natural languages. They suggest terms or particulars, predicates or universals, and operations performed over these (Russell's "logical fictions")

We need, therefore, to isolate not merely a change in linguistic expression that occurs contemporaneously with the ontological emergence of fact, but one that seems to possess some specific generative connection with the latter. The functional quantified symbolic logic does not possess such a connection. There are, though, other elements of the mathematical logic of Principia Mathematica that may prove to be what we are looking for. Before we consider them, however, we might consider some of the logical systems and notations which preceded Principia.

Consider the most ancient of these systems and notations, that of the syllogism. : John ate snails; snails cause ptomaine poisoning; therefore, John will come down with ptomaine poisoning; translated into a typical syllogism becomes, All snail eaters are those who will get ptomaine poisoning." John is a snail eater; therefore, John is one who will get ptomaine poisoning." So reconstructed, it will be noted, the English language consists in sentences or statements that refer to individuals, classes of individuals, and inclusions of classes within others (or members with in classes), Insofar as we take, then, these statements to describe essentially all that needs to be described for the purposes of science and proof we shall want to say that the world consists of individuals, classes of individuals, and classes of classes. Other variations of the syllogism and its notation will seem to describe subjects and predicates, or particulars and universals, e.g., "All human beings are mortal;

8 J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, Oxford, 1956. p. 96

9. See Urmson, op. cit. pp. 97 ff.

10. ibid., p. 97.



Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal.: But no variation of the syllogistic logic and its notation, e.g.: "All M is P, All S is M, therefore, All S is P, will seem to describe or recommend fact as a primary ontological entity. It will not, because the syllogistic logic is an atomic logic, basing its operations on the internal logical structure of sentences or propositions. Consequently, it is necessary in the syllogistic logic to represent, not sentences or statements as such, but the arrangement of logical parts making up sentences or statements, i.e., subjects, predicates, quantifiers, etc. But facts are not conceivable hypostatizations of subjects, predicates, quantifiers, or anything resembling them. Thus when we hypostatize or objectify the forms of expression into which arguments in natural languages are transformed in the syllogistic logic we shall never find among our ontological entities, facts. This is true also of the algebra of classes, which gets formulated by Boole sixty some years before the publication of *Principia Mathematica*. If our suspicions are well founded, then it is not surprising that the ontological emergence of fact did not take place before it did. In that the philosophers employing these previous logics were imposing upon natural languages forms of expression belonging to atomic logics they would have no reason to endow fact which any especial ontological status.

Now it is true, as we have seen, that the functional, quantified logic which is employed in *Principia Mathematica* in the reduction of mathematics to formal logic does not promote the ontological emergence of fact either. But in *Principia Mathematica* we also find the notion of a truth functional propositional logic given one of its first workable formulations. Moreover, this propositional logic is set forth as the foundation on which the higher, functional, quantified logic rests.<sup>11</sup> Thus in some degree, mathematics is reduced to truth-functions of propositions. More important for our purposes: this propositional logic is also set forth as an adequate organ of ordinary argumentation. For example, much of Russell's discussion of logical and mathematical topics in *Principia* and elsewhere is couched in the propositional logic and notation. The same is true of the discussions of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* and to a lesser extent, it is true of the writings of Moore in the period 1910-1923.

What interests us here is the fact that the truth-functional propositional logic of *Principia* is molecular, basing its operations or computations not upon the internal logical structure of sentences or propositions (like the syllogism) but upon logical structures connecting propositions. This means that, as a system into which arguments in natural language are to be translated, it consists of truth-functional connectives, e.g., 'v', and propositional variables, e.g., q's, and r's. In turn this means that when we translate arguments and discourse belonging to natural languages into the propositional logic of *Principia* we end up with logical

<sup>11</sup> Russell even goes so far as to say that "The whole of the logic of deduction is concerned simply with complications and developments of this idea.... 'p and q are both true' ( $p/q$ ) ( $p/q$ ). " Russell, op. cit., p.211



molecules' whose atoms are nothing smaller (so to speak) than propositions. More concretely, we end up with expressions that look like the following:  $P, P \dot{\bar{E}} Q$ , therefore,  $Q$ ;  $P \vee Q$ , etc. (letting the capital letters,  $P, Q, R$ , etc. stand for abbreviations of propositions, not propositional variables).

Suppose, then, we conceive of this truth-functional, propositional logic and its notation as describing essentially everything that needs to be described in deductive arguments, or perhaps any sort of argument. What shall we want to say that these capital  $P$ 's and  $Q$ 's stand for (for the small  $p$ 's and  $q$ 's beign variables, will give way to the capitals). One thing that will suggest itself is fact. Fact will suggest itself because when we assert, e.g., "  $P$  " we are said to be speaking the truth if and only if it is a fact that.  $p$ . Furthermore, this answer holds up better than any other answer that we are able or inclined to give, e.g., "  $P$  " stand for a particular." It even seems right in this respect. The  $P$ 's and  $Q$ 's, and the small  $p$ 's and  $q$ 's of our symbolism, appear to be self-enclosed kinds of things, mutually independent of each other, and this is the kind of thing-when hypostatized facts seems to be. A fact is just what it is. It is self enclosed, independent. One cannot conceive a fact doing any thing to another fact, or suffering and effect from another fact. Hence, as an ontological entity, fact not only appears to be what is referred to by our  $P$ 's and  $Q$ 's of the propositional logic but to fit, in some sense, the truth-functional logic, in which even implication possesses only a material interpretation. In other words the truth functional propositional logic of *Principia* portrays, when its forms of expression are objectified, a world consisting of independent, 'atomic' facts; and a world consisting of independent, 'atomic' facts seems to be what must exist when the propositional logic of **Principia** is taken to portray, as imposed upon natural languages, the essential nature of the world.

We may apply the same explanation to the ontological emergence of fact in Peirce: for already by 1885 Peirce had formulated a truth functional proportional logic.<sup>12</sup> But even before Peirce, Frege had formulated a truth-functional, propositional logic (in the *Begriffsschrift*, 1879), and long before Frege, the Megarians and the Stoics had constructed such a logic at least, in some partial measure.<sup>13</sup> If the thesis we have been advancing is true, it may be asked, why is it that neither Frege nor the Megarian and Stoic philosophers (so far as we know) introduced fact as a primary ontological entity? Now what the specific answer to this question is I do not know. But insofar as the question is meant to level an objection against what has been maintained in these pages, it can be answered in this way. It has not been

<sup>12</sup> See Peirce op. cit. vol. 3 secs. 366, 370 ff.

<sup>13</sup> For an account of the logic formulated in *Begriffsschrift*, see W. & M. Kneale. *The development of Logic*. Oxford. 1962. pp. 478 ff; and for an account of Megarian and Stoic logic. *ibid.*, pp 113 ff.



maintained that the imposition of a truth functional propositional logic upon natural languages must result in the ontological emergence of fact, but only that there will be a natural tendency for this emergence. All sorts of factors may intervene, however, to thwart or divert this tendency. For certainly Mill's canons of induction do not provide us in practice with causes that cannot be neutralized by other causes. We may continue, therefore, to explain the ontological emergence of fact at the time that it did emerge in the way we have been proposing. Restricting our view to Englishmen, Russell and Whitehead, constructed a workable, truth functional propositional logic in the early part of this century; the historical circumstance that Russell and several of those closely connected with or interested in his logical studies, e.g., Moore, Wittgenstein, should have been philosophers rather than mathematicians. But the ontological emergence of fact is also a consequence of something that is not a historical circumstance. Different syntactical and semantical structures project, when we hypostatize them, different ontological structures and entities. Thus, those philosophers like Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein, who imposed the expressions of this new propositional logic upon English and other natural languages, necessarily had suggested to them a structure or aspect of things that neither English or other natural languages had ever suggested. All at once, though never before, it seemed that "the world (divided) into facts."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, 1.2.



## VIII

## THE MYRIAD FACES OF PERSONAL SURVIVAL

The two most common philosophical theses of personal survival that what matters is psychological continuity and connectedness are each and together much too narrow to do justice to common belief and conception.

I can conceive with no trouble, for instance, that I am Plato reincarnated, though no identity through time or psychological continuity between Plato and myself seems to obtain. I can conceive with no trouble that I shall, thousands of years in the future, be resurrected and be judged by God, though no identity through time seems to connect me and myself resurrected nor need there obtain psychological continuity. I can conceive, for example God judging me at that distant time and sentencing me to Hell for a bad life led that I have no recollection of. The thought of this eventuality may perhaps reflect, in my estimation, on God's justice but not on myself's being the object of that injustice.

In contrast to my being able to conceive of personal survival and personal identity obtaining, it does seem that omissions of either can, and often in fact are taken to, count against personal identity and personal survival. The claimant to a large fortune loses credibility of being the actual heir if he cannot remember things that he ought to be able to remember or if his expressions, attitudes, desires are different from those known to have belonged to the actual heir. And the same holds true if, for example, identity through time is put in question. The claimant, for instance, was probably not where the actual heir was known to be at a certain time.

It can even seem, on the other hand, that where both identity through time and psychological continuity obtain neither personal survival nor personal identity necessarily obtains. We could here cite the case of fission. Suppose, for example, that Descartes Evil Demon

1. See David Lewis, 'Survival and Identity,' *The Identities of Persons* ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, University of California Press, Berkeley 1976, pp. 17-18. Lewis thinks that if we had to choose one or the other it should be that 'common sense' answer, identity. Derek Parfit, on the other hand, thinks both cannot be right and chooses as what matters, mental continuity and connectedness. (Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 19; and Parfit, 'Lewis, Perry, and what Matters,' *Rotry op. cit.*, pp. 91. ff)



made it happen that like an amoeba, I as (A) divided into equal halves, (B) and (C). each identical in physical features to the original me (A) and possessing psychological continuity with (A) But clearly (A) cannot both be (B) and (C) for if (A) were (B) and (A) were (C) then (B) would be (C) but that is impossible., for here is the one half (B) of the fission and here elsewhere the other half (C) each in a different lace and hence not numerically identical.<sup>2</sup> Therefore as I said, even with both identity through time obtaining and psychological continuity it is possible that personal survival and identity may not obtain.

Confronted by all these myriad faces that personal identity and survival can take, some even antithetical to each other, it would appear that the question often asked', which matters in survival -identity or psychological survival? Is almost beside the point. The really pressing question is, just what can personal identity that allows for these myriad, often antithetical, faces it wears?

Our aim in this paper is to provide just such an explanation; but with this qualification. I shall let stand simply as they are those cases where a lack of identity through time and psychological continuity count against personal identity and personal survival. These are cases whose natural habitat seems to be law courts or other arena where inter subjective confirmations or disconfirmations of legal and similar claims are mandated. One might say: here an empiricistic stand point rightly triumphs. But obviously it cannot triumph in cases of claimed reincarnation say where identity through time and psychological continuity are admittedly absent.

In the present connection, it might be noted that, except in the proposed case of fission, we have been viewing personal identity and survival from an empiricistic perspective. Thus in the instance of my supposing that I was a reincarnation of Plato, I took it to be fact that there obtained neither identity through time nor psychological continuity. This identity through, time though, was an identity conceived in empiricists terms; a path (as it were) extending from Plato three hundred and some years B.C. to here, nineteen hundred ninety five years A.D. Which because Plato was not observable occupying each segment of it, entitled us to claim that identity through time failed to obtain. Even the call for psychological continuity as a criterion of personal identity is sub rosa commitment to empiricism, in that the psychological is almost by definition, experiential land hence critically empiricistic.

But let us part company with our contemporary empiricistic biased and see what happens. Let us, for example have recourse to that long maligned (in empiricistic circles, at least) explanatory concept of

2. I am of course, repeating a familiar argument, see Parfit, loc. cit. It seems to me that fission taking place as described, under the ministrations of Descartes' Evil Demon allows us to bypass various logically irrelevant difficulties posed by the usual hospital scenario: for example it is questionable that one's brain, so drastically operated on as to render a neat split, could subsequently function and so preserve psychological continuity or that the patient would survive. Descartes' Evil Demon takes care of these sub lunar difficulties.



substance and think of personal identity (as well as survival) in the following terms: of person in terms of substantial self: and substantial self in terms of say G.E. Moore's organic unity.

Now self as substance by itself severs any exhaustive connection with empiricistic observation and determination for, as empiricists themselves have long and loudly complained, the idea of substance has no literal basis and exemplification in experience. Thus self as substance lends it self to the ordinary person's finding no difficulty in supposing himself to be, say Plato reincarnated or being judged by God millenniums hence, for as noted, within itself as substrate, self does not, for identity or survival, need to submit to empiricistic continuities through time. These become irrelevant, just as they are ordinarily understood by us to be, when we, whether in truth or fiction, take ourselves to be Plato re-incarnated. But this negative dividend of our explanation of the self-as-substance is not all. There is a more positive one.

Agreeing with the classical conception of substance as the unchanging through change, we shall want to maintain, on the basis of empiricistic understandings of time themselves for instance, as in Hume, time's being successions of perceptions<sup>4</sup> that substance as such is time less, since what is unchanging excludes within itself successions. But then, between the Plato of our reincarnation and our self as substance now, there is no time, and in this non empiricistic identity it is quite as if we had that Humean "perfect" identity,  $x=x$ ,<sup>5</sup> except that since empiricistic observables are irrelevant, our 'x' on either side of the equal sign need not in the properties it possesses resemble the other. But this seemingly odd " $x=x$ " coheres, it might be noted, with our actual conception of survival and identity in our beliefs of reincarnation and future resurrections. It also coheres with the enigmatic self-identities of our self-remiscences. In the latter, for example I seemingly view myself when a boy, say or eight. That boy, it is my sense, is numerically one and the same as myself reminiscencing, though there is practically no visible resemblance between the two (thus, an  $x=x$  where no Leibnitzian identity obtains).

In introducing timelessness between the objects of the present identities, however, I do not mean to introduce the timelessness of mathematical objects. In the latter case, temporal attributions seem to be incoherent. But they are not in the case of the self as substance. For here, in my reminiscence of myself at eight and here, reminiscencing myself at seventy-eight though no duration or successions of perceptions evince themselves between the two, there obviously was myself then and here myself now (as we should not want to say that there was the number seven then and here the number seven now).

3 See Moore in *Principia Ethica*, passum.

4 See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, second edition, revised and notes by P. H. Niddich. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, p. 35 (Book I Part II Sect. III)

5 Ibid., p. 202



To capture the self as substance in this peculiar kind of timelessness, where no duration obtains nor successions of perceptions but present thens and present nows, I should want to say, as I have elsewhere, that the self-as substance is a 'pure present'.<sup>6</sup> This *suigeneris* temporality, characterizing (I believe) substance, seems to bring together under a viable explanation the myriad faces (as I have called them) of personal survival and identity as they manifest themselves in our ordinary conceptions and experiences of re-incarnation, resurrection, and reminiscence.

We have, I think, surmounted that first Socratean wave posed by our easy conception of reincarnation and other instances of personal identity and personal survival that involve omissions of empiricistic identify through time and psychological continuity. But how are we to surmount that second wave posed by self division? It is here, I suggest, that it will help to introduce something like Moore's 'organic unity.' I shall not try in this connection to set forth Moore's particular version, but something of the following order that the term suggests.

We have, say, in our backyard that type of tree called a 'locust' tree. Now locust trees, as I remember it, propagate themselves by their roots putting forth sprouts. So at this certain time we have just the one large locust tree and some sprouts from its roots. Its organic unity consists in the fact that the sprouts depend for their existence and sustenance on the one large locust tree, in short, there is as yet only one organized unity, that unity terminating in the tree. As time passes, however, each of these sprouts becomes itself a locust tree, no longer depending for its existence or sustenance on the mother tree. Each of them comprises, in short, an organic unity of its own. Thus we have now (say) three locust trees, none of which is identical with the other.

Applying this notion of organic unity to a person dividing, like an amoeba, in half we could say that there was just the one person at first: and even as the beginnings of fission took place, there was still just the one person. But when the division had taken place, certainly then if not before, we no longer have that organic unity comprising our (A) in the experiment; we have two different, independent organic unities (for instance whereas A at a certain time was the organic unity of which (B) and (C) were developing parts, (B) was never an organic unity of which (A) was a developing parts or even a part).

As substance conceived in terms of organic unity our self thus provides a perfectly non-paradoxical account of fission and personal identity. (A) is not self identical with either (B) or (C) nor (B) with (C). Identity through time does not for instance apply to (A) and (B) because (A) and (B) are not identical organic unities. It is true unity is a matter of mere qualitative sameness. But all this would go to prove is that Parfit was wrong: it is identity that matters in survival and not psychological continuity.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See, this author, 'Induction: A Non Sceptical Humean Solution' *Philosophy*, 67, 1992, 324 ff. for a fuller account of pure present.

<sup>7</sup> Parfit, above, loc. cit...



## IX

# BEYOND AUTONOMY : THE METAPHYSICS OF MORAL FREEDOM

I propose in this article to demonstrate, in Part I, that the common philosophical claim that the explanation of moral freedom<sup>1</sup> lies in autonomy is not only false but pregnant with irremediable absurdities. In Part II, I shall attempt to substitute a more just explanation of moral freedom.

## PART-I AUTONOMY, A SNARE AND DELUSION

Since the philosophizing of Kant<sup>2</sup>, it has been popular and still <sup>3</sup>is to explain moral freedom in terms of autonomy. And at first glance, and even tenth glance, this philosophical reconstruction can seem profitable and illuminating. For example, an autonomous political state possesses by definition freedom to govern itself and is therefore responsible for its actions. Why not, then, any autonomous entity?

In addition, the notion of autonomy appears to provide us with an explanation of moral freedom that is non-circular.

In view of these and other "moral" and "theoretic" workings of autonomy what more apt explanation of moral freedom might we possibly postulate?

I mean in what follows to show that far from the attractive explanation of moral freedom that autonomy seems to be it is no such thing, but is, instead, a first step into moral disaster.

1. I use the term "moral freedom" to refer to freedom as hypothetically linked (in the case of individuals or more specifically persons) to moral responsibility, moral praise and blame, etc. Thus, I mean nothing different by the term from simply freedom.

2. See, Mortimer Adler, *Great Books of the Western World*, "The Great Ideas", Vol. II p. 1092 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1972); The seminal role of Kant with respect to the application of the concept of autonomy to the explication of moral freedom is further indicated by the fact that even non-philosophical dictionaries define the term; "autonomy", by reference to Kant's philosophy: see, OED "autonomy.. i.e., the Kantian doctrine of the will giving itself its own laws."

3. See, James Nickel, "Does Basing Rights on Autonomy Imply Political Obligation", *Dialogue*, XXVII, 1989, 537.



But first let me clarify just what is the narrow target of my attack. My target is not, for example, the speaker who uses the term "autonomy" in that careless, analogical way, as when one says in one's late teens, desiring independence from parental authority, "I want autonomy", or some such thing. Insofar as what this speaker would commit one to is merely autonomy as a desired condition I have no bone to pick. But our philosopher would commit us to something much more in his proposal that autonomy is the explanation of moral freedom. He would commit us to autonomy's being not only a necessary but a sufficient condition of moral freedom. That is to say, if there exists at least on the part of a person - autonomy he ipso facto possesses moral freedom. But this, we shall see, is false. Therefore, autonomy is not the explanation of moral freedom. Indeed, as I previously said, that attempted explanation is demonstrably disastrous: disastrous in this way—it commits us in the end to palpable moral absurdities. This is our reason for terming autonomy as the explanation of moral freedom, not merely false, but a snare and delusion.

Now it is clear that if a person's movements result from causes external to the person he is not, with respect to those movements, responsible or morally free. A literal case of such external determination would be a person's being blown off his feet by a whirlwind and slamming into another person and injuring her. Indicative of the status of this slamming into that other person is the fact that we should not even call that slamming into her an "action"; certainly not an action of the person being blown about in the whirlwind. Thus, generalizing, a necessary condition at least of one's being morally free is one's not being ruled by physically external forces or factors. Let us call this condition "EF" or "externally free".

Before proceeding some determination of the theory of compatibilism needs to be made; for if compatibilism is true then arguably "EF" is not true. So let me briefly present three reasons I have for rejection of compatibilism.

One, my first reason, would be that if true, the theory of compatibilism would, as already noted, possibly falsify "EF" and hence render my subsequent arguments null and void. Or to give due homage to pragmatic theory, I need to deny the truth of compatibilism to make "EF" work.

As a matter of correspondence-truth, my second reason would be that in fact the theory of compatibilism is false. But neither my second reason here nor my first one above is, it is clear, a really valid reason. For one thing, The debate whether compatibilism is true or not goes on and shows no signs of abating or, indeed, of having a conclusive resolution<sup>4</sup>. Thus in all honesty we can hardly assign victory to one or the other side of this debate.



There is, however, another sort of reason that can be appealed to that stands, it seems to me, conclusively in support of our ignoring, as we shall, the claims of compatibilism.

Our topic is autonomy as the formal cause of moral freedom. But surely universal determinism (the kind a fair, non-trivial compatibilism espouses) excludes, conceptually, any reference to autonomy, that is, any literal reference to, or even, within such a system, any conception of autonomy. Thus for our purposes the very theory of compatibilism will have simply to be ignored, let out of discussion, as irrelevant and immaterial.

Turning from "EF", I want to cite another condition that ostensibly has to be satisfied before we can propose the existence of moral freedom. This is the condition that the person in question is not ruled by internal parts of himself or, "IF (that is, internally free)". But here again a possible objection needs to be met.

While it is patent that a person whose actions are caused by such a part of himself as a brain tumor is not responsible for the actions in question and hence is not morally free with respect to them, it may be objected that this is not the case with respect to this internal part of ourselves, namely, our brain. It will be argued, for instance., that all our actions are effects of goings-on in our brains-in short, our brains are their cause'; but we do not therefore think that we or others are not and cannot be responsibly for some of our actions at least. As far as ordinary intuitions go, then the very sort of intuitions we have been and are appealing to in the present case-it is not true that moral freedom exists if and only if "IF" obtains.

Now if it is held, as tacitly it is by brain-in-the-vat theorists, that a person is identical to his brain then indeed the present objection triumphs. But it does so, visibly, only because we are tacitly, contrary to our original premise that brain is a part of ourself, supposing that the brain is not a part of ourself, but identical with ourself. On the last hidden assumption, the source of all our actions is, of course, our brain and hence we can seemingly affirm the truth of "IF" only at the cost of having to maintain that we are responsible for none of our actions; morally free with respect to none of them.

4 A case in point of the battle's being carried on inconclusively would be, for instance, Allison McIntyre, "compatibilists could Have Done Otherwise: Responsibility and Negative Agency" *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 103, no. 3, July 1994. McIntyre of course thinks her arguments establish "the truth of causal determinism" (op. cit., 488) with respect to the incompatibilists' could have done otherwise being a necessary condition of moral responsibility. But McIntyre needs, in order to insure this result, the premise of a compatibilist's could have done otherwise's being a sufficient condition of one's being morally responsible, since, if it were not a sufficient condition, some condition other than causal determinism could be in every case what actually accounted for moral responsibility. That is to say, otherwise the compatibilist's case could not be conclusive. But obviously, a compatibilist's could have done otherwise is not a sufficient condition of one's being morally responsible. For instance, Lucretius' Epicurean atoms swerve on their own unpredictably. Thus, of such an atom's past doings, as well as those of any composite of such atoms' doings, e.g. those of the boulder there, it could be truly said that they could have done otherwise. But, plainly, atoms or their mere composites, e.g. the boulder there, are not conceivably morally responsible, epicurean swerves or not.



In actual fact, however, we are, as persons, not identical with our brains. The latter are recognizably but part of ourselves, however important part they might be. With this common understanding of things, for instance, we do not consider a responsible for actions taking place in an epileptic seizure of his brain. Or if an evil scientist induces some state in a person's brain which causes him to commit a murder we do not consider that person responsible for the act even though it is his brain that caused it. Or from another angle, we might point out that a person feels guilty, not a brain.

"JF", then, appears to be as true when directed at physical parts of ourselves, as "EF" when directed at ruling forces external to us. We are supposing here, needless to say, that moral responsibility presupposes moral freedom. But that seems to be no more than a truism.

What seems not so evident, witness the fact that most philosophers in the past have described moral freedom in their terms, is that mental or spiritual parts of a person, especially reason and will when reified, cannot rule a person except at the preclusion of moral freedom. Place oneself in the shoes of such a person—that is, a person being ruled by mental or spiritual parts of himself. Not he but a reified something else called, say, "his will", dictates his arm's now being raised. On the face of it, his arm's now rising is not his action but that of the reified will. He must, therefore, view the rising of his arm in the same third person way another person might view it, for example, with surprise. Thus he cannot be himself morally responsible for this rising of his arm and so attribute its rising to moral freedom on his part. That is as conceptually plain as plain can be. But neither can he attribute moral freedom to that reified will supposedly dictating the raising of his arm, for no more than a brain tumor has eyes to see, ears to hear, a brain to think., and the other faculties involved in moral freedom, e.g., decision making, does a reified will.

It happens accordingly, if relations are being postulated between a reified will and actions or a reified will and (a favourite of theorists) a reified reason, they cannot be explained as the work of moral freedom. No other alternative remaining, they will have to be supposed to be the work of either mere chance or causality. If, though, as typically is the case, these relations possess some kind of consistency and purposefulness, covering as they do the social actions of persons, we shall not want to lodge them in mere chance (for then we should expect the sort of randomness and chaos that would result from the agency of brain tumors), but in causality and then, most credibly, in efficient causality. But in rejecting for our purposes the claims of compatibilism we have placed moral freedom outside the operations of efficient causes. Nor does our doing so appear arbitrary or unjustified. For though ingenious arguments, as we noted foot-note wise in the case of McIntyre, are made on behalf of compatibilism and though it is unlikely that we shall be able entirely to dispose of those arguments to judge by the history of human philosophizing we can name as taking our side on



the matter as eminent theorists as the compatibilist can name on his side. Thus it can hardly be said that in placing moral freedom outside causal operations we are being naive or clearly wrong or without warrant. Indeed, as previously explained, our subject being what it is, namely autonomy, we are in effect forced to ignore compatibilism.

One thing further needs to be established at this point. It might be claimed, for instance, that our entire present enterprise, if it is not to be a mere hunt for a unicorn, rests on the assumption that something satisfying conditions "EF" and "IF", call that something "P" (perhaps "person"), is our can be, the explanation of moral freedom. Aside, however, from an existentially self-referential appeal to our actions themselves, which like Dr. Johnson's kicking Berkeley's stone, is hardly a philosophical proof or evidence, what evidence, much less proof do we have for saying that moral freedom exists; in particular, moral freedom connected with "EF" and "IF" above?

Both "EF" and "IF" postulate the denial of a state of affairs essentially no different from the case where a person's behaviour results from a brain tumor. But patently if human actions were caused by brain tumors absolute inter-personal chaos would result and hence human societies would not exist. But they do exist. Typical human inter-actions would seem, therefore, to be based on the faculties involved in moral freedom; the possession of sight and hearing and sagacious decision making. All the ingredients of moral freedom being present along with its social accompaniments, it is surely reasonable to conclude that moral freedom itself is also present (even though for reasons that could be gone into later, but won't be, we may not be able to ostensibly point to that presence).

If there is a sticking point in these reasonings it is, surely, that there exist societies of insects which rest, by all accounts, not on moral freedom or freedom of any sort, but the causal handiwork of mere instincts. It can be answered, however, that these insect societies simply repeat themselves through the ages, as one would imagine they would have to if they were the mere causal handiwork of instincts. Human societies, in contrast, are in constant structural and material change; moreover, that often displays conscious choice, as in the case of the American Revolution. Thus, it turns out that the citation of insect societies, instead of refuting our presumption of moral freedom, enhances it.

To return, accordingly, to our demonstration that autonomy is a snare and delusion: it is first necessary to take note of a distinction between the literal meaning of "autonomy" and the philosopher's meaning when he equates autonomy with moral freedom. this distinction shows itself in the following puzzling anomaly. When applied

5. Nickel, *op.cit.*, p. 531



to political entities, like States, "autonomy" has a clear and easily accessible meaning. Thus in my Webster's, I find under "autonomy" the following: "independent in government; having the right of self-government", and under "autonomy", "any state that governs itself. As long as these definitions are restricted to political entities no difficulty obtrudes. When applied to individuals or persons by the philosopher, however, the meaning of "autonomy" turns out to be, as James Nickel for one, has observed and as we shall subsequently see, "notoriously difficult to characterize"<sup>5</sup>

My immediate point in bringing up this anomaly is to argue that if "autonomy" has a clear and distinct meaning in one use and a very obscure and inaccessible meaning is another, it has to be the former that we human beings, as communicators, had to begin with. Or perhaps we might say, "As a medium of communication, our language had to start with 'autonomy' as applied to states or other political entities. Only subsequently could it have been, and did it get, applied analogically to individuals or persons".

Clearly, therefore, we shall want in our continuing discussion to insist on the political meaning of "autonomy" since it constitutes, not only the words clear and easily accessible but its original, non-analogical sense. It would obviously be mere obscurantism to try to base our investigation on a secondary sense that, by all accounts, was difficult to characterize. In doing so we should also be obviating any understanding of why and how a concept that offered no difficulties in characterizing should have acquired them the moment it was applied to individuals or persons instead of political entities.

In this very respect, it might be observed that political entities do not forfeit freedom and responsibility when ruled by internal parts or fractions of themselves. Rome, whether ruled by the Senate, by an Emperor, or the Praetorian guard was an autonomous State, free in and responsible for its actions and decision-making, in one case as much as in another. All that was precluded by its being autonomous was its being ruled by some external political entity or power.

One can see where the difficulty of characterization noted by Nickel arises. An internal part or fraction of a political entity consists of persons who can, in their own right, make decisions, perceive, reason and so on. Hence the question whether or not a political entity is being ruled by internal parts, and if it is, which part or parts, raises, as far as its autonomy goes, no problem, or paradox. But the internal parts of a normal person—whether philosophically reified parts like a will or physical parts like a hippocampus do not have eyes to perceive, or faculties to make decisions.

Since "autonomy" in its basic or political sense is congenial to the rule of internal parts, we will unconsciously and not improperly (so far as "autonomy" 's basic sense goes) want to carry over this license of the rule of parts when applying the term to individuals or persons. But whereas the rule or internal parts does not forfeit freedom and



responsibility in the case of political entities the rule of the internal parts of a person or individual by introducing the notion of autonomy we introduce ipso facto contradiction and paradox. One can see why a difficulty in characterization should immediately obtrude.

Before proceeding further, we might instructively compare P, our hypothetical true explanation of moral freedom, and autonomy in its attempt to play that role. As we have seen above, the two are incompatible, one implying the possibility of the rule of internal parts, the other denying it. Thus, if as assumed, P (whatever it is) is true, autonomy (as the candidate for the same explanation) has to be false. At the very least, then we must reject the hypothesis that autonomy is the explanation of moral freedom.

At the commencement of this paper and in this section's title I have maintained, however, something more than the mere falsity of autonomy (elliptically speaking, the hypothesis of autonomy). I have said that that hypothesis was a "snare and delusion" I want now to confirm this last part of my contentions.

Since P precluded the rule of internal parts and autonomy does not but allows the possibility, and since such rule precludes the existence of moral freedom<sup>2</sup> (with respect to the person where such rule obtains), the proponent of autonomy must somehow artificially reconstruct that notion as applied to persons or individuals as opposed to political entities so that, even though internal rule of parts is not intrinsically excluded as in the case of P, it is extrinsically excluded.

Now autonomy's theoretical inclusion of the rule of internal parts in the case of freedom and responsibility allows our conceiving in any particular case of freedom and responsibility that rule taking place, nothing else being said. But where-ever such rule takes place in the case of persons we visibly replace, should they exist, relations of moral freedom by their paradigmatic denial, relations of efficient causes. As previously pointed out, it makes no essential difference whether the ruling part or parts in question are physical parts, say a brain tumor, a hippocampus, or whatever, or some reified mental part, a "will", a "reason", etc. thus, the problem presents itself: how under the aegis of autonomy, given its one clear and accessible sense, i.e., its political one, is moral freedom to be salvaged (much less explained)?

As far as I can see, one and only one possibility suggests itself. Causal sequences can be transcended by an act of creation. If, say, a desire to eat, as causally construed, effects on my part movements A, B, and C (reaching for a plum, putting the plum to my mouth, etc.) but by an act of creation, I replace A, B, and C by other movements D, E, F. (say pushing the plate of plums away from me, reaching for a glass of water, etc.), my desire to eat can no longer be said to be the cause of my movements. Of course, it might still be said that I am their cause, but that will not quite do either; for as a cause I am presumably a link or capable of being a link in causal sequences; for instance, a causal sequence involving what I have born with. For example, it will be argued



that the desires that I was born with a fortiori have determined what I was in the past and what I am today, and so also what I have done and am doing. Thus, as a link in such causal sequences I am no more the repository of moral freedom and responsibility than a brain tumor is<sup>6</sup>. The upshot is that creation will have to be extended to not only one's motions but even to one's motions as a self if moral freedom is, seemingly, to be salvaged. In short, I shall constantly have to create a new I!

From a purely theoretic vantage point I have conjectured that if we impose the concept of autonomy upon individuals as the explanation of their moral freedom and responsibility then, in order to retain moral freedom and responsibility, the above reconstruction or something very much like it is what we are committed to. And in philosophic fact these intimations seem to be confirmed.

Thus in attempting to complete Charles Taylor's assimilation of moral freedom into autonomy we find James Nickel, in the article already referred to, saying, "implicit in Taylor's conception of autonomy is the idea of self-evaluation and self-transformation, of being able to (1) recognize one's preferences, values, actions and commitments; (2) evaluate them in an unmanipulated and at least partially rational way with comparison to alternative possibilities; and (3) carry out a process of self-transformation whereby new preferences, values, action, and commitments replace old ones....".

Now if there is a way of converting autonomy into moral freedom Nickel, as I have already indicated, has hit upon it. But now notice the cost to the cost to the customer of this philosophic machinery.

First of all, this exquisite fabrication of Nickel's proves, on inspection, to be of no use. We can create a new self and new values only because we are already free. Hence, autonomy with its now improved, divine-like machinery of creation, could not be the explanation of that freedom.

Not only, though, has autonomy proved, even after Nickel's valiant reconstruction, to be no explanation at all of moral freedom (since a *petitio* is not an explanation) but the machinery that had to be introduced proves to be stultifying in the extreme if one tries to operate it. For instance, it now has to be supposed that, in order to achieve or, more accurately, retrieve moral freedom, one needs to review in one's mind all one's preference, values, actions, and commitments; evaluate them in an unmanipulated and at least partially rational way with comparison to alternative possibilities—just to commence the operation. Hands raised in horror, one wants to exclaim, "All this in order to retrieve moral freedom!"

How long does it take, for instance, to review in one's mind all one's old values, actions, commitments, etc.? What a huge and indeed impossible labor would even ten hours suffice, say that one could carry

6. See, John Hospers, *Human Conduct*, Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., N.Y., 1961. P.521  
7. Nickel, *op. cit.*, 537.



out the program required, and besides was able to know that one had covered all the practically innumerable cases involved ! At this Zeno-like pace would not all moral action have to grind to a most painful halt ?

In addition, who but philosophers could be persuaded, if indeed, even they could to engage in this purely philosophical endeavour? But then moral freedom and responsibility and hence morality would only pertain to philosophers—philosophers bogged down for interminable lengths of time in almost endless reviews and tinkering and creations. It were surely better, one might think, that everyone was ruled instead by brain tumors! At least the resultant chaos would to be at the cost of endless blood, sweat, and tears.

In contrast, how easily and quickly we all exercise decision-making and moral freedom in actual life! Could it be that Nickel, confronted with the seemingly plain, monstrous consequences of his appeal to autonomy on behalf of moral freedom, fails to see that he has been taken in by a snare and delusion? Or does he not care or indeed is even happy, being like the philosophers mentioned by Hume in section I, Part II, Book 1 of the Treatise, where Hume says, "Whatever has the air of a paradox, and is contrary to the first and most unprejudic'd notions of mankind is often greedily embrac'd by philosophers, as shewing the superiority of their science, which could discover opinions so remote from vulgar conception"? Yet, may we not be throwing rocks at a glass house who live in one ourselves?

Might not Nickel, for example, retort on us, "How are we, who are trying to provide an understanding of what P (i.e., the subject of moral freedom) is, helped by this demonstration that autonomy cannot be the explanation of moral freedom? Are we not left just as far from our goal as ever, supposing that autonomy is not the answer we are searching for?" And might not Nickel then add, "And what is your answer to these questions that focus on our actual, philosophical interest?"

## PART II: BEYOND AUTONOMY

In reply, I should want to say, first, that if we have shown that autonomy is no happy answer to the question of what P is, i.e., the subject of moral freedom or what it consists in, we have shown that philosophers need no longer look, as they have looked and continue to, in that direction for an answer. That is certainly of service to these philosophers and philosophers in general. To know that a certain route cannot be taken is a theoretic plus of some kind.

But more than that has been accomplished. In our on-going test of the adequacy of autonomy as an explanation of moral freedom we have had occasion to show that any viable explanation would have to preclude a rule of the parts of a person. In showing this, though, we have simultaneously shown that analysis cannot be the methodological route we want to take. For analysis mereologically reduces what it is dealing



with to parts; thus, person to say, a reified will, a reified reason, reified desires, and so on, or, more simply, a reified mind and body and therefore either a rule of parts or just parts (an even greater disaster) in merely chance (instead of causal) connections.<sup>8</sup>

These negative implications of our demonstration that, as pertains to an explanation of moral freedom; autonomy is a snare and delusion are not insignificant. Admittedly, however, they do not add up to a positive understanding of just what P is: that is to say, the explanatory "how" of moral freedom.

But just what does? I suggest, first of all, that we begin where we seem to have naturally begun in any case, namely, with our selves as person. For then, arguable, we can begin with an indivisible whole and thus something that is not already the product of analysis; for example a part. This is particularly the case where we take person as active, either in the sense of perceiver or of agent (willing, desiring, etc.) For when as person, we perceive or will, we conceivably do so only as an undivided and indeed indivisible one or whole. As such, that is, active person, I am like Berkeley's "unsplitted" soul with no parts, and thus providing no access to either external or internal intrusions. Therefore I must satisfy, as subject, both EF and IF, and thus the conditions of being morally free. Hence, with one stroke we seem to have accounted, in active person, for freedom.

Our explanatory success here is further confirmed, it would seem, by the fact that it is if and only if we are willing and entitled to designate an individual a person that we can and will find it intelligible to attribute to that individual moral responsibility for its acts or attitudes. We do not, for example, ordinarily hold a tiger to be morally responsible for killing, say a defenseless child. If though, we were willing and entitled to call that tiger a person we could intelligibly censor it morally for the act and thus implicitly attribute to it moral freedom.

On two counts, however, our project as so far carried out proves to some degree short of final success.

First of all, we need to account not only for the existence of moral freedom and responsibility with respect to human behaviour and action but their absence. As simply active being, -that is, perceiver or agent, and thus as an undivided and indivisible whole, a person would necessarily satisfy EF and IF and therefore necessarily be morally free. But then (as pointed out above) there could be no case of a person's not being morally responsible, but that is absurd.

And second we have not taken into account the fact that a person does have parts; for example, a mind, a body, desires, a nervous system.

8. One could cite, as adumbrating my arguments here, Berkeley's cautionary remarks in *Alciphron* VII concerning the philosopher's splitting "things simple and individual into Manifold part". See, Berkeley, *Essays-Principles, Dialogues*, ed. Mary Calkins, (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, N. Y.) p. 397: "If I should suppose things spiritual to be corporeal, or define things actual and real into general abstracted notions, or by metaphysical skill split things simple and individual into manifold parts, I do not know what may follow."



muscles, etc. This fact opposes in several ways our easy solution to the problem of moral freedom. One might object, for instance, that in view of the fact that a person is not only, as active, an undivided or "unsplitted" (in Berkeley's terminology) whole but one having parts, it remains to be explained how a one with parts can, in view not only of its having parts but parts that often have patent efficient causal connections, play the role we have given it in terms of "active person". Merely pointing out that a person as active person often does play the aforementioned role leaves out the "how" he is able to. This is the really philosophically pressing question.

Now in respect to this last question, we shall want, I think, to introduce the Aristotelian notion of the animal soul's being the harmony of the parts of an organism rather than some independent existence. Since persons are, after all, organisms it is not too far-fetched, it seems to me to carry over and join this view of Aristotle's to our basic, pre-analytic notion of person and maintain that a person, instead of being an independently existing being of some sort, is the harmony of the parts, mental and physical, constituting himself. Thus where there exists this certain harmony, there! there exists person.

We should want, however, to abjure dealing with person in the manner of Berkeley, namely, in terms of soul since, as generally understood, the soul is a part of a person and not that whole itself, witness our saying, "Faust traded his immortal soul to the Devil". As a part of ourself and not ourself entire, the soul cannot be the explanatory handle we presently need. This would follow from our strictures on analysis. We should keep in mind, too, our need for a theory that can not only account for a person's possessing moral freedom but this failing to. Hence, for our value of P (namely, our explanation of moral freedom) we shall need something that can be ruled by external or internal parts but that normally is not (since, normally a person is morally responsible for his actions and attitudes).

How, then are we to account for the non-normal case where a person is not sovereign; where he is ruled, say, by a brain tumor? We could now say that in such a case there is a disruption in the over all harmony constituting that person and where this disruption is taking place, there external or internal rule obtrudes. Thus, a person with a brain tumor will sometimes and in some things, but not always or in all things, behave irrationally and erratically as caused to do so by his tumor.

But a last "how" and a perhaps seemingly unanswerable one now confronts us. How are we to account for the fact that there can be a harmony which ensures all the parts of a person being in concord with the morally free decisions of that person? For example, as neither ruled by internal nor external parts or forces I decide to raise my arm and I do so, informing you truly that I did so of my own free will (as the misleading idiom has it). This raising of my arm involved the appropriate concord of muscles, nerves, and so on. If this concord had not existed my arm would not have raised.



We might try proposing that the very predication of harmony ensured, by definition, this harmonious concord's taking place. But that takes us no further than a merely verbal explanation and certainly not a positive understanding of "how"?

One metaphysical principle, among others, is that an organic whole (or "organic unity", to employ G E Moore's term in *Principia Ethica*) is greater, ontologically than the sum of its parts and hence any of its parts. Synthetically connecting this principle with that of a harmonious whole's constituting person we could say that the latter, the harmonious whole constituting a person, was ontologically greater than any of its parts or their sum and linking "ontologically greater" with an immediate (as in the case of the object of an intention envisaged and the intention itself), immanent power over something else (and hence unlike a case of efficient causality, which requires temporal "prior to") we might, with some credibility say that the whole formed by the harmony referred to being ontologically greater than any of its parts, expressly ensures their coherence with it, just as my hand qua material thing ensures in its movements, the spatial coherence of its surface. It might be added: viewing "ontologically greater" in terms of dependency of existence, we could point out that my hand qua material thing is ontologically greater than that part of it, its surface.<sup>9</sup>

Here my metaphysical reconstruction of moral freedom comes to a halt.

Obviously, not everything that needs to be done in the way of explanation has been done. For instance, and of especial importance, is the remaining task of explaining how we can know that the present model of our own moral freedom fits other minds (the problem of other minds). Nonetheless, at least as far as we have proceeded, we have, it seems to me, pulled together the various theoretic parts of moral freedom into a harmonious, explanatory whole. If we have been so far right we have, in doing so, formed within our person a like harmony which is ontologically greater than our person itself. If, then being or becoming more than our given selves is a moral imperative, philosophy, as the generation of theories harmonizing thought-as in the present case, the explanation of moral freedom-has to be the perfection of the person.

9. It might be noted that this Hegelian-like argument finds an empirically supported echo in the latest thinking of psycho biological developmental theorists: see, Gilbert Gottlieb, *Individual Development Evolution*, p. 166 (Oxford Univ. Univ. Press, 1992, New York): "which portray well the major components of the developing individual as an emergent coactional, hierarchical system.... The notion of hierarchy, as it applies to individual development, simply means that coactions occur vertically as well as horizontally in all developmental systems. All the parts of the system are capable of influencing all the other parts of the system...the original hierarchy proceeds from the lowest level, that of genome of DNA in the nucleus in the cytoplasm in the cell, to the cell in a tissue, to the tissue in an organ, the organ in an organ system, the organ system in an organism, the in an environment of other organisms and physical features, the environment in an ecosystem, and so on taking down through the hierarchical system" Where I should want to disagree with Gottlieb is in his in a larger, more inclusive organism. It seems to me that a person one such organism, possesses an independence of these projected larger, more inclusive wholes, e.g., the ecosystem, that a cell does not possess with respect to its containing organism and a causal relation that is different in kind. A person, for instance, arguably and imaginably does what he does with respect to his surrounding environment for reasons and not just for (because of) efficient causes. A cell does not. It is only conceivable that a cell acts on the basis of reasons rather than efficient causes by personifying the cell and that is certainly an illicit leap in argument.



## X

## CONCEIVABILITY AND SCEPTICISM

I shall assume to begin with that special philosophers use the idiom "can conceivable" or "conceivable"<sup>1</sup> in a quite different way from that in which it is ordinarily used. For certainly it is not credible that philosophers do not know what they are talking about, or that ordinary persons, i.e. non-philosophers do not, when they respectively assert what can and cannot be conceived. But whereas sceptical philosophers maintain that we can conceive whatever is "intelligible" or "consistent" within itself<sup>2</sup> non-philosophers deny that we can. Thus although there is no internal contradiction in a cow's jumping over a ten-foot fence or man's living 900 years, non-philosophers will want to say e.g., "It is inconceivable that Farmer Jone's cow jumped over a ten foot fence." "It is inconceivable that any man has lived 900 years." and so on.

My object in the present paper will be, first, to make clear what essentials it is that ordinary and academic<sup>3</sup> use of the idiom "can conceive" differ; and second, to determine, if possible, which use is the more justified.

It should be observed in the last connection that if ordinary usage is vindicated as opposed to academic then one support at least will be removed from that philosophical scepticism which holds that we can know the existence of nothing except perhaps sense-data, and if, on the other hand, academic usage is vindicated, then a complete refutation will be provided of ordinary opinion, which holds that we can know a

1. In what follows, "can conceive" and "conceivable" will be used interchangeably.

2. See, for instance, Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, section IV, part I. "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality."; "All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one which is no more consistent and conceivable than the rest;" section IV, part II: "May not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and which in all other respects resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt?... Now whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived implies no contradiction;" section V, part II: "there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary." While none of these passages taken alone says explicitly that whatever contains no internal contradiction can be conceived, what they say, taken all together, patently amounts to that claim.

3. For brevity's sake I shall use the term "academic" to refer to the philosophical use of the idiom "can conceive" that is under discussion.

4. A more complete statement of this point will be found in my article, "Knowledge of Remote Existence," *The review of Metaphysics*, June 1958, 570 ff.



great many existences, both present and remote. These consequences follow from the fact that it is logically impossible to maintain at one and the same time that we know something to be the case and that the contrary is conceivable.<sup>4</sup> Our success or failure in arriving at an answer to the questions posed is, accordingly, a matter of some philosophical importance.

### 1. ACADEMIC AND ORDINARY USE OF THE TERM "CONCEIVE":

It may seem to casual inspection that the fundamental difference between ordinary and academic use of the idiom "can conceive" lies in just the fact that we have already noted that according to the latter "X is conceivable" is entailed by "X is not a contradiction in terms" whereas according to the former "X is conceivable" is not entailed by "X is not a contradiction in terms."

Further reflection argues, however, that while academic and ordinary usage of "can conceive" do differ in the above respect we have not, in citing it, reached the bedrock of analysis. For why should sceptical philosophers decide to make logical impossibility the necessary condition for asserting that something cannot be conceived? Surely it is not because of mere caprice. Nor is it a satisfactory hypothesis either to suppose that it is something like a "search for certainty" that motivates them in this adoption. It is, for one thing, extremely dubious that sceptical philosophers are more enamored of certainty than non-philosophers. For one thing, it is clear that if a person did seek certainty the last thing he would want to do is to impose connotation of "logical impossibility" upon the phrase "cannot be conceived" in that, in doing so, he must give up all or almost all certainty. The true state of affairs seem to be, not that sceptical philosophers talk the way they do about conceivability because they seek certainty, but rather they seek and vainly seek- certainty because of the way they talk about conceivability.

The thesis that I shall defend is that fundamental or underlying difference between academic and ordinary usage of the idiom "can conceive" is that the former takes "conceive" to mean "form a mental image of" and the latter, to speak for the time being in purely negative terms, does not. This thesis squares with the following facts and considerations. (a) Sceptical philosophers talk and non-philosophers do not talk as if conceiving were identical with forming mental images; (b) The view of sceptical philosophers that "X cannot be conceived" has for its necessary condition "X is a self-contradiction" is accountable for on this assumption (c) The assumption is compatible with the scepticism of the philosophers concerned and incompatible with the "dogmatism" of non-philosophers; and (d) It is understandable, on broad philosophical principles, why some philosophers should want to identify **conceiving with forming mental images**.

(a) As an instance of the way in which sceptical philosophers talk about conceiving, we cite Hume's practice of equating conceiving with



imagining, imagining with forming an idea, and ideas with mental images. Consider, for example, the following passage from the *Treatise*: "Tis an established maxim in metaphysics, **That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.** We can form the idea of a golden mountain and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist.... Now 'tis certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it? 'Tis likewise certain that this idea, as conceived by the imagination, the divisible into parts or inferior ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infinite number of parts... Here then is an idea of extension, which consists of parts or inferior ideas, that are perfectly indivisible...."<sup>5</sup> Though Hume does not in these peculiar uses of the term "idea" say that he is referring to mental images, taken in conjunction with the other things he says about ideas, e.g., that they are faint copies of perceptions, it is clear enough that he is. For what else but mental images are, as it were "faint copies" of perceptions, which can be formed and which lend themselves to some sort of spatial division?

In contrast, non-philosophers manifestly refuse to make any such identification between conceiving and forming mental images. Thus non-philosophers would be perfectly willing to admit that a person had conceptions of this even though convinced and forming mental images. Thus, non-philosophers would be perfectly willing to admit that a person had conceptions of this even though convinced that he did not have the faculty of forming mental images. They would want to agree with Descartes that we did not possess the mental image of a thousand-sided figure but that we did have clear and distinct conception of such a figure. And so on.

(b) Since the formation of mental images is purely a matter of volition and is limited absolutely<sup>6</sup> by no other principle except the obvious one that we cannot form the mental image of a round square, it follows that in identifying the meaning of "conceive" with "form a mental image of" we shall have to maintain that anything which is not logically impossible can be conceived. Since ordinary usage does not make any such identification it need not (and does not) hold that something is inconceivable only if it is a contradiction in terms.

(c) From the fact that it is logically impossible both to maintain that we know something is the case and that the contrary is conceivable, and from what was said in (b) above it follows immediately that if the

5. Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Part II, sect. two (in the Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford Press, p. 32).

6. The formation of mental images is, however limited in a relative sense by our powers to form complex images. for example, human beings cannot in general form the image of a thousand-sided figure, though they can form the mental image of a five-sided figure. It is not impossible, though, that beings on some other planet can form the image of a thousand-sided figure. Hume usually ignores this relative limitation that his identification of conceiving with forming mental images imposes, but not always. See, for instance, his discussion of geometry, *Treatise*, BK I, Part III, section two: "Tis impossible for the eye to determine the angles of a chiliagon to be equal to 1996 right angles, or make any conjecture, that approaches this proportion...." (underline, ours). Selby-Bigge edition, p.72



term "conceive" is taken to mean "form a mental image of" then we cannot know or be certain of any existence save, perhaps, the existence of sense data. This view stands, of course, in direct antithesis to our usual understanding of things, based on or at least involving the ordinary use of the term "conceive"

(d) It is a common principle of philosophy that words of speech are names or marks of things.<sup>7</sup> Now if we subscribe to this principle, and look for that which the term "conceive" names or marks, we shall find no candidate for that role quite so plausible as mental images. For when we "look in our minds", and where else can we reasonably look for "conception"? the only things that we come across that might be marked or named are mental images. Thus a common philosophical principle can (and does) force us to suppose that conceiving is forming mental images.

So far we have characterized the academic use of the idiom "can conceive" positively, its ordinary use only negatively. But clearly we cannot judge which of two uses of an expression is more justified if all that we know about one of them is what it is not. It is essential, therefore, that a positive description of the ordinary use of "can conceive" next be attempted.

Now there appear to be, broadly speaking, two distinct ways in which we ordinarily use the separate terms "conceive" or "conception". Sometimes we use the terms to ask for a description, as when we ask, "What is your conception of Hell?" and receive as a reply, "My conception of Hell is a deep pit full of fire." At other times we use the terms to request persons to project themselves sympathetically into other persons' situations, as when we command, "Conceive yourself in my situation." Parenthetically, we can have at once see why forming a mental image plays no real role in conceiving, as non-philosophers use the term "conceiving". We cannot possibly be provided a description by someone's referring us to his mental images. Nor is a sympathetic projection accomplished merely by forming mental images. In fact, because such a projection amounts to an engagement in affairs and forming mental images requires a kind of trance-like state or disengagement from affairs, forming mental images is not even an aid but rather an impediment to conceiving one self in some other's place.

If conceiving means something like forming a description or projecting oneself sympathetically simple addition would seem to say that can conceive and cannot conceive must mean can form a description and cannot form a description or can sympathetically project oneself. But this deduction supposes that idioms of language are what might be called meaning-functions, that is, that their sense is a mere

7. See, for instance, Hobbes, *Elements of Philosophy*. First Section, chapter three, para. 3: "Words so connected as that they become signs of our thoughts are called **speech**, of which every part is a name;" para 6. "But seeing every name has some relation to that which is named though that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature, yet it is lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word thing to whatsoever we name, as if it were all one whether that thing be truly existent or be only feigned."



addition of the senses of the words or roots contained in them. But while that principle holds true for many expressions in English and other languages it obviously does not hold true for all of them and in particular it does not hold true for psychological idioms. The sense of the term "understand," for instance, cannot be arrived at by adding together the senses of "under" and "stand" taken separately; nor can the sense of "weigh an argument" be arrived at by adding together the sense of "weigh" and "argument" taken separately. Indeed, as so construed, "weigh an argument" has the plain appearance of an absurdity.

Now in like manner "can conceive" or "conceivable" does not mean, as simple addition would have it, "can form a description" or "can project oneself sympathetically"; and "cannot conceive" or "inconceivable" does not mean the negation of the latter expressions. For suppose that I say, e.g., "It is not conceivable that Farmer Jones' cow jumped a ten foot fence." If I am asked to state why it is not conceivable, I do not, for example, say that I cannot form a description of a cow jumping over a ten foot fence. That I can do readily enough. I say something like, "It is inconceivable because a cow's muscles are not powerful enough," or "The highest fence a cow has ever been known to jump is six feet." Having cited some item in the general body of my knowledge which precludes X, I show and nothing else shows, that X is inconceivable. If I am unable to cite such an item, I can only admit that X is conceivable.

Since nothing can be discerned to be at stake in the question of something's conceivability or inconceivability except its compatibility or incompatibility with the general body of our knowledge nothing else surely can be at stake. In short, all that we ordinarily signify when we say, "I cannot conceive X" is "X cannot be fitted in with the general body of our knowledge" and when we say "I can conceive X" all that we signify is "There is nothing in the general body of our knowledge which precludes X," thus even if the separate word "conceive" does name some thing or action - and actually it does not, but that is another story - it plainly does not when joined with "can" in the idiom "can" conceive. For to signal that some claimed fact is or is not precluded by the general body of our knowledge is not to name some thing or action. But if the entire idiom does not name a thing or action of some sort, neither do its parts. Indeed, within the idiom, "can conceive" the word "conceive" appears to possess, like a syllable, no particular sense of its own at all.

If it seems impossible that in joining "conceive" with "can" we could completely evaporate its original meaning and leave it a mere cipher. It should be remembered that language is not a form of block-building but a form of convention. It is important in ordinary affairs to signal whether or not some claim fits in with the general body of our knowledge. Any word or set of words can be made to do the job no matter what their separate meanings may be. For instance, if we wished, we might henceforth use for this purpose, not "can" and "conceive", but "can" and "cook". If we did, though, we should not be referring to an act of cooking when we said, "I cannot cook a man's living 900 Years"



The basic difference then between ordinary and academic usage of the idiom "can conceive" are (1) the latter construes the term "conceive" to function as the name or mark of a thing or action and the former does not; and (2) ordinary use of "can conceive" relates claims of conceivability and inconceivability to the general body of our knowledge and academic usage does not. In fact, since all that counts in the latter is the ability to form mental images and since that ability is bound only by volition and the principle of self-contradiction, claims of conceivability and inconceivability get treated in complete isolation from all past experience, science, and antecedent knowledge. Thus whereas in the ordinary use of the idiom "can conceive" the more we know the more things become inconceivable, in the academic use, granted equal powers of forming complex images, whatever is conceivable to Adam is conceivable to God.

## 2. WHETHER ORDINARY OR ACADEMIC USE OF THE TERM "CONCEIVE" IS MORE JUSTIFIED

Claims and decisions as to whether something is conceivable or not commit us to claims or denials as to what can be known and what cannot be known, and the latter commit us to or prohibit us from lines of action and inquiry. But assuredly it is unreasonable to make decisions and judgments concerning lines of action and inquiry on the basis of principles that exclude from consideration all that we have learned from past experience, and science—in other words, the general body of our knowledge; and conversely it is reasonable to make such decisions and judgments on the basis of what we already know. Accordingly, our ordinary usage of the term "conceive" is more justified than academic usage—indeed, the last is not justified at all.

It might further be added that, irrespective of consequences, it is surely unreasonable to close our mind to the general body of human knowledge and to fasten on the ability to form mental images as a thing of paramount and sole importance. But this, in effect, is what we do when we replace our ordinary usage of the term "conceive" with its academic usage.

The truth appears to be, therefore, that both extrinsically and intrinsically we are more justified in our ordinary use of the term "conceive" than in the academic use that is recommended by sceptical philosophers. The only possible rebuttal to this conclusion is the argument that in our appeals to a general body of knowledge we are presupposing precisely what is put in doubt by the academic use of the term "conceive" and hence we are begging the question at issue. But plainly it is the other way around. We are not entitled to maintain that the existence and possibility of knowledge is put in doubt by an arbitrary fiat. "concerning the use of a word, nor are we entitled to either on the basis of principle that the words in speech are all, names or marks of things. As we have already seen, the last principle is refuted, if by nothing else, by the use we ordinarily make of the word "conceive in the idiom "can conceive."



## XI

# WHY NICKEL'S "RIGHT TO A SAFE ENVIRONMENT" ("RSE") IS A BAD THING

In a recent issue of the Yale Journal of International Law (vol. 18, No. 1), James W. Nickel proposes for national and international adoption what he calls "The Human Right to a Safe Environment" or, for short, "RSE." I mean to demonstrate that the national and international adoption of Nickel's RSE would be, practically speaking, either otiose or catastrophic; humanly speaking, exceedingly oppressive; and legally speaking, regressive. But first a thumbnail sketch of what Nickel's RSE claims to be is in order.

### 1. A SKETCH OF NICKEL'S RSE.

As illustrated in the title of his article, Nickel terms RSE a "human right." Unlike traditional proponents of human rights, however, Nickel does not treat RSE or human rights in general as derived, somewhat in the manner of theorems, from human nature. RSE and other human rights are conceived, rather, as instruments for replacing immoral or humanly pernicious states of affairs (here Nickel focuses RSE on "saftey from contamination and pollution" rather than "freedom from threats of crime" (p. 284)) by moral or humanly beneficial states of affairs [here Nickel focuses RSE on "only very basic aspects of well-being...those that pertain to avioding extreme misery and to preserving the possibility of a minimally good life" (285)]. But because the notion of a human right is a very potent notion, which precludes certain desirable sorts of compromises or trade-offs, Nickel establishes a set of four criteria that must be satisfied before any proposed candidate as a human right may legitimately assume that title. In the case of RSE these four criteria become the following:

- A. It must be demonstrated that a fundamental interest with respect to environmental safety is threatened (288),



- B. That environmental safety requires environmental rights (i.e., that no weaker form of treatment will suffice; e.g., education or "raising consciousness" (291-292),
- C. That the duties entailed by RSE may "legitimately" be imposed on the "addresses" (292)
- D. That RSE be cost feasible (i.e.) "Although RSE is supported by important moral considerations, RSE could fail to be a fully justified human right if its costs were excessively burdensome" (293).

Pertaining to C, Nickel's RSE diverges from the traditional view of a human right in that it does not prescribe merely negative duties for its addresses, namely, the duty not to interfere with or trespass upon the protected behavior or "freedom" of the right-holders, but the duty to actively see to the implementation and realization of the right ("the burden of providing this freedom, protection, or benefit..." (292); for, says Nickel, "A right is not merely a claim to some freedom or benefit; it is also a claim against certain parties to act so as to make that freedom or benefit available.." (286).

Thus, for instance, if there exists a human right to a minimally good life (see above) all individuals, national governments, and whatever international government exists will have the duty to insure for everyone the possibility of a minimally good life (just as it is now frequently supposed that the UN and its members are obligated to ensure, even if armed force is necessary, the rule of human rights everywhere).

In the following respect, however, Nickel's RSE is like a traditional human right: it exists independently of its being accepted. Says Nickel, "Human rights are fundamental international moral and legal norms which protect people... simply as people, and not in virtue of citizenship or allegiance from severe but common social, political, and legal abuses. These rights may not effectively prevent these abuses until the rights are both widely accepted and legally implemented at the international and national levels.. "Nickel then adds, "Nevertheless, rights exist independently of such acceptance"(288).

## 2. WHY, PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, NICKEL'S RSE IS EITHER OTIOSE OR CATASTROPHIC

RSE is supposed by Nickel to be a supplemental but not the "dominant normative" concept of environmentalism for remedying or preventing industrial and other practices of gross contamination and pollution (282). Preferably, because of inflexibilities with regard to trade offs and compromises inherent in the concept of human rights (282), the dominant normative concept, says Nickel, should be the concept of "environmental goods, of respect for and responsibilities towards nature, and of obligations to future generations" (282). Nonetheless, because of the



inherently immovable (as it were) claims imbedded in the notion of human rights it can seem that even environmental goods, respect for nature, responsibilities and obligations to future generations must morally and legally give way to the former where there is a conflict. For instance, say that closing down an anti-environmentalist newspaper could be demonstrated to be an environmental good but that its closing down could also be shown to violate a constitutional (not to say human or natural) right, would not the environmental good have to give way to the right? Arguably it would. But if that be so, then before any environmental legislation should take place it would have to be determined whether that legislation contradicted any human right; and that means we should have to apply A,B,C, and D or their counterparts, to all possible candidates. But as will soon be made evident, that has to be an impossible task.

Let us then trying to be as helpful as we can, scrub this very strict standard of accountability and restrict our determination of genuineness just to RSE. In the case of some gross contamination going on we might justify our first seeing if A,B,C, and D above are satisfied on the grounds that we need to determine whether a mere misdemeanor has taken place (the violation of no human right) or a felony (the violation of a human right, e.g., RSE). But determining even in the restricted case of RSE whether A,B,C, and D, are in fact being satisfied or not is an impossible task. Nickel, for example, tries to make it seem that in the case of RSE it is easy to satisfy A. We need ask". Which environmental abuses frequently lead to substantial human harm" (289) and here we can cite an imagined "town and surrounding area that have become that location of a large, dirty, toxic industry governed by no significant pollution controls" (289). Nickel then sets down the customary litany of horrors: "The costs to the health and welfare of people in this town will be large. Rates of miscarriage and birth defects will be substantially higher than normal; children's growth and intelligence will be stunted. People will suffer from higher than normal rates of allergies, respiratory problems, skin diseases, cancer, and premature death" and so on. (289). There is, though, reason to doubt these popular, politically correct statistics.

In spite of the urbanization and increasing industrialization of the United States, for instance, its population's average age at death has constantly increased. But how could that be the case if, with environmentally uncontrolled industry, rates of miscarriage and birth defects and rates of allergies, respiratory problems, skin diseases, cancer, and premature death had all been higher than normal? The increase in average life-expectancy has taken place, not only in the last few years of increasing government intervention in cases of environmental so-called contamination and pollution, but in the years previous to such controls.



One might cite, of course, advances in medicine as the deciding factor in this increase of average life expectancy. But really all that citation does is to muddle the picture and make it more difficult to determine whether a fundamental interest with respect to environmental safety is genuinely being threatened. If, for instance, medical science should invent a quick, effective, cheap cure for cancer, then it has to become more problematic rather than less problematic that secondary cigarette smoking poses a fundamental interest with respect to environmental safety. In addition, serious doubts and even downright denials concerning the adequacy and even scientific honesty of the tests that have been popularized as showing the pernicious effects of industrialization cited by Nickel above have been and continue to be published by presumably knowledgeable critics.<sup>2</sup>

Before A, B, C, and D can be confidently used as criteria of a right's genuineness, the charges just mentioned, that the purportedly scientific bases of environmentalist concern have been and are fraudulent, will have to be answered, but this seems unlikely or at least a long way off in time. But say that these charges are all laid to rest and environmental studies can all claim reliable assent. The problem still remains: we are assuming that before anything can be done legislatively to eliminate cases of gross pollution or contamination we are required first to determine whether, in the case at issue, a genuine human right is being violated or threatened. But determining this will entail our showing beyond reasonable doubt (since we are still assuming that one is innocence until proved guilty) that criteria A, B, C, and D above are satisfied. For, it will be remembered, on the present view of things we are prefacing each charge that environmental safety is being violated or threatened with the question, "Is a human right being violated or threatened?"

A truly honest and impartial adjudication of A, B, C, and D must, though, take forever. For what one is involved in is essentially something like a metaphysical dispute. What are the determinate boundaries of a "fundamental interest" (A) or "safety" (A) or "threatened" (A): or "weaker form of treatment" (B) or "suffice" (B) or "duties (that) may legitimately be imposed" (C) cost feasible" (D)? There are none. These are all qualitative terms, as used in the present context; and as Hume has rightly pointed out qualities, elliptically speaking, do not lend themselves to scientific resolutions but rather generate mere verbal disputes.<sup>3</sup> But verbal disputes go on, like metaphysical ones, forever. Thus, either of two catastrophes must follow, given the role RSE is now hypothetically playing. If it is legislated that purported gross pollutions or contaminations must cease until it is first determined whether RSE is being violated or threatened, it may very well be that indispensable industries will in effect be shut down for ever: certainly a catastrophe. Or if it is instead legislated that the purported gross contaminations



and pollutions may go on until it is decided whether RSE is being violated or threatened, it may well be that the gross contaminations and pollutions will, in effect, go on forever: certainly a possible catastrophe, anyway.

The only alternative, given our present premises, is to decide that we need not preface legislation concerning purported cases of contamination or pollution by determining first if RSE (or any other purported human right) is violated or threatened. But then in the scheme of environmental concerns, RSE becomes otiose. We need only as presently--simple legislate what we deem needed or necessary. As far, then, as environmental safety goes RSE, or appeals to RSE, may be dispensed with.

### 3. WHY RSE IS, HUMANLY SPEAKING, OPPRESSIVE

Since RSE or any human right, according to Nickel, entails not merely negative but positive duties on the part of "addresses," the adoption of Nickel's RSE by national or international governments entails the establishment of regulations and their agencies of adjudication and enforcement that see to it not just that individuals, corporations, and political entities refrain from violating RSE (negative duty) but (positive duties) that they actively engage in the promotion of RSE; e.g., "Beyond this, each citizen has a duty to promote and support measures to improve pollution controls on automobiles, to create effective schemes to diminish automobile use..." (293).

Since violating a negative duty with respect to RSE or any other human right is, on all accounts, a criminal act, so must be violating a positive duty with respect to RSE or any other human right. The upshot, therefore, of national or international governments adopting Nickel's RSE is the legislation, for one thing, of countless regulations not only seeing to the non-violation of RSE but to its promotion and elaboration. Thus, in the last connection, criteria will have to be established as to what constitutes a citizen's passable conduct regarding the "Promotion and support of measures to improve pollution controls on automobiles" (see above). Simultaneously, there will have to be legislated into existence the agencies seeing to the detection and criminal prosecution and trials of those violating both the negative and positive duties connected with RSE. But surely this Orwellian 1984-like State must be oppressive to the ordinary citizen. If he takes a Sunday drive in his automobile the ordinary citizen must constantly wonder if he will be picked up by the environmental police and hauled off to trial and prison for violating a human right: surely an oppressive experience! Or if he buys a book that has been deemed anti-environmentalist, he must tremble at the thought that he may well be prosecuted for violating a positive duty entailed by RSE, for how can buying an anti-environmentalist book promote RSE? That will be hard to explain. So a term in prison hangs,



like the sword of Damocles, not only over the Sunday motorist's head but the book-buyer's head too !<sup>4</sup>

Thinking of his careless, happy-go-lucky, live-and-let-live days before RSE's adoption by his national government and comparing them with his present bureaucratically-run and regulation-burdened life, with its constant threats of criminal prosecution and imprisonment for violations of RSE and other Nickelean human rights, the ordinary citizen must surely think the change has been for the worse. And must we not agree with him? Surely we must.

#### 4. WHY, LEGAL REGRESSION

One hears that in ancient times inanimate objects were tried and convicted of crimes; so also madmen; so also persons who had to be unaware of the laws or rulers' fiat they had breached; and so on. One's impression is that, by general consent, the modern legal system, which has largely eliminated these sorts of criminal charges and trials, has in doing so made a significant advance in the concept and exercise of justice. Consider, now, the relevant consequences of adopting Nickel's RSE.

RSE is, supposedly, a natural right. It is therefore said to exist independently of acceptance ("Nevertheless, rights exist independently of acceptance. (288)]

There are two ways in which RSE may then be conceived as existing independently of acceptance.

A. It may exist independently of acceptance as not being an object of awareness. For clearly, we cannot accept what we are not aware of.

B. It may exist independently of acceptance in the sense that it is an object of awareness has been rejected..

The traditional proponents of human rights would assent to both A and B. So far as one can make out, so would Nickel. For instance, in Nickel's view, one "Justifies" RSE as a human right by showing, among other things, that the abuses it addresses "frustrate fundamental human interests" (290). Suppose that this justification of RSE has not taken place. Then, to be sure, we do not know that RSE is a genuine human right. Does it follow that RSE is not in fact a human right? Surely (to abide by the logic of "human" or "natural" right discourse) it does not. On the contrary, would not the abuses RSE addresses exist even if not objects of awareness? Surely they would. So would not the citizens concerned have possessed the right to eliminate the abuses in question even if they had not been aware of them, and what could that right be but the human right, RSE (the right to a safe environment)? To all these questions the logic of Nickel's conception of RSE and the common conception of human or natural rights give an affirmative answer.

But this means that our ordinary citizen, even though being completely unaware that RSE is a human right, with the negative and positive duties



attached thereto, can be criminally prosecuted for its violation: but more than just an ordinary citizen, so could be an entire people.

Is this not, though, also the case according to present legal conception, where "ignorance of the law is no excuse?" But there is a difference.

"Ignorance of the law is no excuse" makes agreeable sense where we are talking of positive laws that have been given such public promulgation as makes it reasonable to suppose that anyone who does not know them has been negligent in some blamable fashion. But natural rights and laws, unlike merely positive ones, exist independently of legislation or promulgation. Presumably, they are somehow the findings of pure reason or such reasoning as is exemplified in Nickel's criteria, A, B, C, D above. In either case they are findings or conclusions that would defy the powers of ordinary citizens to reach individually, much less in concert witness the fact that professional philosophers, trained and inured in such abstract studies, can come to no consensus not only on just what are or are not genuine human rights but, indeed, whether or not human or natural rights exist at all.<sup>5</sup> It could not reasonably be argued, therefore, that the persons or whole people we have adverted to were guilty of blamable negligence in their ignorance of RSE. But having violated RSE they would, under the rubric of RSE's existing independently of acceptance, be as guilty of a crime as if they had been aware of its existence.

Now this is plain regression with respect to our present concept of justice and its exercise. And that has to be a "bad thing." But so also, we have shown, are the consequences of the adoption of RSE by national and international governments outlined in 2) and 3) above. If, though, the adoption of RSE is in all these respects or even one of them a bad thing, then, by Nickel's own criteria, which invoke the moral ground of abuse and evil, Nickel's RSE cannot be a genuine human right. Indeed, if our arguments have been at all sound, Nickel's RSE has to be in fact the opposite of a right; that is to say, a crime.

## REFERENCE

1. James W. Nickel, "The human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical perspectives on its scope and Justification, *The Yale Journal of International Law*, Winter 1993, Volume 18, number 1. Page references to Nickel, op. cit will henceforth accompany the text of our article in parentheses.
2. For some works arguing to these effects, see, for instance: D.L. Ray and L. Guzzo, *Trashing the Planet, Harpc, and Environmental Overkill, Regnery Gateway*; Ronald Bailey, *Eco-Scam*, St Martin; Ben Bolch and Harold Lyons, *Apocalypse Not*, Cato Inst., 1993.
3. See, David Hume, *Dialoges concerning Natural Religion*. ed., Norman Kemp Smith. The Library of Liberal Arts, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. New York, 1947, in part XII. PP. 217 ff. A related discussion will be found in Hume's *A Treatise of Hume Nature*, Book 1, Part III, Sect., 1.
4. ~~It might perhaps be objected that RSE could not be "legitimately"~~ (see criterion 6



4. It might perhaps be objected that RSE could not be "legitimately" (see criterion C above) applied in this case because its being applied in the way described would conflict with the human right of free speech or freedom of the press, etc. But it would be equally arguable that the human right of freedom of the press would not apply here because RSE in the present case was being violated. In actual fact, it might be observed, courts of law would probably decide on behalf of RSE and not freedom of speech or the press as is made clear where legislated restrictions on employers' rights to counter unions' arguments in the name of justice have been upheld judically. In any case our ordinary citizen would have to wonder whether in his purchase of the anti-environmentalist book a court would uphold RSE or the freedom of the press and added to this worry would be the possible expense and emotional cost of a trial deciding the issue.

5. One might be reminded here of Bentham's disposal of the theory of natural rights and laws with the pithy and famous comment, "Nonsense on stilts."



## XII

# FORMAL EDUCATION DEFINED

### INTRODUCTION

The term "formal education" occurs prominently in all sorts governmental, social- scientific, and educational reports, projects, and recommendations. It occurs just as frequently and prominently in ordinary discourse. Yet definitions of the term are hard to come by and where found they typically prove to be either jerry-built and inadequate (Like the one we shall later quote from Professor Charles' A Preface to Education) or mere disguised polemic and rhetoric.

It is our aim in this essay to provide a definition of the term that is solidly constructed, non-polemical, and adequate. We do not want to maintain that until this done there can be no clear understanding of what, essentially, formal education is. The very fact that we intend to construct a definition of "formal education" from ordinary and related usage of the term implies that we suppose that ordinary and related usage contain a consistent and clear account of the concept. Explicit definitions of a term do provide us, however, with a control over its use (and mis-use) that we do not otherwise possess. This can be said to be the justifications for our present enterprise and investigation.

### A DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION OF "FORMAL EDUCATION"

We might begin by pointing out that education and formal education are two different things.

Not all formal education is education. Formal education has sometime been mere propagandization. Propagandization is not, we should contend, true education. Formal education has sometimes been instruction in errors or patent nonsense. That is not true education either.

On the other hand, not all education is formal education. What F.G. Livingood calls "home education" is not, for example, formal education:

Education among the early settlers was essentially a home education, hence but few schoolmasters were to be found in the



frontier settlements. This home education consisted of such items as learning to feed and care for the cattle, handling a gun, skilfully making accurate strokes helium plasma. Perhaps these two are parallel paths and will go along together. With the axe, cutting grass and handling the sickle and flail with dexterity. Clearing the land and making durable "linsey woolsey" were considered to be of greater importance to the frontier settlers than the "casting of accounts."<sup>1</sup>

Just what, then is formal education? With certain qualifications that we shall get to later, it must obviously be what people call "formal education." But what is that? We might proceed in the following way to try to distil a definition from current usage of the term. Ignoring the fact that not everything that is called formal education is really education, let us say the formal education is education that possesses just those properties which militate significantly in favour of our applying or refusing to apply the term "formal education." Thus we could say: "Formal education is education that. "where the dots or blanks are to be filled in by the properties in question. For our purposes it will suffice to treat the term "Education" itself as a conceptual primitive. In order, however, to avoid the charge of "circular definition" we shall replace education" in our definition by "instruction" (though "formal instruction," as we shall see, is not always synonymous with "formal education"). Hence, we are left with this still unfilled definitional structure: "Formal education is instruction that.." The question we have to answer is: Just what shall we put after that?"

Livingood suggests in his account of "home education" that the blanks after "that" could be filled in by subject matter. We could take him to be saying that "home education" has to do with certain kinds of subject matter, e.g. feeding and caring for cattle, handling a gun, and so on; "formal education" could then have to do with certain other kinds of subject matter, e.g., "casting of accounts." But this will not really do. For suppose that our pioneer settler picked up a knowledge of casting of accounts by hearsay, trial and error, and reading some random books, should we say that he had received formal education in the casting of accounts? I do not believe we should.

Our very last remarks suggest that what makes all the difference is how the instructions is organized and instituted. If our pioneer settler picked up a knowledge of casting of accounts by hearsay, trial and error, etc., we should not say that he had received formal education in book keeping; if he attended classes, took tests, followed prescribed schedules of reading and study, then we might possibly say that he had received formal education in the casting of accounts. Will, then, this definition work: "Education is formal if it is instruction organized

1. F.G. Livingood, *Eighteenth Century Reformed Church Schools, Norristown, Pa.*, 1930, p. 15.



according to a prescribed plan, involving such things as tests, advancement, and so on?" But suppose our pioneer settler made up a course of studies for himself, made up tests for himself, and so on, and suppose that he completed this course of studies, should we want to say that he had received formal education in the casting of accounts? Again, I do not believe that we should.

It appears that something depends on who organizes and institutes the program of instruction whether or not it is to be called "formal." If I organize it for myself it is not "formal instruction" (much less "formal education"). Seemingly, the "organizers" must be others. Yet not just any others will do either. For suppose that a person attended a college of medicine for a year and it was later discovered that the staff and faculty of this college were charlatans and knew nothing about medicine - they merely pretended to - would people say that he had received a year's formal education? Plainly not. It looks as if those who organize and institute the instructional programme have to be authorities or experts in what is being taught before when shall want to speak of formal education. Let us, therefore, try out this expanded definition: "Education is formal if it is instruction having a prescribed plan, involving tests, advancement, and so on, which is organized and instituted by authorities or experts in the field concerned."

But now take the game of cards, bridge. There are authorities or experts in bridge. Classes are organized and instituted by these experts in the typing of bridge. One can imagine tests being given, etc. A person spends a year attending these classes and graduates as a master bridge player. Now we might, I grant, say that he had received formal instruction in bridge. But we certainly should not say that he had added to his formal education. If he were making out an application of some sort in which he was asked for the years of formal education he had received, we should not advise him to count, "Four at the University of Colorado and one more at the Goren School of Bridge."

Obviously, there remains some slack in our definition of formal education. How are we to take it up? Have we, for instance, still been to loose in our prescription of who must organize an instructional program before it can rightly be called "formal education"? Some philosophers of education would maintain that we have been. The instructional program in question must be organized, they maintain, not merely by experts, but by "society." Thus, in defining formal education C.R. Charles tells us: "Education is called formal if it is carried on through a special instructional program organized and instituted by society."<sup>2</sup>

Does the qualification, "organized and instituted by society," get us what we want? It does not seem to. Suppose, for instance, that I open

2. M. R. Charles. A Preface to Education Macmillan, N.Y., 1965, pp. 41.42.



a school in some remote, primitive area, stock it with books, outline several programs of course-work, and advertise for students. A number of students matriculate. One of them spends two years at my school. Could he not count those two years of attendance as two years of formal education? It assuredly seems that he could. Nonetheless, society did not organize and institute this school and its programs. I did and I am not society.

Is there not, indeed, something conceptually wrong in even talking about society's performing actual tasks like organizing and instituting courses of instruction? We live in a society; but this is not like living in the belly of a whale: here we are, and there is the whale. When we speak of one society's differing from another we describe the difference in terms of customs, laws, usages, and so on. But these things are not themselves agencies which do things. It looks therefore, as if we ought not to talk about society's organizing programs of instruction at all. We are talking a kind of irremediable nonsense when we do.

In spite of these possible objections, however there do appear to be good grounds for relating formal education to society. Consider astrology. In the time of the ancient Babylonians, studying astrology under the supervision of qualified priests was no doubt formal education; that is to say, something that the ancient Babylonians treated as we now treat what we call "formal education." On the other hand in contemporary America, the very same courses in astrology could not be counted as part of one's formal education.

In being refused the designation "formal education" in America astrology is like bridge; but in another respect it is not. It is not wrong in America to speak of taking formal instruction in bridge. There does, though, seem to be something wrong in saying that one has taken formal instruction in astrology.

Studies in geology can count as part of one's formal education but studies in bridge cannot. The latter may, however, be counted as formal instruction, whereas studies, in astrology can be counted neither as formal education or formal instruction in say, the United States, but can be counted as both in say, Turkey! Are these all merely loose ends of essence that have no rationale, that must be left hanging outside any definition of formal education? In spite of appearance, they are to. Order can be brought out of our present chaos.

Let us return to the two considerations which seemed, first time round, to have little place in our definition: subject matter and society. We shall now, however, conceive society, Not as an agency, but as a group of people just insofar as they live under certain customs, rules, usages, That is to say, in speaking of society we shall mean to be speaking of a group of people in static terms. It is their usages, customs, laws that are of moment to us, not their actions.



Keeping this notion of society in mind, let us ask what could permit us to count astrological studies as part of one's formal education in Turkey but not in the United States? Certainly it would be a matter of there being believers in astrology in the one society and not the other. Probably there are just as many believers in astrology in the United States as there are in Turkey. Clearly, the difference that makes all the difference is that according to customs, usages, laws, and so on of Turkey (as we are arbitrarily conceiving Turkey), astrological lore constitutes a body of knowledge; according to the customs, usages, laws and so on of the United States it constitutes mere superstition or even charlatany. Thus both society and subject matter re-enter our equations. For no more than a short inference now suggests that we call instruction "education" where and only where the subject matter studied is socially deemed knowledge, and that we call education "formal" where and only where the study of such subject matter is organized and conducted by socially-recognized authorities in the field, i.e., not just any group or person's say - so as to who is an authority will count.

But even this will not suffice. For a socially recognized authority in chemistry might conduct a course, X, in a university lecture room in the morning and in the afternoon conduct the same course as part of a chemical company's training program of employees in a company lecture room: the students taking the course in the morning are able to count it as part of their formal education and the company employees, taking it in the afternoon, are not able to. Thus after the headings on application blanks, "years of formal education," they may to include: one year of chemistry. Their course of instruction was formal instruction, not formal education. It seems, therefore, that even the place and auspices of the instruction must obtain a certain sort of social recognition before the title "formal education" is granted. So let us add to "the study of such subject matter as is organized and conducted by socially recognized authorities in the field" the qualification "but as organized and conducted in socially approved places and under socially approved auspices".

We are now almost ready to throw our definition back into the world and see how it fares. But one last adjustment. We have related the concept, education, to "instruction in bodies of knowledge." For our theoretical purposes we might either want to dilute or strengthen the ordinary concept of knowledge. As it will turn out, we shall want to do both. For the time being, however, we shall want to strengthen it in the following way. According to one tradition of interpretation, knowledge has to do with natural or supernatural phenomena and their relations. In short, knowledge is about the world. Thus, in this strict sense, there cannot be knowledge of fictitious entities like unicorns, or - if they are thought to be fictitious entities - numbers; nor can knowing how to play a game, or even knowing the rules of game, constitute 'knowledge' since such "knowing" is not about natural or supernatural phenomena and their relations. The term "knowledge" or "body of knowledge," as it



appears in our definition of formal education, will be understood, then, to possess something of this strict sense.

Now at last let us see with what success or lack of success our definition of formal education applies to concrete cases. We noted previously that the study of geology can count as formal education; the study of bridge, even though carried on under socially recognized authorities, cannot. Clearly, our definition accounts for this difference. Geology constitutes a body of knowledge in our strict sense: it is about natural phenomena and their relations. The "science" of bridge, as we have already observed, is not. When we have mastered the rules and playing of bridge we have attained no mastery or understanding of natural or supernatural phenomena or their relations.

Consider the case of courses in theology. A student takes such courses in a Catholic University. When he transfers to another Catholic University the courses are duly accepted as parts of his formal education; there is no question about his receiving credit for them, and so on. There will generally though, be some hesitancy on the part of State Universities to extend credit to the same courses. If a student took for one solid year nothing but such courses there might even be some hesitancy in some quarters to allow him to count that year of formal education. Motives would be mixed. The fact that he took the courses at a university, and so on, would move judgment in the other direction. On the other hand, if he took courses, in seismology no such perpetrations would occur. Plainly, what is causing hesitancy in the one case and not the other is the concept of knowledge as it enters the definition of formal education. Catholic Universities conceive Catholic theology to be dealing with a body of knowledge; State Universities might not.

If the same material were recast as mere inquiry into the nature of the world, then, again the previous perturbations would not arise. For it could be held that, although none of the views advanced in this inquiry into the nature of the world were true, and so did not constitute knowledge, the inquiry itself had to do with the world and was, therefore, the means to a possible body of knowledge. But here, of course, we have slightly diluted the requirement in our definition that the instruction in "formal education" convey knowledge.

It is clear, too, that the strict sense of the term "Knowledge" that we introduced into our definition will itself have to be diluted. For instance, we count instruction in language, literature, history, and the various institutions of society as formal education. Thus, there exists formal education whose subject matter is culture indeed, according to some thought, formal education is primarily instruction, subject-wise, in culture. Now it is true that we speak of a "knowledge" of language, literature, history and social institutions. At the same time, when we look at these things from a certain perspective, they take on the



appearance of artifacts or imaginative inventions of men rather than natural or supernatural phenomena. "Surely", we want to say, "Shakespeare's Hamlet is not a natural phenomenon. It is the imaginative production of a human being?" And so might seem to be all of literature, human history, and language. Especially when we view the history, political structures, language, and literature of our own society or nation in critical comparison with those of other societies or nations, this appearance of things takes place. There exists, therefore, some real ground for saying that formal education whose subject matter is culture does not convey knowledge in the strict sense of the term, in that what it conveys is not knowledge of natural (or supernatural) phenomena.

On the other hand, when we do not reflect philosophically on the origins of culture or engage in critical comparisons of our own culture with that of other societies, our native language, our history, or social institutions, even our literature and the other productions and achievements of the great men (and women) of our society's past and present, can appear to us as possessing all the objective reality of the physical environment itself. And so can all human culture. From the perspective of a person actively living and participating in culture; whether his own or another, no sharp division between natural phenomena and human artifact presents itself. The river that I descend in a boat is not merely a body of water: it is the Mississippi of Mark Twain and the Civil War, taking me to such and such a city, itself rich in such and such history. Shakespeare's Hamlet is no longer the mere fabrication of a man, but as objective a presence as the river itself on which I float, exerting as real a force, to be coped with and delighted in. From this perspective everything except our own subjective fancies combines to form the world about us; and if we are not careful, even our subjective fancies combines to form the world about us; and if we are not careful, even our subjective fancies can seem as much a part of the world as sky and earth thus, the strict sense of "Knowledge" both can and does come into full play in that formal education whose subject matter is culture.

Since, though, it is also possible, we saw, to view culture from the perspective of something men deliberately create and hence as artifact rather than natural than natural phenomenon, we shall want to grant that the term "knowledge" in the phrase "knowledge of culture" cannot be held absolutely to the strict sense we originally gave it in our definition of formal education. For, no doubt, some truth is contained in each of the perspectives from which we can view culture: it is both and it is not artifact; and it both is and is not natural phenomenon.

A Different problem confronts us in the following case. We can call the pioneer's instruction in taking care of cattle, learning how to split wood with an axe, and making durable linsey woolsey; "home education." At the same time it seems impossible to conceive one's receiving 'formal



education' in chopping world; it seems difficult but not impossible to conceive one's receiving formal education in making linsey woolsey; but it is easy to conceive one's receiving formal education in making linsey woolsey; but it is easy to conceive one's receiving formal education in the care of cattle. What accounts for this difference? Since each of the things referred to consists equally of human activities related to natural phenomena, we cannot in answer appeal to the notion of "strict" knowledge. The other notions we introduced into our definition of formal education seem no less incapable of sieving out the difference. Some addition, obviously, has to be made to our definition or some elaboration of it.

Pursuing this problem, we might consider that particular part of our definition which speaks of organization. We lined organization to studies, in a field, we said, had to be organized by authorities in the field before they could constitute formal education. Now "studies" is ambiguous. We may mean by "studies" just the program that is devised : such and such books, such and such time spent on this topic, such and-such on that; such and such an order given to the coverage of topics e.g., first two weeks on addition, then three weeks on subtraction, then four weeks on multiplication etc." Formal education involves "this sense of the term "studies", no doubt. But it involves another sense also, "studies can mean what is studied; for example, such and such multiplication tables, and so on. In the sense, the study of geology and the body of knowledge studied are one and the same thing. Now it would seem that before instruction in some subject matter can attain the status of formal education there must be organized study in both senses of the term "study" Thus, the question as to whether or not a person's program of instruction in some subject, X, possesses some kind of organization does count for or against our saying that he receives formal education in X. If, for example, a teacher said to a class, "We are going to deal with geology. Study the subject as you please-read any book you please or do what you like," we should feel that the students were not receiving formal instruction and hence, formal education. But also counting for or against our saying that a person has received formal education in X is the question as to whether or not the body of knowledge comprising X possesses some kind of organization of structure. We could, for instance, offer a course devoted to the memorization of all the disconnected gossip of Denver. The actual program might be rigorously organized : So much time to be spent on the gossip emanating from 17th street, so much for the gossip emanating from 16th street, and so on. But if no connected principles and relations were intended to be disclosed in this survey of gossip if all that was learned or meant to be learned was piecemeal gossip, we should hardly want to claim that the persons attending this class were receiving either formal instruction or formal education. We might say; to be formal education the program of instruction has to possess form and so does



the body of knowledge which is the topic of instruction.

We now have at hand the ingredients for explaining why instruction in the use of an axe cannot seemingly attain the status of formal education while instruction in the care of cattle can. We might, if is true, minutely and rigorously organize instruction in using an axe. We could portion so many minutes to ways of gripping the axe; so many, to stroking with the axe; and so on. The use of an axe does not, however, lend itself to being formed into an organized body of knowledge, possessing connected principles and relations. Or, certainly, it has not been formed into one, and one must I think, shudder at the idea of trying to. The care of cattle has been formed into an organized body of knowledge, possessing connected principles and relations. Studies in the care of cattle have consequently, attained the status of formal education.

Even as presently expanded, though our definition of formal education proves to be slightly out of kilter with fact. But before we go into its further short-comings we might tie up one loose thread that remains dangling. We noted previously that while in America there is formal instruction (though not formal education) in bridge, there is neither formal instruction or formal education in astrology. What makes for the difference of attributions here? The answer would seem to be this. Bridge does not purport to be a science but a game. It cannot, therefore, be held to be something "bogus". But while bridge is a game and hence cannot be "bogus", astrology purports to be a science, and thus can be "bogus". Since it is considered by American society to be as bogus science or charlatanry; it cannot have knowledgeable experts. There cannot, after all, be authorities on the influence of stars on men's lives if there is no such influence! Thus, there cannot be genuine instruction experts in astrology; thus, there cannot be formal instruction in astrology; and thus, there cannot be formal education in astrology.

We mentioned no more than a paragraph ago, that certain further short-comings would crop up in our definition of formal education, and some time before that, we mentioned that we should want to dilute the concept of knowledge (after first strengthening it); indeed, in one place, we did dilute it. These remarks now need to be tied together.

In its entirety, our definition so far runs something like this : formal education is instruction a) that has as its subject matter a structured body of knowledge concerning natural or supernatural phenomena and their relations and b) that has been structurally organized and presented by socially recognized authorities in the respective field c) under socially approved auspices. Instruction, in our definition, is the genus; a) and b) and c) the differentia, and hence, that which (in the Aristotelean tradition) constitutes the excellence of the thing. Now it does seem that any thing that satisfies this definition is unquestionably formal education. But it would also seem that certain courses of instruction



which are today termed "formal education" fail to satisfy it. Thus, if we are to believe ordinary usage of the term "formal education," our definition is too narrow. Since ordinary usage is what we have been going by we have no right to part company with it now, just because it does not suit our definition. Plainly, though, some important compromises have to be made.

Consider, first of all, the very first courses in one's formal education reading and writing. Do the simple exercises in reading and writing that children undertake in the first grade constitute or even approximate "instruction in a structured body of knowledge?" Are connected principles and relations learned? One might perhaps try maintaining: "Advanced studies in reading and writing have as their objects of study various principles. Rules, etc. Thus, even though first grade students are not being explicitly instructed in these principles and rules they are being implicitly instructed in them, and therefore their studies qualify as "formal education." But by the same reasoning we could maintain that the home study of cattle raising was "formal education" by implication. Since we certainly do not want to do that, we shall have to insist, that by "instruction in structured bodies of knowledge" is meant "explicit instruction," But clearly first grade instruction in reading and writing is not explicit instruction in connected principles and relations. The child learns to write "cat", then "dog," to read, "Tom sees the cat," then, "I see the cat," and so on. Contentwise, what he learns is what he should learn in home education: a piecemeal body of practice learned piecemeal. Yet in spite of this, first grade courses in reading and writing are called formal education and therefore are formal education.

At the other end of the educational process we find listed in college catalogues courses in music, ballet, home economics, and even football. They too are called formal education. But do courses in ballet deal with natural phenomena and their relations? Or do courses in music? No one can seriously suppose so. No matter how we regard musical compositions and dances - and here they differ from languages and social institutions - they fail to take on the appearance of external and objective parts of our environment. They insist on being, as it were, purely human creations and conventional existences. But if someone should still want to maintain that music and ballet are direct expressions of human nature and so, at one step removed; natural phenomena, what will he say about football? Surely he cannot want to stretch the term "natural phenomenon" to describe specific games.

How are we to adjust our definition of formal education to these two types of defiant case, one drawn from the first grade and the other from college?

Now I do think we shall have to grant that there is no such thing as a definition by genus and differentia of formal education that covers



everything that we call formal education and nothing else but that which we call formal education. But this is true of all "essential" definitions or definitions by genus and differentia. A widely accepted "essential" definition of man, for example, is rational animal. Not every instance of a man, though is the instance of a rational being. Essential definitions must be thought of as presenting, not so much actualities, but through their different ideals to which the actualities more or less Omeasure up. Thus our definition of formal education, being essential should be viewed as depicting, not everything that we in fact call formal education; but what we should ideally want something to be before we called it formal education. This is evinced in the fact that the differentia of our definition to some degree direct and influence our calling the various things we do "formal education." Thus, even where there is an actual falling short (as it were) of a, b, and c in our ascriptions of the term "formal education." there can always be discerned a connection between the two

In the case, for example, of first grade reading and writing we have what amounts to instruction in the acquisition and use of the utensils of formal education. One has to be able to read and write in order to pursue courses that fully satisfy the definition of formal education e.g., college courses in physics, and so on. We treat as "formal education" this authoritatively organized instruction in the media and organon on formal education just as we treat as "formal instruction" in swimming preliminary exercises having simply to do, with breathing, moving one's arms, and so on. This is a perfectly natural thing to do. It is also something visibly connected with the realization of our definition.

Concomitantly, both the form and content of first grade instruction in reading and writing are typically influenced by the differentia. a, b, and c, of our definition of formal education. The piecemeal methods of home education would no doubt suffice (as we remarked earlier). In fact, they do suffice, e.g., as when children pick up reading and writing at home prior to going to school. But where receiving the designation "formal education," as when carried on in school, first grade work in reading and writing emerges divided into various segments and progressions; the subject matter emerges with some sort of structure given it; it is even possible that the teacher will introduce, parenthetically, connected principles and relations; such as rules of spelling ("I" before "e" except) or syntax ("A singular noun takes a singular form of the verb"). These parentheses may pass far over the heads of the first grade students, but they will seem to the teacher to be called for. Here, we might say, the ideal is exerting a force upon "recalcitrant matter."

Similar observations hold for the sort of college courses listed above music, ballet, home economics, football. To one degree or another, these all fall short of the ideal projected by our definition of formal education. At best, they have only the faintest appearance of bodies of knowledge



in the strict sense, i.e., knowledge of natural or supernatural phenomena; at worst - for instance, in the case of football - they can make no such claim whatsoever. They all fall woefully short of constituting structured bodies of knowledge. How then, are we to account for their having been given clearance to the title, "formal education"?

No simple answer can be given to this question. Various forces can be detected at work. Music, for example, was treated by the Pythagoreans as a science depicting there mathematically harmonious structure of the world in the late Roman times and the Middle Ages it was held to be one of the seven pillars of wisdom. When, in this century, music was readmitted to the formal curricula of the more prestigious universities its ancient reputation and standing might have had something to do with its reception. Significantly, however, in many of these institutions it was first allowed readmission only up to the point of musicology. Having pushed this part of its anatomy in, though, the entire beast followed bit by bit, so that today not only musicology but music theory and performance appear in the course offerings of almost all universities. When one break with the ideal is made, others more easily follow.

Once courses in music performance were admitted into the universities as formal education it was hard to bar admittance to ballet; and once ballet, why not football? In the last connection, there would be additional reasons for opening the doors. Some would be financial; some would have to do with intercollegiate rivalry and athletic prestige. In order to have a winning football team one needs good football players. Good football players are not usually scholastic prodigies. And so on.

Although, superficially viewed, these intrusions into the college curriculum might seem to have been unrelated to our definition of formal education, closer examination shows that they were not. For one thing, they were typically accompanied by expressions of serious misgivings on the part of large segments of the academic communities involved. The question was agonizingly raised: "Ought admission be granted?" And when admission was granted, the question often persisted, "Ought it to have been?" It has even been felt by many that the older admissions of various vocational subjects like pharmacy and business were *infra dig*. For various reasons that we shall not go into here, the notion of formal education, as opposed to notion of mere formal instruction, gravitates towards a subject matter separated from the everyday world of practice and production. The farther removed the subject matter it treats of is from such mundane concerns the more congenial appears the alliance.

Just as the notion of formal education barred the entrance of various subject matters to college curricula, so it altered their shape once they were admitted. The notion projects as an ideal, for instance, the requirement that the body of knowledge to which it is directed be a



structured body. In an older day, this requirement called for little more than some system of state classification and definitions. But recently, following the lead of the more advanced sciences, it has called for dynamic, theoretic models. Concomitantly, at all levels of formal education, there has been a shift away from subject matter organized in terms of static classifications and definitions toward subject matter organized in terms of dynamic, theoretic models the new mathematics, taught even in primary schools, eschews the merely classificatory- for example, multiplication, addition, subtraction on the base ten and introduces the dynamic theoretic model of bases themselves. We see the same force of the ideal exerting its influence in history, political science, sociology and the other humanities. Studies in music no longer content themselves with mere classifications - baroque, classic, romantic, impressionist, and so on. Increasingly, attempts are made to construct dynamic principles or models for explaining these changes in style. We mentioned a short time ago that there seems to be some sort of underlying antipathy between the notion of formal education and practical, everyday concerns like business. This observation suggests one last gap in our definition of formal education. So far, except in our reference to an "ideal" thrust of the notion toward structure and knowledge in the strict sense, we have attempted to lay out a definition that was free of explicitly evaluative content. Now in dealing with phenomena or objects whose existence does not depend on human existence or manufacture, this is possible and usually even desirable. We may, for instance, want to set forth the nature of water as divorced from any use (e.g., Potability) or value it may have for human beings. When it comes to artifacts and other things whose existence depends on human nature and enterprise we shall need and want to denominate their connecting principle in our definitions of them. In the case of defining "table," for example, we shall need and want to specify the purpose of a table. Already contained in the specification of a purpose is a latent evaluative content. Simply to say that some things as a purpose is to imply that it has a value for someone. But though human feelings, attitudes, and evaluations are implicitly introduced into the definition of "table" by the specification of its purpose, they do not constitute one of its explicit parts. In the case of some existences or modes dependent upon human nature, however, evaluation and attitude do comprise an explicit part of their definition. The term "statesman", for instance, cannot be applied without introducing explicit evaluative commentary, and therefore it cannot be satisfactorily defined without introducing the same commentary. Thus a statesman is defined by Webster's as "one who exercises political leadership wisely and without narrow partisanship in the general interest" (*italics ours*).

Now it equally appears that the attitudes and feelings that we entertain for formal education enter into our readiness or unreadiness to apply the term "formal education" If for instance, we did not attach



to the notion of formal education feelings or attitudes of a certain sort it would be inexplicable why we should hesitate to grant course in business and other practical and mundane affairs the title "formal education." But to some degree, we do hesitate.

What feelings or attitudes do we attach to the notion of formal education then? To judge from the deference paid teachers and professors and the struggle most parents make to have their children continue with their "formal educations," and to judge no less from our own introspections, we attach feelings of respect verging on awe. This means that formal education is in fact conceived as something to be regarded with respect verging on awe. By the same token, to the extent that something is not regarded with such feelings it cannot become a subject matter of formal education or, at least, its becoming such will be resisted. Take once more the use of an axe. We claimed with some justification that formal education in the use of an axe was inconceivable because of the structural barrenness of the subject. But surely a contributing reason would be that the use of an axe, strikes us, rightly or wrongly, as nothing commanding respect verging on awe. Could we, for instance, accept instruction in garbage removal as a province of formal education? We find ourselves loath to, in much the same way that Socrates in the *Parmenides* found himself loath to speak of the Platonic Form of a dirty stick.

Accordingly, we shall add to our differentiae of formal education the following :.....d) that is socially held in respect verging on awe. Thus in its entirety, our definition goes: formal education is instruction a) that has as its subject matter a theoretically structured body of knowledge concerning natural or supernatural phenomena b) that is structurally organized and presented by socially recognized authorities in the fields concerned, c) under socially approved auspices, and d) that is held, socially in respect verging on awe. In this definition, let us once more observe, we have to do with an ideal and not merely with everything to which we in fact grant the appellation "formal education."



## XIII

LOCKIAN PASSAGES IN HUME'S  
TREATISE, BOOK ONE

In a Pickwickian sense of "Berkeleyian" meaning by it subjective idealistic or neutral monist - and in a less Pickwickian sense of "Lockian," the question is debated whether Hume's system is Berkeleyian or Lockian.<sup>1</sup>

The participants in this debate frequently come down today on the side of Locke, witness for example Anderson in Hume's First Principles.<sup>2</sup>

I do not intend in this essay to argue that the Berkeleyian view is the correct one, though I think it is when applied, not to the Enquiry, but to Book One of the Treatise. What I want to do is prepare the ground for the Berkeleyian interpretation of the Treatise (not the Enquiry!) by disposing of what may appear, and has appeared to some, an immovable bulk of evidence against it; namely, the *prima facie* Lockian passages that interlard Book One of the Treatise (and occur in the other two books as well). Before a Berkeleyian interpretation can be comfortably embraced these passages have to be explained away. One could say, of course, that before a lockian interpretation can be embraced the many Berkeleyian passages in the Treatise will have to be explained away too. As I indicated previously, however, I do not intend here to wage that particular battle. I simply want to show that the Lockian ones can be interpreted so as to cohere with Berkeleyian intentions.

As a first step in this enterprise it might be observed that if Hume had Berkeleyian intentions he would not be impeaching them - not really - by seeming to expound Lockian ones. The point is, as noted by Reid not tacitly, though conditionally, acquiesced in by Hume, the Lockian theory inexorably gives way to Berkeleyianism, either in the form (to use

1. See, for instance, Passmore, *Hume's Intentions*, Cambridge Univ Press, 1952, p. 13.  
2. See, Robert F. Anderson, *Hume's First Principles*, Nebraska Univ. Press, 1966, p. 176. See also, Passmore, loc. cit. On the other hand, for a contemporary philosopher who, though not engaging in the present debate, comes down on a non-Lockian side, see Terence Penelhum, *Hume*, St. Martin's Press, N.Y., 1975, pp. 73-74.



contemporary nomenclature) of subjective idealism or neutral monism.<sup>3</sup> Thus, as a Fabian manoeuvre, one could forward Berkeleian aims by introducing Lockian passages.

This abstract and general resolution of our question can however, hardly constitute a full, or even a very satisfactory, one. The particular Lockian passages that we have mentioned resist being dissolved in a general solution. Like Dostoevski's tortured little children who cry out, in the Brothers Karamazov, against the "best of all possible worlds" of the theodicy, they seem to stand as concrete, living refutations of our pious speculation of Hume's over all strategy, which is, after all, only that. But they are not speculations. They are actual assertions of the Lockian position - or seem to be. Until they can be disposed of in all their concreteness our prefatory speculation can have little or no force at all. The rest of this essay, therefore, will be devoted to just the Berkeleianization (so to speak) of these embarrassing passages. But here a major difficulty confronts us. It would obviously be stultifying in its tedium to attempt this resolution of every Lockian passage in Book One. Therefore, what I propose to do instead is to consider in some depth two such passages. These are passages that seem to provide almost unanswerable support for the Lockian thesis. They have been cited by proponents of the latter - for example, Anderson - to that effect. They have the appearance of being unequivocal advocates. Our assumption shall be that if these passages can be brought to a Berkeleian heel, then the rest, being generally weaker advocates, can also.

### 1. LOCKIAN SECRET CAUSES

As arguing that in the final analysis Hume's system in the Treatise is Lockian and not Berkeleian Anderson several times cites the following passage from Book One.<sup>4</sup>

But philosophers observing, that almost in every part of nature there is contained a vast variety of springs and participles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that 'tis at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause but from the secret operations of contrary causes.<sup>5</sup>

3. In his *An Inquiry into the Human Mind* Reid (as is well enough known) argues that the common theory of ideas, which forms that part of the Lockian theory which says that we directly perceive or apprehend only ideas, contains within it the outrageous conclusion of (in contemporary nomenclature) subjective idealism and neutral monism. In his letter to Reid, dated 25 Feb. 1763, commenting on the latter's *Inquiry* and its attacks on the Treatise, Hume avers - conditionally it is true - that if Reid is able to clear up certain difficulties he (Hume) "shall think that my errors, by having at least some coherence, had led you to make a more strict review of my principles, which were the common ones and to perceive their futility" (Greig, *Letters of David Hume*, I, 375-376). Hume, it should be remarked, already remarks on the futility of the common (Lockian) principles in Book I, Part IV section II of the Treatise.

4 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 108, 135, 169.

5 Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 132.



According to Lock, a true or perfect science of natural bodies would enable us to deduce effects from causes; but no such science is possible<sup>6</sup>. The reason it is not is that either causes are too remote and consequently hidden from us or too minute and consequently hidden from us<sup>7</sup>. *Prima facie*, Hume's hidden causes of the contrariety of events could be, e.g., Anderson wants to maintain, Locke's hidden causes. It might even seem that they must be. None the less, it is clear that they are not.

Locke's system, where Locke is being most careful and the proponents of a Lockian interpretation of Hume most faithful to Locke<sup>8</sup>, unites in it, in something like a marriage of opposites, scientific realism and perceptual idealism or the theory that all that we are directly aware of in perception are private contents of our minds - ideas, perceptions, etc. From the first partner of the marriage Locke derives the notion that physical causes reside in the minutes parts or atoms composing bodies<sup>9</sup>. These account not only for the effects one physical body has on another but for the perceptions that we, as perceiver, have<sup>10</sup>. It follows, however, from the second partner of this marriage that we cannot know or apprehend these internal constitutions of bodies in that between them and us hangs always the curtain of our perceptions.<sup>11</sup> Now it is true that Locke sometimes talks as if, were our eyes microscopical, we should be able to make out these "real essences" of bodies<sup>12</sup>. As it is, they are just too minute. But this is simply careless talk on the part of Locke and insofar as it suggests something like perceptual realism must be dismissed as being inconsistent with his official position. According to the latter, which limits the objects of awareness to ideas<sup>13</sup>, the real essences or causal agencies of bodies are not contingently hidden so that given microscopical eyes we should be directly acquainted with them; they are, by the very nature of perception, intrinsically and irremediably hidden.

It does not matter that Locke himself never seem to be willing to admit this implication of his system. Anyone conversations with Berkeley's arguments. Which Hume most certainly would be aware of it and hence view Lockes hidden physical causes as being intrinsically and irremediably hidden.

The crucial question then, is: Are Hume's secret causes or springs intrinsically and irremediably hidden? For only if they are they truly Lockian and can we suppose that Hume thought they were Lockian.

6. See, Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Fraser, Book IV, chap. III, secs 25, 29.

7. Loc. cit

8. See Passmore, op. cit., p. 13

9. See Locke, op. cit., Book IV, chap. III, sec., 25, 29.

10. See, *ibid.*, Book IV, chap. VIII, secs. 7 and 8.

11. See, *ibid.*, Book IV, chap. IV, secs. 3

12. See, *ibid.*, Book IV, chap. III, secs. 25.

13. See, *ibid.*, Book IV, chap. I, secs. 1.



Having termed the "secret operation of contrary causes" a "possibility," Hume goes on to describe how this possibility is converted into a "certainty." And how is that? Says Hume, "by further observation" (*italics ours*), and then citing various cases in which the trained eye will see or notice what the untrained does not, he proceeds to argue that the philosopher's view that contrary effects have contrary causes arises from the same sort of mixed observations and principles of the imagination from which probable reasoning in general emerges, along with the probability of chances.<sup>14</sup>

The upshot of Hume's further examination is, therefore, that the "springs hid by reason of their minuteness" and the "secret operations" are not, in the last analysis, Lockian springs and operations at all. They are only contingently hidden springs and operations, in the same way that a needle in a haystack which escapes my glance is not an irremediably hidden needle, as would be a Lockian hidden cause, but merely a contingently hidden one, which, on looking closer or with keener eyes, I may detect.

### THE LOCKIAN BRAIN MODEL

There occurs in Section V of Part II of the Treatise the following very peculiar passage, which is quoted by Anderson in support of the Lockian thesis. Hume has been explaining how it is that we are led to have the false or fictitious idea of a vacuum. His explanation has been in terms of impressions, ideas and the sliding propensities of the imagination—in short, in terms of objects belonging to a subjective idealist or neutral monist interpretation of his system. But he then says: when I receiv'd the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation as P of union among ideas, without examining into the causes. Was more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience than for want of something specious and plausible, which I might have display'd on that subject. Twou'd have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain and have shewn, why upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are related to it. But tho'I have neglected any advantage, which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow'd with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac'd; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling

<sup>14</sup> See Hume. op. cit., pp. 132-134.



into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that, which the mind desir'd at first to survey. This change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded<sup>15</sup>.

Anderson accepts the above account of how we have false ideas as Hume's "physical explanation" of the phenomenon; moreover, as an explanation that Hume found himself forced to give<sup>16</sup>. But surely there is something very awry in all this.

For one thing, not only has Hume previously explained the formation of false ideas, e.g., the "idea" of a vacuum, in terms of psychological and not physical principles. e.g., the propensity of the imagination to slide over resembling ideas, but he at once reverts to the psychological account. Making the resemblance of ideas the chief source of the confusions referred to in the "physical account."<sup>17</sup> Thus his "physical explanation" is no sooner yanked on stage than it is yanked off, doing absolutely no specific work whatsoever. All the actual work of explaining how we have the false idea of a vacuum and how we mistake ideas and words, and so on, is left to the psychological explanation. So was the "physical explanation" really needed? No.

For another thing, Hume refers to the physical explanation as something which; though plausible, is specious. As applied to reasoning and argument the term "specious" was used in the 18th century, as it is today, to mean "apparently sound but in reality sophistical or fallacious."<sup>18</sup> Would Hume advance as his own explanation, and one that he was "forced" to advance, an explanation that he deemed sophistical or fallacious? This does not seem credible. Moreover, he says in the some place that his first maxim is "that we must in the end rest contented with experience," and that presumably means: "We cannot take as our final analysis a Lockian interpretation."

Above all, as presented by Hume, the "physical explanation" seems to deliberately flaunt an intrinsic silliness and incoherence. The mind wants a particular idea and sends off animal spirits to a certain region of the brain where the idea is placed. But in order to dispatch the animal spirits on this errand the mind presumably knows what it wants and so has the very idea that is being rummaged for in a brain cell, no less! After this incredible rummaging, the animal spirits return with an idea that is recognized as being slightly different from the one originally wanted but nonetheless we accept it! Thus, we already had

15 Hume, op. cit., PP60.61

16 See Anderson, op. cit., pp. 122-123.

17 See, Hume, op. cit., pp. 61-62

18 See, Oxford Dictionary, "specious". Quotation from Pope: "to soothe them from a specious reason feign..."



the idea we wanted and having it we accept one that we do not want in its place! At the slightest pressure of examination this entire account crumbles into inconsistent and absurd fragments. Can Hume have possibly been taken in by it? It is impossible to suppose so. On the very face of it, while making some kind of bow in the direction of the Lockian account of psychological occurrences he is pointedly parading the internal absurdity of that account. But what is the reason for his doing so at this particular juncture in his arguments? And in particular how are we to make sense of his own statement that he "must have recourse" to this Lockian brain model?

My answer is that Hume has deliberately laid out his discussion in Part II of Book I on the bias of Hobbes' deductive ordering of the natural sciences and that precisely where the introduction of the Lockian brain model occurs is where Hobbes' scheme dictates that it must occur and that, hence, if Hume is to keep to his adopted format he must have recourse to the Lockian brain model just where he does have recourse to it and can truthfully say that he must. Let me now substantiate this answer.

First of all and most important of all is the fact the ordering of topics in Part II Book I of the *Treatise* follows, step by step, the deductive ordering of the natural science as laid out in Hobbes. As Hobbes conceives science it falls into two main parts, natural science or "natural philosophy" and "civil philosophy." The latter has to do with "consequences from the accidents of politic bodies." the former, with "consequences from the accidents of bodies natural."<sup>19</sup>

Natural science, according to Hobbes, consists of four parts, forming a connected deduction. We start with, first, the definitions or explications of the "names" of the most universal accidents, of "bodies natural"<sup>20</sup>. The names of these most universal accidents, on Hobbes' examination, prove to be the names of the basic elements of geometry; for example, "place" and "motion,"<sup>21</sup> Thus in Hobbes the first part of natural science superficially corresponds and is intended to correspond to that prefatory part of Euclid's axiomatic geometry in which are laid down definitions, axioms, and postulates; except that in Hobbes' conception the axioms of Euclid are demonstrable and the postulates mere rules of construction, so that we commence with definitions or explications alone<sup>22</sup>.

The second part of natural science consists of the application of the previous definitions and explications to the "ways of motion

<sup>19</sup> Hobbes, *English Works*; ed. Molesworth, London, 1839, Vol. 3, pp. 72-73 (*Leviathan*, Part I, Chapter IX).

<sup>20</sup> Hobbes, *op. cit.*, Vol. I pp. 70 ff. (*Elements of Philosophy*, Part I, Chapter VI, "Of Method").

<sup>21</sup> "Motion", since in Hobbes all science is demonstration of cause or effect and motion is the first cause. See, *ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.



simply,<sup>23</sup> as when we enquire "what motion makes a straight line, and what a circular."<sup>24</sup> The outcome of these enquiries somehow takes the form of demonstrations concerning figures: presumably, the names included in the previous definitions are compounded together through syllogisms to form necessary conclusions concerning such things as the "quantities" of angles in triangles, and so on.<sup>25</sup> But, whatever the mechanics of these derivations are imagined by Hobbes to be, the intended correlate is the demonstration of theorems in Euclid's geometry and Hobbes, indeed, calls this second part of natural science "geometry."<sup>26</sup> Thus, in Hobbes the first two parts of natural science amount to geometrical definition followed by geometrical demonstration.

Hobbes puts no name on the third part of natural science but what he seems to have in mind is a demonstrative or "rational" mechanics.<sup>27</sup> Applying the conclusions of geometry to the names of various more particular accidents of bodies one presumably derives a knowledge of the "effects one body moved worketh upon another," first with respect to bodies taken as wholes "invading" other bodies and then with respect to the parts of bodies and their motions and effects<sup>28</sup>. The study of the causes and effects of parts of bodies and their motions in turn encompasses the causes of perception or sensation: first with respect to the "things without us," the "medium" of transmission and its disposition, and the disposition of the eyes, the brain, the nerves and heart<sup>29</sup> and then with respect to the "ways of internal and invisible motions" immediately producing sensation.<sup>30</sup> The last study, along with the fourth part of natural science which deals with "*sensible qualities, such as light, colour, transparency, opacity, sound, odour, savour heat, cold, and the like*", is called by Hobbes "physics."<sup>31</sup> This segment of physics comprising the fourth part of natural science deductively depends, according to Hobbes, on the prior segment dealing with the "ways of internal and invisible notions" because light, colour, etc., are the effects of sensation and the causes of sensation reside, as we have already noted, in those same internal and invisible motions. These internal, invisible motions of sensation are conceived by Hobbes as having their primary seat in the heart,<sup>32</sup> not as by Locke and the "received opinion" of Hume's time (and our own), in the brain.

25 See *ibid.*, p. 86; Hobbes, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 72-73.

26 Hobbes, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 71.

27 Hobbes' own use of the term mechanics is narrower, in that as he uses it mechanics does not include the study of cosmological causes and effects (see, Hobbes, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 72-73).

28 Hobbes, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 71.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 78.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 72

31 *Loc. cit.*

32 *Ibid.*, p. 79

33 *Ibid.*, p. 102

34 *Ibid.*, p. 105



A further peculiarity of Hobbes' system concerns the sort of space which he conceives sensible objects or those objects of the fourth part of natural science as dwelling in. Body is defined by Hobbes as "that, which having no dependance upon our thought, is coincident or coextended with some part of space"<sup>33</sup> and magnitude is said by him to be, not the effect of our imagination or a phantasm but the "accident of a body existing out of the mind."<sup>34</sup> The implication of these explication is that those parts of natural science which refer in their propositions to pure magnitudes or extensions, namely geometry and rational mechanics, refer to things in real space, even though, according to Hobbes, "we compute nothing but our own phantasms,"<sup>35</sup> In contradistinction he is explicit in maintaining that the objects of the fourth part of natural science or the second segment of physics, namely, the sensible objects of perception, exist only in what he calls imaginary space.<sup>36</sup> Imaginary space is "the phantasm of a thing existing without the mind simply; that is to say, that phantasm, in which we consider no other accident, but only that it appears without us."<sup>37</sup> It is, it would also seem, the last effect or Consequence studied by natural science. As the colored, sounding, light-reflecting sensible objects of perception are the effects of the internal, invisible motions of sensation, the appearance of external existence or "outness" which they have, comprising imaginary space, is their effect upon the mind.

Summarizing, then, we obtain this deductive ordering of the subject matters of natural science in Hobbes: the definitions of geometry; the demonstrations of geometry; the demonstrations of rational mechanics, first as they deal with whole bodies in motion and their causal relations and then with parts of bodies in motions and their causal relations, but with particular emphasis upon the manner in which parts of bodies and their motions operate, under the guise of "dispositions" of external objects, media of transmission, and sense organs as the external causes of perception; and lastly, the demonstrations of "physics": first as they deal with the invisible, internal parts of our bodies and their motions as they operate to produce effects in our bodies or phantasms (the subject matter of physics here overlapping the subject matter of rational mechanics); second, as they deal with the sensible objects which are produced in sensation by those same internal invisible parts of our bodies and their motions; and third, as they deal with the effects of

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 92

<sup>36</sup> See, Ibid., p. 105

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>38</sup> For the sake of simplicity and brevity I have omitted reference to Hobbes' treatment of arithmetic or the science of number and of time and in my account of Part II's ordering of topics I shall omit reference to Hume's treatment of these same topics. Suffice it for our present purposes to observe that both philosophers give priority in their discussions to geometry and space, their discussions of arithmetic and time reflect and are subsequent to, their discussions of the former topics and play approximately the same elaborative, but subordinate, role in both their systems.



those same sensible objects upon our minds comprising the appearance of outness or external existence, which Hobbes calls "imaginary space."<sup>38</sup>

Turning to Part II, Book I of the *Treatise* we find the exact same ordering of topics. Sections I, II, III, and IV up to the "third objection", pages 26-42, in the selby-Bigge edition of the *Treatise* (henceforth SBT), have as their subject matter the definitions of geometry. Beginning with the "third objection" of section IV and continuing to the end of the section, pp. 42-53 SBT, the topic dealt with is the demonstrations of geometry. In the first half of section V, pages 53-60 SBT, we pass topic wise from geometry to Hobbes' rational mechanics.

First, under the camouflage of two preliminary objections to Hume's previous contention that we "can form no idea of a vacuum," page 53 SBT, the distinguishing ideas of Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics are introduced, those of a plenum and a vacuum, along with the ideas of rest, annihilation, and bodies in motions, pages 54- 55 SBT. After this introduction of the basic ideas of Cartesian and Newtonian Mechanics, a demonstration in rational mechanics is cited by Hume as purportedly confuting his previous contention. This is the classic argument that the motion of bodies would be impossible without a vacuum "into which one body must move in order to make way for another", page 55 SBT. The topic of this demonstration consists, *prima facie* in the motions and "invasions" of whole bodies: that is to say, the topic of the first segment of Hobbesian mechanics.

Next, pages 55-60 SBT, Hume attempts to explain how we falsely imagine that we have an idea of a vacuum when we really do not and to demonstrate that we do not through, and on the basis of, a series of considerations and thought-experiments which have as their subject matter, how the dispositions of things without us, media of transmission of example, rays of light striking the eye, page 58 SBT-and sense organs, affect our perceptions., These, of course, are the especial topics of the second segment of Hobbesian mechanics.

Having considered the external causes of perception we proceed, in Hobbes' scheme of the natural sciences, to the consideration of the internal, invisible motions of our own bodies as they constitute the immediate causes of our phantasms or perceptions; in short to physics in its first segment. Thus if Hume is indeed following Hobbes' deductive ordering of the natural sciences but up dating various of its more specific proposals he ought to introduce at this exact place in his discussion hardly a Hobbesian representation of the heart and is invisible, internal motions but a Lockian representation of the brain and its invisible, internal motions. And just this, let us point out with all the fanfare that we can muster, he does, page 60SBT !

The second segment of physics, according to Hobbes, and the fourth part of natural science, deals with the sensible effects of the internal.



invisible motions of our bodies' parts; namely, the sensible objects and qualities of perception. Now immediately after inserting the Lockian brain model into his discussion Hume returns to a consideration of sensible objects in his continuing effort to show that the idea of a vacuum is a false idea, pages 62-63 SBT. Superficially he seems to be referring to the very same sorts of objects that he referred to before introducing the Lockian brain model, namely, the objects of mechanics: bodies at rest and in motion, the invasion of bodies, and so on. He insists that he is to be understood as dealing solely with "the manner in which objects affect the senses" and not "their real nature and operations", pages 63-64 SBT. Thus, at his own insistence, this portion of Hume's discussion conforms to the second segment of Hobbes' "physics" or the fourth part of his natural science. The final segment of Hobbesian physics and the concluding segment of natural science concerns itself with imaginary space of the appearance of external existence engendered by sensible objects. This is the topic, it hardly needs pointing out, of section VI or the concluding section of Part II, "Of the idea of existence and of external existence".

In tedious, I am afraid, but necessary detail I have shown how Hume's discussion in Part II of Book I follows step by step Hobbes' deductive ordering of the natural sciences. Now if both philosophers entertained the same conceptions of science and scientific method it is perhaps just barely conceivable that Hume might have duplicated Hobbes' ordering of topics by coincidence and in that case we could not be sure that his statement that he "must" have recourse to the Lockian brain model was merely a let-handed way of saying that, if he is to continue examining the subject matter of the various sciences according to their Hobbesian ordering, he must. But of course, neither philosophers entertains anything really resembling the other's conception of science, either in its method or subject matter, except that both seem to think that the sensible objects of perception are in fact mind-dependent, phantasms or ideas and impressions. Not the slightest possibility exists, therefore that the one to one correspondence in the ordering of topics which we have traced could have been accidental. Hume had to be deliberately tailoring his examination of the various sciences and their subject matters to Hobbes' account of their deductive ordering.<sup>39</sup>

"But granting all this," it may be objected, "it is still theoretically left open that Hume means by his 'must have recourse', not simply that Hobbes' scheme calls for the introduction of a lockian brain model at just this juncture, but that we need to introduce it in order to

39. This, unfortunately, has to remain a matter of speculation and inference. Neither in his correspondence nor else where does Hume refer to Hobbes' deductive ordering of the sciences. Indeed, Hume's references to Hobbes are rare and fragmentary; but this is true of his references to all Non-classical philosopher: Locke, Berkeley, Malebranche, Newton, etc.



scientifically account for the occurrence of irregular mental phenomena for example, the occurrence of false ideas." To suppose this however, is necessarily to suppose that Hume took his Lockian brain model seriously and that is simply not supposable. The points that we made before still hold : that Hume himself treats the introduction of the Lockian brain model as supererogatory; that he terms it "sophistical; and that he seems consciously intent on displaying the internal absurdities of the model. Nonetheless, it would be disingenuous to claim that no difficulties remain over in our "Berkeleyanization" of the passage in question. Some quite plainly do, and with them I now want to deal.

For one thing, it may seem unbelievable that Hume- disagreeing as fundamentally as he does with Hobbes- should pattern his discussion of the subject matters of the natural sciences on the latter's conception of their correct ordering. What could possibly be his motive ?

I suggest that the motive lies right before our noses in Part II itself. What we find is Hume endeavouring to show on the one hand that the objects of the various sciences - the space of geometry for example can be successfully interpreted in terms of experiential psychological concepts and on the other that their materialistic interpretation not only fails but must lead us into all sort so paradoxes and contradictions. Thus, he tells us that the hypothesis of "Physical points" necessitates the postulation of infinite divisibility<sup>40</sup>. But that the postulation of infinite divisibility entails the self contradiction that any finite extension will, if clearly conceived, have to be supposed infinite in extent.<sup>41</sup> Surely, though, if Hume wanted, among other things, to attack the materialistic interpretation of the objects of the natural sciences (here including, like Hobbes geometry and arithmetic) he could do no better than to use as his stalking horse, not Newton, for that would rightfully be deemed a technically unqualified piece of impudence, nor Locke himself, since Locke's system walks on both an idealistic and a materialistic, led, but Hobbes-according to "received opinion" the very archetype of the materialist and, besides, a figure whose ideas one could attack without having to worry about defenders rushing to the rescue and causing an indecent brouhaha. Seen in this context nothing could be more plausible than Hume's aligning his discussion in Part II, which in large measure is a critical one dealing with difficulties in the standard materialistic interpretation of the objects of natural science, with Hobbes' particular ordering of the parts of natural science. What better and more natural strategy than to meet one's opponent on his own, strongest ground and there defeat him! But let me add quickly: I am referring to Hume in the Treatise and not to Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding or his other, later works. In these I should admit that Hume is skeptically tolerant and even friendly to a materialistic

40 See *ibid.* p. 40.

41 See *ibid.*, pp. 29-30



metaphysics insofar as it pleases one to engage in that profit less" enterprise. Without arguing the point here (shall merely, in as dogmatic tones as I can muster, maintain that a distinction has to be made between Hume's philosophical attitude toward materialism in the *Treatise* and in his subsequent works.

The second and last difficulty that I wish to deal with is by far the more serious. At the beginning of section V of Part II Hume presents an argument from "natural philosophy" to the effect the not only "the idea of a vacuum is real and possible but also necessary and unavoidable." The argument which we have already mentioned, is that "the motion we observe in bodies...wou'd be impossible and inconceivable without a vacuum, into which one body must move in order to make way for another." But he then adds, "I shall not enlarge upon this objection because it principally belongs to natural philosophy, which lies without our present sphere."<sup>42</sup> Now two points emerge from this argument and disclaimer each of which seems capable of bursting the bubble of our Berkeleian contentions.

A. It is important for our purposes to maintain that Hume is deliberately following Hobbes' deductive ordering of the natural sciences in his own discussion of scientific subject matter in Part II. Hobbes explicitly describes himself as dealing with natural science. Hume explicitly denies dealing with natural science. How then can Hume be said to be modelling his discussion on Hobbes?

B. It would seem from Hume's disclaimer to have been treating of the subject matter of natural science that he thinks that there does indeed exist a natural science which deals with Lockian (and Hobbesian) bodies in real as opposed to imaginary space. This supposition is seemingly corroborated by his disclaimer several pages later that his "intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations."<sup>43</sup> But if he does think that there really exists a bona fide natural science dealing with bodies dwelling in some real space external (as it were) to the curtain of our sensible perceptions, then he very well may be introducing the Lockian brain model as a piece of legitimate natural science, his use of the term "sophistical" to describe it, its internal absurdities, and so on to the contrary not with standing.

It hardly needs to be remarked that A and B above not only suggest difficulties for our Berkeleianization" of Hume's introduction of the Lockian brain model in Part II but for a coherent interpretation of Part II that any attempt to clearly conceive physical points demonstrates the absurdity of the notion. His representation of the Lockian brain model displays in clear view its internal absurdities. And concerning

42. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 64.



the pretensions of natural science as set forth in the "received opinion" or Lockian interpretation of it - that is to say, the conception of natural science as dealing finally with material bodies he says in section V itself that "such an enterprise is beyond the reach of Hume understanding"<sup>44</sup> and so implies, it is obvious, that there exists no such science. Of course, we can, theoretically, write off Hume as incoherent. But if we need not we ought not to and with in fact need not.

Suppose we accept the Berkeleian interpretation of Part II. Then, for one thing, we shall suppose that Hobbes' "Natural science" has to be entirely re-formulated in terms of experiential psychological concepts. One can maintain with all kinds of evidential support that this is precisely what, on the constructive side, Hume is doing in Part II, witness, for example, his experiential psychological explications of space and vacuum. If, then, one means by "natural science" a science dealing with material objects in real space, as in the first three parts of "natural science" in Hobbes and "natural science" in Locke, part II has not been treating of the subject matter of natural science; but if one conceives of natural sciences as "Berkeleianized", then Part II has. In short, Hume's denial that he has been dealing with the subject matter of natural science amounts merely to a verbalism.

Objection B is not, however, so easily disposed of. What we have to do first of all in answering it is to locate a motive for Hume's introduction into Part II of not only the conceptually unworkable Lockian brain model, which in part we have, but that very powerful argument of the necessity of a vacuum which just precedes his state that he will not enlarge upon its reference to bodies in motion "because (that topic) principally belongs to natural philosophy, which lies without our present sphere." And here, I suggest, a Berkeleian interpretation of Hume's intentions supplies us with a motive and alone does so. For we can then say that what Hume is doing there is in effect arguing that the materialistic interpretation of natural science, with its postulation of material bodies in motion in a real space, is necessarily committed, witness the argument on moving bodies, to the denial of the plenum conception of space and the adoption of the vacuum conception. In short he is saying something like this; If you accept a materialistic interpretation of mechanics, then the only version you can possibly entertain is the Newtonian Lockian one, with its void or vacuum; you cannot possibly entertain the Cartesian Hobbesian one, with its plenum. And now his motive becomes clear, since immediately afterwards he purports to demonstrate that one is deluded in even thinking one has the idea of a vacuum the idea is a false idea. In other words, a materialistic interpretation of mechanics entails the postulation of a vacuum and hence the supposition that one has the conception of a vacuum; analysis shows, however that one has no such conceptions. The conclusion to

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 64



be drawn, therefore, is that the materialist interpretation of mechanics is not just false; it is unintelligible.

This too would appear to be the subtle point of his introduction of the Lockian brain model. He has been arguing that the idea of a vacuum is a false idea. Thus the materialist interpretation of the subject matter of mechanics is in effect demolished. Plainly, it seems to me, the introduction of the Lockian brain model is meant to carry out the very same sort of demolition on the materialist underpinnings given to perception by Hobbes, Locke, and the received opinion of Hume's own time; in short, the materialist interpretation of the subject matter of what Hobbes calls physics."

It may perhaps be objected: "In saying this you have to be maintaining that Hume intends his representation of a Lockian brain to be identified as yet another false idea." But what evidence do you have for this claim? Granted, Hume uses the term, 'sophistical' to describe the representation. Granted he seems to deliberately flaunt several absurdities contained in it but granting all this it still does not follow that he is maintaining that it is a false idea."

We agree that it does not. And we must also agree that Hume nowhere says that the representation of the Lockian brain and its operations is the false imagination of an idea. We must surely, suppose however, that at the time he composed the *Treatise* he was familiar with Berkeley's *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, that work having been published in 1713 and having already attained a wide circulation three editions by 1734. Now in the second dialogue of the *Three Dialogues* Berkeley has Hylas propose, as an explanatory basis for our perceptions and cognitions, the idea of a Lockian brain (a "Cartesian brain," a "Hobbesian brain" would all serve as well). He then has Philonous demonstrate that Hylas can really have no such idea at all. What he supposes is the idea of a material brain with networks of nerves leading to it which "communicate certain vibrative motions.... and these being filled with spirits, propagate them to the brain...." a "Hobbesian brain" would all serve as well). He then has Philonous demonstrate that Hylas can really have no such idea at all. What he supposes is the idea of a material brain with networks of nerves leading to it which "communicate certain vibrative motions.... and these being filled with spirits, propagate them to the brain...." is at most the absurd conception that "one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas," the argument being: Hylas means by "brain" as sensible thing; sensible things are all immediately perceivable; those which are immediately perceivable are ideas and these exist only in the mind; hence to say that the brain is the source of our perceptions or ideas amounts to saying that one idea, the brain is the source of all

<sup>45</sup> Berkeley, *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. Luce and Jessop, London, 1949, pp. 208, 209.



other ideas.<sup>45</sup> Berkeley's demonstration that we can only falsely imagine that we have the conception of a lockian brain is *prima facie* conclusive, given the two Berkeleian premises that what we directly perceive are only objects in the mind and that we can conceive of only like objects. In the *Treatise* Hume straight forwardly agrees with these two premises, his stated view being that what are present to the mind are only perceptions and that these in fact, as experiment shows, "are not ossest of any independent existence"<sup>46</sup> and that "tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions."<sup>47</sup> It is unimaginable, therefore, that he should not have agreed with Berkeley's argument and contention that we can have only a false idea of a Lockian brain; and with the intent of making just that point introduced the Lockian brain model to "explain" the existence of false ideas. What a delightful philosophical joke! And what could be more in keeping with Hume's sly humor, which most delighted in pulling philosophical and theological legs by seming to say what, taken by itself, was strict orthodoxy but, taken in its surrounding context, had to be heresy!

But if, in Hume's view, the vacuum of rational mechanics is, demonstrably, a false idea and the Lockian brain model is also, then in Hume's view, natural science, as conceived in the Lockian model, is one immense false idea. In pointing this out we have perhaps exceeded the aim of our paper, which was simply to show that the Lockian passages in Part II of Book I of the *Treatise* could be plausibly "Berkeleianized," it was not to show that the Berkeleian interpretation of Book One is the correct interpretation and the Lockian interpretation untenable. I cannot resist pointing out, however that the only interpretation of part II which endows it with coherency seems to take us inexorably to that further conclusion.

<sup>46</sup> Hume, *op.*, cit., p. 67, p. 210

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67



## XIV

## UNDIVIDED TRUTH OR DARSHANA

I should like to propose a rather heretical hypothesis.

"Darshana" means truth, but certainly not "truth" as when we say, "The truth is: I do not like pickled onions." In its most inclusive sense or meaning of "Darshana" "truth" has to mean "undivided truth," and for human beings, that has to mean, primarily, "undivided truth concerning human relationships." But not quite "undivided truth concerning human relationships," either. The term "human" is too broad. With respect to human beings truth cannot be one and undivided. It could only be that if all human beings had the same ancestry, culture, religion, and so on, which of course, they do not.

Given a certain group of human beings, having a common racial stock, language, culture, environment, mentality, we can speak of an undivided truth. The undivided truth for that group would consist in that way of viewing things that prescribed the right or true ordering of all that group's relationships: relationship of individual to individual relationships within the family, relationships between families, relationship of individuals to the state and the State to individuals, religious relationship, relationships of the individual and the group to the environment and so on. "Right and true ordering," in turn, would be an ordering such that each relationship fitted harmoniously into every other one. Thus if one ordering were removed or altered there would be something like a shock wave of alarm and horror and resistance travelling through the whole fabric. This way of viewing things would, therefore, be undividedly true.

Now my heretical hypothesis is this. Whereas it is generally believed today at least in the West - that mankind is approaching ever closer to undivided truth, I want to maintain that just the opposite is the case. Fact, I want to say, coheres more closely to those legends of almost every people which depict a Golden Age in their remoter past than to the notion of progress. I am, let me repeat not referring to specific truths; thus, to truths such as characterize media cine or physical science or methods of communication, and so on. I do not deny for an instant that in the realm of specific truths there has been great



proliferation and progress and no more so that in the last hundred years. I am referring to undivided truth.

We all know, for example, that for all the vast accumulation of specific truths that Modern Western Man is heir to and whose stock he is daily adding to with all the assiduity of the ant, no species of Man has ever found life and the world so meaningless and incoherent.

Again, were it not so tragical, one might publish as a farce the common spectacle of so-called "undeveloped" peoples and nations being "developed" by their Western "betters." What we see are old ways of doing things and thinking replaced by highly efficient technologies and glib formulas, but a people or nation that had a profound sense of itself and its relationships turned into a shapeless mob engaged either in internecine warfare of the pitiless hedonism of stung drones.

Archeology discovers in the debris underlying both Chinese and Middle Eastern Civilizations unwall'd towns, notable for a total absence of any relics of warfare. This state of things is estimated to have lasted from one to two thousand years. One discovers in the pyramids of the early dynasties of Egypt truth so undivided that it defies the power of any outside mind to penetrate. The momentum of this truth sustained, with waning force, Egyptian civilization for another three thousand years. We may suppose that the Rg Veda was merely the religious representation of a vision of things that was equally undivided. I call to attention these creations of very ancient man in order to make a comparison. Consider the corresponding orderings of human relationships to be found in the works of Locke and Marx. In Locke, they resolve into a rational elaboration of natural property rights; in Marx, into blind determination emanating ultimately from the most advanced modes of production of any given time. Thus according to Marx all present human relationships are reflections or functions of an automated assembly line! My point is: whereas in these traces of ancient systems we find indications of an almost four dimensional man and society, in Locke and Marx we find at most a one dimensional man and society. It is no wonder that when politicians try to reproduce a Lockean man or society or a Marxian man or society they cannot; for man and society are at the very least three dimensional and hence cannot possibly be cut to one dimensional cloth.

From all sides the evidence suggests that undivided truth is the creation, not of civilizations or nations or races in their full bloom much less in their decay, but in their first emergence into self-consciousness. It is, indeed, arguable that both take place together; a nondescript group or congeries of groups at one and the same time forms or has formed for it undivided truth and consciously identifies itself. If this is right, the 19th century notion of progress is - with respect to a life wholly lived and understood - 180 degrees in error. It is, coincidentally, to be noted that the late 18th, 19th, and early 20th century European



and Americans are almost alone among peoples in not supposing that undivided truth lay somewhere in the past. It is possible, of course, that from the perspective of a few centuries it will be ascertained that 19th century Europe and America were the cradle of some new undivided truth. That would account for the healthy optimism of the Europeans and Americans in the question and perhaps for the fact that in some places in the world Queen Victoria's birthday is still celebrated as a legal holiday (in Alberta and British Columbia, Canada, for instance).

On the other hand viewing the hypocrisies and barbarities of the last seventy years - World War I and the Versailles Treaty, World War II and the Nuremberg Trials (where victors posing as judges; though as guilty in all things as the condemned, turned vengeance into a Law of Nations, trapped out in judicial robes)-viewing such monstrous spectacles one might be led to ask how if a new, undivided truth was cradled in 19th century Europe and America, such things could have come to pass. It is easier to suppose that the optimism of the Victorians was founded on delusions.

Why is it that so often the masterpieces of human creation, whether in the arts or in speculation and thought, attend the morning and not the afternoon of men's efforts? Is it that veins of potentiality are like veins of gold: once found their richest lode is soon mined, leaving to subsequent efforts a mere picking over of rubble and second rate deposits? Something like this could be the case.

But why should undivided truth makes its appearances at one particular time and not another? The invention of some new technology or weapon, the appearance of a dominant figure, a hazardous feat accomplished by a society, the acquisition of some new frontier or form of wealth - these are a few of the factors that seem to presage such moments of creativity. It may be that each, in its way, reveals a vein of potentiality that, as something new and rich, both brings into one focus divided interests and initiates a synthesizing response: hence, the emergence of undivided truth.

While this explanation accounts for a good deal - especially with regard to the more transitory harmonies of relationship (like "era of good feeling" after the American Revolution; the integrated vision of the Italian Renaissance) which illuminate a nation or a career, it does not account for the fact that the most ancient relics of undivided truth that we possess give evidence of being of a different and greater magnitude than men's subsequent creations, just as, held up to the Iliad and Odyssey, subsequent poetic creations in the West seem dwarfish by comparison.

One recent explanation of this appearance of things is advanced by Professor Julian Jaynes in *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (Boston 1976). The mind of ancient



man, claims Professor Jaynes, was functionally different from modern man's: It was in a sense schizophrenic. The normal man of ancient times heard and saw and was commanded by divinities in the same way that a schizophrenic might be today, with the difference that these experiences of ancient man were socially coherent.

My own inclination is to think that the mind or brain of ancient man was essentially the same as modern man's, but rather than being schizophrenic it was integrated in a way that modern Western man's (at least) is not. Paul D. Maclean in *A Triune Concept of the Mind* (Toronto, 1974) maintains that modern man's brain consists of three somewhat autonomous parts: a most ancient part (the reptilian brain), a next most ancient part (the mammalian brain or the limbic system) and the newest part (the neo-cortex). Undivided truth emerges, I should like to hypothesize, when all three brain of man are meshed together in their functioning. This is a delicate balance which man achieves only when the neo-cortex both rules over and is ruled over by the limbic system. Where the limbic or mammalian brain totally rules over the neo-cortex, as in probably the case of neanderthal and undoubtedly in the case of homo erectus, thought and speech are restricted to the most concrete aspects of things. Let us suppose that a further development of the neo-cortex, as in probably the case of neanderthal and undoubtedly in the case of homo erectus thought and speech are restricted to the most concrete aspects of things. Let us suppose that a further development of the neo-cortex takes place in particular, a development of its linguistic areas (there is some evidence for thinking, for example, that cromagnon man possessed language, neanderthal merely speech)-so that abstract generalization becomes possible. At the same time, let us suppose that man's natural and social environment remains one in which concrete aspects prevail: fending off this particular enemy, hunting this particular game, and so on. Although by now the neo-cortex, with its powers to project and deal with abstractions, is potentially dominant over the mammalian or limbic system and potentially can free itself from the concrete focuses of the latter, in actual fact it is still directed by the limbic system, being (as it is) immersed environmentally in particulars.

Thus at this point in time, a synthesis of human relationships can take place which integrates the new universalizing powers of the neo-cortex with the concrete focuses of the limbic system. Thus, the whole man, neuroanatomically speaking, is engaged and represented: man three dimensional (the reptilian part of the brain which seems to have to do with ritual, among other things, is obviously concrete in its orientation). Hence, there emerges, where it does, undivided truth.

Once, though, man has created a system of abstractions synthesizing human relationships this very system can become an object of thought and interest. As it tends to do so the neo-cortex, I hypothesize,



drifts apart from its moorings in the concrete (the limbic and reptilian systems). When now new veins of potentiality are struck, the neo-cortex partially divorced from the concrete-synthesizes largely at the level of abstractions. As this process continues these syntheses become more and more one dimensional; the older and still fundamental parts of his nature (the reptilian and mammalian) are ignored in the syntheses of what are now "theorists"; we have Locke or Marx instead of the creators of the Vedas, for example. The denouement is Modern Western Man and truth divided.

If the hypothesis that I have been presenting is correct, or if something like it is a right view of things, then one can understand the present phenomenon of Western universities, where the brightest and most educated minds are those that seem to be engaged in a desperate search for truth in the relics of ancient systems: Taoism, Buddhism, the Vedas, as so on. I am not sure that this search can be successful, since the environment of these distraught minds and their racial and cultural inheritance is so much different and so far removed from the matrix from which these systems emerged. What is indicated, however, is a sort of final abstraction on the part of the neo-cortex in which, viewing itself and its works, it says, as it were, "Now that I am the supreme and absolute ruler I find I rule a kingdom of phantoms and I am one of the phantoms."



## XV

## DO ANIMALS BELIEVE? DO THEY KNOW

To believe the commonly accepted definition of propositional knowledge as true justified belief animals by this I mean non-human animals should not be able to know proportionally, for justifying seems to be beyond their ability or understanding. The same result follows from the traditionally elevated status accorded knowing by philosophers as compared, say, to believing. Knowing in Plato, for instance, pertains to the purely human or divine within us, Reason; belief to our more animal parts and senses.

On the other hand, philosophers have generally accorded propositional belief to animals. Thus, Wittgenstein treats "A dog believes his master is at the door" as a perfectly proper and sensible thing to say (as opposed to: "A dog believes his master will come the day after tomorrow")<sup>1</sup>. And Joseph Margolis in *Knowledge and Existence* says that "a sheep dog may be said to believe that barking at a flock of sheep in a certain way will facilitate herding them correctly."<sup>2</sup>

If those philosophers who endow animals with beliefs and deny them propositional knowledge are correct our common understanding of things must be absolutely in error and vice-versa, if our common understanding of things is not in error these philosophers must be. For in ordinary life and practice we do not speak of animals having beliefs and we do speak of them as having propositional knowledge. But this may seem patently wrong headed especially our saying that we ordinarily do not speak of animals having beliefs.

What makes for confusion on the last score is the fact that we do ordinarily speak of animals propositionally thinking. We say that the dog thinks his master is at the door - either when the dog is acting as he does when his master is at the door but we know he is not or we do not know whether he is or not. We also say that a person believes that

1. Wittgenstein *Philosophical investigations*, Part Two, I.

2 Joseph Margolis *Knowledge and Existence*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1973, p. 10.



P in the same circumstances (let  $P =$  "the postman is at the door, "and say that the person in question behaves in a certain way when the postman is at the door and he is behaving in that way). Because the logical grammars of "think that P" and "believe that P" have these and other points in common and because in abstract contexts, such as philosophical ones are, logical grammars tend to become diffused, we are tempted when philosophizing to suppose that in cases where we say an animal thinks we could synonymously say that he believes; for example, that where we say, "The dog thinks his master is at the door," we could synonymously say, "The dog believes his master is at the door." In actuality, however, ordinary usage does not sanction the substitution of "believe that P" for "think that P" in the case of animals.

For the reasons already cited this fact or ordinary usage and thus ordinary thought is not easily elicited in philosophical contexts. Simply repeating the two expressions over in our mind dulls whatever discriminatory powers we have. By a sort of staining process (as it were) employing heightened examples we can, though, bring the fact of their non substitutionality into focus. We can point out, for instance, that where we propositionally believe we can believe more strongly or less strongly also that one's belief that P can believe more strongly or less strongly; also that one's belief that P can lessen or increase; also where we can be said to believe we can be said to disbelieve. Thus if it were ordinary usage to say that a dog believes his master is at the door it ought to be ordinary usage to say that he strongly believes his master is at the door or that his belief that he is at the door is increasing or that he disbelieves that. he is at the door. But it is not ordinary usage to say these things; indeed, there is something definitely unintelligible in saying them. Presumably, therefore, it is not part of our ordinary understanding that dumb animals believe (but let me reiterate: in philosophical contexts this fact will probably not directly present itself to us; we need, as it were, to "stain it").

According to ordinary usage, on the other hand, animals - even very low and dumb ones - propositionally know. Indeed, we even speak of insects and mere plants as proportionally knowing. Seeing some cattle huddled in a corner of the meadow we say, for instance, that they know a storm is coming (we do not say, N.B.: "They believe a storm is coming"). And caterpillars are commonly said to know that there is going to be a hard winter (but "believe that there is going to be hard winter"? A thousand times "no"). And water plants that droop in a certain way are said to know that there is a change of weather about to take place. Nor are these figurative ways of speaking such as take place in children's stories. If asked, e.g., "Do you really mean that the cattle know a storm is coming?" ordinary persons will say that they do.

To the question, then, "Do ordinary understanding actually maintain that animals propositionally know and deny that they propositionally



believe?" our considered answer is "They do." But if this conclusion is accepted two further questions visibly ask for an answer. First of all we shall want to ask what logically motivates ordinary usage in attributing propositional knowledge to animals but not belief? And secondly, we shall want to ask which is justified - ordinary usage in those attributions or common philosophical opinion which entertains just the opposite attributions, denying propositional knowledge to animals and affirming to them propositional belief? Since the answer to the last question will be found to lie in the answer to the first, let us proceed to lay bare, if we can, ordinary usage's logical motivating.

Now once again it will turn out that it is the logical grammar of "think the P" that sheds the light that we need. We saw previously that the grammar of "believe that P" extends to the expression of degrees of strength, to increases and decreases of belief, and to disbelief. Thus I intelligibly say, "I believe more strongly than I used to that P," or "My belief that P has lessened," or "I disbelieve the claim that P." Brief inspection will show that "think that P" does not possess these extensions or ramifications. One does not strongly think that P: one's thought that P does not increase; and one does not dis-think that P. Comparatively, anyway, the grammar of "think that P" is thus simpler and more restricted than that of "believe that P." But why should this slight difference make any significant difference?

We must fix our attention on "degrees of strength." When we introduce degrees of strength into our descriptions of belief we are projecting such things as affirmative evidence balanced against negative evidence, appearance balanced against negative appearance, and so on; and in these projections we are, more broadly speaking, projecting the existence of a divided mind. The same is true, of course, when we introduce increases or decreases of belief and when we speak of disbelief, for we can only disbelieve where we understand that there is something that is believed and so place one against the other. By the same sort of reasoning - since the logical grammar of "think that P" eschews degrees of strength, increases or decreases of thinking that P, and a dis-think, - we might say that it projects the existence of an undivided mind. We pretty much "think that P" and that's it. The logical picture therefore evolves: "believe that P" can be used to project an undivided mind, and here its logical grammar overlaps with that of "think that P" but whereas that of "think that P" goes no further than that of "believe that P" continues into the projection of a divided mind. Thus when one busy "believe that P" one is committed to a lot more than one busy "think that P".

In the case of "know that P" we have obviously to put aside all such purported features as justification and evidence if we are to account for the ability of dumb animals to propositionally know (as ordinary usage claims). These may belong to believe that P and ostensibly they



do; for if we say we believe that P we can be asked on what grounds we do so and what evidence we have for P. But are we not asked "How we know that P"? We are indeed; but though philosophers have frequently treated this question as a request for grounds or evidence, close examination will show that it is not. It asks for the source of our knowing. For example, if asked how I know that Tom is a thief I may answer, "Jerry told me so." Now no one seriously thinks that "Jerry told me" designates a ground or evidence. As ground or evidence for the belief that Tom is a thief "Jerry told me" would probably be objected to. It would certainly designate very weak evidence. If "How do you know that P"? did ask for evidence or grounds why, then should anyone present a proposition like "Jerry told me," which does not warrant even a strong belief? He would not. Yet we all the time answer the question, "How do you know that P"? with just such propositions as "Jerry told me."

All that such an answer to the question can sensibly be supposed to designate is a source. And that 's precisely what is being supplied. The distinction is vitally important to our understanding how dumb animals can proportionally know but not believe. The point is: there may exist sources for something but, logically speaking, neither we nor anyone else need be aware of them. This is not the case with respect to grounds or evidence. A certain level of intelligent discrimination and weighing of things has to recede the existence of these. In other words, in a world without intelligent beings there would still be sources, e.g., sources of pain, but there would not be evidence or grounds.

It follows, therefore, that dumb animals could propositionally know even though knowledge has sources but they cannot related such things as sources, or even comprehend them. On the other hand, since dumb animals cannot conceive of grounds and evidence they could not believe.. Or put it this way: if there existed only dumb animals propositional knowledge could exist but belief could not.

Tied into this resume is the previous conclusion that we reached regarding the logical grammars of "think that P" and "believe that P". Unlike believe the P" (we may recall) "think that P". We do not more strongly know that P; our knowledge that P does not increase, etc. When we assert that we know the P we are not allowed to suggest that we entertain a contrary supposition or that evidence, pro and con, is even in question. It is assumed that with one voice (as it were) we affirm that P.

In its full development, the logical picture that we thus derive is this. Both "know that P" and "think that P" express the assent of an undivided mind to P. "Believe that P" does not: its logical grammar includes within its compass the balancing of pros and cons and justifications in short, the ability to assent to P while at the same time entertaining some doubt with respect to P - in short, the expression of



divided mind to P. "Believe that P" does not: its logical grammar includes within its compass the balancing of pros and cons and justifications in short, the ability to assent to P while at the same time entertaining some doubt with respect to P - in short, the expression of divided mind. In saying this, though we have already provided the answer to the second question: which is justified in its attributions, ordinary usage or common philosophical opinion?

On mindedness, both logically and chronologically, precedes divided mindedness. A claim can evince one-mindedness; even a plant. But the sophisticated activities describing a divided mind justifying, balancing pros and cons - pertain only to human beings or, at most a few other highly evolved mammals e.g., gorillas, killer whales. As expressing one-mindedness, "thinking that P" and "knowing that P" are appropriately ascribed to animals. As expressive of divided mindedness and the various sophisticated activities describing the latter "believe that P" cannot be, except with the same sort of inappropriateness that would attach, say to applying the term "morally good" or "morally evil" to dumb animals. Therefore, ordinary usage is demonstrably correct in its claims; common philosophical opinion, incorrect.

Some interesting corollaries follow. If, as I think we have shown it does, belief belongs to a very sophisticated level of mental life which is unambiguously possessed by man alone whereas propositional knowledge is something much more primitive that falls within the competence of animals and even plants, then, obviously, the Biblical story of Adam and Eve and the Tree of knowledge needs to be radically altered. Adam and Eve in their pristine, innocent state possessed knowledge. What they did not possess was belief. So the story should read: Adam and Eve and the Tree of Belief.

Or touching more immediate concerns: the word "philosophy" means (as everyone knows) "love of knowledge." No discipline, however, more adamantly insists on the consideration of pros and cons and thus the dividing of one's mind than does what is called "philosophy." It should, therefore, have its name changed to "the love of belief" or "philodoxa," and those commencing tuition in the discipline should be told, not that they are embarking on a quest for knowledge but a quest of belief. Indeed, they should be told that the road they are setting forth on will take them from knowledge to belief and that in following it they will finally cease to know. And who, acquainted with the discipline, does not know that this is so?



## XVI

# A DEFENSE OF MASCULINISM VERSUS FEMINISM OR, A REPLY TO ALISON JAGGAR AND FEMINISTS IN GENERAL

## A PREFATORY EXPLANATION

Although, as its title indicates, Alison Jaggar's recently published paper, "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects,"<sup>1</sup> is intended primarily to describe various contending schools of thought within the feminists camp and to make practical recommendations thereon, in the process of doing so Jaggar repeats with approval some of the more common canards of feminism and also, and more importantly, sets forth a plausible minimal criterion of anything's being properly called "feminism."

For the last two reasons, and because Jaggar is a recognized authority and proponent of feminism and hence may be quoted without its being imputed that one is unfairly representing that philosophy or dogma, I shall carry out my defense of masculinism versus feminism within in framework of Jaggar's "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects". This intention will explain the subheading of our defense of masculinism versus feminism, "A Reply to Alison Jaggar and Feminists in General"

## A DEFENSE OF MASCULINISM VERSUS FEMINISM

To go by "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects"

1. Alison Jaggar. "Feminists Ethics, Projects, Problems, Prospects". *Denken der Geschlechterdifferenz, Neue Fragen und Perspektiven der Feministischen Philosophie*, edd Herta Nagl-Docekal, Herlinde Pauser-Studer; Reihe Frauenforschung Band 14, Wien, Wiener Frauenverlag, 1999, 143-159.
2. See Geoffrey Chaucer, "The Wife of Bath's Tale". *The Canterbury Tales*, The Penquin Classics, Baltimore, Maryland, 1952, trans. Coghill, pp. 305-316. The question is posed (p. 309), "What do women most desire?" and the answer given (obviously Chaucer's) is, "My liege and Lady, in general, women desire the self-same so verieghty/On husbands as the have on those that love them, And would be set in mastery above them; that is your (a woman's) greatest wish".



(henceforth, FEPPP), or almost any other contemporary promulgation of feminism. the combatants in the immemorial battle between the sexes and the nature of their battle itself have in recent years suffered or undergone a dramatic sea-change.

It used to be that the combat, insofar as anyone's conscious understanding of it went, was a contest either between individuals as such, this particular wife, this particular husband, or in the case of secret ambition of women to rule men.<sup>2</sup> The particular morality, legal system, religious doctrines of the time and place were not in contention. Above all, it was not claimed, by one party or the other, that these social and religious frameworks were designed by males for their own advantage, or by females for theirs. They were like the squares on a chessboard upon which the contest takes place but are themselves not in contention.

Today at least in feminist circles as described by Jaggar, the combat of the sexes is taken to be a combat between not only the above social, legal, and moral frameworks, the analogical squares of our chessboard, but even between those most abstract and hence seemingly sexless frameworks of all, philosophic systems of ethics.

In what follows, namely, my defense of masculinist, I shall accept this contention of the feminists. It may therefore appear that our argumentation has to be flawed from the commencement, for if even philosophical thought is sexually biased, then, it would seem, neither Jaggar nor I can escape in our philosophizing a relativism that precludes an objective determination of questions. It will be one of my main projects to show why this is not in fact the case and to show how masculinism in philosophy, as well as elsewhere, escapes the present charge, though feminism does not.

Before I proceed to this validation of masculinist philosophy, though in the way of clearing the ground of possible obstructions to a clear view of our topic-I want to take issue with Jaggar and other feminists on some adjacent claims and suppositions of their which help fuel the fires and smoke of their more particular animadversions upon our western society's male-biased<sup>3</sup> conventional morality, legal systems, and even its systems of philosophy.

3 Jaggar repeatedly refers to the "male bias" of our social and philosophical frameworks: see, Jaggar, op. cit., 146, 154, 158, 159 165, 167. As already indicated, I shall not want to deny but to defend the "male bias" in question.

4. Jagar, p. cit., 163: "Feminist ethics recognizes that we inhabit a painfully prefeminist world". See also 166.

5 See Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*, vol. one Penquin Books, Baltimore., 1960 pp. 12, 13, 28, 35; e.g., p. 13, "Ancient Europe had no gods:" p. 28 "In this archaic religious system [the Pelasgian] there were as yet, neither gods nor priests, but only a universal goddess and her priestesses..." Graves finds the same state of affairs having taken place in the Near East (loc. cit) ; see also 35, where Graves describes the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy as having taken place "in Mesopotamia, as elsewhere" Our assumption is that Graves' "elsewhere" was "everywhere".



For one thing, Jaggar often refers to the present time and its morality or moralities as "prefeminist"<sup>4</sup> The implication of Jaggar's use of this term is that, up to the present, there has existed only male-made (as it were) moralities, expressive of male self interest and male moral experience. One can point out, however, that there stands in opposition to this implication of Jaggar's use of the term, "prefeminist," a considerable body of theory and research holding that prior to the existence of patriarchies and their male moralities, male religious systems, and so on, there existed matriarchies and their female moralities, female religious systems, and so on.<sup>5</sup>

Let me propose however, a slightly more complex theory than these two standard ones. I would suggest that ancestral men, hominids, dominated their woman in the way that, say, the male gorilla dominates the females of his group: in the final analysis, by brute, physical strength. Against the pronounced superiority in brute, physical strength of the homo erectus male neither the greater guile nor the greater ferocity of the female could prevail. I am supposing in this that homo erectus possessed no true speech; simply animal cries, signals, and so on. Hence, neither guile nor ferocity could be formed through speech into such things as duties, obligations, gods or goddesses, and so on. To the extent that there was anything like a moral order it was like the pecking order of brute animals. Dominance relations were determined by mere force or the bluff of force and incorporated in behaviour but not in concepts. Thus in this speechless society, there existed a natural and unarguable dominance of males over females. Nor could there be, on the part of an outside observer, any doubt about who dominated who and why.

I would next want to suggest that sometime during the subsequent development of Neanderthal or at least Cromagnon man—perhaps as a matter of remarkable invention on the part of some individual, probably a female—our ancestors developed true speech. Because of a variety of factors, some of which still manifest themselves as in, for example, the generally earlier speech-making abilities of female infants compared to male infants, the women of these Neanderthal or Cromagnon societies acquired an adeptness in true speech or even true speech itself before the man. They were thus able to carry the physical force of the male with deceptive talk of various kinds. I imagine these cave women, for example, now backing up their already effective arsenal of tears with prudential threats spun out of imaginative uses of language. Thus, with a command of language that man could understand but not

6. Graves' own explanation for the dominance of women over men in early societies is that women played upon men's ignorance of human generation; see, Graves, *op. cit.* : p. 28: "Women (were) the dominant sex and men her frightened victim. Fatherhood was not honoured, conception being attributed to the wind, the eating of beans, or the accidental swallowing of an insect". Graves' theory is not, however, inconsistent with our own regarding language, and may even be argued to presuppose it.



themselves employ (just as brute animals can understand) human verbal commands but not themselves initiate them) I imagine these women conjuring up the images of horrifying power of retribution and death, like the Furies of later times, all under their monopolistic control or since naive male-kind still had no idea of the role played by men in procreation, claiming as belonging to themselves alone the power to replenish or not replenish the tribal population. In these and other similar ways I imagine these cave-women exacting obedience from the tongue tied, comparatively guileless male (as women still do) and so instituting a full bodies matriarchy in place of the preceding patriarchy or speechless males (thus proving once again that the sword is mightier than the sword)<sup>6</sup>. Thus, with speech came matriachy, along with matriachy's grim goddesses of the earth and underworld its grotesque Cromagnon Venuses, its Furies, hag-like Fates, and so on: these all having shapes, in their pre patriarchal days, that were intended to intimidate just the male population and not, as later, the population at large.<sup>7</sup>

Meaning by "matriarchy" not just the institution of maternal lineage, but an Amazon - like dominance of women over men in all social institutions, I am proposing, then, that matriarchy both followed and preceded patriarchy, and hence women at certain times in the past ruled men. Their rule, accordingly, has already been tried and found wanting, as shown by the final, general replacement of matriarchies by patriarchies. But just why, except in the case of a few remote and backward communities, did matriarchy finally give way to patriarchy?

Part of a possible explanation is that males finally acquired an equal ability with women to speak and so, by employing their own lies and inventions of divinities and other unseen powers, were able to take back their lost dominance, or at least here and there they succeeded in going so. But why should these isolated patriarchies in the end replace, if our theory is correct, the much more numerous and long-established matriarchies?

The most likely explanation is suggested by the fact that with the emergence of patriarchy there emerged the sky-gods or, vice-versa, with the emergence of sky-gods was a dispenser of justice, Zeus. As a

7. See Graves, op cit., p. 38. "The vengeful Erinnyes are understood by the mythographer as warning Zeus not to emasculate Cronus with a square sickle; but it was their original function to avenge injuries inflicted only on a mother or a suppliant who claimed the protection of the Hearth = Goddess, not a father."

8. The claim that Zeus....early Zeus, anyway, the Zeus, for instance, of the Iliad.....was a dispenser of justice is, one must grant, moot; see, for instance, Lloyd-- Jones, Justice of Zeus, Sather Classical Lectures, volume forty-one, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, chapter one, "The Iliad." Lloyd-Jones argues, convincingly, however, that the Zeus of the Iliad was dispenser of justice (loc. cit.). In Hesiod the association of justice with Zeus and hence with kingship is unequivocally stated (see Hesiod's citation of the myth that Zeus was the father of Dike or justice); and later on in Aeschylus, "In a remarkable fragment of a lost play....Justice herself explains the origin of her connection with Zeus" (Lloyd Jones, op cit., p. 35).



tribal memory embodied in myth, for instance, we are told by Hesiod that "Zeus, after overcoming the last dangerous threat to his power by conquering Typhoeus, marries Themis and becomes the father of Dike together with Eirene, peace"<sup>8</sup>. That is, it is only with the advent of the sky god Zeus and patriarchy or vice-versa that justice begins to be a fact of perception and to prevail in human societies. What is thus suggested is that, divinities being in the image of their creators and the matriarchal goddesses being all whimsical and vindictive types within care for justice or impartiality, matriarchs were like their goddesses, unpleasant and whimsical rulers to be under, productive of more discord and disorder and disorder than concord or order<sup>9</sup>. In short, matriarchies, in their competition with patriarchies, waned and disappeared in the same way that inefficiently or even insanely run businesses wane and disappear.

According to this view of things, which, I should parenthetically say, possesses quite as much if not more evidential support than Jaggar's view of the human past as having always been dominated by males, not only is it false that the present times are prefeminist but the further implication of Jaggar's use of this term, that we shall in the future witness the rule of feminism, conjures up, not a future of peace, order, and prosperity, but a future of whimsy, vindictiveness, and discord, all descriptive of an unnatural condition of things. One might say: God (and I mean here some sky-god), God pity both the men and women of the societies thereof! But I shall have more to say later concerning the predictable consequences of a return of feminist rule, along with the possible claim of some feminists and seemingly, sometimes anyway, Jaggar, that feminist does not subscribe to the rule of women over men but merely to an equal rule of both.<sup>10</sup>

Right now I want to critically pursue to further adjacent claims of Jaggar's: the claim that the present so - called "male-biased" social frameworks of religion, law, and other institutions have necessarily resulted and must necessarily result in the subordination of women to men and that with the abolition of those institutional oppressions and the consequent so called emancipation of the female women will necessarily enjoy happier and fuller lives.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Thus Graves op. cit. p. 35; The principle theme of the Gilgamesh tablets is a revolt against the matriarchal order, described as one of utter confusion.. See also, Graves, op. cit., p. 36: "Though the myth of the Golden Age derives eventually from a tradition of tribal subservience to the Bee-goddess, the savagery of her reign in preagricultural times had been forgotten by Hesiod's day... "An instance of matriarchal savagery was the sacrifice of the queen's consort at the end of a year: *ibid.*, p. 14: "his (the consort's) flesh was torn and eaten raw by the Queen's fellow nymphs priestesses wearing the masks of bitches, mares, or sows."

<sup>10</sup> See Jaggar, op. cit., 161: "While feminist ethics may begin with feminine ethics, it cannot end with it." It is only, Jaggar argues, op.cit., 166, as a matter of passing tactics, ensuring victory, that feminists should abjure "gender-blind" theorizing.

<sup>11</sup> Both these claims are rather to be inferred from everything that Jaggar says rather than straight forwardly presented.



With respect to the first claim the necessary and therefore inevitable domination of women by men given the past and present male-biased social institutions - one might cite any number of historical and literary sources depicting the very opposite. For example, no kings were presumably more absolute rulers than the French monarchs of the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet anyone residing in their courts know that if a favour were wanted, - for example, some royal grant of emolument, - it was not to the king that one went but to his wife or mistress: to Marie Antoinette or Madame de Pompadour.

Why should this have been so? Certainly, only because certain women exerted immense power over certain men, the religions and legal system of the time and place to the contrary notwithstanding.

Was this the case only in the artificial and effete milieu of royal courts? Or in an effeminitized France? Let me cite in rebuttal a popular Indian poem that very long ago was included in the Jainist canons. In perusing this poem, it might be observed, one could almost think that one were reading something printed, say, in an older, Non-feminist-intimidated The New Yorker. That is to say, and this accounts for our recognizing the humor in it, the poem describes a condition with which we are all familiar. With a few stanzas omitted, here the poem is:

***If a monk breaks his vows,***

*And falls for a woman, She upraids him and raises her foot to him, And kicks him on the head., "Monk, if you won't live with me "As husband and wife, "I'll pull out my hair and become a nun, "For you shall not live without me." But when she has him in her clutches, It's all housework and errands!" Fetch me a knife to cut this gourd! "Get me some fresh fruit! "We want wood to boil the greens "And for a fire in the evening! "Now paint my feet! "Come and massage my back! "Bring me the chair with the twine seat, "And my wooden-soled slippers to go out walking." So pregnant women boss their husbands just as thought they were household slaves. When a child is born, the reward of thir labours she makes the father hold the baby, And sometimes the fathers of sons Stagger under their burden like comels. They get up at night, as though they were nurses, To lull the howling child to sleep, And though they are shamefaced about it, Scrub dirty garments just like washerwomen. <sup>12</sup>*

So much for the inevitable domination of women by men in a male-dominated world....As for the joys of woman's liberation, let me quote from a very shrewd observer of this century's mis-en-scene, Agatha Christie, in her An Autobiography. comparing the woman's lot of today with that of her Victorian predecessors, Christie has this to say:

12. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India*, Grove Press, N.Y. First Evergreen edition, 2nd printing, 1959, pp. 459-460 (trans. Basham).



"The position of women, over the years, has definitely changed for the worse. We women have behaved like mugs. We have clamoured to be allowed to work as men work. Men, not being fools, have taken kindly to the idea. Why support a wife? What's wrong with a wife supporting herself? She wants to do it. By golly, she can go on doing it!

It seems sad that having established ourselves so cleverly as the 'weaker sex', we should now be broadly on a par with the women of primitive tribes who toil in the fields all day, walk miles together camel-thorn for fuel, and on trek carry all the pots, pans and household equipment on their heads, while the gorgeous, ornamental male sweeps on ahead, unburdened save for one lethal weapon with which to defend his women.

You've got to hand it to Victorian women, they got their menfolk where they wanted them. They established their frailty, delicacy, sensibility - their constant need of being protected and cherished. Did they lead miserable, servile lives, downtrodden and oppressed? Such is not my recollection of them. All my grandmother's friends seem to me in retrospect singularly resilient and almost invariably successful in getting their own way. They were though self-willed, and remarkable well read and well informed.

Mind you, they admired their men enormously. They genuinely thought men were splendid fellows dashing, inclined to be wicked, easily led astray. In daily life a woman got her own way while paying due lip service to male superiority, so that her husband should not lose face.

"Your father knows best, dear", was the public formula. The real approach came privately. "I'm sure you are quite right in what you said, John but I wonder if you have considered..."<sup>13</sup>

I have so far been dealing with and attempting to demolish some of the out-works, one might say, of the feminist positions. Or in any case, Jaggar's more moderate feminist position in FEPPP.<sup>14</sup> But while showing that these adjacent claims of Jaggar's and other feminists, as I have been calling them, are more based on partisan fancy than objective fact, feminism and in particular the philosophy of feminism still remain to be heard from and refuted and the opposed position of male-biased conventional morality and masculinist perspective and philosophy

13. Agatha Christie, *An Autobiography*, Dodd Mead and Company, New York, 1977, pp. 121-122.

14 In other writings of hers Jaggar is no quite the moderate feminist that she appears to be FEPPP, where she has assumed the role of elder statement. Indeed, some of her proposals have gained nation-wide notoriety, witness the following holding-up-of hands in horror in the business journal, *Forbes*, April 1, 1991, 86, under the title, "Visigoths" : Alison Jaggar denounces the traditional nuclear family as a 'cornerstone of women's oppression' and anticipates scientific advances enabling men to carry fetuses in their bodies so that child-bearing responsibilities can be shared between sexes."

15 Jaggar, op. cit., 164; also, 157.



vindicated. In what follows I shall take Jaggar's descriptive account, thought not, of course, her normative account, of all the social institutions, moralities, and philosophies that I have been referring to, be essentially correct. Thus, I shall take feminism and feminist philosophy to maintain, as its two universal principles, that (1) it is immoral to subordinate women to men (2) that moralities need to take into account women's moral experiences.<sup>15</sup> For our argumentative purposes I shall conflate the essence of feminism and feminist philosophy into these two principles

Paralleling this conflation, and taking Jaggar's own descriptions of prevailing western conventional morality and philosophy as accurately representing the facts, I shall suppose that the essence of male inspired moralities and philosophy or what Jaggar would call "male-biased" morality and philosophy is the denial of the above two principles. That is to say, I shall suppose that the essence of masculinism or male morality and philosophy consists in the two principles that it is moral to subordinate women to men-meaning by this, first of a, that it is moral to subordinate feminist morality and philosophy to male morality and philosophy and 2a) that women's moral experiences, at least, where diverging from men's, not only need not but should not taken into moral account: meaning by this, they should not be allowed to alter, where it is masculinist, conventional morality. In short, in what follows I shall be directly opposing the most basic claims that Jaggar makes for feminism and feminist philosophy. Since, though, Jaggar's basic claims in FEPPP are, compared to the claims of other feminists to judge from her own account of the latter<sup>16</sup> - minimal claims, I shall suppose that in refuting Jaggar on feminism and feminist philosophy I shall have refuted feminism philosophy themselves.

Now it may be that, as Jaggar presumably would like to pretend, feminism, both as a cult and a philosophy, intends not the dominance of women's moral experiences over man's or of women over men, but a cessation of the immemorial war of the sexes and thus the domination of neither over the other. Let us, anyway, suppose that this were so (though even Jaggar's title to her paper and many of her asides suggest rather the carrying out of war tactics most conducive to a female victory over the male).<sup>17</sup>

If, though, Jaggar has been accurate, and I think she has been in her depiction of male morality and philosophy as treating the

16 Some of the more radical feminists cited by Jaggar are (op. cit., 11), Cixous, Irigaray, Marilyn Freye. Freye, for instance (loc. cit.) "questions whether feminists really need ethics at all (Freye forthcoming)"

17 The title of Jaggar's paper, "Feminist Ethics, Projects, problems, Prospects," as interpreted by Jaggar, proposes how, tactically and strategically, feminists can most effectively secure victory in their program to see to it that the view that it is "morally wrong to subordinate women to men is universally accepted" (Jaggar, op. cit. p. 91) and (ibid., 23) "to promote woman's emancipation...."



subordination of women and their moral experiences to men and their experiences as right and moral, and if that may be treated as the essence of masculinism as the essence of feminism consists in the opposite principles, then there obviously can be no such thing as the moral equality of the sexes: If feminism, for instance, is to triumph, as Jaggard advocated its doing, then there must take place a suppression of masculinism and its male-biased principles and hence a condition where, in actual fact, the male is being dominated, as in the matriarchies of old, by the female.

It is also arguable indeed, more than merely arguable: conclusively arguable that moral and legal equality between the sexes is practically impossible, short of the abolition of the family. For as long as there exists the family unit there will come about occasions when the desires of husband and wife conflict. If the family is not to explode into fragments, one or the other of the spouses has to have the last word. Moreover, it is almost a truism that ultimate power cannot be divided. There has to be, in other words, a head and not two heads of a household. If that is the wife, the husband is dominated; if the husband the wife.

On behalf of feminism Jaggard might want to contend, should it prove impossible for men to bear fetuses,<sup>18</sup> that with the advent of the rule of feminism the family must or will be abolished as, for instance, it is for the guardians and kings in Plato's hypothetically ideal Republic, and as it actually was, to some extent, in ancient Sparta. But even given the abolition of the family, there cannot, practically speaking, exist as moral and legal equality between the sexes. Women may be more fierce than men, as acknowledged in the piece of conventional wisdom that tells us, "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned", and they may be more guileful than men (as is noted throughout literature and even that composed by women, witness our quotation from Agatha Christie's Autobiography), but men are physically more powerful. Duties involving the use of an individual's own physical power cannot then be allotted on an equal basis to women. Moreover, and most importantly, it has to be supposed that the possession of greater physical power, and the way that power is physiologically embodied, must have its psychological effect so that in the long run men will naturally resent and even find it morally degrading to submit to women rather than have women submit to them. For actually and Jaggard herself argues that what is actually the case rather than the hypothetically ideal case should be the basis of our present reasoning concerning feminism and its tactics<sup>19</sup> Might, as Thrasymachus in Plato's *The Republic* contends, makes Right.

As exclusive disjuncts, then, masculinism or feminism must prevail; both cannot nor can one be abandoned without either the moral

<sup>18</sup> See, again, Forbes, "Visigoths," April 1, 1991, 86.

<sup>19</sup> See Jaggard, op. cit., 168-169.



subordination of women to men or of men to women and in morality's train, either the legal subordination of one sex to the other and in the altere's train, either the actual subordination of one sex to the other. And this must be the case whether there exists the institution of family or not.

The question, therefore, comes down to this as a question concerning actualities: what grounds are there for holding that masculinism should prevail over feminism, as it historically has in the replacement of matriarchies by patriarchies, or feminism over masculinism?

As we originally noted, it may seem that in trying to reach an answer here we must end up locked in a stale mate. Women to judge by the duration and virulence of the battle between the sexes, can be counted on to join the feminists and claim that the arguments of masculinists cannot be believed, being male-biased, and should be dismissed, while men or those who have not been intimidated by the egalitarian, self-righteous cries of the feminists, can be counted on to dismiss the arguments of the latter as being "female-biased". Since every participant in the argument is either a man or woman, how can there possibly be a standing point that lies outside mere, dogmatic partisanship?

Now I first want to introduce a fact concerning the uniquely male sex chromosome, the Y chromosome, that bears directly upon the present question. This is the fact that, unlike the X sex chromosome, or, indeed, any other chromosome, the Y chromosome is a "fluorescent" body; at least, it is in the case of man and the gorilla. In this connection, let me quote Ursula Mittwoch in "Sex Chromatin Bodies"<sup>20</sup>. "Another interesting difference between X and Y bodies is that a second X chromosome is visible in interphase nuclei in the large majority of female mammals, whereas a fluorescent Y body is absent from the cells of most male mammals; it has been seen only in the cells of man and the gorilla". That is, the Y chromosome of the male human being is a body that, under certain conditions, produces light.

One might therefore argue as follows: according to many theologies and many religions themselves--for example, Manichaeism, Neo-Platonic Christianity, and so on--divinity, or at least beneficent divinity, is likenable to pure light or is, indeed, pure light. Combining this religious insight with the discoveries of chromosome science, one has to suppose that only the male part of mankind possess true souls or, in any case, souls that actually reflect and duplicate beneficent divinity. Thus men, as opposed to the female part of mankind, are alone qualified to found genuine moral systems. Hence, the very fact that a morality or philosophy is male biased and morally subordinates women to men testifies to its truth and rightness. But for the same reason already given, men but not women are alone able to perceive this truth. For,

<sup>20</sup> Ursula Mittwoch, "Sex Chromatin Bodies," *Human Chromosome Methodology*, 2nd. edition, Yris, 1974 pp. 73.4, also p. 84; p. 90.



not being fluorescent or luminous, but dark, the X chromosome can confer upon women only at most the powers of darkness: the desire, for instance, for an illicit power over men, as noted by Chaucer: and so on. But not actual moral vision.

If it be objected that, according to the same discoveries, the male gorilla also possesses a fluorescent Y chromosome but it does not seem that the male gorilla has founded any genuine morality or

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has any such moral comprehension, it is answerable, I think, that for all we know he may. We just do not know gorillas that intimately or, if we are, say Manichaeans, we might want to retort that gorillas are perhaps a failed creation of beneficent divinity; an experimental creation that of various reasons did not work out.

It may be wondered, perhaps, why I should introduce into a serious philosophical discussion such superstitions as I have immediately above. I will not agree, however that what I have referred to.... the identification of beneficent divinity with light and divinity itself are necessarily superstition and even if they were they might still express, in symbolic form, truths of nature, in the way that folk-cures of some diseases have been found to constitute real cures. But I am, nonetheless, willing to forgo the advantage of these admitted speculations on light and divinity, and limit my arguments to what we know as fact. For on this basis too, I shall now show, the male-bias of conventional morality and traditional philosophy, both can be vindicated.

To begin with, it must surely appear to any impartial thinker that if one party in a dispute has access, say, to moral perceptions A and B while a second party has only access to moral perceptions A, and if these perceptions are the only one at stake the first party has an edge over the second insofar as being a judge of whether A should take precedence over B or B over A. Indeed, the second party can not reasonably be considered a possible judge at all.

But just this, I want to contend, is the actual position in which men and women are situated when it comes to judging what moral values should be given our assent and to what extent. My more particular contention will be that in the case at issue, where an absolute incompatibility exists between masculinist and feminist moralities namely where the one maintains that it is moral to subordinate female morality to male morality and hence, via the legal implications of this moral subordination, women to men, and the other in effect holding that male morality be subordinate to female morality and hence, by the same implications, men to women, it is men who are in a position to judge between the two moralities, where they conflict, whereas women are not in such a position. Thus, the historical fact that moralities, legal systems, and the other frameworks of advanced societies, like



their religions and dominant philosophical systems, have been in Jaggar's judgment, "male biased," is perfectly right and proper and as things should be.

How is this itself "male biased" contention to be impartially vindicated? Quite simply.

Insofar as the battle between the sexes is looked at from moral perspectives it has to be a battle between that moral value or those moral values which, because women are what they sexually are, basically womanly moral values and not manly moral values and vice versa, those that are basically manly values and not womanly values because men are sexually what they are. What precisely these values in fact are is a matter that, I grant, needs a great deal more scientifically controlled investigation than has so far been given it. It may be as ordinary untutored impressions would seem to dictate, that the male values in question consist in some form or forms of aggressiveness, and the female in some form or forms of caring. But what seems clear, in any case, is that the presence of the Y chromosome produces such enormous glandular, hormonal, and other physical and physiological differences in the initially female body and brain it must *a fortiori* simultaneously produce comparable psychological differences and these, where moral experiences come into play, moral differences. That is to say, it is only common scientific sense to suppose that since a male, because of the presence of the Y chromosome, differs physically and physiologically so drastically from the female he must, in some crucial area of his moral experiences and values, differ from the female. As I have already indicated, what these differences actually consist in--I refer here to difference in moral experience and valuation--may still need to be scientifically determined. But our argument does not rest on that determination; only on the postulation of a crucial difference (or differences). And that postulation would seem to be also a postulation of the feminists themselves, where, like Jaggar, they demand that (see Jaggar's second universal feminist principle) "moralities need to take into account women's moral experiences". For if the latter were not supposed to be essentially different from men's moral experiences then it could hardly be supposed that actual, conventional morality, however "male biased" it might be, would not be taking into account these very experiences and not be open to the feminist complaint that they were not.

We have, then, as our minimally necessary that in certain areas at least what we shall call "Y moral experiences and valuations" (or "Y morality, for short") differ from what we shall call "X moral experiences and valuations" (or "X morality, for short") -- whatever these differences may specifically be. What follows, therefore, is that in these same areas--presumably areas where male and female interests conflict--man's Y and woman's X morality will deliver different verdicts and different



perceptions. But since men also possess the X chromosome and hence share in woman's X morality, but woman do not possess a Y chromosome and hence do not share in an experience of its male morality, men but not woman will be able to apply to conflicts of male and female interest in a balancing judgement and that means, a deliverance of justice. To be sure, in certain actual cases where emotion overwhelms all attempts to objectively balance the claims involved, they may not, but it is possible for them to. The point is: men are in position to deliver a just verdicts, where the moral and other claims of men and woman conflict, whereas women are not. And this fact; which would seem to account for the almost maniacal character of matriarchal rule -- for instance, the leteral tearing apart alive of the Queen's consort by the Bee goddess's maneads-- would also seem to confirm the Gilgamesh tablet's complaints of matriarchal disorder and confusion. The upshot is: for the sake of the justice itself, men have to replace women as the rulers of a society and to see to it that women do not, above all, exercise the powers of legislators or judges.

So, far, however, our argument and the evidence we have adduced above seem to show only that where there are conflicts of interest or moral perceptions between men and women is it impossible for women to deliver just verdicts. In other areas it would seem that they might and that hence, justice to a limited extent existed in pre-patriarchal societies or, in other words, in their antecedent matriarchies. It might seem, therefore, that the lack of justice that is imputed in Hesiod and in various Greek myths to have prevailed before the advent of Zeus was a lack of justice in certain particular areas only: those where the interest of men and women were in conflict. Here men, as the saying goes, got from their matriarchal masters, as a mere matters of course, the short end of the stick. It was not that their matriarchal masters meant to be unjust: it was merely that in these particular areas (where X and Y moralities were in competition) these matriarchal could have seen only what their X moral experiences dictated. They necessarily had to fail to arrive at a balanced judgment of their own, even had they tried.

Since the distribution of X and Y chromosomes has to be changed in the interval, this would currently have to be case as well. Women might intimate the balanced judgements of men in these areas, as parrots imitate the talk around them, but without any more genuine understanding of what was involved then in completely color blind person would have colors. Hence, the call for a matriarchal society is really the call for a basically unjust society. This conclusion, as itself expressing a balanced judgement and thus resting ultimately on the possession of not only X but a Y chromosome and hence upon the experience of both X and Y moralities and not just X morality, must, unfortunately, be comprehensible only to men, involving as it does a comparison of the claims and titles of both X and Y moral experience and hence as lying outside the bounds of a woman's actual experience. Thus, as I indicated



at the beginning, a stale mate between men and women on the question of whether a matriarchal or a patriarchy ought to be embraced by our society is not mandated. Since men, for the reasons already given, can exercise balance judgement covering both sides in the areas concerned, their male-biased verdict can be an informed and just one, while the female-biased judgement of women *fortiori* cannot be. For the same reasons given above, women will have to take this conclusion itself, as far as their immediate moral perceptions go, on the blind faith. But insofar as women can exercise an impartial reason, they ought to be able, abstractly any way, to follow out the evidence and arguments we have adduced to the same conclusion and so be willing to give at least an abstract assent to it. Or so it might be hoped.

It is not likely, however, that they will. Suppose, for instance, that the physiology and hence psychology of women is such that they can not reason impartially, but by their very natures must always mix reasons with emotions pertaining to their X moral experiences? For example, suppose that when confronted with a conflict of interests of no matter what sort, a certain person finds it impossible to separate, elliptically speaking, as far as the claims of justice go, skewed and emotional, rather than balanced and rational. Those who could separate justice from mercy might want, therefore, to claim that the person in question lacked "a reason." They would not mean, in saying this, that the person in question lacked a reason in the way that some one who reasons cleverly but paranoidly, might be said to lack a reason. In short, what would be meant would be that a person in question's reasoning powers were vitiated by outside elements and so always delivered impure reasonings.

Now it is surely in some such sense that it has been maintained, at all times and places, by various societies and their most able and trusted thinkers, that women lacked a reason. Where there is so much smoke one has to assume that there is fire. In addition, this hypothesis can explain not only the deranged nature of life and religion in the matriarchies that preceded the rise of patriarchy the "utter confusion" of the matriarchal order complained of in the Gilgamesh tablets; the savage, almost insane, rites of the matriarchal Bee goddess, described by Robert Graves-but the fact, to believe the early Greek mythologists, that prior to the advent of Zeus and hence patriarchy, there did not exist justice. If Plato is right when he claims that the ethics of a State mirrors the ethics of its rulers and if the ethics of a matriarchal society mirrors the moral judgments of its matriarchal rulers and these rulers all lack reasons, in the sense noted above, then we should have as a consequence a society in which there actually did not exist justice anywhere. Everyone would be, according to Plato's principle, mixing their reasonings with, say, mercy or some other emotion or passion, and hence, except perhaps in the fancy of some of the male member of this society, there would not occur in actual practice the objectively



balancing judgments constituting justice. As myths often are the disguised presentations of time buried truths, the myths relating Zeus to the very existence of justice would then be vindicated.

We have supported our contention that woman per se, lack the ability to render justice by referring to the widely separated and diverse cultures in which it has been maintained, by thinker and ordinary member alike, that women lack a reason and by referring to the symbolic credibility of myths. But does this outrageous contention of ours - or certainly, a contention that will generally be taken, in view of today's obsession with egalitarianism, as outrageous-possess any more reliable support? It would seem that it does. One gathers that humoral and other studies of the brain now suggest that the activities of male brains are separated from each other and compartmentalized where as those of female brains are not, but tend to be diffuse. Reading these neuro-anatomical suggestions into macroscopic behaviour, as seems justified on the basis of scientific studies themselves,<sup>21</sup> seem to confirm the myth that says that Zeus or, in short, patriarchy, was the father of justice. But if that is so, then as we have already said, the feminists' call for a matriarchy or even a shared rule of men and women, is a call for a injustice. For take even the case of shared rule. What one is confronted with by shared rule is, genetically looked at, three x-chromosome for every y-chromosome (what one gets where for each male ruler there is a female ruler). Where men alone are the rulers, what one is presented with genetically is the balance of one x-chromosome for every y-chromosome. Now clearly, being their balance, the latter, but not the former, which is an imbalance, constitutes a just agency or an agency productive of justice.

21 For experimentally demonstrated connections between neuroanatomical and physiological structures and behavioural and psychological structures see, for instance, Paul D. Maclean, *The Triune Brain in Evolution Role in Paleocerebral Function*, Plenum Press, N. Y., London, 1990.



## XVII

## THE PARADOX OF UTILITARIANISM

What I shall maintain in the following paragraphs is meant to apply equally to all varieties of utilitarianism: act utilitarianism; rule utilitarianism; multiple-object utilitarianism (i.e., a utilitarianism that applies the criterion of utility to not only acts and rules but to institutions, motives, emotions, or whatever else there is that lends itself to a calculation of its utility). What I shall maintain will also apply equally to utilitarianism whether defined in terms of happiness or welfare (conceivably two different things), or in terms of probabilities or actualities, or in terms of superlatives (e.g., greatest happiness) or comparatives (e.g., greater happiness). What then; is this perhaps seemingly impossible thing that I wish to maintain about utilitarianism? Paradoxically, it is this: the more successful utilitarianism is the less successful it must be. In short, one might say the like the scorpion of legend, utilitarianism in the end stings itself to death.

I shall attempt to demonstrate this paradox in the following two cases: 1), where utilitarianism is defined in terms of maximizing happiness and 2), maximizing welfare. Having completed those tasks, I shall reply to some possible objections.

## 1. HAPPINESS-UTILITERIANISM

Now every proponent of utilitarianism obviously thinks that utilitarianism is right doctrine and hence should be accepted by everyone : the more the merrier. To that end, instance, he presents utilitarianism in the most glowing colors he can conjure up, the most powerful arguments he can invent. Hence, first of all, let us suppose that the utilitarian has to agree that is an ideally desirable outcome of his argumentation, claims, and so on.

A second agreement that we think is called for is that, for most persons, complicated, uncertain, inconclusive thinking is a painful and frustrating chore. They are unhappy when obliged to engage in such thinking. If required to engage in such thinking almost every hour of every day they would, most of them anyway, suffer the unhappiness almost of someone on a rack. And added to this torment would be their feelings of guilt when, against their conscience, they would connive, as



they certainly would, merely to pretend, when called upon, to engage in this sort of thinking or even evade its chore altogether (like Hume in the last section of Part I, Book I of the Treatise, taking up a game of backgammon instead or perhaps even a tall whiskey and soda).

Thirdly, I believe that anyone acquainted even with the simplest form of utilitarianism, which confines itself to acts and says no more than that an act is good if and only if it conduces to the greater happiness, will have to confess that it is generally difficult and frustrating to try to determine whether an act does in fact or in probability eventuate in such an outcome. Even in the most seemingly unequivocal cases, carried out in completeness, such a determination is difficult and frustrating to come by. Say that my contemplated act is assassinating Mohandas Gandhi. Say I am trying to determine whether the result of doing so will in the end produce greater happiness than my not doing so. The more honest I am trying to determine whether the result of doing so will in the end produce greater happiness than my not doing so. The more honest I am in this determination will not it prove the more difficult and frustrating? Variable upon variable confronts me. Unknown upon unknown masses against me, until it seems that I am simply overwhelmed. If I am like most persons for perhaps there are a few who enjoy such uneven and interminable intellectual combat will I not soon be reduced to painful unhappiness? Certainly, I must be.

If this same utilitarian determination is extended beyond acts to rules and beyond rules to institutions, emotions, motives, moral dogmas and who knows what else, the variables and unknowns and hence the difficulties and frustrations must obviously multiply astronomically. And so must my unhappiness.

Does it not follow, then, that the more successful utilitarianism is in gaining converts the more unhappiness and hence the less happiness will be produced? If any single act's production of happiness or unhappiness can be plausibly determined certainly this is that act. Hence, in a manner of condensed speaking, the doctrine of utilitarianism convicts itself of being non-utilitarian. Or one might say, with some credibility: should everyone be converted to utilitarianism, the more incere the conversion, the greater would be the evil (as evil is defined by happiness-utilitarianism). QED.

## 2. WELFARE-UTILITARIANISM

In case it be held that welfare and happiness are two different things, is that the above demonstration does not apply to welfare utilitarianism, it should be noted that persons being generally reduced to a state of torment where they were not previously in such a state can hardly be said to have been benefited welfare-wise. But even ignoring that plain truism, if persons are reduced to a condition where they cannot arrive at unequivocal determinations of right and wrong or even a general



agreement of some vague sort, and that would certainly be the predictable outcome of people in general being converted to utilitarianism, their minds would have to be in a constant state of confusion and chaos. Could wise decisions and policies issue from minds in such a state? Clearly not. But how without wise decision and policy making could there be an increase of the general welfare? There could not be.

Hence, again, we must conclude that should everyone be converted to utilitarianism, albeit welfare and not happiness utilitarianism, the result has to be evil (as evil is defined by welfare- utilitarianism). QED.

### **Objections and Replies**

1. It might be argued that if our results (above) apply to utilitarianism they apply to all philosophical moral theories or recommendations. So unless one wants to relegate all philosophical ethical theories to limbo why pick on utilitarianism?

In answer to this objection, one could point out, first of all, that some philosophical more theories do not involve their adherents in unpleasant epistemic tasks, like calculating complicated consequences of actions. A realist theory like G.E. Moore's in *Principal Ethic*, but where immediate moral intuitions are extended from good to right (so a sort of combination of Moore and Ross), commits one only to having intuitions or sorts of perceptions of qualities; e.g., the quality: good, the quality, right. Having perceptions is not typically task-like. On the contrary, it can amount to a pleasant adventure. Indeed, looking to see is something people enjoy and even pay money for. thus, as I can myself vouchsafe from my own experience as a one time adherent to the ethical realism of Moor's *Principal Ethica*, the experience of determining in the Moorean mode what things have the quality, good, is neither painful nor frustrating. Without having to calculate anything one simply looks, as it were, to see. Surely, therefore; it need not be true that the epistemologies of all philosophical moral system must involve one in a disagreeable and frustrating task.

But even if they did, it would not follow that a particular ethics was thereby involved paradoxically in its own demise. An ethics that proposed to maximize virtue, for instance, would not convict it self of decreasing virtue because it mandated, on the part of its adherents, some activity that was onerous or frustrating; say, like attempting to determine, as in Kant's ethics, whether or to a certification could be universalized without contradiction. if the ethics in question called simply for the realization of virtue for the sake of virtue itself, it would be irrelevant that realization might involve one in painful struggles. In fact, that it did would seem only to enhance our realization of virtue.

2. It, might be objected that the following way can be envisaged for seeing to it that, although utilitarianism were adopted by everyone, the unpleasant task mandated by it of determining what conduces to the



greater happiness or welfare could be left to just those few persons who, it happens, delight in such exercises; for example, professional philosophers or technocrats.<sup>1</sup> The latter would, presumably, happily and effectively determine what actions, rules, motives, etc. were in probability utile in producing more or less happiness or the general welfare and publish their results in tables available to the general public. In turn, the general public would only need to consult the tables in question to find out what they should or should not do, what rules they should defend or annul, and so on. Such simple exercises would not be frustrating or painful, much less conclude in some Hamlet-like indecision or lack of agreement concerning what should or should not be done. Hence, according to this picture of things, utilitarianism would not be involved inherently in its own refutation and the paradox we originally ascribed to it would no longer be ascribable. The universal adoption of utilitarianism would, on the contrary, conduce to the greatest happiness or welfare of everyone. QED!

The picture that we have just painted in our imagination superficially seems, I grant, to refute our charge of paradox. This seems accomplishable by re-conceiving utilitarianism as "scientific utilitarianism"; an ethical system run on high by professional philosophers or technocrats. It is these who will perform all the otherwise onerous (but to them, exciting and interesting) calculations of utility, which will be then disseminated to the general public as already completed determinations, thus relieving those who find complicated calculations painful or impossible of any work more complicated or painful than merely reading off from tables what is or is not to be done in any particular case of an act, rule motive, etc. One might here be reminded, for example, of the way that forward observers in the artillery are relieved of the painful and even impossible task of calculating gun adjustments by being provided tables of these adjustments already worked out by mathematicians. So, in this re-conceived "scientific" utilitarianism; an ordinary person, wondering if action X were one he ought to perform or not, would look up in his "utility" tables X's already calculated utility or lack of utility and so know whether to perform X or not, with all frustration, difficulty, unhappiness and indecision eliminated!

Such a picture of things seems almost too good to be true. And indeed it is. One only needs to bring the details of this fanciful painting

1. A forerunner of my "scientific utilitarianism" is, no doubt, that utilitarianism of Sidgwick's run by a governmental elite for the hoipolloi, which Bernard Williams has aptly named "Government House Utilitarianism" (For William's origination of this name see, for instance, H. N Hare in Hare and Critics, edd. Seanor and Fotion, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 287). Although I have not indicated that my scientific utilitarianism would be operated by a government bureaucracy of some sort, were it ever a fact of life, it is certain it would be. Hence, added to the painful encumbrances that I have already located in a scientific utilitarianism would no doubt be those further ones that attach themselves, with seeming inevitability, to one's dealing with government bureaucracies.



into focus to see that, like Bosch's painting of the garden of earthly delights, it contains, out of superficial sight, all sorts of grim diabolerie.

For one thing, if (as is the case) a simple tax law spread out in all the complexity of its more particular interpretations takes many densely filled pages, what must be the volume of legalistic prose describing the utility of one act or law or institution with respect to all the almost innumerable circumstances both it and its consequences have to be correlated with? One has to suppose that what must issue from our philosophico-scientific head-pieces in the way of tables determining all the utilities that have to be determined well constitute such a huge mass of the most difficult reading material that the ordinary person, confronted with the task of assessing from it utilitarian guidance on any matter, will find the task as impossible as it is painful; even more so than had he attempted the calculations himself. Nor would computer be of any use, since fitting any particular action, rule, motive, etc. to the correct code of its utilitarian determination would be another as impossible as painful task.

In much the same connection, it could be expected that any particular determination one made from the innumerable tables provided by our philosophico-scientific head-pieces would, due to the inevitable ambiguities and different interpretations possible, be disputed by almost everyone else. The resultant hubub of contention could scarcely conduce to greater happiness or greater welfare.

And finally it has to be expected, from what we already know of such attempted determinations, that our philosophico-scientific headpieces or chief utilitarians will be generally at logger heads over their calculations, some maintaining this determination to be the correct one, others that, and still others a third, and so on. Because these determinations are meant to provide all the members of a community with their decisions concerning all affairs it can be expected that however much these chief utilitarians may individually enjoy working on insoluble puzzles, their titles of leadership and captains of conduct now being at stake and on the line, any failure to prove the determinations in question must predictably cause resentment, frustration, anger, and unhappiness even among themselves, not to say their clients. Hence, whether the utile be defined in terms of happiness or welfare, under scientific utilitarianism more evil must predictably result than even under a "democratic" utilitarianism, of and by and for the people,

3. But might not we succeed in circumventing the paradox we have been referring to in the following way. Taking our cue from Mill in his *Utilitarianism* or, more recently, Hare<sup>2</sup>, might we not propose that ordinary persons or persons who find mental computations of utility

<sup>2</sup> For Hare's two-level moral system or what he calls his "Kantian-Utilitarian Rationalistic Theory" (Hare, "How to Decide Moral Questions Rationally," *Critica*, Dec. 1986) see Hare, op. cit., above (footnote 1).



frustrating and painful simply abide by the secondary principles or rules of their culture, e.g., "Thou shalt not commit adultery," etc., without question, just as they generally do anyway, and only in the case where there exist conflicts appeal to specialists or professional philosophers to resolve, on the basis of utilitarian computations, these conflicts? Surely this procedure must eliminate our particular paradox!

Now I grant that it would seem to; at least if we suppose that professional head-pieces can arrive at some consensus in their resolution of moral conflicts. For the sake of argument, in the face of completely contradicting evidence, let us accede to this supposition. Perhaps, for instance, we could leave these complicated computations in the hands or programs of computers. Have we not, then, rescued Utilitarianism from its own seeing self-defeating generation of inutility?

As I said, we may have seemed to. Closer examination, however, will show that a final scorpion's lethal sting remains in the tail of Utilitarianism, even as presently construed. Surely, for example, according to that construal, everyone will have to know that in the case of moral conflict he is to submit his problem to specialists for resolution and that these resolutions are to take place on the basis or the principle of utilitarianism. But having logical priority, therefore, are the questions (A) "Whether it is utile does it conduce to the greatest happiness of the greatest number or their welfare for each person and thus for me (say) to decide the utility at issue or to let others decide it for me?" and of even greater logical priority, the question (B): "Is it right--does it conduce to the greatest happiness of the greatest number or their welfare to abide, without utilitarian validation on each persons's part, by the secondary principles of his culture or not?" On the very face of it, A and B impose on each person the very sort of utilitarian determinations that compose the paradox that we have attributed to Utilitarianism. So really, we are no further along than we were before.

Finally, (4) almost the antipodes of "scientific utilitarianism," we might propose something even more democratic than Hare's "two level" system like Moore's where Moore's moral intuitions are extended from good to include right (again a sort of combination of Moore and Ross by why not?).

Now it is true, I think, that we do have immediate, painless intuitions or something like a painless common sense apprehension of what conduces to the happiness or welfare of people in concrete case. For example, one knows, without having to engage in onerous comparisons or calculations, that giving one's son at Christmas the sled he has been begging for will make him happy and that seeing he does not smoke say he is not yet in his teens will contribute to his welfare. If, then, utilitarian decision-making could be limited to such concrete particular cases we could seemingly resolve the paradox at issue:

So limiting the compass of utilitarian decision making involves us, however, in several obvious difficulties. For one thing, there come times



when people generally have to make decisions concerning very broad and general concerns, such as arise, in democracies anyway, concerning political alternatives. Immediate intuitions of concrete utility here tend to run out or to be immersed in irresolvable conflict and controversy. But even of more moment is the following difficulty as regards the present system.

Suppose that we limit our utilitarian intuitions to just those particular, concrete cases where they seem at home (so to speak). Now my concrete utilitarian intuitions seem most at home in what is utile for me. If what is to your utilitarian advantage conflicts with what is to mine, my intuitions have a tendency to concern themselves with the latter and ignore completely the former. The same is true as we extend their compass beyond ourselves to our family (versus other families), to our tribe (versus other tribes), and so on. Thus left to themselves, our utilitarian intuitions will tend to be partial: and the more concrete they are the more partial they tend to be: Hence, there must emerge when we combine people together an irresolvable war of all utilitarian intuitions against all utilitarian intuitions.

How is utilitarian impartiality and consequent peace to be brought about? Surely, only by means of the traditional definitions of utilitarian theory which institute that impartiality by construing utilitarian decision making in the most general terms possible; in terms, for instance, of the happiness of the greatest number or maximizing welfare or some such thing. By this means self and family and other antagonistic partialities are made inoperative. Every one's interest is to count equally.

This impartiality of decision making is bought, however, at the expense of bare single intuition. We may have an immediate bare reliable intuition of what conduces or will conduce to our own or our family's Christmas ha'pennies or welfare. We may even some times believe that we possess such an intuition of some political alternative's utilitarian rightness. But no one, surely, can plausibly pretend to possess a reliable immediate Single intuition of what conduces to the greatest happiness of the greatest number or what maximizes happiness for all of humankind. These most general ends evoke and can evoke no reliable Single intuition; only the sort of onerous and frustrating thinking we could call, following Hare, "critical thinking." To the extent, therefore, that utilitarian theory to ensure impartiality and harmony, and obviously those are basic desiderata of the theory, it cannot take refuge in bare, concrete intuitions.

The paradox thus remains: the more successful utilitarianism is to wit, the more persons who are converted to it-the less successful it must be.



## XVIII

## FOR DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

Why should there be, it might be asked, Indian journals of philosophy for instance, *Darshana International*? As the very adjective "international" implies, is not philosophy of trans-cultural scope? But if so, what does *Darshana International* bring to the market that, say, English or American philosophical journals do not and perhaps better? How justify the implied duplication of presentations? Considered globally, is not, then, the publication of *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy in the name of economy, be shut down?

One might retort, of course, that the above argument is double-edged. Why not say that *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy be the ones chosen by our global "resource administrators" to present and develop philosophy and the English and American journals be shut down?

In the above paragraphs I am, plain to see, raising a purely academic question; certainly one that does not apply to the present world. But it could to a future world, where, imaginably, printing materials were, globally, so reduced in supply, and where a United Nations ruled everywhere and in everything, that it could make sense or even seem imperative to allocate just to English or American or Indian journals a monopoly in philosophical publication. Then indeed, the question we have asked, "Why should there be Indian journals of philosophy for instance, *Darshana International* in particular.

The validation that comes immediately to mind is something like the following. Though perhaps not in the realm of the physical sciences, certainly in the realm of values and ethics different cultures adhere to and promulgate different values and ethics. Although there may be overlaps in the values and ethics promulgated, that is not always or everywhere the case. At least some incommensurate values, some partially incommensurate ethics, are by different cultures adhered to and promulgated. On the credible assumption that the philosophical theses incorporating these different values and ethics will be not only different but logically independent, we shall, then, desire or at least justice will



require-that every culture be allowed to possess its own philosophical publications. But not only every culture, holistically speaking but every incommensurate sub-culture or sect within that culture'.

What we are appealing to here is the theory of cultural relativism; that is, the view that all social values and ethics are relative; their esse or being lies solely in their being entertained by whatever society entertains them. But this is not all.

As so far described, cultural relativism is what one arrives at when one views empirically the various societies of the world. One soon enough discovers that they entertain various different and even incommensurate values and ethics. But empirically, one discover nothing more as to their existence than the fact that they are entertained by the respective societies that entertain them.

If, now, we take a scientific, dispassionate stance toward these relative values, including our own, we shall arrive at what might be called "egalitarian cultural relativism." For, in being dispassionate as science and even philosophy dictate we be, it has to seem to us that these different, relative values and ethics of different societies all have no more or less than an equal claim to existence. It is only when we judge these different sets of values of other societies from the standpoint of our own particular society's set of values that we seem justified in setting one society's values above or below another's. But what justifies our judging other systems of values or ethics by our own? Why not vice-versa? Surely, if we are truly dispassionate, we shall want to say, "Nothing".

Suppose, for instance, we apply to all these different value-systems and ethics a utilitarian measuring rod: "that which conduces to the greatest happiness of the greatest number". But that measuring rod is to, either empirically or theoretically considered, a value of all cultures. It is an actual value, conceivability, only of the speaker's own culture. It might be, for example, a dis-value of Indian culture (happiness being held (say) to be a self-debasing attachment to illusion). But if the measuring rod to be applied to the values of all cultures is one belonging to our own culture alone or, conceivably, not in fact to all others, our adoption of it as their measuring rod obviously violates our commitment to scientific dispassion and pure reason, for these world find nothing in that value of ours that differentiate it, authority-wise, from any other value belonging to any other culture. Hence, as just now seen, where empirical observation leads us to the conclusion that values and ethics are relative to the particular societies that one set of values or ethics is no better or worse than another: in short, egalitarian cultural relativism.

As I have already noted, cultural relativism, so conceived (and this seems to be the dispassionate, scientific way of conceiving it), validates the right of Indian journals of philosophy and Darshana International



in particular to remain in publication, even in that grim future world of scarcity of resources that we have adverted to. To repeat in slightly altered form what we said: egalitarian cultural relativism say that these Indian journals and *Darshana International* in particular are publishing philosophical expressions of sets of values and ethics that not only are not available in the sets of values and ethics of other societies for example, in English or American sets but which are of no less intrinsic (though no more) rightness or worth than those of these societies and so are equally justified in seeing the light of philosophical representation and publication.

While however, the doctrine of Darshana International and other Indian Journals of philosophy, it does so only if it is itself a defensible theory. One cannot, after all, base a claim on an indefensible premise. But is egalitarian ethical relativism a defensible theory? Demonstrably, it is not.

The main and central arguments that commands this denial is the following. If any society is to survive it must possess a moral system binding on its member. If its members are not bound together in such a system, they are free to go each their own way in their personal relations. But what must devolve from this common license to "go one's way" or "do one's own thing" is, let it be actually adhered to, either a Hobbesian war of all against all or mere social chaos. Even at small scale of a family such license although only partially adhered to usually results, as every one known, in the disintegration of the family. How much more surely this is due to happen at the large scale of a society and where the license in question is complete!

The question, that is: can egalitarian relativism, put in actual practise, supply the binding moral system required for the very existence of any society? patently, it cannot.

Egalitarian relativism, viewing with its dispassionate eyes the speaker's own society's sets of values and ethics and those of other societies and finding one set no more authoritative than another, can therefore find none that is authoritative. Suppose, as a last resort, the speaker arbitrarily chooses one set to be authoritative; but then the very arbitrariness of that choice has to deprive that choice of any authority. Under the aegis of egalitarian relativism, the most one can squeeze out of the conflicting sets of values and ethics empirically presented one are conditional imperatives; e.g., "If you want to succeed, you must do such and such" or "If you are a Dobu Is lander, such and such a rules will seem authoritative to you". But what are needed for the moral bindingness requisite for the existence of a society are not conditional imperatives but categorical imperatives, and these cannot be provided by egalitarian relativism, except it be the self contradictory and thus already indefensible categorical imperative of Nihilism. "Thou shalt have no categorical imperatives".



Take the case of instance, of the conditional imperative, "If you want to succeed, you must do such and such". Addressed to a member of a society that member remains free to say that he does not want to succeed; so what?

Theorists have tried, it is true, to find antecedents for conditional imperatives or "if, then"s which can be supposed to hold for everyone. Thus, the pursuit of happiness can with some plausibility be proposed, and has been proposed (for example, by Aristotle), as just such an antecedent. One's reasoning might then be, for instance: "If you want to be happy then you must do such and such; but since everyone wants to be happy, you must want to be happy: and hence, you must do such and such"

As matter of fact, though, a person can wish not to be happy. He may, for instance, have committed a heinous crime and wishes to be made unhappy and to be punished, because of his feelings of guilt.

As in the case of even happiness, there would seem to be noting that a person cannot, in some circumstance or other, wish either to possess or not possess, to be or not to be. Hence, conditional imperatives cannot provide us with the general bindingness requisite for the existence of a society.

On the face of it, then since egalitarian cultural relativism has to deprive us of any binding social imperatives and hence has to eliminate not only morality but society itself, we obviously cannot appeal to that theory in our attempted validation of Darshana International and other Indian journals of philosophy's right to exist in that grimworld of scarcities that, in many persons' view, looms ahead of us. The cost of our doing so would be much too great. Hence, some other foundation for that validation will have to be found, but what can that foundation be?

Pure reason has already failed, as commanding common consent, mysticism is out of the question, Empirical observation, the only remaining alternative, though commanding common consent provides us with only some form of cultural relativism. Presumably therefore, the foundation in question will have to consist in some form of cultural relativism: If though we opt for cultural relativism, what possible relativism is there except egalitarian relativism? Certainly, the pages of philosophy mention none. Yet, clearly there is an other relativism, and one that we are all acquainted with: what might be called "hierarchical cultural relativism".

Unlike the artificially produced egalitarian relativism of dispassionate science or pure reason, this is a natural relativism which is everywhere evidence in actual societies. Moreover, as we shall see, this other relativism does provide us with categorical imperatives, those sine non qua Nons of moral bindingness and the existence of any society:



To begin at a beginning. As long as we maintain a purely dispassionate stance in our view of things consonant with pure reason or science, we shall be unable, it has become evident, to wring any categorical imperatives from the differing values and ethics of the world's different societies: or if any, only that imperatives of Nihilism "Thou shalt not have any categorical imperatives", which contradicts itself: But while this dispassionate stance in our view of things may be the prescribed stance of the scientist and the philosopher it is certainly not the actual stance of any normal human being qua human being. The man of the completely dispassionate stance is, like the so-called "economic man", a one-dimensional man, existing only in theory; a mere "reason on stilts". The actual man is many things besides a pure reason: a being full of passions, attachments, instincts or propensities, to name but a few of his extra-rational properties or characteristics.

Now if one steps out of one's role as philosopher or pure reasoner into that of a full human being, a being of not only reason but feeling one's particular society's values and ethics will not have the appearance of merely conditional imperatives but categorical imperatives. This seems to be a natural effect of our childhood training in the values and ethics of our native culture: a training, by social necessity, of unarguable and therefore binding do's and don'ts. In addition, though, in the case of the man of both reason and feeling or the whole man there seems naturally to come into play with the passage of time a set of feelings and attitudes that complement these categorical imperatives: those feelings of attachment and dutifulness which Socrates, in Plato's *Crito*, as justifying his refusal to escape from prison, attributed to the fact that Athens had been his provider and parent, who had taught him what he knew, and therefore deserved his obedience and gratitude. The normal and that is the full man the man, of both reason and feeling, not is likely to have at his command the eloquence to express verbally, like Socrates, the grounds of his feelings of gratitude and obedience, but his actions often testify mutely to their existence. It is with some such mute testimony, for instance, that this whole man, placed on the battlefield, dies "for his flag and country."

This normal, whole man of not only reason but feeling. When confronted with the fact that different cultures entertain different values and ethics from his own, will agree so far with the philosopher there are indeed different cultures with different values and ethics. But the conclusion he will come to is not the same as the dispassionate philosopher's. Because of his emotional and engrained attachment to his own culture's values and ethics, which he will consider as both sacrosanct and exclusive, he will entertain a cultural relativism that: unlike the dispassionate philosopher's egalitarian relativism, says, not that the values and ethics of all cultures are on a par, but that his own, having a special provenance, are the true values and ethics. He may then think and believe that those of other cultures, where differing,



are false. But he need not. Because of the exclusive character that he may impute to his own cultures's values and ethics, are exclusive to them also, and so, in courtesy, even go so far as to say that when in Rome one should do as the Romans do. In this he may seem to be in agreement with the philosopher's egalitarian cultural relativism. But in his special attachment and feelingful commitment to his own culture's values and ethics he is not. In saying, "When in Rome do as the Romans do", he does not envisage himself as subscribing to the Roman mores as categoric imperatives but simply, as a matter of courtesy or prudence, as conditional imperatives. The point is: one may out of courtesy or prudence, put in temporary abeyance one's own society's categorical imperatives without their not still in foro interno remaining categorical imperatives. The nonalienated Mormon, for example, who takes a drink of whiskey, realizes that he is breaking a categorical imperative and would readily admit that he ought not to be taking the drink of whiskey in question. Put it is, after all, as much actual human nature to sometimes ignore or even flout one's own society's categorical imperatives or ethics as to have an ethics and categorical imperatives.

In our possible future world of severe sacrcities, the right of Indian journals of philosophy and Darshana International in particular to the wherewithals of point is, under the aegis of this more natural relativism, which on the basis of a special provenance separates in some hierarchical way the values and ethics of one's own native culture from those of other cultures, more unequivocally established than under the philosopher's egalitarian relativism. For the categorical imperatives that rule the individual in this more natural relativism will demand philosophical representation with a categoricalness that conditional imperatives cannot command. According to the philosopher's egalitarian cultural relativism, *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of Philosophy may claim, as a matter of fairness, the right to publish and develop philosophy. According to the hierachrcial cultural relativism that naturally prevails in all societies, *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy have not just the right derived from fairness but the duty, derived from categorical imperativeness, to publish and developed philosophy as representing philosophically the caregorical imperatives and values of Indian culture.

Since a duty, unlike a right, cannot be waived the validation in question is, as we said above, more unequivocal than that posed by the philosopher's egalitraion cultural relativism, even were we to suppose, contrary to fact, that latter were that later were a defensible theory.



## XVIV

## LOGICAL TRUTH AND POSSIBLE WORLDS

The notion of possible worlds, as employed in the interpretation of modal and related concepts, has seemed to provide us with explanatory powers that we did not antecedently possess. The own very visible fly in the ointment or better, flies have been the attendant metaphysical, epistemological and linguistic problems that have emerged there from.<sup>1</sup> But say that these problems were finally all laid to rest. So far as one knows, that is not beyond the pale of all possibility. Would not the theory of possible worlds, as presently employed, anyway, then deserve our uncomplaining acceptance and adoption? I intend to show in this paper that it would not.

A necessary condition of the notion of possible worlds being theoretically retained in explaining modal and other related concepts. I would argue, is that it adequately define or explicate logical truth. In particular, it should need to so define or explicate the modal operator necessarily or it is necessary in the usual notation the square so as to lay the foundation for our distinguishing between logical truths and other sorts of necessary truths. This would come under its task of explaining or<sup>2</sup> explicating validity and the other formal concepts of Logic.

1. See William Lycan, "The Trouble With Possibel Worlds." in *The Possible and Actual* ed. Michael J. Loux, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, 1979; Colin McGinn, "Modal Reality," in *Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences*, ed. Healey, Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1981. Lycan (op. cit) argues that no single "semantic approach" to the concept of possible worlds, of which there are four, the "relentlessly Meingongian," the "Periphrastic," the "Quantifier-Reinterpreting," and "the actualist" (p. 286), has been able to provide, in the face of various difficulties each has posed a solid theoretic foundation for that cconcept. MacGinn (op. cit) convincingly argues that the theory of possible worlds fails to meet various essential linguistic metaphysical, and epistemological requirements (pp. 146 ff.)

2 See McGinn, op. cit., pp. 145-146. McGinn concludes (p. 146) that "meeting some such conditions as these formal ones) is clearly necessary if the theory is to have any attraction at all."

3 Irving Copi, *Symbolic Logic*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1954, p. 305

4. See, D.W. Hamlyn, "Contingent and Necessry Statments." *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* ed. Edwards. The Macmiullan co. New York., 1967, Vol. Two, p. 201.



It seems to me that this is a modest and minimal theoretical requirement. In any case, I shall stand by it.

Now precisely what can be shown, I think, is that the possible-world definition of logical truth, i.e., "A logical truth is a proposition,  $P$ , that is true in (or of) every possible non-empty universe,"<sup>3</sup> is not merely confronted with epistemological, metaphysical, and linguistic difficulties, but that it fails in its very own definitional task, and then, not merely, as Hamlyn holds, by being circular,<sup>4</sup> but in this absolutely compromising way: " $P$  is true in (or of) every possible non-empty universe" states neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of  $P$ 's being a logical truth.<sup>5</sup>

Following the accepted view that a logical truth is a proposition that is "true by virtue of its logical form alone,"<sup>6</sup> we can easily show that the possible-world definition fails as stating a sufficient condition. If for instance, "An unmarried man is unmarried" is true in all possible worlds so presumably, must be "A bachelor is unmarried," for when the sense of "A bachelor is unmarried" But while, on any workable account, "An unmarried man is unmarried" is a logical truth though it is a necessary truth.

When it comes to arguing that the possible world definition fails to state even a necessary condition our case is complicated by the fact that we have to posit a possible world in which a logical truth is not a truth e.g., "It is raining or it is not raining" is not true " $2+3=5$ " (construed logicis mystically) is not true. In the received Logic, such negations are taken to state what is not possible. Nor can it be denied that if these negations are taken to be true then the notion of a proposition's being true by virtue of its logical form alone has to be abandoned and thus the very notion of a logical truth. But our own thesis requires that very notion, since it is in terms of it that we have initiated our attack upon possible world explication! It would seem therefore, that we are hoist with our own petard in any attempt to argue that the possible world definition of a logical truth does not state a necessary condition of a proposition's being a logical truth.

We need not, however, surrender to this conclusion. We might, on the contrary, argue that the conception of possible worlds that occurs in possible-world explications allows us to postulate as possible what is not possible and that it also forces us to give up the notion of a logical truth, but that these unacceptable results constitute a reduction

<sup>5</sup> Circular definitions can be theoretically useful (as for example are Russell's notoriously circular definitions of numbers in terms of numerically distinguished classes. e.g., "Two is the class of all classes of pairs") But a definition that fails to present necessary and sufficient conditions presents a definition that is at once too narrow and too broad. It therefore has to generate falsifications of itself and certainly no reputable theoretic use can be envisaged for a definition in logic that does that.

<sup>6</sup> Baruch Brody, "Glossary of Logical Terms." *The Encyclopaedia of philosophy*, ed. Edwards. Vol Five, p. 58



of absurdum that reflects, not upon our line of argument, but the possible-world definition of a logical truth.

We might observe, first of all, that, as ordinarily construed, what is possible and not possible is determined by our understanding and knowledge of the actual world. To borrow Hume's example: to a savage acquainted with northern climates it is possible for water to turn solid; to a savage acquainted only with a tropical climate, it is not possible. When it comes to what is logically possible or not possible the issue is not, admittedly, quite so straightforward. Our understanding and knowledge of the actual world seem to have no immediate bearing on our assent to a purely analytic truth like "A bachelor is unmarried" or "It is raining or it is not raining." We do not suppose, for instance, that an increased acquaintance with bachelors or rain will teach us that perhaps some bachelors are married or that it sometimes is raining and not raining at one and the same time in one and the same place.

Yet in very broad terms, the kind of world the actual world is would seem to have an essential connection with the ability of terms and logical forms to generate necessary truths. In a world, for example. Where all things and relation were in constant flux except for language would it seem necessarily true to say "A bachelor is unmarried" or "It is either raining or it is not raining"? *Prima facie*, it would not. Thus, for instance a madman who experienced everything as being in total flux might, on recovering his sanity relate that in that terrible experience logical and other necessary truths were no longer true but false or senseless. In the fashion of Cratylus in Aristotle's account, he might say. "By the time I pointed to a bachelor and therefore unmarried' he was married: and by the time I pointed and said 'it is raining' it was not raining" and so I was convinced that "A bachelor is necessarily unmarried" and 'Necessarily it is either raining or it is not raining' had to be untrue." Moreover, we can imagine this same madman, who has recovered his sanity, adding. "I now know that I was wrong;" and in saying this he would in effect be avowing, that the connection between the meaning of terms, logical forms, necessary truth, and the world was a contingent, empirical one: for on the face of it his error resulted from the experiences he had not from some misunderstanding of the English language.

When, though we speak of possible worlds we are not any longer speaking of possibilities, logical or otherwise, that are determined by our understanding and knowledge of this actual world.

The term "worlds" describes self-contained, autonomous systems. And that, precisely, is what we get when we turn on its head our usual notion of the possible as being ontologically subsequent to the actual construe it as being ontologically antecedent. We project the picture of the possible as comprising possible worlds and, consequently, the constitutions of these possible worlds as being undetermined by the



constitutions of anything external of each, including the constitution of this actual world. Hence, what we know and understand with respect to this world can no longer count in determining what may or may not be possible. Thus, while the negations of logical truths may still determine what is in fact not possible since that determination stems from our understanding and knowledge of this actual world only, as we saw in reverse in the case of the madman and his experiences of total flux, they cannot reach out and determine what may not compromise "possible worlds." Hence, lacking this actual world as a ground for determining what worlds are possible or not possible, we cannot any longer know or even reliably believe that it is not possible, in some "possible world" that ' $2+3=5$ ' is false or "It is raining or It is not raining" is untrue. As Descartes, for other reasons, felt free to propose that God had he willed to do so, might have created a world in which ' $2+3=5$ ' was false<sup>8</sup> we are now free to propose that in some possible world ' $2+3=5$ ' and "It is raining or it is not raining" are false. Only this actual world and our understanding and knowledge of it prevent us from doing so and they have been ruled out as constraints by the notion of possible worlds.

But even if we do not wish to suppose that there are some possible worlds where these logical truths are not true very surely must admit, on the hypothesis of possible worlds, that we cannot know or say for certain that in no possible world are " $2+3=5$ " and "It is raining or it is not raining" not true. Making therefore "true in all possible worlds" a necessary condition of a proposition's being a logical truth is to convert at the very least, that about which no uncertainty exists for example, that "It is either raining or it is not raining" into something uncertain. But assuredly we do not want to stipulate as a necessary condition of propositions' being logical truths a condition that converts the apodeictic certainly of the latter into uncertainty."<sup>9</sup>

7. Boruch Brody. loc. cit.

8. Cf. E. M. Curly. "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths." *The Philosophical Review*. Vol XCIII. No. 4. Oct. 1984. pp. 569 ff

9. Although McGinn objects that this sort of objection begs the question as an epistemological objection (op. cit., p. 153). in his subsequent assessment of theories intended to bridge the gap between our modal knowledge and some faculty or means for arriving via a field of possible worlds at such knowledge he appeals to the incongruity we have here rested our case on: sec. for instance. McGinn. op. cit. p. 155: "If this were the procedure. then our grounds for modal claims would be highly non-conclusive: we would have no right to the confidence we commonly repose in such claims. and scepticism would be indicated. (recall that many necessary truths have been supposed paradigms of certainty.)",





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## **DEDICATION**

This 152nd issue of the Darshana International is most respectfully dedicated to Sri Jagadguru Sankaracharya of Sringeri His Holiness Sri Bharati Tirtha Mahaswamigal, the Patron-in-chief of Journal Tattvaloka, the splendour of Truth. He was a great Mystic and Seer and a man of profound intellect and great poet and a multisided excellence.

May his spiritual teachings guide the path of humanity for ever.

ANURAG ATREYA  
Managing Editor



## EDITORIAL

### THE YOGA OF THE YOGAVASISTHA IN A NUT-SHELL.

**J. P. Atreya.**

The Yogavasistha is a voluminous Sanskrit work on Yoga or the Art of Self-realization. All its teachings on Yoga have been summed up in one sloka, which runs thus:

परब्रह्म का दृढ अभ्यास (ध्यान) प्राणों का निग्रह (प्राणायाम) मन को संयमित रखना योग कहलाता है। शब्द एवं अर्थ दोनों ही ब्रह्मस्वरूप हैं। शब्द ही ब्रह्म है।

Translated into English, it means: Yoga (1) Deep admiration of the One Reality - Satchidanada Brahma; (2) stopping of the movement of Prana or Vital breath; and (3) control of the Mind.

The first of these three aspects of Yoga is what is called, Jnanayoga in Vedanta truth of the Mahavakyas - that there is ultimately one Reality, Brahman, and that I am that and that everything ultimately is the peace; the second is what is known as He in which complete control of the pranas breath control is practised and life becomes completely peaceful - Silence is experienced. The third is the psychological method - that of Patanjali in which mind becomes completely niruddha or controlled and no thought arises in it.

Of course there are many methods for realising all these three states of experience, which are in full details explained in the Yogavasistha as well as in many other books on Yoga.

The person who has realised such states of experience complete Moksha - Freedom, or Nirvan while still living is called a Jivanmukta which should be ultimate goal of all spiritual seekers.

J.P. Atreya.



# EDITORIAL

## THE YOGA OF THE YOGAVASISTHA IN A NUT-SHELL.

J. P. AIRY.

### NOTES

The Yoga Vasistha is a voluminous Sanskrit work on Yoga or the Path of Self-Realization. All its teachings on Yoga have been summed up in one short, simple, and easily understood book.

The first part of the book deals with the nature of the soul and the world, and the second part with the practical aspects of Yoga.

The first part of the book is divided into three chapters: (1) the nature of the soul, (2) the nature of the world, and (3) the nature of the mind.

The first chapter deals with the nature of the soul, and the second chapter with the nature of the world. The third chapter deals with the nature of the mind, and the fourth chapter with the nature of the body.

Of course there are many methods for realizing the soul, but the method of the Yoga Vasistha is the simplest and the most direct.

The person who has realized the soul is called a Jivanmukta, or a liberated soul, and he is free from all suffering and sorrow.

which should be the ultimate goal of all spiritual seekers.

J. P. AIRY.

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# I

## PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY AND INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN MEDICAL PRACTICE

**Ebijuwa T**

In this paper I present argument intended to support the following positions :

- (i) that the right to health care is a fundamental right.
- (ii) that the right of patients to health care is not only necessary for the well being of citizens in the state, it is also an essential ingredient for the preservation and development of any society;
- (iii) that the right of medical doctors to withdraw services based on the principle of autonomy does not undermine the right of patients to health care.

It should be noted from the outset that the discussions here may not directly be applicable to those countries where health care service are determined by the principle of "demand and supply". Rather, the issues here arise in countries where medical practice is state controlled and when medical doctors are employed by the appropriate state department. The reason for this is not only connected with the commitment of most developed and developing countries to the provision of health care<sup>1</sup>, it is also connected with the fact that the distribution of health care which some believed should be left in the hands of the operators of private market has been described as socially ineffective (Le Grand and Robinson: 1976: Ch. 2, Abel-Smith: 1976: Chs 3 and 4, and Culyer : 1976: Ch 7)

This issue if industrial actions reveal, among others, people's underlying motives. Workers take to industrial action when they are dissatisfied with the working conditions at times because some rights are undermined and sometimes as support for colleagues or certain class of people wrongly punished, or, even as some will argue, industrial



actions in general (especially by medical doctors) are geared towards the promotion of the interests of patients. As Alan Johnson (1990-61) puts it, a well paid employee is a happy worker. But the question one may ask here is, who is strike action in this regard directed at? An industrial action may not only be effective when majority take part, it may also be effective when someone, a group, management or even the government is inconvenienced, embarrassed or harmed. In fact, it is true to say that strike action is one of the ways labour union force their employers to reconsider their views on fundamental labour matters. Indeed, industrial action, as Galenson avers; is an integral part of the productive mechanism which invariably leads to the development of any nation (1964:31). Evidence abound in some industrialized countries to exemplify this developmental process. However, this is not without some hostilities or in some cases open violence against the labour unions. Discussing the development of labour unions in some industrialized countries, Sturmthal (1960:143) Writes that:

Some of the pioneer countries in the process of industrialization-England, France, the United States, the German confederation - succeeded in delaying the emergence of effective unions for sometime by legislative, administrative or judicial devices. The combination of Acts in England, the Loi Le Chapellier in France, the criminal conspiracy doctrine under the common law in the United States, the Suppression of any effective worker's combination in the North German confederation and the anti-socialist laws of Bismarch are examples of this phenomenon. What has been called the "take off" period was a consequence, in these countries, relatively undisturbed by aggressive unions.

The implication of the above is that even without the unions there was relative industrial growth. Yet when the labour unions emerge they made significant impact in the developmental process of these countries. The cases of hostilities are not peculiar to developed societies. There are many instances when union leaders have been arrested, harassed and in some instances, the unions are proscribed as the cases of Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) and academic Staff Union of universities (ASUNU) in Nigeria Exemplify. This is however not to say that the similarities in hostilities or harassment is an indication of similar industrial and economic growth. In African, because labour unions evolve as a result of the instigation and activities of colonialism, did not, like other industrialized nation, experience the same form of industrial and socio-economic growth. (Isamah 1985.) As a result, it is not out of place as some will say to believe that the role of labour unions will be controversial in the newly developing countries. While we may agree that labour unions play significant role in the development and preservation of any society, what seems to have generated some controversy is the exact form this role should take in Africa. This is part of the reasons for our claim that, in developing countries, industrial action especially by medical doctors may not be the best option.



The above point can be appreciated from the following perspective. If it is true to say that the organs that control or guide the affairs of the health institutions are under the control of the state, it is reasonable to say then that the form health policies and decisions will take will depend on the whims and caprices of the government in power. Since the demise of the civilian regime that inherited power at independence in 1960, Nigeria for example, has witnessed several military coup d'etat that have dampen not only the socio political and economic atmosphere under which viable labour unions have operated, the coups have also severed the pace of industrial growth in the country. This does not however deny the fact that the military governments did not recognize that a labour union is an important vehicle for social and economic transformation, But as Isamah (1985:136) puts it, what is expected of labour unions under the military government is a docile labour movement, free to pursue its own interests but within the relatively narrow bound prescribed by the military government. T.M. Yesufu (1982:73) explains this view in the following manner :

There is nothing that has characterized Nigeria's Industrial relations system so much in recent years as the greatly enhanced degree of government involvement since 1966.... in Nigeria before Military rule such intervention was confined to enacting basic legislation which safe guarded the lowest categories of workers from physical exploitation... however the shift that has taken place after the inception of military rule in 1966 has been such as to amount, on the face of it, to an almost complete negation of the principle of voluntarism. This is evidenced by industrial relations legislation that was enacted since 1966, together with the various complimentary decrees and administrative action which had the effect of putting the economy under formal state control and severely limiting the areas of initiative open it workers and employers..

Now if the miliary government can limit the initiatives of the unions and the institutions under which such unions operate, then we are left with unions with little or no resistance. It should be noted that we started with the assumption that when people take to industrial action, especially when majority takes part, it will embarrass or inconvenience the government. The underlying assumption here is that once the government is sufficiently embarrassed as a result of persistence industrial actions, the possible outcome will be either of two things. First it may serve as an avenue of identifying the weakness of the regime, second, and as a consequence of the latter, it determine the desirability of the leaders and/or the ruling party for a re-election. That is, of course if the government is democratic. But the case is different in Nigeria and some African countries with military leadership. Put differently, where there is industrial action by medical doctors, it is those who may not be able to take a trip abroad, or pay the "very high" medical bills of private clinics that bear the brunt. This is why we believe that industrial action by medical doctors should be reappraised.



However, one question that one may ask is whether such appeal may not undermine the personal autonomy of doctors. One thing is however clear. Medical doctors, like anyone else in a moral community have the autonomy rights, that is, right of self-determination and sovereignty over decisions that concern their lives. But this right as would be argued shortly cannot be adequately harnessed if its realization is not other regarding.

The debate over whether a medical doctor's autonomy is sufficient to establish his/her right to self-determination is usually plagued with a number of important questions. Among such questions are: what is it for one to be an autonomous agent? Or, what or what is it that a doctor's right to his/her autonomy entails? Does the doctor's right to his/her autonomy vitiate the patients right to health care?

The question of the meaning of autonomy is ambiguous as it means different things to different people. In Kantian ethics, autonomy is regarded as a constituent property of a person<sup>2</sup>. The autonomous person reasons, chooses his own norms and values, plans ahead, makes decisions and acts freely in accordance with these decisions (Wulff et al: 1986). Similarly, utilitarian philosopher like J.S. Mill, is also interested in the Freedom of individuals, but unlike Kant, he is more concerned with the freedom of action than the freedom of the will. He reconciles this view with his utilitarian position that by maintaining the promotion of autonomy he maximize the benefits of everybody on the long run.. he writes that:

I regard utility as the ultimate appeal in all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect of those actions of each, which concern the interests of other people (Mill, 1962:241).

The difference between Kant and Mill here from a first reading will appear somehow subtle, as both views emphasize the significance of the principle of individual autonomy. Mill's view that individual autonomy must be pursued because it is beneficial, just as we pursue other things that are equally beneficial; like the views of those who believe that doctors industrial action will lead to the promotion of the interests of patients, leaves his conclusion open because of the utilitarian mental calculations, which balance the degree of freedom against other desirable goals. Kant presents a much more forceful position. He states that to violate a person's autonomy is to treat him as a means to an end rather than as end in itself. The points here is not to evaluate Kant and Mill's analysis of autonomy. But we believe that whatever the nature of both interpretations, one thing is however common to them; that is, individuals, are social beings with the capacity for self-determination and sovereignty over decisions immediately



affecting his/her life. Autonomy here deserve more explanatory value. This is so because, the notion of autonomy which serves as the basis of industrial action for medical doctors appears narrow. It is based on an underestimation of the notion of autonomy. The question of autonomy goes beyond merely having the capacity to decide in order to satisfy a fixed goal, It involves among others, the capacity to reason about what one wants to do in terms of reason for acting (Ebijuwa: 1991:66-67). It therefore involves a reflection upon the grounds for one's action, that is, one must be able to determine whether these grounds are a result of his/her self-centred goals or not, to enable him/her determine whether these grounds constitute reasons.

Here, as David Gauthier (1963:116) says, the agent does not just make practical judgments resting on reasons for acting, he/she decides to act and does act in accordance with his/her judgments. To be an autonomous agent, therefore, requires, in addition to others, the ability of the agent to put his/her practical reasoning into practice. By his work according to his reasoning, the agent demonstrates his/her freedom and self-governance. That is, freedom of thought and freedom to act must be conjoined in an agent who is to be called autonomous; for such an agent 'ought' strongly implies 'can' in the sense that 'can' is a necessary condition for 'ought'. For instance a preposition like you ought to render help to innocent patients presupposes that you can render such help (Ebijuwa: 1991:66). This is so because if one believe that one ought to perform certain actions, then one must logically be capable of performing those actions irrespective of socially excusing conditions.

The question then is, does this claim to doctors autonomy undermine patients right to health care? True, doctors have the right to market their services; select their values, and determine how they may be achieved. Sade (1977:573-574) for example, puts this view in the following manner.

In a free society, man exercise his right to sustain his own life by producing economic values in the form of goods and services that he is, or should be. Free to exchange with other men who are similarly free to trade with him or not. The Economic values produced, however, are not given as gifts by nature, but exist only by virtue of the thought and effort of individual man. Goods and services are thus owed as a consequence of the right to sustain life by one's own physical and mental effort.

The demand of Sade, at least as conceived in this paper is that doctors can, in spite of the economic values that evolve as a result of the sale of their services, withdraw such services whenever the atmosphere for the realization of those values are in doubt. For Sade, the ability to market such services and determine what is affecting one's life, explains what autonomy means. But this notion of autonomy is vitiated by the fact that our idea of morality is not only concerned



with what happens to an individual normal agent. What is moral, as David Gauthier (1963) says, are never merely the concern of the agents (s) confronted by them; moral problems necessarily involve the interests of others. In the same vein, Raphael (1955:117) writes that "...in speaking of obligatory acts I have said that their content always relates to the interests of other persons or creatures."

In other words, our idea of the autonomy of a moral agent here does not only rest on the ability of the agent to demonstrate his freedom and self-governance as Sade and others are wont to believe, it also implies, that in the course of the exercise of this freedom, one ought to act in such a way that the actions (s) takes into cognisance the interests of others. At this juncture, it is possible for one to imagine a slight drift into what we earlier identified as J.S. Mill's utilitarian consideration. Clearly, this form of paternalistic relationship does not reflect our intention in the preceding discussions. In facts, it leads to a conflation of what Wulff and others called genuine paternalism and unsolicited paternalism (Wulff et. al: 1986). Whereas the former reflect the relationship between a father and a son, that is, a father imposing his will on his son because "daddy knows more than his son", the latter, as the name implies does not create room for this kind of father son relationship. In fact, from Kantian perspective, it is almost always morally wrong to undermine the autonomy of patients (in fact, of all human beings).

Our argument here does not deny the fact that doctors may have genuine interest in patients, especially when such patients are in positions that demand such assistance. Our argument rather is that when patients, need the services of doctors, withdrawal of such services does not reflect any genuine paternalistic relationship. Such withdrawal violates the principle of non-maleficence. Whereas doctors might rely on the advantages that may evolve as a result of the industrial action as the basis of their assistance, the patients need the doctor at a particular time which, if absent, might lead to the death of the patient.

Here we are not invoking the Hippocratic oath which represent doctors professional commitment to their patients, because recent debate about the value of human life seem to show that the oath is no longer taken seriously.

The oath, for example, rejects abortion and Euthanasia (Rachel: 1984:283). Rather, we believe that human need for health care is morally significant to the extent that it involves a right to health care. This is so because good health is not only a necessary condition for competing for social opportunities. Realizing one's human essence and fulfilling one's societal responsibilities, it also contributes to various forms of development, which in turn, have the potential to improve health as well as material conditions. In view of this, a right to health care is implied by a fundamental sense of fairness; that is, a sense of the



appreciation of the value of human life (Ebijuwa: 1991). Hence, it may not be out of order to say that, it is reasonable for doctors to provide medical services irrespective of the circumstances - or at least, such services be regarded as essential services.

The point being made here is not only beneficial to patients, but by extension, its realization will provide a solid foundation for national prosperity. For, as Adejumo and Moloye (1988) put it; no serious society could embark on an industrialization programme without accelerating simultaneously the basic conditions of its social and human development. However while calling for a rethink on the part of doctors in view of the connection of the notion of autonomy with the appreciation of the moral worth of human life, and in particular because the promotion and preservation of the health of human beings will lead to the development of material and social conditions, the state must also on its part appreciate the value of the sacrifice of doctors. This is so in view of the strong connection between health and development. The assistance of the international community is also imperative. The reason for this is not only because we now live in "one world" of network of inter-locking relationships - the existence of which generate cross-cultural evaluation of values (Ebijuwa, 1996b), but also because since both developed and developing nations contribute significantly in the provision of medical services, the international community through its agencies (WHO, UNICEF, etc.), can serve as link when negotiation fails between the labour unions and the respective government. That is, such international agencies would serve as ideal arbitrators at times of serious disagreement between medical doctors and their respective employers. Especially when such disagreement are likely to lead to withdrawal of services. Where such disagreement is over remunerations the international agencies would be in an ideal position to contextualise the issue and recommend a fair remuneration package that could receive the mutual consensus of the state and the workers. On the other hand, where the disagreement involves the supply of essential items like drugs, dressing, and other equipment the international agencies will also be in the best position to determine what is adequate in particular situations. The international agencies could also serve to bring about resolution of conflicts before they degenerate to strike actions through the use of diplomacy propaganda and threat of isolation of the intransigent party from global Associations. As T.F. Mason (1980:26) puts it:

One method that is used is to exclude recalcitrant from participating in those agencies that provide benefits and there by depriving them of sources of well-being that would accrue to them through these channels. This is not to resort to coercive power in the traditional sense, but to introduce a new method of compulsion that can become very effective as nations (an individual, groups, etc.) sense the need for these benefits, and collaboration in more and more areas becomes a necessity of contemporary life.



The approach is important not only because it will serve as a viable alternative to industrial actions in the medical enterprise, it will also not undermine the autonomy of doctors and integrity of the state. Indeed, this approach will lead to both the preservation and promotion of the society and humanity at large.

Thus far, our discussion have been that the right of patients to health care is a fundamental right. This is so in view of the moral significance of the value of human health. We argued in the course of our discussion that this view vitiate a particular notion of autonomy which defines autonomy as the promotion of one's self-will and governance. Indeed, we argued that the notion of autonomy properly analyzed, at least as conceived in this essay, involves not only the promotion of one's self-will but also the interests of others. For this reason we argued that to refuse to render medical services to patients in need will amount to a violation of the principle of non-maleficence which characterizes the ethics of the medical profession.

### NOTES

1. The range of this commitment can be seen for example from the broad national health insurance of France and West Germany to the more selective USA programmes of Medicare (for the old) and medicaid (for the Poor). And most importantly the comprehensive British National Health Services Scheme whereby most forms of medical care are provided free at the time of use to anyone who is judged to need it. For a detailed discussion of the commitment, see especially chapter three.

1. J.Le-Grand (1982).

2. See also T. Ebijuwa and A.B Afolabi, (1997:21-30).

3. T. Edijuwa, (1996: 77-89).

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## II

THE LOGICAL VERIFICATION OF THE  
MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

Ian Goddard

What is the "Mystical" Experience?

There are many experiences that may be called "mystical." The goal is to establish the qualities of these experiences that are distinct from normal experience. Some experiences which may be called "mystical" are not entirely distinct from normal experience. For example, if I say "I hear the voice of god," or I see angles," this may be called a mystical experience; yet the hearing of voices or seeing of visions, true or false, are descriptions of data in space and time. In this context they are not truly distinct from normal experience.

What defines the mystical experience as a truly unique experience are the descriptions of reality arising from it that transcend the space-time dimensions of normal experience. In the full mystical experience the perception of space and time, of here and there, of now and then, of this and that, of self and not self, is totally swept away.

During the mystical experience the boundaries which normally segregate our universe into distinct and separate entities dissolve. It is this separate entities and their relative motion that form the structure of space and time. So when these separate entities cease to be separate entities, the structure of space and time must dissolve: here becomes there then becomes now, external becomes internal, all things become equivalent, and consciousness expands without limit.

Thus, while normal experience is an experience of separate entities in space and time, the mystical experience is an experience of the abolition of all separations and consequently of all space and time. The perception of reality during the mystical experience that identifies the mystical experience as unique can be summed up as follows:

The abolition of all divisions  
Abolition of space: here and there unify  
Abolition of time: now and then unify



## CRITERIA FOR PROOF

During the mystical experience it appears that there is in reality no space or time, and that all differences are equivalent. If this is the absolute truth, it must be unconditional. If unconditional, we must be able to confirm this truth claim via physical measurements even outside the mystical experience. If it cannot be confirmed in this fashion, logic dictates that the mystical experience of no space-time is an illusion. What then are the necessary criteria for establishing logical confirmation?

As the mystical insight is that there is no space and no time, confirmation simply requires proof that :

Space = 0

Time = 0

To prove the space and time equal zero we must prove that space and time are symmetrical. If space and time are symmetrical, the equal but opposite components of this symmetry must neutralize each other so that the total calculation, the net sum, of all calculations of space and time must always equal zero.

## SYMMETRY OF SPACE

Space is the distance between two points.

Space is confirmed and measured by motion from point A to point B. Because motion is the measure of space, the natures of space and motion are equivalent.

As motion is the measurement of space, when we measure space our measurement starts at point A and moves through space to point B, as illustrated.

Describing this motion as a vector, our process of measurement is expressed  $A-B = 3$  units of space.

At this point tradition assumes this measurement of space is complete, so it would be said that this space = 3 units, period. This assumption is short-sighted.

At this point the mathematical description of our measurement of space is asymmetrical, even though the nature of the motion that is the measurement of space is symmetrical, as will be shown. So, if the process of the measurement of space is symmetrical, but our description of this measurement is asymmetrical, logic dictates that our description is incomplete.

How is this motion symmetrical? Due to the fact that it is relative. As Albert Einstein observed, "Every motion must be considered only as a relative motion." And relative motion is symmetrical.

What the relativity of motion means is that motion is not the private property of a single point of reference, such as D, but is a common property of all the points of reference relative to which D is measured as a point is space and time.



Therefore, as the motion of the finger marking the course of the measurement of space in our illustration is relative to the ruler, there ruler is also in motion relative to the finger. The motion of the ruler is equal but opposite, i.e., symmetrical, to the motion of the finger.

As the motion that is the measurement of space is symmetrical, the logical description of the measurement of space must also be symmetrical. Any other description is less than complete.

As the measurement of space is symmetrical, the complete description of the measurement of the space illustrated is:

$$\text{Space} = (A \rightarrow B = 3) + (A \leftarrow B = -3) = 0$$

## SYMMETRY OF TIME

Time is the continuous and irreversible motion from point A to point B in the changing relation of physical entities.

The direction of the motion of time is traditionally Described by an arrow pointing from past to future. As this "arrow of time" points in only one direction, time is thought of as being asymmetrical.

However, motion through dimension of time -the fourth dimension- is mechanistically equivalent to relative motion through space. So, just as relative space-motion is symmetrical, relative time motion must also be symmetrical.

Describing the symmetry of space-motion, Einstein observed that as you fall down to the Earth (-), it is equally true that the Earth rises up to you (+). This space motion is mechanically equivalent to time motion : as you move toward point X in the future (+), it is equally true that point x moves toward you (-)

Our forward motion toward the future is measured only relative to points in time moving from the present backwards into the past. These points in time are the hash marks on the ruler of time, and they move relative to our forward motion, backwards in time.

Apart from the backward motion of points of reference into the past, there could be no measure of a forward motion of time. Time-motion is therefore simultaneously forward (+) and backward (-).

Your reading of this sentence moves further into the past with passage of each new second. The backward passage of this moment into the past is your forward motion toward the future.

The forward motion of time is positive time (+T), The backward motion of time is negative time (-t). As time is both (+t) and (-t), net time, or total time, is (+T) + (-T).

With the logical and necessary symmetry of time flow established, the proper calculation of the passage of each second of time (t) is: we



have just advanced one (+1) second into the future; the nature of this advance was the passage of one (-1) second into the past, thus :

$$\text{net } T = ((+1) + (-1)) = 0$$

Each step forward in time is simultaneously a relative step backwards, and thus the observer can never actually reach the future, but must remain forever at "now."

The zero sum of net time is now, so we could express the net equation of time as:  $\text{net } T = ((+1) + (-1)) = \text{now}$ . Now is static; now is the only time there ever is.

As time is symmetrical and thus must always equal zero, time is conserved. Of course, if we want to identify a specific point in space-time we would do so by asymmetrical calculation. We do this by the exclusion of negative space and time- motion from our calculation.

But, if we want to know the nature of the whole we must include the whole nature of space and time motion which is positive plus negative.

### CONCLUSION

What was required to be proven that space and time are symmetrical and thus equal zero has been proven. By proving that space and time equal zero, all measurements of all physical phenomena are neutralized to zero, as space and time are the basis of all physical measurements.

As the total measure of space and time equals zero, logic clearly dictates that the claim arising from the mystical experience that there is no space and no time is true. The mystical experience is therefore the experience of the truth.

### COUNTER ARGUMENTS

**1. While material things travel into the future, no material thing travel into the past. This is an asymmetry.**

Wrong : No material thing has or will ever travel into the future. The future, like the horizon is never reached. A thing "travel into the future only relative to point x in the past, when we assume point x in the past is now, which it is not.

All material things are always at now. No. Thing could ever be identified that is not at now. Things appear to move forward toward the future only relative to points in time moving into the past. So just as no material thing can travel into the past, no material thing can actually travel into the future. All things are forever at now, with the appearance of forward and backward motion radiating symmetrically from now. Now is the symmetry of time.

The bottom line is that the experience of things moving forward in time is (=) the backward motion of points in time into the past. There is no asymmetry.



## 2. Nonuniform motion is asymmetrical and therefore cannot equal zero.

The "asymmetry" associated with non-uniform motion is differences in the measurements of force and time relative to objects in uniform motion. But measurements of difference are relative, and it is in this relation that we find symmetry.

Analysis: there are two observers, A and B. Each is in a rocket in motion relative to the other. Rocket A suddenly ignites its thrusters and accelerates.

As there is no absolute coordinate, both A and B move away from the other faster; thus the velocity of A and B is still symmetrical. Yet there are differences.

The first difference is that only A feels a force. But this is because force is exerted only upon A. The direction of the force is exerted only upon A. The direction of the force felt by A is symmetrical to the propulsive force exerted upon A. This symmetry neutralizes net force to zero.

The second difference is that A's clock is found to have run slower when it is brought side by side with B's clock. But when each observer calculates net time, as previously described, each observer calculates the same time, i.e. zero.

We can also observe this symmetry by adding the time differences: if clock A ran 2 minutes slower than clock B, then net time =  $(B+2) + (A-2) = 0$ , this is the logical symmetry of difference.

So net velocity, force, time and therefore acceleration all equal zero.

## WHAT ABOUT ROTATION?

Rotation is said to be absolute motion not relative, because the rotation of an object can be measured free from external coordinates. But rotation is still symmetrical.

As the illustration demonstrates, while rotational motion may be absolute, the measurement of the direction of rotation is relative to the point of measure.

As the object is measured to rotate simultaneously clockwise and counter clock wise, in total, in what direction does the object rotate? No direction for net rotation equals zero logical symmetry.

The calculation of the net is the door to symmetry. The mystical experience is the experience of the net, which is the whole. In the whole there is no direction space, or time

## 3. The conclusion that space and time equal zero contradicts experience which dictates that they must exist.



Net momentum equals zero, yet momentum "exists." The fact is that zero is the necessary basis for the experience of space-time.

Just because x is an illusion does not mean x is not "real," for to be real is primarily to be experienced. Secondly, experienced things are real due to our valuation of them.

If I valued all things equally, even pleasure and pain, nothing would seem or be real. It is only when I grasp for x and run from y that the world becomes endowed with "real" costs and benefits.

It is our valuation of things that endows experience with "reality," and our valuations are only in our minds. Our valuations are simply a genetic program evolved to maximize human survival. The only true and absolute value is zero.

This zero value is the necessary base of all values. For every positive (+) there must be a negative (-) and we could not have a (+) without a symmetrical (-). So in the final analysis - the net equation everything must always equal zero. This zero sum is the whole, and the whole is the blank canvas upon which the "universal mind" paints endless value-filled worlds, the sum of which can never exceed the neutral base.

**4. The goal of science is to define the qualities that make things separate from one another and to classify these differences. Yet symmetrics - the logical system of net equation - by summing all things to zero, does just the opposite.**

The goal of logical inquiry is to find and describe the truth. If the truth is that every positive is symmetrical to a negative and the sum is zero, and in this way all differences actually equal zero then that is the truth.

Symmetrics is a logical system that defines and describe the distinct analytical modalities of asymmetrical exclusive analysis and symmetrical inclusive analysis, or symmetric.

In asymmetrical exclusive analysis we describe an isolated frame of reference to the exclusion of all external data. Asymmetrical analysis would describe the above object as rotating only clockwise or only counter clockwise, to the exclusion of all other valid measurements.

In symmetrical inclusive analysis symmetrics no valid data are excluded. While we may be able to see only one aspect of x at a time, the true nature of x is found in the sum of all its aspects. So to describe the true nature of rotation we must add the measurements taken from all, or equal and opposite, points of view relative to, in this case, rotation.

Asymmetrical analysis describes systems, i.e., frames of reference excluded from the whole. But if we apply the nonzero sum of an asymmetrical analysis to the whole, and assume that the whole is nonzero, we commit the blind man's error: confusing the part for the whole.



The ancient Indian tale of the blind men and the lesson in symmetrics: the true nature of  $x$  is found in the sum of its parts. It is in this fashion summing the primary parts of the measurement of space and time that symmetrics automatically describes the true nature of space and time.

The central thesis of symmetrics is that the fundamental nature of any measurement in space or time is binary, i.e., is composed of at least two points of reference. Any measure of space or time requires at least two points of reference. Due to the symmetry of space and time motion which is the process of the measurement of space and time, the process of the measurement of two points must always be symmetrical. Thus net calculation  $= 0$ .

### 5. Symmetrics is useless if it has no productive application.

Logic is larger than its application to human needs. The pursuit of truth must seek out the supreme and objective reality, even if that truth may not increase production. As Plato proposes in *The Republic*, "The knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not of aught perishing and transient."

Symmetrics automatically describes the nature of the supreme objective reality, the whole, or the eternal via net equation--the summation of the symmetrical components of measurement.

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### III

## MAN AND HIS CONCEPTS OF NATURE

**Ranjan Ghosh**

Upto our own day there has been three major conceptions of the universe: the holozoic, held by the Greeks and Medievals the opposite conception, the mechanistic world of Newtonian science; and the modern conception, which reconciles the mechanism of the second with the vitalism and teleology of the first.

Properly speaking, the idea of nature arises only as the concomitant of science, for it is the idea of the world as a single structure of interrelated bodies and events determined by uniform laws, the indispensable presupposition of scientific thinking. Accordingly, we find the idea of nature coming into being in the Western world concurrently with the scientific thinking of the early Ionian philosophers from Thales onward. First, the nature of things - what determined their mutual disposition and activity - was conceived as the stuff of which they were made, and the unitary, systematic relations among them were maintained by regarding this substance as one and pervasive. All things were held to be water or air or fire, and their diversity was explained as the differentiation of the one fundamental stuff (or nature) according to single principle of change (for example, rarefaction and condensation). Hence, the idea of nature became extended to the general way in which things are constructed, interrelated, and mutually affected. Scientific treatises were those 'on the nature of things', and they explored precisely these features of the experienced world. Finally, the world as a whole, as a system of interrelated entities governed by universal laws, came to be thought of as a single individual - Nature - frequently personified and conceived as ubiquitous, omniscient, and all-inclusive.

The Greeks conceived the world as a living organism, constantly changing and in motion, which, however, they could make intelligible to themselves only in terms of a permanent, unchanging, eternal form, both yet was the source of all change - an unmoved mover at once both final and efficient cause. (This Aristotelian concept developed, of course for the earlier variants, of which Plato's idea of the Good was the most



significant). Because the eternal form was final cause, the world was conceived teleologically, as a scale of forms each striving to actualize a higher form. The ultimate form must therefore be the final object of desire toward which all things purposively tend. This *nisus* is judged in a material thing, the matter of which is the potentiality of becoming informed. Matter, as such, is crassly unintelligible and is the presupposed condition of the deficiency of finite existents from the pure translucence of the intelligible form. But all matter is infused with soul, which is the source of all motion and change and the seat of the *nisus* to the actualization of form.

In the detail of Aristotle's system, although in essentials it prevailed for centuries as the most advanced scientific theory, there were further contradictions, especially with respect to his theory of motion. These sorely troubled the Medievals and led eventually to modifications in introducing ideas precursory to inertia and finally ushering in the Copernican and Galilean revolution. The detail of the history need not be repeated here. We can lend frank admittance to the consequences following from the ensuring world-view as that of a mechanical universe, 'objective' in the sense of being external to consciousness, leading to an unbridgeable gulf between matter and mind, and an intractable separation of facts from values. Here we find the origins of the problems in the practical and social field which mankind is facing today.

But mechanism in physics suffered a decline in the late nineteenth century with the successive failures of attempts to give mechanistic accounts of electro-magnetic phenomena. The physics of the twentieth century, in contrast, has abandoned both mechanism and materialism, replacing forces by space time curvature and viewing the occurrence of matter as a singularity in the metrical field. The effect of the change has indeed been revolutionary but the full philosophical implications of the revolution have not yet been widely recognized.

The most far-reaching result both of relativity and of Quantum Theory has been to reverse the logical order of explanation of phenomena.

Instead of tracing back events to the external relations between separate and mutually independent particles, contemporary physics locates and identifies particles in energy systems or fields, which exist if at all only as integral wholes. Structure has become prior to particularization, so that if either the position or the velocity of a particle is sought in isolation, the other becomes indeterminable. Such priority of the soul to its constituents is both in the nature of things and is epistemological; it is epistemological because it is also ontological. To explain and describe the entities of the world, they must be referred to the structural wholes to which they belong and they can be made intelligible only by doing so. And this is because they only exist, are distinguishable, and have the properties they do have as inseparable features of a structural whole.



The Greeks found no hiatus between matter and mind but saw them as continuous phases of one scale of degrees. For the Presocratics it was a material scale, the soul always belonging to the purest or most unmixed grade, be it air with Anaximenes and diogenes of Apollonia, fire with Heraclitus, or the 'thinnest of all things' the Nous of Anaxagoras. One must not regard these ideas as 'materialistic', because the matter of the Presocratics was living matter and the soul was its purest unadulterated form. In a sense, all matter was simply downgraded soul. With Plato, soul floats loose from the body and is 'akin to the forms', but yet not one of them; while for Aristotle, the two concepts are combined and the soul is the proximate form of the body, and the passive intellect is the place of forms, so that continuity between matter and form is preserved. Objectivity, accordingly, is a notion not yet explicit in the Greek mind, although its chief ingredient, universality is their main discovery. Pythagorean numbers translated into Platonic forms are the progenitors of the objective truth in modern thought. This is not the appropriate place to expound or to criticise in detail this conception of the universe, although it is immediately apparent that it holds conflicts implicit in it. For example, the dualism between matter and form is never wholly or satisfactorily overcome, and the soul remains an ambiguous entity which is somehow neither yet also somehow both. Aristotle comes nearest to solving inherent problems, but he fails in the end by his inability to demonstrate how God, as pure form can be both immanent in and transcendent beyond the world. He asserts both immanence and transcendence while insisting equally on the absence of all matter in God, and so he is committed to the sheer transcendence of the unmoved mover, to the detriment of his entire system.

The heliozoic world-concept is not, however a mere error, but is an embryonic form of a truth yet to be derived from it. Indeed, there is much in it to which our own age had returned, although in a more sophisticated version. The Greek philosophers were the first to conceive of dialectic and to construct systems, knowingly or inadvertently, as continua of graded forms. Their grasp of the real as teleological was a sound insight, as was also the volitional notion of the world discoverable in Anaximander's speculations, in Empedocles', and in Aristotle's. The objective would as they conceived it was not simply subjective to them, but was the essential basis on which later science was built; and that, for all its apparent rejection of much which now seems fantastic, has preserved fundamental and important elements of truth.

Nature for the Greeks was one vast living organism, sentient, self-moving and conscious, in which human and other living beings were localized centres of the pervasive soul-substance. This soul-substance was, in the last resort, identical with, and the purest form of, that ultimate stuff (or nature) of which all things were made. The lesser souls, whether of gods, men, or animals, were differentiated by varying



degrees of adulteration of the original stuff by its own less appropriate forms. The problem for the Greeks, therefore, both metaphysical and practical, was how the human soul could be purified and become wholly reidentified with the universal substance.

The birth of modern science in the sixteenth century A.D. produced an entirely different and opposite conception of nature. With the development of the notions of gravity and inertia, nature came to be viewed as an aggregation of bodies moved by forces calculable solely from their masses and positions. It was one great machine. This conception involves a cleavage between the machine - the total aggregate of material existence and the conscious mind, whether of God (its putative creator) or of man (the subject of scientific knowledge). Various attitudes to nature arise from the dichotomy so created. Nature is first the object of human knowledge set over against the knowing mind as an alien other to be observed from without. Next, as science succeeds in discovering natural laws, nature becomes an opponent to be conquered and controlled, a combination of forces to be subdued and domesticated, to serve the purposes of man. Subsequently, it becomes apparent that nature in the service of man has limitations, that resources of matter and energy can become exhausted, or so modified that man's purposes may be defeated by the every technology he employs to serve them.

Supervening upon these attitudes to nature, however, a third conception has arisen which complicates more radically the relation between nature and man. This new view emerged with the conception, in the mid-nineteenth century, of the idea of evolution. Henceforth nature could not be regarded simply as a machine, but was conceived as a process of continuous development. Laws of mechanics are reciprocal and reversible, but an evolutionary process is unidirectional and progressive. Further, under this conception of nature, man is recognized as a product of evolution, and his knowledge the outcome of biological development. His relation to nature now comes to be envisaged in terms of that between organism and environment. The effect of this modification was not immediate or total, although its implications were revolutionary. Environment, at least in the first instance, was still regarded as external and set in opposition to the organism, which must adapt itself to alien conditions in order to survive. Man's adaptation follows upon that of lower species, which involves the development of sensibility, sense-organs for distance reception and cognitive apparatus. His capacity to know and to act intelligently, his conquest and control of nature, his social and technical advance, are thus seen as aspects of his adaptation to environment.

So conceived, social progress though very different in character and in principle from biological evolution, appears as an extension of the same process. Yet as it proceeds, the development of human social



organization, with its accompanying technical advances, reacts upon and bedevils biological adaptations. Species are decimated, energy sources are tapped and drained, the ambient life-giving envelopes of atmosphere and sea are polluted and the balance of nature is upset. With the advance of biological science and the study of ecology, it has become apparent that the idea of adaptation of organism to environment was a misconception, for the environment is not static, nor is it a mere external setting for indwelling life. Evolutionary change involves the environment equally with the living thing. The two constitute a single organic whole, an open system in dynamic equilibrium. Modification of, or 'control' over, the environment, therefore becomes less a means than a menace to human survival, and the exploitation of more inimical than advantageous. Voices are then raised advocating conservation: but that involves a conflict between the demands of technical progress already made and those of environmental preservation. In some sense, the demand is for a reverse of the evolutionary process, which runs counter to the very conception of evolution itself. The use of technology to mitigate the ravages of technology is severely limited. The preservation of resources can be effected by new techniques only at the expense of other resources. Pollution of atmospheres and water can be limited by new devices but not eliminated. If population can be controlled, consumption may be limited but the demand for progress and 'development' will persist. The evolutionary process cannot be arrested, and if social progress could be reversed, it is not obvious that the results would be beneficial. The idea of nature hitherto engendered by science has, in its effects on practice, led man into an impasse - a labyrinth to escape from which we need a new guiding-thread, in the form of a new concept of nature and our own place in it.

It is not simply that the idea of nature in the advance of science has come full circle and has returned to that entertained by the Greeks. In some sense this has occurred, but the new conception is much more elaborate and sophisticated than the original one, and is rather a combination and reconciliation of the two opposite notions of mechanism and organism. The earlier mechanism rested in Newtonian physics, which has today given place to relativity and quantum mechanics. Physics has ceased to be mechanistic and has even adopted a conception of matter which is itself non-materialistic. The relation of mankind to nature has to be understood in the light of this dialectic conception.

Three major metaphysical questions arise out of this conception of mankind and nature. The first concerns the individuality and self-identity of man as a person, the degree of his self sufficiency and freedom. How far is his identity submerged and overwhelmed in such a conception? If *prima facie*, it may seem to be fatally subordinated to an all absorbing totality, two considerations forbid any such conclusion apart from human thought and self reflective consciousness there would



be no idea of nature science generates. it is man's own science. his own construction, his own judgement of the world, and the interpretation, self-made of his own experience. It cannot, therefore, be wholly subordinated to, and submerged within, the totality conceived as nature. Further, this reflection is not in conflict with that conception itself. For it is one form of a totality, self generating in a scale of forms, each of which is more self-complete and self maintaining than its predecessors the Human mind supervenes at a relatively highly developed stage and accordingly, represents a high degree of self-sufficiency, integrity, and self-determination. It is the fruition of the natural process and cannot be reengulfed and submerged in its more primitive matrix.

The second major question is that of the ultimate character of the totality. Is it, as a whole, a consciousness, self-aware of its own identity? The latter is hardly plausible and is not consistent with the conception of a scale of concretely existing phases. First, so far from being a mere schema, the totality must be seen as a continuum of interwoven forms; and, secondly, among these forms human personality is one of the more highly developed, though in obvious ways incomplete and limited. Whatever transcends human consciousness can hardly be something more abstract, more diffuse, and less integrally whole.

The third question follows naturally from these two. How does human life and purpose relate to the totality in which it is integral? What sort of self-determining conduct on the part of mankind is most appropriate to the conception of nature above outlined? The aspiration to conquer and control nature is now revealed as arrogant folly, liable to lead as in our own day looks probable, to self-destruction. Man must somehow see himself as the instrument of nature's own purposes, which his science must divine and follow. Perhaps, in a new and more significant sense we shall have to revive the ancient exhortation to live accordingly to nature if we are to live successfully, satisfactorily and virtuously. But that does not mean that we must revert to what is primitive. Rather it implies that, when nature is adequately understood, the general direction of evolution will be more clearly seen, and human action and policy can then be properly alligned and assimilated to it.

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## IV

**MAN: A CONSCIOUS MACHINE:****Charles. P. Alexander,**

It could be traced back to Francis Bacon, while probing into the history and growth of scientific ideas since 15th century on. He, an English Philosopher, broke through the walls of conventional methods of enquiry and provided new methods and inspirations to modern science. He was of the opinion that it is better dissect the nature than abstract it. This indubiously had an impact on the existing scientific investigations, i.e. Science began investigations on inherent complexities in everything (animate and inanimate) by dividing or breaking them into smaller and simpler components or parts. 'The Science' was first of all divided into many, and each Science began to study their subject of investigation with further divisions. Hence, to study the structure of the body an Anatomist will, surely, have to dissect it and with particular method, adequate to serve his purpose have to look into discrete components of the organism. So is also with Bio-Chemist, Endocrinologist, pathologist, Chemist, Physicist etc. They all have their perspective spectrum and binoculars:

Today we are in the strong clutch of reductionism and relativism. Although there could be diverse versions of reductionism, the one that we are concerned here is the view point that there is nothing more in an object or organism than the sum total of its parts. The success of this approach consists in its capacity of knowledge accumulation, because it hold that the complete description of an object lies in laying bare the components of the object and unvailing the reality about these parts one by one. Hence, to understand parts of whole is to understand the whole. This lead each group of Scientists and thinkers to view natures and reality from their own respective perspective. A cellular biologist might describe each of the anatomical components in terms of individual cells. Where as a molecular biologist would try to bring forth molecular structure of various parts of a particular cell. But the Physicist atomic physicist would point out how an individual atom is built up of tiny particles (Nucleus surrounded by electrons). Furthermore, another brand of Physicists, the Nuclear Physicist may take the processes a step further by describing all Nuclei in terms of



just two particles - Neutrons and Protons. Now, the Energy Physicist? Oh they delve away at the lowest level, in order to understand the structure of the particles neutron and protons. In other words they begin from where the Nuclear Physicist stopped. Now, hand it over to a Chemist, he would explain how each molecule is an arrangement of atoms. None the less our dear Bio chemists are of the opinion that man is nothing other than pile of chemicals, devoid of any mysterious quality or character - transcendental elements. He (Bio chemist) describes the functions of brain and nervous system as well blended activity of electrical circuits and chemicals - (Electro chemical activities). But the paradox is that all these sciences endeavour to explain one and the same phenomenon from their perspective. If so, what then is the reality?

To move on further is to land on the plat form of Artificial Intelligence (AI); probably the intellectual fashion of the day; The endeavours of the supporters of AI has been to explain Biological Intelligence (BI) in particular and Man in general, in terms of concepts and techniques of computer by the application of analogical paradigm. This would in fact lead to a kind of reductionism, i.e. Man is nothing but a machine! This is so, because the functional modality of human brain is analogous to that of a sophisticated computer chip, and computer is nothing but machine. However, thinkers like Sir James Lighthill argues that since a computing machine must have a definite number of operating states, it will certainly run out of capacity to generate a 'combinatorial explosion' and bring it to a halt. But in his counter argument Richard Gregory says that brain too has only a finite numbers of operational states and they also must suffer from the combinatorial explosion. To him it would be wise to conclude that BI depends on strategies for preventing overwhelming growth of the tree of possibilities, perhaps to which AI too is subjected. The tragic point is that in claiming this Gregory had blissfully ignored the phenomenon of higher states of mind that one is capable of experiencing, as in the case of mystics. Human brain is full of combinatorial possibilities and the actualisation of it depends on the choice of man.

Another argument that goes in favour of AI is that if it is possible to build up a computer based machine that can read meaning in symbols then it is easy to say that intelligence is not necessarily the property of living organisms alone. But it can equally be ascribed to computers and any physical mechanism that can carry out a given, necessary, processes without grave errors. But John Searle states, rather negatively that computer machines can follow rules, for instance, of arithmetics, grammar, etc. but cannot grasp, what to man is, meaning of specific symbol and words. Gregory's opposition to this is that Searle's view could be true of a smaller calculators and machines, but not of a chess computer; for each move made by the opponent, to a chess computer, has sense and it means a lot to the computer (because on the basis of the proceeding move the proceeding move is calculated). Marvin Minsky had gone to the extend stating that his Thermostat has three 'beliefs': in spite of the fact that the term belief is, normally, used to depict human



interventions and relations- 'it believes that its too hot in here, its too cold in here and its just right in here' This view leads one to think that there is no semantic inertia in so far as computer based machines are concerned, which might in turn tempt one to assume that they too have mind.

There are, still a few more, crude arguments given by the advocates of AI, to produce brain-mind identity, and to reduce the functions of brain to that of machine. However, one should not be oblivious to the fact that the processes, within the brain, are not sufficient to show the existence of all mental states. If granted those afore cited arguments, in favour of reducing mind to the functions of brain and brain to that of machine, it would seem that the craving of man to uncover the mysterious functions of mind is an ignoble and blind search. Morality has no place here, for conscience has no value and what is to be reckoned is the mechanical operations. Ample reasons are placed before us by the supporters of AI for thinking that if the 'essence' of human being is defined in terms of rationality then any task proposed for a rational being is, in principle, capable of being performed by a machine. The term rationality is, here, taken to include construction of mental schema about the external world; possession and use of language; exhibition of intentionality; motivation and purpose in human action; following of social norms and laws; construction of mental schema of a society, values etc. So be-it, that brought us to the understanding that as it were rationality includes everything of human being and so is the essence of the social being called man. But once accepted this view one will not escape the view point that AI too is capable of 'sharing it' (the essence). However, the essence of man is not just rationality. Rationality is only one of the dimensions of this multi dimensional being.

A next possible way to moot on the possible identity between AI and BI, is of the kind that AI system is holistic in the same sense as BI or human existence is holistic. Individuals are holistic. Individuals are holistic entities in the sense that the total system requires simpler subsystems in mutual interaction and that this interaction produces properties of the whole, not present in each part in isolation. of course, this kind of holism is not always necessarily true of all complex entities. For example a complex chemical molecule may have properties of its parts which are different in quantity but not in kind or quality. But on the other hand the capacity to refract light is a holistic property in the sense required here, since the bodies that are complexes of molecules may have this capacity which the molecules themselves do not possess. so is also man; Now given the above; (1) there is no reason to believe that mind or consciousness is some thing above and distinct from the function of brain (or the totality of brain function, which is physical. (2) Human brain itself is like a machine (at least in operational modalities). So the question now is not, could a machine be conscious (the transcendental identity of a being) but what kind of machine could be conscious.



It is an undeniable truth that each and every person has peculiar psycho somatic states which none other than the subject is owner of. But when one describes one's state of mind, under some circumstances, for instance, 'I am in pain' or 'I am in love' etc. to a second person, she readily understands that the information really is about certain inner states or processes like sensation and feeling etc. But the insistent attribution of any such mental states to a highly sophisticated computer machine, to express its similar feelings or sensations (if at all there is any) is, to me, highly doubtful. This expressive-intentionality is the exclusive calibre of a self-sustaining holism; i.e. Man.

To move on further, let us take the notion of 'Insight'. Suppose there is an entity which has no capacity for insight. It has a brain like functional part which receives input, as it were, from sensory nerves and releases output, as it were, to motor nerves. But it has no picture of what is going on inside and how the information processor operates. We may admit that the entity is 'not conscious' or to use Nicholas Humphrey's word, 'unconscious' (certainly not in Freudian sense). It is, here precisely we can make a distinction between the computer-machine and human beings. Man has, apart from his functional organs, an inner eye (insightful eye) whose field of vision is not outer world but the inner world. This inner eye provides one with the picture of its perspective field. This picture is useful and is designed in such a way as to tell the subject as much as one requires to know. Thus, this human animal is a conscious animal. This is the machine which has consciousness (a machine with insightful eye). In other words, awareness is a possibility of a machine; for example, a chess-computer (robot) may be aware of its each move, mechanically. But the awareness of awareness is a possibility only of a conscious (human) machine and not of an unconscious, pre-programmed sophisticated computer-machines.

Yet more, the notion of freedom of will too, need serious attention. Freedom of will has to be taken into account if one likes to understand what is the essence of man. Machines, certainly, has implanted intelligence; where as that of human being is inherent. Man creates his essence, which is an impossibility for a pre-determined machine, because, it's freedom is subject to limited parameters. Perhaps, Thomas Hobbes was right in saying, in leviathan, that whosoever look into himself and consider what he do when he dose, think, opine, reason, hope, fear etc. and upon that ground he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. That is man.. This principle is true and applicable only to man and not an iota of it to a machine. Man's freedom is determined by himself; the lesser one indulges in the game of life the more is in bad faith;

Therefore, man can be considered, from the neurological point of view, as analogous to a sophisticated machine, albeit endowed with consciousness. Consciousness enables one to look within and without;



enables one to sacrifice one's inner instinctive inclinations- eros and thanatos-not conducive to social life, by rendering an alturistic twist to them. It is consciousness that leads one in understanding oneself and that motivates one to have empathy and sympathy for one's comrade. However, no matter how sophisticated a computer machine may be, it is deprived of consciousness, although it mechanically operates, as though to emulate mental states of man. Life is, to a large extent, the product of complex inter relationship that exist within a certain large number of cells and nerve fibers, and the over all behaviour of them. As a matter of fact in describing human body it is only the relationship that holds between the cells and different anatomical parts that matters. Our physical body is in a flux. It is being continually replaced by fresh materials during mitosis and metabolic processes. This in fact is not the case with a machine; for instance, just take a machine and work with it, one would notice that there is little growth in that machine, and if there is any worn outs them it has to be replaced by the same material or else the change in the part would result a major change in the operational calibre of the machine and the identity of the machine too will change. This, in turn, points to the fact that growth and development is the sustaining factors of men and it is due to the constant change at the cellular level. In fact a little of the material or elements that constitute one's today's body was there a decade ago. Yet none of us with sanity deny the fact that one was and one is the same person; for each one remain essentially the same person throughout life, with individual, historical and social identity. The explanation for continual identity cannot be vested on cells alone, because they are temporary and in the process of division to enhance growth and development is the sustaining factors of men and it is due to the constant change at the cellular level. In fact a little of the material or elements that constitute one's today's body was there a decade ago. Yet none of us with sanity deny the fact that one was and one is the same person; for each one remain essentially the same person throughout life, with individual, historical and social identity. The explanation for continual identity cannot be vested on cells alone, because they are temporary and in the process of division to enhance growth and development. But the secret behind permance lies in the way they are arranged. This in other words, is the organised forms, that really matters in regard to the essential continuity of man's identity as much as field alone is real in quantum physics. Hence this view lays bare the point that in human beings over and above various sensory elements, there must be qualities belonging to the organised form. This is of course, something in addition to sum total of its parts. This surely makes man different from computer-machine, because machines are deprived of this extra qualities belonging to the organised forms. although they are the product of sum total of parts.

It is this organised form that adorns man with hope in life, purpose for life and courage to break new grounds even when one is utterly slashed by the hard ways of life. This organised form, then, is the transcendental spirit that is encapsuled and pervading as the being in totality. And that is the noos the indescribable spirit of man the atman. the soul, the Brahman and the self. Shall we call this The Reality.



## V

## THE NATURES OF MAN AND A PATHWAY TO PEACE

**Alan Newcombe**

A stack of 1,000 bills, each worth 1,000 dollars, is worth a million dollars and is a stack 7.5 inches high. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states that the Military Expenditure ( M.E.) for the world, in 1980, was 656.7 billion dollars, a stack of 1,000 dollar bills worth 656.7 billion dollars would have a height of 77.73 miles. President Reagan has talked of a M.E. for the U.S.A. alone of 3 trillion dollars; this amount would make a stack of 355.11 miles of thousand dollar bills. Since with each passing year our security is reduced and a bigger M.E. is required it seems that one nature of man is a huge capacity for self-deception.

The Prisoner's Dilemma game enables us to see other natures of man. The game is played by two subjects, Row and Column, and by the experimenter or bank. The pay-off matrix is shown below. Players column and Row each simultaneously make their choice to cooperate or defect and the pay off (paid out or collected by the experiment or some other third party) is fixed by the intersection of a row and the column chosen. If both choose to cooperate (the CC play) the pay off is one unit to each of them (the pay-off to Row is in the lower left corner of each cell in the diagram); if Row chooses to cooperate while Column chooses to Defect then Row pays 10 units to the bank and the bank pays 10 units to Column. If both players defect then each pays one unit to the bank and if Row chooses to defect while Column chooses to cooperate then Row receives 10 units from the bank while column pay 10 units to the bank.

Mathematicians look at the matrix above and say that the "rational" choice for column is to defect since the possible pay-offs are  $+10-1$  and this is better than the cooperative pay -off of  $-10$  or  $+1$ . The same argument applies to Row with the net result that both choose to Defect and lock in on the D pay-off of each



Losing one unit. The word "ratioanl" is misused in the sentence above; the mathematicians assume that each player will choose to be selfish and want to maximize his own gains and will, having made that value choice, apply his reason to the problem of achieving that goal. The player may choose to maximize the other player's gain in which case he will decide to always play the C move. He may also decide to maximize the sum of the two players gain and in this case only the CC choice gives a pay-off greater than zero. When real people play this game the amount of cooperation rapidly levels off at 75%. This figure describes a situation in which 3 pairs of subjects have settled in on the CC play and one pair is locked in on the DD choice. The interesting question then becomes how do we handle the individual who wants to play D? One way to explore this question is to have one player a confederate of the experimenter who plays according to a set strategy. If the confederate always plays D then the amount of C responses from the subject is only 6% (the subject tries a few C plays and when only D responses are elicited he gives up and plays D. When the confederate plays only the C choice the amount of cooperation from the subject rises to 50% the reality is that half the subjects are playing C all the time and the other half (playing D) are exploiting the Confederate who by playing C all the time appears to the subject to be always "turning the other cheek". How many subjects are entrapped into playing D by what they regard as a subject wanting to be exploited? Two subjects playing the game for 300 decisions end up with 75% cooperation a number which describes 3 pairs playing CC and one pair locked in on the DD play. If a Confederate plays the Tit-for-Tat strategy (playing back to the subject the decision that the subject has just played to the confederate would prefer it if the Subject would cooperate. This has been solved by occasionally responding not with the Defect move that the Tit-for-Tat strategy calls for but by a cooperation response; this deliberate initiative raises the level of cooperation over 90% and this strategy can be called the Queen Strategy because it is the most powerful strategy available to produce cooperation. We can conclude that most people will be cooperative, Trusting and trustworthy. Of the 8% that are locked onto the DD play half of them might be cooperative if faced with a reasonable opponent. A number of investigators have shown that Defect players are Isolationist, more Authoritarian, higher on a Militarism scale than others. We are never going to attain peace and general and Complete disarmament if we listen to those highest on the Nationalist, Authoritarian, etc. scales. The suspiciousness and Misanthropy of the authoritarian and Militarist mind may explain the fact noted by Eayrs (1964) that whenever Canadian politicians decided to make a friendly move towards the United States, the Canadian military, when it was consulted (in the period up to 1929) always advised against such a move Urie Bronfenbrenner reports that Americans and Russians see each other as mirror images. Any action by one of these



countries is seen as good by the citizens of that country and as bad by the other country. (I am right handed, my mirror image is left handed). Thus any act by another country is interpreted not only in terms of the action itself, but also in terms of our emotional attitude towards that country. Once two nations become hostile to each other, they not only see themselves as good, but also project onto the adversary all of the evil of which they know themselves to be capable. Because we know our own capabilities for the evil we have projected we have difficulty accepting a friendly gesture from the other side at face value and will search and twist it until we find the hidden advantage which the proposal contains for them. Those people who are the highest on the Misanthropy (distrust of others) scale (which correlates highly with the Militarism scale) would be the ones to make the greatest projection and have the greatest suspicion. Bronfenbrenner showed slides to children in both the U.S. and the S.U. and found that when he showed a slide of a road with trees planted beside the road and asked the children why the trees were planted the answers would be quite peaceful if he said the trees were in their country but quite militaristic if he said they were in the other country.

Stanley Milgram (1965) investigated some conditions of obedience and disobedience to Authority. He posed as researcher investigating various conditions of the learning experience. The subject was told to say 5 words to another subject (actually a confederate of Milgram's) via a microphone and if the learner (the confederate) did not repeat all five words correctly the subject would then give a shock to the learner. Each time the words were repeated incorrectly the shock would be increased in voltage and time. Initially the subject and learner were in separate rooms connected with microphones and later they would be in the same room and the subject would have to put the learner's hand on a shocking plate. Voltages administered (they were simulated) went as high as 400 even though the high voltages were clearly marked as being dangerous. Some subjects refused to give high shocks but, as Milgram states, "There was no set of conditions under which all subjects would refuse to give shocks. When subjects refused to give shocks milgram would tell them that the nation needed the results of the experiment. Later larsen (1973) repeated these experiments and found that by leaving the shocking dial at 400 volts and making sure that the subjects saw this before the experiment started subjects would blithely give large shocks. Later Richard Borden found that the presence of a observer dressed in a uniform caused more shocks and shocks of higher voltage to be given while the presence of a woman or a Quaker caused fewer shocks and shocks of lower voltage to be used. The effect of the observer disappeared when the observer left the scene.

It might well be that the presence of people known to be in favour of peace in our communities would have a catalytic effect on others in the community provided that the peacemakers do not go away.



Participation in a walk for peace once a year is nice but anonymous; participation in a peace activity once a month may have an impact much greater than 12 times that of being in an annual walk for peace.

Some people have stated that war is caused by an instinct for aggression and many papers have been written to disprove this idea. It has, however, been refuted by the observation that world war III be fought by people doing operations that are common place such as answering telephones and turning keys; activities which we do not associate with an instinct for aggression. Gandhi said that "the personality of a man changes when he acquires a gun". The comment that the other side only understand force and power is usually used by someone in uniform or by a politician; I feel that the sentence defines the attitudes of the speaker and not of the other side. If aggression is not an instinct then the assertion that it is an instinct is wrong; if aggression is an instinct than we have just redefined the problem and need to find methods to contain aggression (or war).

To sum up, we can say that the natures of man depend on both personality and environment. Most of us play the Prisoners' Dilemma game in a cooperative way, (and the game allows us to try out strategies to play against an uncooperative player). Attitudinal work reveals that the players of the D play are high on the Militarism, Nationalism, Distrust of Others (Misanthropy) scales.

Bronfenbrenner points out that even schoolchildren project evil onto the other side and then think of themselves as "all-good". Milligram is surprised at the extent we will practice cruelty when we think it is authorized by the state and larsen, and later Borden, modify that view by pointing out that their subjects were just as cruel because they felt that they were expected to be so; Borden holds out a ray of hope by observing the effect of the observer (which may be the same as the effect of a minister on a group of men with respect to swearing and if there were enough minister ...?)

Given that the natures of man vary from the subject who told Milgram that he would not administer a shock (or more shocks), to the nature that does what he thinks society expects of him, how can we find a pathway to peace?

The first requirement must be that we have a foreign policy that is partly determined by the other nation. If we arm and expect that the other side is completely evil than we will be perceived by the other side as only understanding force and their governing group will drop the more peace-minded individuals from the governing group and we will have produced a self fulfilling prophecy.

It we play D all the time we can only expect a 6% C reply. Nor should we so unsophisticated that we always play C (we did that during the thirties and may have entrapped Hitler and made him worse than he otherwise would have been).



We know from the Prisoners Dilemma Game that the best strategy to play is Tit-for-Tat but this has the failing that you have no initiative. We can improve the strategy by using the GRIT technique described by Charles Osgood. He suggests that by responding to a hostile signal from the other side with a friendly response we can reduce hostility. Certain conditions must be met for the technique to work: 1) the friendly move should be described in advance of making the response (so that the other side can detect the move). No bargaining should be used and this is one of the hardest things to control since many people expect that if they give something they should receive something in return. There is a response set which requires that the other do something first, Sadat's statement that he would go anywhere to achieve peace, even to the Knesset, if invited is an example of the type I have in mind. It is not bargaining, but also is not the unconditional statement required of a GRIT move. The Tit-for-Tat strategy combined with the GRIT move forms the Queen's Strategy mentioned earlier in this paper. President Kennedy used the GRIT move some 16 times in 1963 and each time the S.U. responded within 24 hours with a move equal utility. The success may be due to the fact that Kennedy explained the technique to the soviet Ambassador before using the GRIT initiative.

Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif together with a number of graduate students did an experiment in conflict reduction some years ago at a place called Robbers' Cave. They had a large group of young boys at a camp and divided them into two groups and encouraged them to become hostile to each other. They then tried various conventional ways to reduce hostility but these methods failed. Summit meetings were either unsuccessful or were successful with the leaders who were then disavowed by the followers. The only method that worked to reduce tension was to have the two groups involved in a project that both wanted to see achieved without the help of the other group. Sherif's called such a project a super-ordinate goal. After the superordinate goal was achieved the boys saw former enemies clearly without the projection of evil that had formerly tarnished their views of each other. On the international scene we would like to see the U.S. and its mirror image, the S.U. cooperate, a procedure that is going forward at a national level in Libya. Many of the problems of that area would disappear if 5 acre farms were given to the landless; the big gain for the world would be the reduction of tension between the U.S. and additionally one would hope the greater security for the world that their reductions in Military Expenditure would produce. The peace Research Review dealing with superordinate goals points out that an irrigated Sahara with one third of its area in trees would produce enough food to feed a billion people.

When decision makers begin to ask questions such as "how can we obtain security for the world?" then they will discover a great deal of research about future stable situations and about ways to get there from the present metastable situation. As long as they exclude many

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answers by asking the wrong questions we will stay in our current war-prone situation. When they limit the answers by asking the question, "how can we defend our nation?" we enter a situation in which for the superpowers the answer is "we can not defend our nation; we can only deter war" Perhaps middle and smaller nations feel that they can defend their nations! Does a nation obtain security by increasing its Military Expenditure (M.E.) ? For some years a group of us have been studying this question. We have found a method to find an equation which relates M.E. / Capita to GNP/Capita; we have studied the period 1950 to 1978.

If the actual M.E. / Capita is greater than the value calculated on the basis of the GNP/Capita, the nation is 30.5 times more likely to be involved in an international war than are the nations (sub-critical) which have a M.E. / Capita less than that indicated by their GNP/Capita. The effect covers the 5 years after the year under study. In order to have a deterrent effect a nation has to become supra-critical by increasing its M.E./Cap. and this action is an indication that the nation is at risk of war with some other nation. Perhaps a modification of Gandhi's comment about a man and a gun is relevant, namely, when a nation acquires too many guns, its foreign policy changes. The supra-critical nations fight their wars with other supra-critical nations.

The slogan of Vegetius, si vis pacem, papa bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war) is false. Our findings show that the truth is, si bellum paras, fiet bellum (if you prepare for war, war is produced). Decision makers in the 20th century should adopt a new motto, Si vis pacem, para pacem.

Richardson (p.8) had the general case summed up neatly, "What you prepare for, that you will get."

As response times to an enemy missile attack become shorter, the probability that a false signal will cause World War III increases. A slogan from the past is "Make Love, not war". I do not want to make love with either side; what I want to do is to live with them, because if we do not learn to do this very soon we will most certainly die with them. The choice is between life and death for the mammals of the earth, and with such stakes I say we should therefore choose life.

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## VI

## RETHINKING SWARAJ

R.K. Behera

As India is celebrating her 50 years of Independence, it is high time for us to once again reflect or rethink on Swaraj. Because substantial progress has not yet made. India as a nation still stands at cross-roads. It is plagued by emotional divisions, poverty, illiteracy, population explosion and so many of such problem. Gandhi defines Swaraj as the freedom to err and the power to correct errors. Self control or Govt. of self is necessary when conflict, passion of temptations affect one. This has to be extended to family, caste, city and to nation in regulating the respective affairs.

In Hindu svaraj, Gandhi observes that ethical living replaces the worldly pursuits, and violence in any form against any human being is condemnend.<sup>1</sup> Gandhi gives four main definitions of Swaraj : as the rule over one's self, in terms of symbol or image which he explains as the complete control by the people of the country's imports and exports, of its army and its law courts; as the easy availability of food and clothing to everyone and in terms of conditions in which a young girl even at the dead of night will move about without any fear.

These four definitions, Gandhi writes, include many others, like removal of untouchability, end of Brahmin-non-Brahmin quarrel, unity of Hindus and Muslims and complete religious freedom with respect for other religious faiths, self-sufficiency and self-protection of every village and town, mutual regard between the ruled and the ruler and between capital and labour; and the equality of all. Gandhi ji derives certain implications from the above definitions: the Govt. will not trade in liquors; Opium and such things: no speculation should be permitted in food-grains and cotton, none should break a law, and finally, wilfulness should not be permitted in the sense that a person charges with something should not be permitted in the sense that a person charged with something should not be allowed to act as a judge but an established court should examine the charges<sup>2</sup>.

1. Mahatam Gandhi, the collected works of Mahatma Gandhi. The Publications Divisions, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, II revised edi., Vol. 12, p. 512.

2. Ibid., Vol. 19, P. 506-7



The root meaning of Swaraj is self-rule, and thus, Gandhi defines Purna-Swaraj as complete disciplined rule from within<sup>3</sup>. First of all, it means national emancipation. In the case of our country it meant termination of the British Raj. Tilak gave the slogan 'Swaraj is our birth right'. Others repeated it many a time. Gandhi in a consistent and articulate fashion pleaded for village swaraj. It meant that every village must be an independent and self-contained unit in itself. Each village should be self-sustained and autonomous, so that every village is capable of meaning its affairs itself, even to the extent of depending itself against the onslaught of the environment. My idea of village Swaraj is a complete republic, independent of its neighbours for its vital wants, and yet interdependent for, many others in which dependence is a necessary<sup>4</sup>. The term independence has no such limitation, it may mean licence to do what one likes. Thus, Swaraj is positive, while independence is a negative term. Purna-swaraj is not isolated independence, but healthy and dignified independence<sup>5</sup>.

Gandhi declares: swaraj means the control of the military in our hands, our control over income and expenditure, over land revenues and over courts. When we have such swaraj, we shall be able to prevent all misdeeds. Apart from the other things, economic freedom can be ours this very day. We can achieve it with the help of the spinning wheel. The country may not, of course, take-up the idea today<sup>6</sup>. Real swaraj consists in restraint and only moral man performing his duties can achieve it. Gandhi also points out that it is impossible to achieve swaraj by establishing big factories in India<sup>7</sup>.

The key to swaraj lies in our system of education<sup>8</sup>. Gandhi says that his ideas about education are very exacting and wants the teachers to meet once a week to exchange ideas to facilitate innovations. Secondly, intelligent students should be consulted and their suggestions should be invited regarding the methods of teaching. The students health is the collective responsibility of the teachers, the main responsibility of the teachers rests with the teachers of hygiene<sup>9</sup>.

Aurobindo defines swaraj as the direct revelation of God to the people. It is not mere political freedom but freedom of the individual, of the community, of the nation, spiritual freedom and social freedom. The ancient sages have declared spiritual freedom, and the social freedom, and the social freedom was the message given by Buddha. Caitanya, Nanak, Kabir and the saints of Maharashtra. Social freedom is the freedom of the human intellect and the nobility of the human

3. Ibid., Vol. 45, P. 263

4. Harijan, July 26, 1942, P., 238

5. Mahatma Gandhi, Op. Cit., Vol. 45, P. 343

6. Ibid., Vol., 19, P. 229

7. Ibid., Vol. 8, P. 374

8. Ibid., Vol. 13, P. 359

9. Ibid., Vol. 13, P. 339



soul. Spiritual freedom cannot be attained in a land of slaves. God has set apart India as the eternal fountain head of holy spirituality<sup>10</sup>.

Swaraj is an organisation of national self-help and national self-dependence. When a foreign organism dominated the body-politic it compels the whole body to consider it as the centre of its activities neglecting its functions. This habit of subservience should be replaced by self-help. The village samiti or council should be the organ of executive work. It should set up schools in which our children will grow up as good citizens and patriots and not as dependents in a dependent nation. The life of the village must be self-reliant and self-sufficient; the first condition is the awakening of the political sense of the masses. Finally, swaraj is not possible without the unity of speech, or intellectual conviction, the unity of hearts that spring from love.

The idea of self must be replaced by the idea of nation. The self-dependent and self-sufficient village organism, the old foundation of Indian life must be revised. But the village should not be isolated as in the old system in our new national life. It should live with the neighbouring units for common purposes; each of such groups should be the part of the distinct unity which is the subordinate part of the province and the province, a part of the single life of a country. The cell of the national body, viz village, should be healthy Swaraj: begins from the village.

To attain swaraj or the individual, social, political and spiritual freedom, or villages should be self dependent and self-sufficient, but essentially should be a part of the district, province and of the nation. The leaders of our freedom movement often used the word swaraj, they are not very clear in their minds about its all implications. At the special congress session of Calcutta (Sept. 1920) lala Lajpat Rai said that this word was deliberately chosen for its ambiguity in order to enable the Indians to remain within the projected common wealth or to leave to according to their own preferences, while referring to the period of 1920-21, Jawaharlal Nehru recalls, "It was obvious that to most of our leaders swaraj, meant something much less than independence".

The term Swaraj has metaphysical implication also in the system of Gandhi. It is the name of a hypothetical condition of human life in an ideal society in which everyone has the capacity to resist the abuse of authority. That is, Swaraj becomes identifiable with Ram Raj. On one occasion he said: "By Ramrajya I donot mean Hindu raj I mean by Ramrajya divine raj, the kingdom of God.....the ancient ideal of Ramrajya is one of true democracy<sup>11</sup>". In this way, swaraj implies the reign of complete social justice, equality and freedom, Ram Raj is acme of swaraj. It is not merely a political or an economic ideal; it represents the fructification of the moral spirit. It also desires a social order without

10. Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library. Sri Aurobindo Ashram. Pondi Cherry. India. 28th May, 1931

11. Gandhi, Young India, 28th May, 1931

12. K. G. Mashruwala (ed.), Gandhi-Vichar-Dohan. P.61



egotistic interests that cause social conflicts and tensions. The Ramrajya is regarded as the kingdom of dharma, non-violent swaraj, swaraj of the people and the final goal of swaraj<sup>12</sup>.

Therefore, Ram Rajya was that stage of development where ethical considerations would govern the life of the individuals. Swaraj or self rule or freedom was that stage of development where the people would still feel the necessity of government and state. In Ram Rajya the people will not be divided among different castes or languages. They will be self disciplined, truthful and non-violent. Ram for Gandhi stood for noble conduct, self-restraint, popular administration and public happiness. Ram Rajya will be society of economic equality. Gandhi wrote: "There will be no Ram Rajya in the present state of inequality in which a few roll in wealth and the masses even donot have enough to eat".

Gandhi was one of the foremost champions of democratic ideas. He frequently asserted that real swaraj will come not by the acquisition of authority by a few but by the acquisition of the capacity by all to resist authority when abused.....any notion of democracy is that under it the weakest should have the same opportunity as the strongest<sup>13</sup>. True democracy do not depend merely on the protection of rights of the strong in society but on the social defence of the weaker sections of the society. It is not an ideology or a Govt. which permitted the privileged few to prpresent the hopes and aspirations of common men and women, nor did true democracy depend upon the majoritarian principle of members. Gandhi argues that Swaraj of the people means the sum total of the swaraj (self rule) of individuals. And as such swaraj comes only from performance by individuals of their duty as citizens. In it no one thinks of his rights.

The meaning of swaraj is tied to the attainment of freedom by means of Ahimsa and Satyagraha. It is for this reason that he abruptly suspended the non-co-operation movement of 1922. He also interpreted swaraj as independence within the British empire if possible and without it if necessary. It meant that while he frankly called the alien rule as 'Satanic' that in 1920, he has no reservations in making peace with the English people. If some form of partnership could be devised between the British Empire and Indian Independence. On one occasion he said, "I (swaraj) means a state such that we can maintain our separate existence without the presence of the English. If it is to be partnership, it must be a partnership at will."<sup>14</sup>

In other words, the first step to swaraj lies in the individual.<sup>15</sup> He never accepted swaraj of a nation to be anything different from the swaraj of each and every individual of that nation. He openly expressed that swaraj of a people means the sum-total of the swaraj of individuals.<sup>16</sup>

13. U.S. Mohan Rao (ed), The Message of Mahatma Gandhi, (New Delhi) Publications division, 1968, P. 83

14. Autobiography, P. 76

15. Speeches and writings of Gandhi, P. 409

16. Gandhi Harijan, March 1939 English weakly Journal, Harijan Sevak sangha, Poona.



## VII

VEDIC DEITIES IN PANINI'S  
ASTHADHYAYI**B. Prasannakumare**

'Samskrta' one of the members of Indo-European family, is the language of the Gods.<sup>1</sup> The ancient scriptures of vedic and puranic lore are composed in this language. The vedas are deemed to be the eternal, i.e. 'Nitya', beginning less, i.e. Anadi and not made by man i.e.: Apauruseya'. There are six supplementary science of vedas known as Vedangas<sup>2</sup>. Among them the two are directly concerned with language: Vyakarana and Nirukta. Vyakarana, the linguistic analysis and Nirukta, the interpretation of the meanings of selected words in the Vedas through etymological methods.

Vyakarana, the most prominent of the six vedangas, has been studied with great zeal in ancient India. It is said as the face of the Vedapurusha<sup>3</sup> and it is considered the first step to ladder to Moksha<sup>4</sup>. Patanjali, in his Mahabhasya, mentions the tradition that 'Brahmanena niskarano dharmah sadango vedo adhyeyo jneyasca. Pradhanam ca sadangesu vyakaranam, Pradhane ca kto yatnah bhalavan bhavati<sup>5</sup>. and he says 'It is a means to analyse and produce the language of the words.

The Sanskrit term for grammar, Vyakarana literally means 'linguistic analysis'. The grammar of Panini known as Asthadhyayi or Astaka has generally been recognized as the first and foremost Sanskrit grammar. Panini's primary concern was the building up of Sanskrit words, both vedic and classical, from verbal roots, proverbs, primary and secondary suffixes, and nominal and verbal terminations, but he was also interested in syntactic problems involved in the formation of compound words and the relationship of the nouns in a sentence with the action indicated by the verb<sup>7</sup>. He has been highly acclaimed by the Indians, ancient as well as modern. Asthadhyaye (the eight chaptered) consists of eight (asta) chapters (adhyaya) further sub-divided into quarter-chapters (pada) and contains about four thousand rules called Sutra<sup>8</sup>.

The sutras refer to groups of verbal roots (dhatu) and of nominal bases (gama), hence the dhatupatha and the ganapatha form adjuncts



to the work. The fourteen sutras of Astadhyayi known as Mahesvara Sutras indicating the phonetic arrangement adopted by Panini in his works. According to tradition this catalog of sounds was handed down to Panini by the Lord Siva. Tradition about the origin of these fourteen sutras is, 'God Siva in his well-known form of Nataraja is pre-eminently the Lord of Dances. Tradition attributes Natyasastra in its earliest form to his divine authorship. It was the rattle of the drum (Dhakka) played at the end of Siva's dance that once gave out nine plus five sounds, which constituted the Mahesvarasutras forming the basis of Panini's grammatical aphorisms<sup>9</sup>.

The systematic and complete form of grammar available to us in that of Panini i.e., Astadhyayi. It is masterly analysis of the Sanskrit language as it existed in the days of Panini, who lived approximately before the fifth century B.C.<sup>10</sup> In the words of Max Muller - "There is no grammar in any language, that could vie with the wonderful mechanism of his eight books of grammatical rule."<sup>11</sup> Patanjali, in his Mahabhasya, says that the importance of Panini is Astadhyayi such as:- Pramanabhuta acaryo darbhavapitrpanih sucavavakase pranmukha upavisya mahata prayatnena sutrani pranayati sma. Tatrasakyam varnenabhyanarthakena bhavitum, kim punariyata sutrena,<sup>12</sup> and Samarthayogannahi kincidasmin pasyami sastre yadanarthakam syat.<sup>13</sup> His brevity of expression is unparalleled, and has set precedence for later grammarians who compared the joy of saving half a syllable to the joy at the birth of a son<sup>14</sup>. These are also clear that Panini is known as the greatest linguist of the world. And he records all the linguistic peculiarities in his monumental works Astadhyayi which are going on in those days. On the otherhand he records the following vedic deities both singly and in pairs in his Astadhyayi.

(1) Surya - 'Rajasuyasuryamrsodyarucya kupyakrstapacya vyathyah (Ast-III-1-114). The words Rajasuya, Surya, mrsodya, rucya, kupa, krsta, pacya and avyathy are irregularly formed by the addition of the affix 'kyap'.

(2) Vrsakapi and Agni are included in the sutra 'Vrsakapyagniskusitakusidanamudattah" (IV-1-37) In forming the feminine with the affix 'neep', the letter 'ai' having udatta accent is the substitute of the finals of vrsakapi, Agni kusita and kusida. Thus vrsakapayi (Rigveda X 86-13) the wife of vrsakapi, Agnayi (Rg. I-22.12) the wife of Agni

(3) Another sutra 'Agnerdhak' (IV.2.33) The affix 'dhak' comes in the sense of 'this its deity', after the name Agni. Thus Agenyah.

(4) Soma - 'somattyan' (IV.2.30) The affix 'tyan' comes after the name soma in the sense of 'this its deity'. Thus 'Saymyam havih', 'saumyam suktam'.

(5) Sukra - 'Sukradghan' (IV.2.26) The affix 'ghan' comes in the sense of 'that its deity; after the words sukra'. Thus 'sukriyam Havih-'an oblation belonging to sukra.



(6) A ponapat. Apamnapat - 'Aponaptrapannaptrbhyam ghah' (IV.2.27) The affix 'gha' comes after the words 'aponaptr' and 'apannapt'. in the sense of 'that its deity.' The words 'Aponapt' and 'Apamnapat' are the names of two deities, these words irregularly assume the form ending in 'naptr' when the affix is to be added.

(7) Mahendra - 'Mahendradghanau ca' (IV-2-29) The affix 'gha' and 'an' as also the affix 'cha' come after the name 'Mahendra' in the sense of this its deity. As - 'Mahendriyam, Mahendriyam and Mahendram: oblation sacred to Mahendra.

(8) The four deities - 'vaya, Rta, Pitr, adn usasha' are recorded in the sutra - 'vayvritupitrusaso yat' (IV-2-31) The affix 'yat' comes after the names 'Vayu, Ritu, Pitr' and 'ushas' in the sense of 'this its deity' Thus 'vayavyam', 'Usasyam....' and the sutra - 'Usasosasah: (VI.3.31). For 'usasa' is substituted 'usasa' in a devatadvandva. Thus 'Usasasuyam.

(9) Dyava, Prthivi, Sunasira, Marutvamn, Agnisoma, Vastospati, Grhamedha are included in the sutra 'Dyavaprthivi' sunasiramarutvadagnisomavastos patigrhamedhacchacah' (IV.2.32). The affix 'cha' comes also in the sense of 'this its deity', after the names 'Dyava' etc. Thus 'Dyavaprthiviyam' or 'Dyavaprthiviyam' belonging to the gods 'Heaven and Earth.

(10) Nasatya - 'Nabhrannapannavedanasatyanamucinakulana - khanapumsatanaksatranakranakesuprakrtya. (VI.3.75).

(11) Tvasta - 'Aptnrtresvasrnaptrnestrtvstrksatrhotrpo trprasastrnam' (VI.4.11) (12) Pusa and Aryama are stated in the Sutra as - 'Inhanpusaryamnam sau' (VI.4.12). (13) Indra - 'Sisukrandayamasabhadvandendra jananaadibhyaschah' (IV.3.88) (14) It is worth noting that in 'Kasyet' (IV.2.25) Patanjali refers a symbolical name of 'ka' is not a pronoun, but the proper name of a Deity. <sup>15</sup> Therefore, the dative case of 'ka' would be 'kaya', (oblation sacred to ka), not 'kasmai'. 'Kasyet' - The short 'i' is the substitute of the final 'a' of 'ka' when the affix is added. Thus: 'kayam' = 'oblation sacred to ka. As 'kayam Havih' etc.

A long list of pairs of Deities is also found in the Astadhyayi. For eg" Agni and Varuna, Agni and soma, 'usa' and 'surya' etc. (1) 'Idagneh somavarunayoh' (VI.3.27) For the final of Agni, is substituted the long 'I' When 'soma' or 'varuna' follow in a 'Dvandva'. Thus 'Agnisomay, Agnivarunau' (2) 'Divoddyava' (VI.3.29) For 'Div' is substituted 'Dyava' in a 'dvandva' of the names of the Devatas. Thus 'Dyavaksama, Dyavabhumi and Divasasca Prthiviyam' (VI.3.30). For 'Div' is also substituted 'Divas' (as well as 'Dyava') when 'Prthivi' follows in a 'Dvandva' of the names of Devatas. Thus 'adivasprthivya' - 'dyavaprthivya' and 'Astadhyayi' (IV.2.32).

The twin agricultural Deities 'Sunasira, and other combination with 'Rudra pusa' are also available at 'Astadyayi' (VI.2..141 and IV.2.32) 'Dyavapr...' (IV.2.32) is already stated earlier. Another sutra - 'Nottara -



pade 'nu-dattadavaprthivirudrapusakmanthisu' (VI.2.141). Ina dvandva compund of the names of divinties, both members of the compund simultaneously do not retain their accent, when the first syllable of the second word is anudatta, with the exception of prithivi, rudra, pusan and manthin.

Panini mentions the older Goddesses - female Deities -Indrani, Varunaini, Agnayi and Vrsakapayi. The sutra- 'Indravarunabhavasarvarudramrdahimaranyaya-vayavanamatulcaryanamanuk. (IV.1.49). Thus Indrani-the wife of Indra, Varunani, - the wife of varuna etc are formed. Sutra IV.1.37 stated the forms Agnayi Vrsakapayi. It is pintoed out that Panini always mention Prithivi as a pair with Dyaus and usas .<sup>16</sup> and oblations were offered as an independent deity.

The officinating priests were given (V.1.69) kadankaradaksinaccha ca: Thus kadankamarhati kadankariyah or kadankaryah- 'one deserving straw such a cow. So also Daksiniyah or Daksinyo Brahmanah - 'a Brahmana deserving alms. payment for their service is also included in the sutra thus - Tasya ca daksina yahjakyebhyah' (V.1.95). the affix then, comes after a word being the name of a sacrifice, in the sense of a ' the fee thereof.' As Agnisthomasya Daksina - Agnistho - miki etc. The sutra would have appled only to such sacrifice denoting words as Ekahah, Dvadasahah, which are time - denoting words as well.

All it shows that the worship of varous Vedic deities with oblaitons and peformance of appropriate rituals by different classes of priests were going on while Panini was compling his Astadhyayi. Most probably, these were mentioned inconNECTION with the sacrifice.

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4. Prathamam Chandasamangam prahurvyakaranam budhah - Vakyapadeeya-I.II.
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6. Vyakriyante 'Sabda aneneti vyakaranam.
7. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. V, p. 4
8. Alpaksaramasandigdham saravadvisvatomukham astobhamanagvadyam ca sutram sutravido viduh parasaropapurana.
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11. Quoted by Raghunath safaya, ' the Teaching of Sanskrit, p. 196.
12. I, 1.1.
13. VI.1.77.
14. Ardhamatralaghavaena putrotsavam manyante varyakara-nah.
15. Cf Samjna caisa tatrabhavath.
16. Ast. IV. 2. 32 & IV. 2. 31.



## VIII

# RIGGS, LEWIS AND THE PRINCIPAL PARADOX OF TIME TRAVEL

Joseph Wayne Smith and Roger Porter

## 1. INTRODUCTION

There is a well known argument against the possibility of time travel: if I could travel back in time, then I could in a suicidal rage kill my earlier (i.e. younger). self. However my existence is a necessary condition for my trip back into time to have occurred at all, so if I do not exit, the postulated act of time travel would result in a contradiction. Therefore time travel is impossible. Some philosophers have defended the logical possibility of time travel by arguing that actions such as attempting to kill one's earlier self would always fail. David Lewis has argued along these lines in an often quoted paper<sup>1</sup>. Recently Peter J. Riggs has done the same.<sup>2</sup> In this paper we argue that both Lewis and Riggs fail in their defence of the logical possibility of time travel.

## 2. LEWIS AND RIGGS ON TIME TRAVEL

Lewis considers the example of a time traveller, Tim, who after time travelling back to the time of his grandfather's youth, attempts to kill his grandfather. Tim is an excellent rifleman and after taking every precaution should easily be able to kill his grandfather. But Tim's grandfather did not die by a sniper bullet, so for Tim to kill him would be to change the past. But the events of a past moment are not subdivisible into temporal parts and so they cannot change. Thus either Tim killed his grandfather in the past or he did not. This leads to an apparent contradiction: "Tim can kill his grandfather but does not" and "Tim does not kill his grandfather and cannot" both seem to be true. However they are contradictory. Lewis accepted that both of these

1. D. Lewis, "The Paradoxes of Time Travel", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 13, 1976, pp. 145-52.

2. P.J. Riggs, "The Principal Paradox of Time Travel," *Ratio* (new series) x, no. 1, April 1997, pp. 48-64. Page references in the text are to Riggs's paper.



statements were true, but denied the they were contradictory because "can" is equivocal. Lewis said:

Tim's killing Grandfather that day in 1921 is compossible with a fairly rich set of facts: the facts about his rifle, his skill and training, the unobstructed line of fire, the locked door and the absence of any chaper one to defend the past, and so on. Indeed it is compossible with all the facts of the sorts we would ordinarily count as relevant in saying what someone can do. It is compossible with all the factors corresponding to those we deem relevant in Tom's case Tom being an identical non-time-travelling-would-be-sniper-of-Tim's grandfather. Relevant to these facts, Tim can kill Grandfather. But his killing Grandfather is not compossible with another more inclusive set of facts. There is the simple fact the grandfather was not killed ... Relative to these facts. Tim cannot kill Grandfather. He can and he can't but under different delineations of the relevant facts. You can reasonable choose the narrower delineation, and say that he can; or the wider delineation, and say that he can't. But choose. What you mustn't do is waver, say in the same breath that he both can and can't, and then claim that this contradiction proves that time travel is impossible.<sup>3</sup> Joseph Wayne Smith gave the following argument against Lewis:

Lewis had promised to show that there was no contradiction in his thought experiment, but only an apparent one generated by an equivocation produced by the term 'can'. His argument cited above is a plea for us to ignore this obvious contradiction. With respect to one set of facts, Tim can kill his grandfather; with respect to another set of facts he cannot. But what about with respect to the total set of facts of the situation? The contradiction arises once more. Lewis may not wish to speak of making consideration of all relevant facts, but nothing prevents us from not conforming with his wishes. A good scientist must surely consider all available facts relating to any matter and not behave as Lewis asks us to behave. But then, this contradiction proves that time travel is impossible. We have been given no reason by Lewis to believe otherwise.<sup>4</sup>

Peter Riggs has said (p.52) that Smith is claiming the Lewis is explicitly wrong. In a footnote to his claim he says that Smith "asserts that the 'apparent contradiction' in Lewis's argument proves that time travel is impossible!" The "!" is no doubt added to smugly show how "dumb" Smith's argument is. Yet the passage quoted above lends no support to Riggs' interpretation. Smith asked why is it that one can not say in the same breath that Tim both can and can't kill his grandfather. Why not take this contradiction to prove that time travel is impossible? In the quote from Lewis he seems to be resorting to a linguistic philosophers trick of saying that one is free to choose the

3. Lewis pp. 150-1.

4. J.W. Smith "Time Travel and Backward Causation", in Reason, Science and Paradox: Against Received Opinion in Science and Philosophy (Croom elm, London, 1986). pp. 49-58. Citation p.51.



narrower delineation of the wider delineation but not both. But again: why not? If "He can and he can't as Lewis says, then how can a mere linguistic convention prevent a logical contradiction from being physically realized? Lewis argued that when Tim tries to assassinate his grandfather, he must fail because it is logically impossible to change the past. Well, how does Lewis know this? Indeed it seems question begging to assert this in the context of time travel. What is it that prevents Tim from killing his grandfather? Does some mysterious force cause Tim to Miss his shot? Suppose however, using analytic philosophy's imaginative licence that Tim has invented a weapon capable of destroying the entire universe. The weapon is physically infallible (a gift from Wotan). Tim sets the weapon to "Explode after time travel", then in an act of suicide goes back into time with the weapon to his grandfather's youth. What prevents Tim's grandfather from being destroyed? To say that Tim cannot kill his own grandfather because such an action would entail an explicit contradiction does not give us a good reason for why this is so.

Lewis's narrative has a second sniper called Tom. Tom is not a time traveller although he mistakenly believes that he is, and he wants to kill his own grandfather. Tim and Tom are both excellent riflemen, have an accurate rifle etc. So why is it that Tom can kill his grandfather, but not Tim? Riggs notes that the generally given reason is that "Tim is a continuant entity in spacetime and his very existence is a sufficient condition to ensure that his grandfather lives on to have an offspring" (p.53). Riggs rightly notes that this explanation "has never been found adequate by time travel sceptics" (p.53). Time travel sceptics want to know what happen to prevent a time travellers bringing about a paradoxical situation. They want a causal story. Riggs attempts to supply it. He says:

Previous attempts to resolve the Principal Paradox have relied on something always happening that avoids contradictory circumstances. An explanation for this 'something' (be it nerves or wind or even bad luck) usually is provided. We have seen that with travel to an earlier time, most but not all, causal antecedents of events will be earlier than the events themselves. This is a major distinguishing feature the time travel case has from the everyday one. Since Tim's existence provides a guarantee of failure, there always must be a cause(s) of Tim failing. These failures come about either from temporally prior causes (e.g. by accident) or they come about from later causes (which are related to Tim). Exactly how such events would manifest themselves cannot, in general, be specified a priori. It is true that certain sequences of events involving a time traveller might appear rather odd, such as a long succession of failed murder attempts, but this is only because in everyday life (where all events have prior causes) such as a series of events would be an extremely unlikely and unexplained set of coincidences (p.56).

In Riggs' opinion either "locally forward" or "locally backward" acting causes prevent contradictory situations from arising in time travel and



that a "global" view of a closed causal chain of events provides a satisfactory explanation of the non-occurrence of the time travel paradoxes.

The relationship between events on a closed causal chain, is a relationship of causal interdependence, a holistic relationship where "every event on the chain depends causally on all other events on that chain" (p.60). In open causal chains causal interdependence does not exist because only the last event in the open chain is causally dependent on the other events. Closed causal chains without causal connections to events external to themselves generate conceptual incoherences, Riggs observes. An adult time traveller could "spontaneously metamorphosise into his newly born self" (pp. 59-60). Consequently the "internal consistency of a closed [causal] chain is implicit in our notion of causal interdependence" (p.63) but so too is the compatibility of these events with local external events. Both internal and external causal influences produce a state of existential equilibrium by a process of balancing which is dependent upon the whole structure.

Riggs does not succeed in our opinion in showing that nature must be self-consistent. In fact from the perspective of paraconsistent logic, his account is question begging. The self-consistency requirement is merely added to this account of causal interdependence: it is explicitly assumed, not proved, that nature must be self-consistent. Paraconsistent logicians such as Graham Priest, who believe that notion itself involve contradiction, would feel, surely, that the question at issue is being begged here<sup>5</sup>. After all, time travel does involve some unavoidable logical oddities. For example, the classic example of a "necessary truth"; no macroscopic object can be in two places at the same time, arguably is violated (imagine that I go back into the past of one minute ago). So some independent philosophical defense of the selfconsistency requirement is needed and Riggs' paper supplies no such argument.

Critics of time travel are to suppose that the holistic causal structure of the world is such that something will always happen to stop Tim killing grandfather. But will it? Riggs says: "Tim has no influence on events in his grandfather's era if he does not travel 'backward' in time" (p. 53). But this is false as the two Terminator movies dramatically show. Tim doesn't need to travel back into time to alter the past: he can do this by sending back instructions either to a hitman in the past or by sending back an invincible Terminator.

With a fight of further analytic fantasy suppose that Tim sends back into time an omnipotent evil demon who is not limited by broken firing pins, misfiring rifles or other mishaps which "just happen" to save Tim's grandfather. If you like, in this thought experiment Tim could become an omnipotent evil demon not subject to the laws of the causal order, who takes this journey back in time and kills by "psychic" means. The point of all this that the time travel scenario is above all

5. See for example G. Priest, *In contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent*. (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987).



else a logical thought experiment rather than merely a physical one. Free will, human time travellers and all the other objects that may be subjected to the action of causal interdependence are not necessary for generation of this paradox. All that is needed is that a single incidence time travel permits in principle the elimination of its own past causal antecedents. As such a purely physical resolution, such as Riggs' proposed solution, is always open to refutation by more elaborate thought experiments. We conclude then that Riggs fails to resolve the principal paradox of time travel.

### 3. IS TIME TRAVEL "POSSIBLE"?

The physicist David Deutsch and philosopher Michael Lockwood have defended the possibility of time travel based on the "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics<sup>6</sup>. Let us assume that time travel is permitted in principle by today's best physical theories. Assume as well that grandfather style paradoxes are unavoidable: then what? Nothing can stop Tim or a suitable agent/Terminator killing grandfather. So what happens after grandfather dies? Would Tim both exist and not exist (after all, a time traveller can in principle be in two distinct places at the same time)? that would it be like to see a logical impossibility physically realized? Or would we say that because this situation is physically realized, it is not logically impossible? If the death of grandfather does realize? a logical contradiction, would it mean that annihilation of Tim and perhaps the universe would occur, for one view of negation holds that  $\sim p$  "annihilates"  $P$  so a contradiction  $p \ \& \ \sim p$  cannot be physically realized because of a logical incompatibility between  $p$  and  $\sim p$ . Another view of  $p \ \& \ \sim p$  holds that because  $p \ \& \ \sim p \rightarrow q$  in classical logic  $p \ \& \ \sim p$  cannot be physically realized because then everything would happen! In this paper we cannot address these questions. For one thing we are not sure, methodologically, of how one could resolve such ultimate questions for we have lost what faith we once had in the conceptual power of philosophy to solve most of the problems which it can coherently pose. Perhaps the paradoxes of time travel show the incoherence of the basic physical theories that permit them? Perhaps they show that nature is not self-consistent, so classical logic is wrong? This would seem a more fruitful area of investigation than the direction chosen by Peter Riggs and most other writers on the topic of time travel. At some point in this debate someone must have the courage to explore the full ramifications of Tim's successful murder of grandfather.

6.D. Deutsch and M. Lockwood, "The Quantum Physics of Time Travel", Scientific American, March, 1994, pp. 68-74. See also T. Sider, "A new Grandfather Paradox?", Philosophy and phenomenological Research, Vol. LVII, no. 1, March, 1997, pp. 139-144.



## IX

## VEDANTA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

D. Mesy

The conception of Human Rights is of central Importance in the context of the happenings in the modern world. Innocent people have become victims of oppression and discrimination. We are confronted with inequality, brutality and violence in the present world-situation. The reality of infringement upon human rights in various forms and varying degrees ranging from torture and ill-treatments of prisoners, the use of deadly chemicals, aerial bombardment of defenceless towns and villages, racism and apartheid, and the practice of slavery. The discriminatory treatment of minority cultures and the denial of equal right to women are still prevalent. The universal and fundamental freedoms talked about are denied. Injustice and discrimination and continue to thrive. New forms of these appear with urbanisation, technological and economic development. Alienation, increase of communication traffic, growing contamination of the environment and the like threaten the very security of human lives. The ideal of man's self-realisation has been hindered from all sides. Certainly, the denial of human rights is responsible for the escalation of violence. In this context, the proclamation of the vedantic truths must be extended to the sphere of human rights.

An examination of the meaning and implications of human rights is relevant and important in this context. The problems concerned with rights have steadily attracted the attention of political and legal philosophers especially since the 17th century. The societies of ancient Greece divided themselves into free men and slaves and the latter had no rights. The Middle ages witnessed the common people as being no better than slaves. The medeival philosophers spoke not of rights but duties a man owed to his Lord of his king. A marked change occurred with the introduction of terms like 'an English man's birth right' or 'natural rights', which are more personal and universal. The idea that man can have a right which is inalienable and indefeasible possessing some kind of sanctity and validity and which transcends the ordinary positive laws, is the basis for the examination of the nature and criteria of rights.



Ordinarily understood, a right is a claim upheld by law. The concept of right was originally associated with juridical law. Legal writers like Wesley Hohfield and Arthur L Corbin distinguish between claim-rights and mere liberties. A legal right is a claim to performance usually against other private persons. Other people have duties towards the right-holder.

The meaning of right becomes clearer when it is contrasted with liberty or privileges. Liberty is marked by the absence of duty, it is a licence to invade another's right. Legal benefit as that of a driver's licence is a privilege. Rights stand in sharp contrast to liberties. It is something that can be urged, pressed or rightly demanded against other persons. When right is duly given to a person, there is no reason for gratitude since it is one's own due. It is a value which cannot be replaced by any amount of compassion, obedience or obligation.

Rights can be positive or negative. A positive right means that something should be provided for me, it is a right to other persons' positive actions as in the case of medical treatment or the right to living wage. My positive rights imply that some one else has the duty to do something for me. On the other hand, when I say that I have a right to free speech or to the practice of my religion, what is meant is that I should be left free from interference in these fields.. This is negative right which is a right to other person's omissions. Thus I have a right means either that someone else has the duty to provide the service I claim to or to leave me alone. The right not to be interfered with or the right to food, shelter, education. etc. Certainly admit of exceptions. Hence these cannot be held absolute.

Legal rights are different from moral rights. Legal rights are conferred by specific rules and protect the privileges in a certain situation. It is bound by institutional regulation. Legal rights depend on society and on social recognition. But there are rights which are not derived from such clearly visible laws and institutional regulations. Even before there is any regulation or law conferring such a right we assert that someone has a right to something. Such rights are termed moral rights which are treated as existing prior to or independently of any legal right. Moral rights do not depend on social recognition. Even it is not recognised by the person who has it.

Human rights come under moral rights. A definition of human rights may be like this: "human rights are generically moral rights of a fundamentally important kind held equally by all human beings unconditionally and unalterably". Human rights are enjoyed by all human beings by virtue of their belonging to the species *homo sapiens*. The 1948 U. N. Declaration of human Rights states: "everyone, as a member of society... has the right to work, to free choice of employment... to just and favourable remuneration... to rest and leisure... and periodic holidays with pay... to food, clothing, housing and medical care.... to education .....to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits".



The roots of human rights can be traced to the concept of "natural rights" according to which there are some rights that all persons possess equally which are professed to be "inalienable and unviolable". In a sketchy analysis of his political philosophy, John Locke includes the right to life, liberty and property in natural rights. For him, natural law is a claim to innate, indefeasible right inherent in the individual. He goes to the extent of even saying that the individual and his rights are ultimate principles. This points to the fact that natural rights transcend the state they are not the creation of the state. At the same time the state and positive law have to safe-guard such rights. These are rights which transcend the existing state and form part of an unseen order of the universe seeing expression in concrete terms.

Accordingly governments are founded upon respect for God and conformity to Divine law. The major religions of the world testify to this fact.

The shariah of Islam, Dharma of Hinduism, law of Moses of ancient Israel are all examples of this type of universal laws prior to the formation of the state. In a similar way, most of the modern constitutions are formed prior to the establishment of a government and incorporating these inalienable and God-given rights.

A number of historical documents such as magna carta, the English Bill of Rights, U. S. Declaration of Independence and bill of rights, the French declaration of the rights of man and citizen etc. also contain provisions of rights as human rights. The French national Assembly recognised the ignorance, neglect or contempt of human rights as the sole cause of public misfortunes and corruption of government and hence firmly resolved to set forth these natural, imperceptible but inalienable rights. They proclaimed that the goal of society is the common happiness and that government is established to guarantee to man the enjoyment of his natural rights such as liberty, equality and property. It is clarified that liberty consists in the ability to do that which does not harm the rights of others. Equality in that law is the same for all whether it protects or punishes and property is the right to enjoy and to dispose of one's goods, one's revenues., the fruits of one's labour and industry.

Several attempts have been made in the history of philosophy to portray the dignity of man. Pico della Mirandolla in the 15th century spoke vehemently against the medieval spirit which recognised man as a creature of lust and wickedness, a mere infinitesimal being in comparisoin with the majesty of God. He stresses man's free will and dignity of hyman personality. This optimistic concept of the 'oration on the dignity of man' representing a faith in the potentialities of man's existence has been taken up by Immanuel Kant who portrayed man as an autonomous being having a personality of infinite intrinsic worth. Everything else in this world has an exchange value, a price for which the owner is willing to sell his property, but man alone possesses self-



direction and dignity for he is priceless. He has moral will and free choice of action. Stressing the importance of freedom, Kant observes: "freedom is independence of the compulsory will of another : and in so far as it can co-exist with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole, original, inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity".

According to Kant the real or essential aspect in man is not accidental or historical but teleological. He says: "I shall set forth the method by which we must study man-man not only in the varying form in which his accidental circumstances have moulded him, in the distorted form in which even philosophers have almost always misconstrued him, but what is enduring in human nature and the proper place of man in creation"<sup>3</sup>. All these place him even above angels: "with all his failings, man is still better than angels void of will". Accordingly Kant held that man belongs to the 'kingdom of ends' and must be treated as an end in himself only.

Recognition of the dignity and respect for human personality is basic to human rights. All the great religions of the world in one form or another preach reverence for life, in particular human life, his dignity, value, responsibility, aim and meaning of life. And in this religious insight also we can trace the roots of human rights. The judeao-Christian religion finds the dignity of man in his createdness 'in the image of God' as the Books of genesis enjoins that God created the human being in his own image. God said: "let us make man in our own image and our likeness"<sup>4</sup>. This assigns a responsibility to man which lies in his special relationship or follow-up with God and with his fellow- men. Regarding the purpose of human life, it is taken to be an ideal which transcends the mundane goals of human existence and is based upon the vision of God or Ultimate reality. There is actual coherence between the Ultimate reality and the essential nature of human being. Values like love, truth, beauty, goodness, joy and happiness belong to the original human nature and as such the purpose of life is conceived to be the realisation of what is most essentially human. When God is accepted as the Creator and human beings as creatures, realisation of the purpose of creation forms the basis of human life.

Religions can provide the basis for human rights in another way also. The sacred scriptures of all faiths proclaim the equality of all persons, irrespective of the difference between male, female, rich, poor, race, class or caste. God is the parent of all humanity and that all human beings are descended from the one pair of the regional ancestors, Adam and Eve. Prophet Malachi pleading for Judaism says: "Have we not all one father? Has not one God created us?" The Quran puts it like this: "O mankind, we created you from a single pair of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes that you might know each other (not that you might despise each other)". In religions like



Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism and Confucianism, the essential equality of all is assured from the fact that the realisation is available to all equally. That is, Enlightenment, unity with the Absolute or Fellowship with the Ultimate is the sacred duty every man can aspire for. The Bhagavat gita makes it clear thus: "I look upon all creatures equally, none are less dear to me and none more dear. All those who take refuge in me, whatever their birth, race, sex or caste will attain the supreme goal: this realisation can be attained even by those whom society scorns".<sup>7</sup> Here there are no distinctions of class, caste, nationality, race or sex. According to the Rg-veda, "Lord, God of glory is He to whom both the Aryans and the outcastes belong". The svetasvatara Upanisad treats the distinctions of man, woman, youth, maiden etc. as only diverse forms of the One Reality. Distinctions among people are attributed to their conduct, morality, level of spiritual education and attainment and not to birth. Jainism holds: "by deeds, not by birth is none a Brahmin. By deeds one is a kshatriya, by deeds is one a vyasa and by deeds is one a Sudra"<sup>9</sup>.

The social dimension of human rights also derives its meaning from the religious presuppositions: To participate and fulfil the diverse responsibilities of social life is considered to be an integral part of being human in the religions like Confucianism, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam etc. These religions teach promotion of equality beyond the barriers affirming the dignity of all members of society.

Unfortunately certain conventional interpretations of passages from the sacred texts promote discrimination among people on the basis of caste, colour, creed or sex. There is thus an urgent need for all religions to examine and reconfirm their teachings concerning human dignity, responsibility and equality of mankind. A more refined sense of religious consciousness is to be developed so that we can overcome all the forms of discrimination and look at man from the right perspective.

The idea of equal human rights is certainly a revolutionary idea. It is different from status rights and rights based on merit. It is associated with the idea of a single status society based on the concept of equal and universal human worth. A feudal system recognised distinct hereditary castes with well-defined rights and duties depending upon their status. In a purely meritocratic society, we grade persons according to their rankable qualities like talents or skills. In sharp contrast to this, human rights are based on the worth of the human beings. In the modern context it has taken different forms ranging from economic, social and cultural rights to a claim upon the state to provide and guarantee the means for achieving the individual's happiness and well-being or in short his welfare.

With this idea of human rights, let us turn to Vedanta and examine the place, role and dignity of a human being according to the Vedantic conception. Are human rights relevant in the vedantic context of



expaining the nature, duty and purpose of man? One can clearly see that certain conceptions of vedanta regarding man, his destiny and purpose surely admit of human rights considerations. First and foremost, let us take the Advaitic concept of man. The advaitic thought of samkara is the systematic presentation and coherent exposition of the Upanisadic themes. Brahman is the central theme of Vedanta. It is Real, it is knowledge, it is Infinite. It belongs to an altogether different order where description and explanation do not count much. Man in his inner most essence is Brahman. But this fact is clouded by ignorance. When the right knowledge sets in and the cloud lifts, man realises his true nature. The Upanisad says: "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman himself." If man were not already Brahman, no amount of knowledge could raise him to Brahmanhood. This knowledge is quite different from the ordinary knowledge or conceptual knowledge. The knowledge of Brahman is intuitive experience, it is a deep communion, direct realisation. Brahman is immortal, the individual human being is not different from it. It is known to be one with the Absolute consciousness. The individual human reality is the reality which is infinite and eternal. But it becomes separated from the supreme self like a spark from that of fire because of its association with ignorance. Knowledge removes this ignorance by removing the limiting adjuncts and finally comes to the realisation that the human reality is the absolute. Realisation of Brahman is the highest human objective. Man must know that 'I am Brahman'

### AHAM BRAHMA ASMI.

This highest truth is certainly an example of the recognition of human dignity to the core. Similarly the teaching 'that thou art', Tat tvam asi, implying the superiority of nothing to man and reality once again testifies to the dignity and respect of man. In fact, the Upanisads contain several passages which assign man his immortality. These, it may be noted, completely rule out the possibility of any discrimination since all the essential traits of a human soul are attributed to the common source. The question of one being superior to another does not at all arise.

It is sometimes argued that the Upanisads admit of metaphysical reality only and therefore at the practical level discrimination and inequality are accepted. It is cited, as an example, Samkara's attitude to women and their position in the society. Women are essentially related to household needs, their mental horizon is restricted to the family and home and so the education of a girl-child is limited to domestic affairs only. In one of his Bhasyas, Samkara remarks that "Women are not entitled to read the vedas". Furthermore, according to the Chandogya Upanisad, Weak acceptance and obedience are treated to be part of womanly nature. But it was also to be noted that there are several panisadic consideration of society and social relations bear witness to



this. According to it, the self binds the society in bonds of love. Love of the self alone is the basis for becoming dear. Women are treated variously as wife, mother etc. and in all these she is equal to and sometimes even superior to man. For example, as a wife, she is the physical and spiritual companion of man, her presence is essential for the performance of all the religious rites, preservation of race and even for happiness. A man has to share his possessions with her. She is competent enough to receive education and become a learned person and participate in philosophical discussions. According to the Upanisadic tradition children are precious and thus, women, as responsible for getting the right kind of children are glorified. Commenting upon the neglect of women by denying them education, status and opportunities of development, Vivekananda points out that the evil of discrimination represents "a negation of the vedantic doctrine of divinity of all human beings, men and women alike". For him, women are the emblem of the Divine mother. Hence he cried: "the emblem, of the Divine Mother has been reduced to a slave to bear children. why is it that our country is the weakest and the most backward of all countries? Because Shakti is held in dishonour here. There is no chance for the welfare of India unless the condition of woman is improved. It is not possible for a bird to fly on one wing only".

A similar attempt to uplift women and provide equal opportunities for them can be found in Gandhiji's constructive programmes. He always wanted India's womanhood to rise to realise its due status, work and duty in the society. He wanted the women to have education, to become real partners in the lives of their husbands and family, to play a leading role in the satyagraha movement and in the reconstruction of the country.

Social life and social responsibilities is another point to be considered. The Upanisadic society is one oriented towards earthly pleasures and riches. References to kula as family and varna as a group or class of people engaged in a common profession can be found in them. Accordingly we find different castes with definite functions, rights and responsibilities. of these, the most important rights were the right to perform sacrifices and the right to Brahman knowledge. The Upanisads are very particular in reserving the right to sacrifice for Brahmanas who have the sole right to officiate as priest. As an exception kshatriyas are also allowed. Similar is the case with Brahman knowledge. Accepting the scriptural position, Samkara also reserves the right to Brahman knowledge to the upper castes only who are "equally qualified for the study of the Vedas". Sudras are debarred from the knowledge of Brahman. A sudra is ineligible for knowledge because "the Smṛti mentions that a sudra has no right to hear the Vedas, no right to study the Vedas and no right to acquire the meaning of the Vedas". The Brahmasutrahbhasya states the reasons for preventing



the sudras from studying the Vedas, for one becomes competent for things spoken of in the Vedas by a sudra, for Vedic study presupposes the investiture with the sacred thread which ceremony is confined to the three castes".

As an exception to this hard and fast rule of deying the right to study the Veda and perform saacrifices to the sudra, Samkara admits that "all the four castes have the right to acquire the knowledge contained in the Itihasas". Sudras can have Brahmajnana through the Gita since Bhagavat gita is a part of the Itihasa. Gita enjoins : "Lord grants the highest goal even to the lowly born, women, Vaisyas and Sudras".

Two points have to be mentioned here: Firstly Brahman is stated to be beyond any caste. The Mundaka Upanisad speaks of Brahman as invisible, ungraspable and imperishable having no family or caste. since Brahman is the source of all beings this really implies that the Upanisads teach social equality also. The distinction between inferior and superior among beings is unwarranted in such a context. Secondly, Sankara himself admits the necessity of caste, life-stages and actions only at the unenlightened state of life. That is, "the division of castes has been introduced in order to defend the undertaking of rites by people who are under ignorance". So far as the ignorant people are concerned caste and the like have a meaning. And when 'enlightenment' dawns these become meaningless. In one of the Bhasyas, Sankara says: "The different castes such as the Brahmans or the ksatriya, the various orders of life and so on, upon which rites depend and which consist of actions and their factors and results, are objects of notions superimposed on the self by ignorance, i.e. based on false notions like that of a snake in a rope".

Again two other important concepts emphasised in the upanisads are significant from the 'human rights' point of view. These are Dharma and Ahimsa. Dharma is translated as justice. Different Upanisads refer to it differently as duty, right, virtue etc. And the Upanisadic advice is to practise Dharma in one's life. Dharma is a very comprehensive term and has a very significant position in the Hindu ethics referring not only to social, economic and personal duties but aiming to create mental, moral and spiritual fellowship among men. Dharma is created for the well-being of all creation. The Mahabharata enjoins: Dharma is that principal which is so called because it protects all, preserves all that is created. Dharma is that principal which is capable of preserving the world. In the Indian tradition it is accepted as an arbiter, the individual and social conscience-keeper and as such it includes all the religious observances, secular laws of society and community and individual rights and duties. "Dharma", says Dr. Radhakrishnan, "is the form and activities which shape and sustain human life. It is any human activity which helps the realisation of the self and spreads harmony in



society. As a concrete principle, it means all the duties of a man performed to the best of his ability for the personal as well as social betterment. Exploitation and discrimination find no place in Dharma.

Another essential doctrine extolled in the Upanisads is non-violence which is accepted as a duty of everyone. Let us note that the Upanisads despise violence not only to man but even to animals. The Chandogya Upanisad accepts non-violence as the means to the world of Brahman.

All the above facts reveal the relevance of human rights considerations in the Vedantic context. Developed from the scriptural triad, the Vedanta deals with not only metaphysical and epistemological problems but also the social life of the community. The rights and responsibilities of man are duly recognised. A true appreciation of the worth of the human person is basically essential for the meaning and importance of human rights. Expressed in different forms and in different places this principle is accepted in the Vedanta. what is required is the attempt to justify violation of effective protection of human dignity and of the rights of the human being must be nipped in the bud itself. This is necessary not only as a basis for lasting peace but also as a foundation for social justice.

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## X

## THE CONCEPT OF SELF IN BUDDHISM : SOME REFLECTIONS

**R. K. Rawal**

The one thing I should like to make clear at the very outset of this paper is that much confusion prevails concerning the concept of the Self (1) in Buddhism, and that its genesis can be traced to Buddha himself. His silence with regards to such metaphysical query as the existence or non-existence of the self has contributed a lot to the perpetuation of the confusion to this date. In fact, it can be safely averred that no other issue has raised so much dust or proved itself to be so ticklish to solve to one's satisfaction as this one in the entire range of Buddhist philosophy.

However, it should be noted that while the Abhidhamma philosophy advocates the doctrine of Anatta in no uncertain terms, the earlier texts associated with the Vinaya or the Suttapitaka also refer to the concept of not-Self, but they confine its meaning to the five Skandhas or aggregates that constitute the Nam-Rupa or the Mind-Body organism of man. An exposition of the concept of Anatta (not-Self or lower self) as expounded in such Pali texts as Anattalakkhan Sutta or Mahavagga leads, of necessity, to the concept of the existence of Atta (higher Self) by implication, as we shall observe later on.

My contention therefore, in the light of the above mentioned statement, is that the view of Anatta attributed to Buddha is a misconception that needs to be removed, as it has been much distorted by a number of Western and Eastern commentators alike. They have either completely denied the existence of the concept of self in Buddhism or misinterpreted the word Anatta in such a way as to suit their own philosophical inclinations. By attributing a wrong meaning to this word, they have not only rendered an irreparable harm to the real message of Buddha but also tarnished his image as an upholder of a 'soulless' philosophy of life. As Professor Chowdhury states, "There is no parallel in the history of philosophy to this confusion based on the misunderstanding of a single word (Anatta) that gave turn to the reading of a religion which was not intended by its intention" (2).



The present essay is an attempt in approaching the multiple views concerning the existence or non-existence of the Self as held in early Buddhism. I deal with each one of them in three sections of rather unequal length.

I begin by presenting the view that steers the middle course between Buddha's denial of the Self on the one hand and its affirmation on the other. All these views are recorded, some directly and some indirectly (i.e. by implication), in different Pali texts as they came to be formulated by various hands from time to time during the centuries that followed the Master's nibbana. My reference here is to the dialogue that Buddha had with one Vacchagotta the wanderer, who approached him to pacify his mind about the problem whether the Self or soul exists or not. It is here that Buddha maintains his famous silence concerning the query posed by Vacchagotta. On being asked by the wanderer whether the soul exists after the extinction of the body, the Buddha remained silent. On being further asked if the soul did not exist after the annihilation of the body, the Buddha once again maintained silence. Realising the utter irrelevance of his query for the Buddha a dissatisfied Vacchagotta took his leave of the Master in disappointment. After Vacchagotta's departure, Anand asks Buddha what prompted him to remain silent. Explaining the reason behind his silence, he replies to Anand in a manner indicative of his apathy to such metaphysical poser. He tells Anand that had he admitted to the existence of an entity like soul, he would have been considered as one siding with the eternalists (Sasvatvadins), and had he totally denied the existence of such an entity, he would have been looked upon as one siding with the annihilationists (uchhedvadins).

Now that fact is that for Buddha the pragmatist, who was primarily concerned with the problem of suffering and its cessation, entering into any such metaphysical dispute served no purpose : it did not contribute in the least towards the lessening of suffering. Buddha therefore preferred to remain silent about almost all the final and absolute metaphysical questions to talking about them, lest any misreading of his answer to any such query should result into further fogging the mind of the inquirer. Another reason for his silence was his insight into the questioner's ability to grasp the inner meaning of what he intended to convey. He thought that any debate of this nature, if continued, would make the confusion worse confounded for the inquirer. He therefore decided to remain either silent or non-committal. Vacchagadha, according to Buddha, was not ripe enough to comprehend his inner message and hence his silence. As against this, it is interesting to note, he merely holds a flower before an enlightened Maha Kashyap, and this silent gesture is enough to convey a great deal more to this mature disciple than meets his eye.

Buddha actually lived in an age when innumerable schools of thought existed raising hair-splitting arguments about questions of which the solutions tended to be either partial or incomplete, and



therefore dissatisfying to the disputants involved. The best way, according to Buddha, was to realise the truth by oneself through one's own inner experience rather than through an explanation offered at a mere theoretical or phenomenal level. That is why he continually admonishes his disciples to be as those who are light unto themselves (appo dipo bhava). He emphasises the fact that his teaching aims at prompting the seeker to come and see (perceive and experience) here and now (ehipassika) the truth regarding the final reality for himself. Truth at its deepest level has to be perceived by one's innermost Self in its most quiet moments, and not by one's empirical or surfacial self engaged in eternal pursuits.

In sum, Buddha's total aversion to all speculative concerns involving unending debates and shaky conclusions is the main reason behind his silence when faced with a volley of unprofitable questions, as this neither led one way or the other to one's liberation. It should however be clear that Buddha's silence is never an outcome of his inability to dispute metaphysical issues or his ignorance of the Self.

## II

the focus here is on the view which upholds the theory of Anatta (not-Self) in early Buddhism. According to this view Buddha did not believe in any permanent entity or abiding Self that exists in one's body and gets transmigrated from one body to another on one's physical demise. What therefore gets reborn is not any eternal soul substance but the samskaras or impressions of the previous life ; these mental formations, conditioned as they are by one's Karma, pass on from one life to another. After one's physical demise, it is the force of their Karma, their Karma energy, which, like a stream in constant flow, carries forward all such psychic constructs to their new birth in a new birth in a new body. There is thus no ontological 'I' beyond the psychological 'me', a bundle of changing psychoses, nor any immanent Self behind the embryonic organism of man. This comprises the psycho-physical being of man made of the five aggregates (panca skandhas), namely, rupa (body), vedana (feeling or sensation), sangna (cognition or perception), samskaras (mental impressions formed by one's volitional actions), and vignana (consciousness). In verse 279 of the Dhammapada, we came across the statement that all dhammas, that is all things, compounded and uncompounded alike, including the uncompounded state of Nibbana, are 'not-Self' and therefore unreal (sabbe dhamma anatta). However, the proposition concerning Nibbana is highly debatable and sounds unconvincing, as it is a state full of supreme bliss where one realises the nature of one's true Self, at once unchanging and unconditioned. I deal with this problem in Some detail in section III of the present essay.

Turning to Milindpanha of Nagsena and Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, we find that both these works employ similes to the same effect: to illustrate the truth that there is no permanent ego or soul which transmigrates from one existence to another. Having thus denied the existence of any abiding entity, both Nagasena and Buddhaghosa look



upon the entire phenomenon of birth-life-death and rebirth as one continuous process of becoming, wherein every present state of psycho-physical nature makes for the formation of the next state in close succession. Such close succession of psycho-physical phenomena, now forming, now dissolving, is what makes the entire process of becoming appear like a stream of consciousness in constant flux.

This entire course of 'becoming' is at times referred to by Buddha as constituting the self or *atta*; as such it is more a process than an entity to be identified with something fixed or eternally the same. Such process accompanies a person not only through the course of one life but through successive lives in the form of fleeting states of consciousness. As Mahathera Narada observes, "As the process of one life-span is possible without a permanent series of life processes is possible without anything to transmigrate from one existence to another. The Buddhist doctrine of rebirth soul be differentiated from the theory of reincarnation which implies the transmigration of a soul and its invariable material rebirth".(3)

The vital question that looms up before one therefore is: how is reincarnation at all possible without there being a soul to be reborn? And if so, the next query that arises is. what is it that is exactly reborn in the next existence? Both Nagasena and Buddhaghosa have tried to explain the former question by employing various similes to illustrate the point that nothing as such transmigrates from one life to another. The most striking simile offered by Venerable Nagasena is that of the flame. In his *Milindapanha*, while explaining the problem to king Milinda, Nagasena observes how the flame of a torch can directly communicate its light to another torch in a continuous process without the flame itself being transmitted. The flame of life (*vijnana* or consciousness) also thus passes on from one existence to the next one in a similar manner, although it does give the appearance of an apparent break at the time of death. Rebirth thus, according to venerable Nagasena, does not involve the transmigrating of any 'Being' from one body to another on one's physical cessation. It is the constant passing on of the flow, flame or stream of life from one state to another that takes place under the endless cycle of becoming. Every psycho-physical state of life - past, present or future-as one can notice here, is thus, according to Buddha, causally connected : the present state of life in being as much an outcome of the last state of the past life in the preceding birth, as the future state of life in the succeeding birth is dependent on the last state of the present life.

Moreover, to disabuse the mind of the king of its belief in the existence of an essence called soul or self, Nagasena offers him the analogy of a chariot. Just as the chariot is a formal name given to a type of vehicle consisting of certain components, such as the wheels, the axle, the seat, the yoke, the canopy, etc., - all arranged in a certain form - similarly the name given to a man only signifies the existence of the person concerned. There is in fact no such person existing in



essence. In order to make his analogy more clear to the king, Nagasena explains to him how the name Nagasena stands for the combination of various parts (the five aggregates or panca-skandhas ) that make for his psycho-physical personality. His name therefore, like the name 'chariot', is only a signifier to cognise him as such, there being no Nagasena in reality existing independently of his empirical self. Thus, according to Venerable Nagasena, there is no jiva or soul existing behind or beyond the mind-body composition of man, which is assigned the name 'Nagasena' only for convenience. It has thus only cognitional (vyavharic) significance, there being no existence of any essential (paramarthic) person (Purusa) as such. What therefore counts in Buddhism is more the continually changing personality of man than an ever-abiding person. However, what beats me is why Nagasena should at all have employed the illustration of an inanimate object like a chariot to compare it with that of man, an animate subject, in order to disprove the existence of a transcendental Self.

We now come to the next query posed by the king Milinda to the Venerable Nagasena concerning that which, in the absence of a transmigrating soul, is born in the next existence. Nagasena replies that it is the mind-body complex that is reborn from the present existence to the succeeding one. The ever-curious king further inquires if it is the same mind and body which is reborn. Nagasena answers that it is not the same mind and body which is reborn but a different mind and body. A relentless Milinda, loaded by his desire to know more, asks emphatically if it is not the same mind and body which is reborn, is not then the person so reborn free from all kinds of evil deeds committed in the previous life? Nagasena's reply is that no one is totally free from the consequences of one's deeds, good or bad, committed in the previous birth. One is therefore bound to be reborn on account of these deeds, his present mind and body having been derived from his deeds of the past. By offering various illustrations, Nagasena tries to convince the king that though it is not the same mind and body which is reborn, what is reborn is at the same time not altogether different either, since it carries with it the traces or impressions (samskaras) of the deeds done in the life preceding the present one. I submit in what follows next at least one illustration of Nagasena to expound his view.

Nagasena expounds his view to the king by presenting him the illustration of a man who has stolen a mango from the trees of another man. The owner of the tree, having caught the thief, takes him to the local king. He informs the king about the theft of the mango by the man. The stealer of the mango says to the king in his defence that the mango he has stolen is different from the owner that the owner has once planted; he should therefore not be punished for the theft. Nagasena then inquires of the king Milinda if the man should be punished or not for the theft. Milinda replies that the man should be punished even for the theft of the present mango, because though it is



not the same as the one planted by its owner, it is still derived from it, and therefore a continuation of the same mango. As such, though it may not appear to be the same as the original mango, it is not quite different either. Likewise, the present self or psycho-physical state of a person, though not the same as the one preceding it, is still not altogether different either from the one it has immediately derived.

What all this amounts can be made much clearer if presented in terms of a series of selves undergoing change from one state to another. Thus the state of the self that is A1 may lead to the next state of A2 but not B1, as that would be a totally different series from the one represented by A1. While the series remains the same the states change. A2 is a continuation of the state A1, and therefore similar to it but at the same time it is not the same as A1, as it indicates the addition of some new experiences to the preceding state of A1. every successive state thus contains within it the accumulated experience of all the states which have gone before it. The cumulative forces of the partially changing self have all the potential of emerging to the fore at any stage suitable for their appearance. This is what makes it easy to account for the persistence of the memory in a person: it keeps on going latently thorough the successive phases of the self that changes in part only. It also explains the problem of a moral obligations the part of man. Since every successive state of man's self in flux is finally a continuation of the states that have gone before it, the latest in order partakes of the sense of moral responsibility inherited from all its predecessors. As Professor Hiriyanna, containing the charge of inconsistency laid against the sense of moral obligation and persistence of memory in a man vis-a-vis the Buddhist theory of the changing self, remarks so very aptly, "... if the self also be changing every moment, it becomes difficult to account for the fact of memory. Here also the Buddhist has his explanation. He holds that each phase of experience as it appears and disappears, is wrought up into the next so that every successive phase has within it all the potentialities of the predecessors' which manifest themselves when conditions are favourable. Hence, though a man is not the same in two moments, yet he is not quite different. The self is not only a collective, but also a recollective entity. It is on this basis that Buddhism establishes moral responsibility. What one does, it is true, the same one does not reap; but he that reaps the fruit is not quite alien either and so far merits to come in for the good or evil that belonged to the preceding members of that particular series"[4].

Likewise with the Venerable Buddhaghosa who, in order to strengthen the view that there is no abiding Self in man, offers, like Venerable Nagasena, illustrations to elucidate his stand. Citing the examples of an echo, of reflection in a mirror, and the impression of seal, he tries to expound this complicated problem in a very lucid and convincing manner. He shows how an echo is reflection of a sound that is carried forward through the air by means of sound waves which follow each other in succession, like links in a chain, from one point to another. What in fact happens here is that the original sound or the



organ of sound itself, does not get transmitted from one location to another, as does a soul in transmigration. The image of a man which is reflected in a mirror, in a like manner, is more a replica of his figure in reverse. What thus passes on through the mirror as one looks into it, is the image of man rather than the man himself. The seal, similarly, when pressed against a printable surface, leaves behind its impression on it without itself being transferred. All such representations or appearances, despite their close resemblance to the object of their origin, do differ a slightly, from them. They are also thus similar to but not the same as their prototypes, thus verifying the truth of the adage that like begets like but not exactly alike.

No better illustration of this process in modern times can be given than the one offered by Dr. Coomaraswamy. The learned commentator compares the entire process of the continuity of life with a series of billiard balls, each rolling ball pushing the next one by coming into close contact with it in quick succession. "If another ball", says Dr. Coomaraswamy, "is rolled against the last stationary ball will stop dead, and the foremost stationary ball will move on... the first moving ball does not pass over, it remains behind, it dies; but it is undeniably the movement of that ball, its momentum, its kamma, and not any newly created movement, which is reborn in the foremost ball. [5]

In the same way when the present life comes to a close, what passes on to the next one with full momentum is its Karmic energy, and not any migrating entity. The last mental set-up or thought-moment of the present life prepares the stage for the next one in the life that follows. It would therefore be of interest to note that nowhere does the Buddhist philosophy offer the example of the seed of a tree being wefted away by air from one place (the tree) to another (soil) to be reborn (to sprout) out of the womb of the soil. The reason being that such a simile would put to one's mind the idea of a self transmigrating from one locale (the present existence) to a new location (the place the reborn self has shifted).

### III

In this section I discuss the view I subscribe to: it is that Buddha did believe in a higher self transcending the changing empirical ego. The pali canonical texts are so full of passages that emphatically deny the existence of a permanent self that no proper attention has been paid to such utterances or sermons of the Master, which, if one has eye to perceive, clearly allude to the existence of the self beyond the self composed of the five aggregates.

However, what prompts me to look upon Buddha as one who ultimately did believe in the existence of self or Atta is the fact that the whole concept of Anatta sounds to me to be inconsistent with regards to Buddha's views on suffering (Dukha) and impermanence (Anitya or Anicca), when all these considered in the context of Nibbana. Nibbana, according to Buddha, is a state where one realises the nature of that



which is unconditioned, uncompounded and unbecoming, having freed himself from the fetters of the conditioned, the compounded and the becoming. It is also a state where one experiences the peace that passeth all understanding, a state of supreme bliss (nibbanam param sukham) free from all suffering. Why should it then not be considered at the same time a state where one realises the true nature of self (Atta) that is consistent with that of bliss (sukha) and permanence (nicca or nityata)? Thus, if one can liberate oneself from the unending cycle of becoming, if one can pass on from the state of suffering to that of eternal bliss, it rather seems strange that one should not move away from the state of not-self to one of self-realisation.

In order to apprehend this intricate problem of the self in its right perspective, it would be better to focus on those scattered passages and references in the early pitakas (Vinaya and Sutta) which have been unfortunately over looked by most of the commentators in their zest to concentrate on the more known and popularly accepted theory of Anatta. The reason being the prominence given to this doctrine in all the three Pitakas, especially the Abhidhamma Pitaka dealing with the metaphysical implications of Buddha's ethical teachings. What I should like to stress is that despite his silence, Buddha has given enough signals to indicate the existence of Self, if one could only read their implied message. In Majjhima nikaya he points to the evidence of then Self's existence by implication when he admonishes his disciples staying at the jetvan grove get rid of their attachment to form, feeling, perception, mental dispositions, etc., as all such constituents do not in reality belong to them. Using the illustration of a person who might carry away all the trees and grass of the jetvan grove in order to dispose of them for his various needs, the Buddha then asks them if the person's act would amount to his taking away the disciples themselves for his use. On hearing him, the disciples categorically reply that the person concerned would not be taking them away along with the trees, the Buddha further asks them to clarify their view. The disciples argue that since the trees, grass, leaves, branches, etc. do not belong to them nor from a part of their self, the persons, probably a wood-cutter, would not be taking them (the disciples) away. Likewise, the Buddha immediately quips, the five constituents have to be done away with as they do not from or belong to or form a part of their Self. This, by implication, points to the fact that the real self is as much different from the constituents (skandhas) that make for a person's lower self, as the disciples who have made their temporary abode in the jetvan grove are from the trees that from the grove.

There are many other examples to prove Buddha's ultimate belief in the eternal Being or Brahman, that is identified with Dharma in early Buddhism. The way of the Dharma, according to Samyutta Nikaya (I. 141) is the way of the Brahman, while to dwell in the Dharma, declares Anguttara Nikaya (I. 207) is the same as to dwell in Brahman. The noble eightfold path is alternately referred to as either Brahmayana



or Dharmayana. In Anguttara Nikaya (II. 52) we again come across the statement that to see the self in what is not-self (anattani ca atta) is a wrong view held by the fools who tread the path of birth and death. In fact, the words Brahma(n) and Dhamma have been so often used as prefixes before a number of nouns, such as brahmacarin, dhammacarin, brahmacakka, dhammachakka, dhammakaya, brahmakaya, etc., that they have come to be looked upon as being synonymous.

Referring to the much neglected ideas of Brahma(n) and Atta in early Buddhism Miss I. B. Horner, none the less, points to the significance they both hold in the Upanisads and the pali canonical texts alike. She averres, "As the idea of brahma in the pali canon has been over looked in spite of the ever recurring brahmacariya, the walk to or with Brahma, the sublime - so has that of atta. Both were of the utmost significance in the Upanishads. Both have a significance, even if we have not yet assessed it, in the pali canon" [6]. Thus, to walk along or enter the path of Dhamma, according to early Buddhism, is to tread or enter the path of Brahman. And, as the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad states, "There is nothing greater than dharma," and further, "that which is the ultimate truth" (I.4.14). Moreover, when in verse 380 the Dhammapada declares that self is the lord of the self, is the refuge or the self, it is clearly making a distinction between the higher self that is the lord and refuge of the lower self. Verse 160 also contains a similar idea which runs very close to this: "Man alone can be the master of himself, none from outside can ever be his master". When Buddha thus admonishes us to look upon the self as our master and only refuge, he surely is referring to the undying and the unchanging self within us and not to any surfacial self comprising the elements of psycho-physical nature. How can anything which is itself in constant flux or undergoing instantaneous change, can ever be the lord or refuge of a person? If everything is impermanent (anicca), what is it that permanently remembers the transitory nature of everything? There has to be a fixed, deep-seated Spectator who for ever goes on watching the fluid of the ever-changing states of the self. As Professor Hiriyana rightly cautions us in this connection, "we should - be careful how we understand the Buddhist doctrine of the denial of the soul. As a stable entity which, without itself changing, appears amidst changing conditions - bodily and mental - Buddhism does deny the self; but it recognizes instead a 'fluid self' which because of its very fluidity cannot be regarded as a series of altogether distinct or dissimilar states. We may, however, observe in passing in so stating his view the Buddhist has tacitly admitted a self transcending the experience of a moment. In the very act analysing the self and dismissing it as but a series of momentary states, he is passing beyond those states and positing an enduring self which is able to view them together, for a series as such can never become aware of itself" [7]. The problem of memory and recognition as well becomes difficult to explain without positing belief in an unchanging entity aware of all change. The theory that every new state of consciousness, conditioned as it is by the accumulated



experiences of the previous states, revives in part the memory of an already experienced object/event in the past, does not offer a convincing explanation of memory. The fact is that memory or recognition, as Professor Murti would have it, is something more than the mere revival of the object of the previous state; it also adds something new to the present state of consciousness: the awareness of our having experienced the object before. Now, every mental state, according to the Buddhist philosophy of change, being momentary, unitary and self-contained, cannot take cognizance of any other state, preceding or succeeding it. To be aware of change, it should be noted, does not in any way amount to change in awareness itself, for how can one be aware of change without accepting the changelessness of awareness itself? Thus, as Professor Murti rightly maintains, "If there is no soul how is it then that detached moments of consciousness can remember or recognise things which have been experienced a long time ago..." "Consciousness of change" as he further emphatically adds, therefore "is not change of consciousness" [8].

The above line of reasoning, it is interesting to note, makes the theory of the momentary change of the self from one state to another sound as unconvincing as the doctrine of disbelief in everything held by a person. This may sound strange but fact is that just as a person, while disbelieving everything he disagrees with, tacitly accepts his belief in disbelief itself; likewise, to put it the other way round, he who believes in the theory of the self undergoing change from moment to moment, posits, by implication, his disbelief in the non-existence of a changeless self that acts as a witness to all change. Belief in Anatta or 'not-self' likewise falls short of conviction without positing one's belief in its logical counterpart, that is self or Atta. To be thus aware of the fact that everything is constantly changing is a difficult proposition to accept without accepting the existence of that which is enduringly aware of this change both within and without. Even Madhavacarya, to continue with present course of argument, in his attempt to refute the Buddhist view of instantaneous change, states in his Sarvadarsansangraha how, if no two moments are alike and if everything were to undergo change from one moment to another, then the man who commits an act during one moment and the man who reaps its consequences in the next one, would be different. Denial of a permanent self thus negates the possibility of the same person inheriting the legacy of his accumulated Karmas. Such a belief also stands in contradiction to Buddha's injunction to follow a spiritual path and work out one's salvation with diligence. Whose salvation is to be sought if there is no one to realise or enjoy it? It all sounds absurd. As Professor Murti puts it very succinctly, "Karma without permanent agent who wills and reaps fruit of his action is inconceivable. What is the value of spiritual life if there is none at the end of it? Buddha's doctrine would be the acceptance of pain without any one who feels the pain, a spiritual discipline without any person who undergoes the discipline and a final result (nirvana) without



any individual to enjoy it. Such an absurdity it might be said, could not have been meant seriously by Buddha". [9].

I agree with Professor Murti that Buddha would never have held such a view seriously, for how can there ever be a state of supreme bliss (nibbana) without a Being to experience it? It can therefore be safely asserted that the theory of Anatta (not-self), holding only a partial and limited view of man's total Self, owes its existence, as stated earlier, to the monks who compiled the teachings of the Master in the centuries that followed the Master's death. As Mrs. Rhys Davids rightly observes, "This happened because the pitakas are the work of men removed from the founder by centuries, not far short of five centuries when values were undergoing change" [10]. The result of all this was that the compilers of the canonical texts, along with their commentators, distanced as they were in time from the Master, failed to read the implied or intended message of his primary teachings. In interpreting the doctrine of Anatta, they failed to realise that it in no way negates the ubiquity of an immutable Being. Mrs. Rhys Davids looks upon the whole theory of Anatta as a later day accretion to the foundational message of Buddha on the part of his followers: as such, it is untenable for her and nothing more than "monkish gibberish".

The following additional examples lend further credence to Buddha's confirmation of the Self. In Vinaya Pitaka we find the episode of Buddha coming across a party of certain young men whiling away their wives in a grove. One of them, who was without his spouse, was instead accompanied by a courtesan. At an opportune moment the courtesan, true to her nature, fled from the place taking away along with her all their precious belongings. While seeking for her, the young men meet Buddha on the way and ask him if he had seen such a woman. The Buddha asks them in turn if it was better for them to go in search of a woman or search for their Self? In his famous sermon on the burden and its bearer in Samyutta Nikaya, it is stated by Buddha how the five skandhas are the burden and any attachment to them the bearing of the burden. In contrast to this, detachment from the skandhas is casting off the burden. The burden bearer of course is the ego of the man that gets enmeshed by the various psycho-physical snares of life. Self is something different from the all-experiencing ego of man in that it lies beyond all empirical determinants. All such passages thus admit of the interpretation that a changeless Self does exist as a witness keeping a watch over the changes that the lower Self for ever undergoes.

Speaking of the self a witness, there is an interesting passage in the pali scriptures to which attention has been drawn by E. M. Hare. In The Book of the Gardwal Sayings, I, translated by him, Hare quotes Buddha as saying to a Brahmin, "Thou scornest the noble self, thinking to hide the evil self in thee from self who witnesses it" [11]. This reminds us of the analogy of the two birds dwelling on the self-same tree in the Mundaka Upanisad (III. 1. 1) and the Svetasvatara Upanisad (IV.6). In both it is mentioned how while the one bird eats the fruit of the trees,



the other silently watches what the other is doing. The bird attached to such worldly activity as the eating of the fruit is the lower self, whereas the bird who plays the witness is the higher Self. When the lower self, however, watches the glory of the higher Self, it becomes liberated from all sorrow (Mundaka, III. 1.2) and (Svetasvatara, IV.7). Similarly, while practising the insight meditation (vipassana), the practitioner is enjoined to observe objectively the passing thoughts and sensations felt by the mind-body organism. The question is: which is the self that keeps a constant watch over the changing phenomena taking place at the psycho-physical level?

Another passage which refers directly to the existence of the higher Self in early Buddhism, occurs in Arguttara Nikaya. A certain Brahmin, having approached the Exalted one, tells him, "This, Master Gotama, is my avowal, this my view: There is no self-agency; no other agency" Buddha replies, "never, Brahmin, have I seen or heard of such an avowal, such a view. Pray, how can one step onwards, how can one step back, yet say: There is no self-agency; there is no other agency?" [11]. This is a clear avowal of the Self as an active/prime agent responsible for movement in every sentient being. Though seemingly motionless, this self-agency is in fact as full of motion as a top which appears to be equally motionless as it spins round with astonishing velocity. The Self of the man who has attained Nibbana may thus appear to be still and at rest with itself, but in reality it is in a state of intense activity.

In Mahavagga, we repeatedly come across the utterances like "This is not mine", "I am not this", "is not my self" with reference to each one of the skandhas. In Anattalakhana Sutta, the two words Atta and Anatta are used together as when the Buddha says, "Rupam bhikkave anatta (Body, o monks, is not-self), or "Rupam ca hidam bhikkava Atta abhavissa" (if, o monks, the body were the Self), etc. This itself should be proof enough to indicate the fact that for the Buddha the Self was something different from each one of the components that constituted the lower self, and it was therefore wrong to identify it with the psycho-physical complex that a man is made of at an apparent level. As Professor Chowdhury so tellingly remarks, "If we say- 'This is not gold, that is not gold, we do not mean there is no gold' [12]. Thus when the Buddha says, 'I am not this', 'is not mine', 'this is not my self', it most naturally invites the counter questions, 'who am I?', 'What is mine?', or 'What is my Self'? This is the Self that one realises by transcending all the agitational forces that keep his experiencing self constantly engaged (attached) and disturbed; it is what one finds on extinguishing or cooling off the desires that burn him. It thus lies beyond all thoughts, all passions, and senseous experiences which make for mental formations (samskaras). When, in short, this compound of transient aggregates is rightly comprehended as being unreal, when all the lower selves or egos are made to dissolve, there is bound to remain behind That about which one can justly assert, 'This am I', 'This is mine', 'This is my



Self". One's Being thus is clearly perceived when one, through his own efforts, succeeds in putting a halt to the cycle of Becoming; this can be made possible, to put it in Blakean terms, by "cleansing one's doors of perception".

Even grammatically the word Anatta has been wrongly interpreted as meaning "self-less" or "soul-less", when it is thus used as an adjective in its English rendering. Whereas in reality, the word being a negative of the noun Atta, is itself a noun, and as such, it should mean "not-self" and not "Self-less". A correct grammatical application of the original pali word Anatta, while using it in English, changes the entire meaning of the word and one begins to see what the Buddha meant by it. Seen in this light, the utterances like Rupam anatta, Vedana anatta, Sanna anatta, etc. should mean the 'matter is not-self', "feeling is not-self", "cognition is not-self", and not the "matter is self-less" or "soul-less" and so forth. To yield this latter meaning Rupam anatta should be changed into Rupam anattam, anattam being the adjectival form of anatta, which is a noun. This is also true of other terms mentioned above. An, added before the word Atta, acts only as a negative prefix, which makes the word Anatta to mean not-self and not soul-less. Thus, as Professor Chowdhury rightly comments, "On grammatical grounds alone the popular interpretation falls to the ground. It is only by mangling grammar that the traditional interpretation can be upheld but no student of language can support such an interpretation" [13]. If the word Atta in pali means Self, how can Anatta, its negative form, can mean anything else but "not-Self"? The word Anatta only suggests the absence or negation of the universal Self and it is never to be used as an adjective. One should, according to Professor Chowdhury, therefore be very careful in interpreting the word Anatta as soul-less in English, as there is a world of difference between it and the word "not-self", which alone represents the correct version of Anatta in English. The whole confusion has unfortunately been there because of the failure on our part to comprehend the sharp distinction that exists between the terms "not-self", and "Soul-less". An imperfect interpretation of the word Anatta does not in any way make the Reality less real or the unreal Real.

The crux of the problem, however, is that the Buddha was hardly interested in what exists or what does not. For him the main problem was what was real and what was unreal. The real for the Buddha was not the superficial self that identifies itself now with feeling, now with sensation, and now with the body. Any of these was not the real 'I', the innermost Self that one achieves after all the delusory selves have been dissolved into nothingness. Edward Holmes observes, "The more carefully one studies the teaching of Buddha, the stronger does one's conviction become that the ultimate category in which he thought was that of the real and the unreal, not that of existent and non-existent" [14]. The existent and the non-existent, according to Holmes, are



mutually exclusive terms, whereas the real and the unreal, being polar opposites, always co-exist. The Buddha regarded the entire tenor of outward life as unreal, though not necessarily non-existent. His entire scheme of life, Holmes suggests, was an answer to the question that he must have asked himself: which is the real pole of existence? The Buddha in fact having gone down to the very root of the problem, had arrived at the profound truth that it is Nibbana the eternal and the unbecoming, which is the real pole of existence. This naturally implies the existence of the Self that experiences the unconditioned and timeless state of Nibbana. Dr. Radhakrishnan, describing this unconditioned state of the self liberated from the ceaseless chain of cause and effect, persuasively argues, "... nirvana is timeless existence, and so Buddha must admit the reality of a timeless Self. There is a being at the back of all life which is unconditioned, above all empirical categories, something which does not give rise to any effect and is not the effect of anything else.... Nirvana is the simultaneity which is the support of all succession" [15]. If there were no self, none to realise the bliss that is Nibbana, then the whole struggle to undertake this long and arduous journey within in quest of truth, all effort to annihilate one's egoistic impulses and desires (trishnas), would be as futile an exercise as a cry in wilderness, an endless setting out without ever arriving at.

Concluding, I might venture to say that for me Buddha is but a belated Upanisadic rishi born out of his time, who, like his great predecessors, either preferred to remain silent about his experience of the Self, or could only describe the nature of the self, as do some Upanisads, in negative terms only. Since the Buddha preferred not to talk about the self, it should not be construed as his denial of the self. When a person achieves the knowledge of the Absolute, his mind is permeated with such profound peace that he tends to remain silent about what he has realised than to talk about it. Such a person may feel the task of describing the Indescribable as an unprofitable engagement. A taciturn Buddha must have felt the same way and decided to maintain a noble silence over the nature and existence of the Supreme. In Kenopanisad we find a similar statement concerning the knowledge of the self, when it declares, "He who thinks that he has know the Real, is in reality ignorant of it; he who realises that he cannot know the Real, has in fact understood it the best" (II.1.3). In the same way, when Buddha employs such negative language as "I am not this", "This is not my self" etc., he perhaps shows thereby the difficulty of describing the real Self in clear terms. His words only echo the idea expressed earlier by the words neti (not this), neti (not this) in Brihadaranyak Upanisad that equally define the self by negation thus: "This Self is That which has been described as. 'Not This' (III.9.26). In the Nasadiya, one of the principal philosophical suktas of the Rg vada, a similar language is used. It tends to become vague as it expresses itself in terms of negatives in describing the nature of the Brahma or the First cause thus:



The non-existent was not, the existent was not;  
Then the world was not, nor the firmament, nor  
that which is above (the firmament).  
Death was not nor at that period immortality,  
there was no indication of day or night [16]  
(Rg Veda: X.129, 1-2)

The thing is that in order to spell out the meaning of what lies beyond all sensate experience, one is left with no other tool but that of a language which, more or less, is bound to become paradoxical or negative in its expression. Paradox (e.g. the more you have, the less you are) or the negative (neither this, nor that; neither here, nor there, etc.) seems to be the one way left open to describe the Self (Atta) in an authentic way. It seems that language itself becomes an impotent tool in describing the most profound and apocalyptic experiences or visions of life. Such experiences as the sudden dawning of the light that has for long deluded the mind, or the instantaneous grasp of the ever-escaping truth in a flash of intuition, cannot perhaps be described or communicated in any language but that of negation. Negative description of Reality however does not negate the reality of its positive existence. Professor Chowdhury's comment, "All description being description of qualities, that which is devoid of qualities can only be denoted by negatives, but that does not make reality a negation" [17], is worth taking note of in this connection.

One can also notice a close parallel between the words that Upanisadic rishi uses in his prayer to the supreme in the Brihadaranyak Upanisad and the utterances of Buddha immediately after achieving enlightenment. The rishi prays to Brahman to lead him from

Untruth (evil) to truth (good);

Darkness to light; and

Death to immortality.

(I.3.28)

Buddha's first words on getting enlightened were:

Ignorance (delusion) is destroyed,

knowledge (Truth) is gained;

Darkness is dispelled and the light has dawned; and,

The doors of immortality have opened.

The only difference one can notice here is that while the Upanisadic rishi believes in the efficacy of prayer to realise the Universal Spirit, the Buddha lays emphasis on self-help to realise the same end. For one the word of the prayer is as significant as the silence of the meditation for the other; for one the way down (making the Divine descend through devotion), for the other the way up (raising oneself to the stature of the Divine through one's own efforts). And, after all, are not the way up and



the way down two sides of the same coin, two opposite processes serving the same end? If, for example, one were to climb a staircase and another to come down it and if they both were to meet at the landing place situated at the centre of the staircase, would not they both be serving the same end? The essential thing in one's spiritual journey is to arrive at this Centre. It does not matter which end-top or bottom-of the long, steep road/staircase does one arrive from.

Before I wind up, I should like to offer one last example of close correspondence between the concept of Self as held in Katha Upanisad and in Udana on entering the sphere of Nibbana. According to Katha Upanisad, the supreme self shines through its own light and that it is a state where

Neither the sun shines, nor the moon or the stars;  
nor do the lightnings. Nothing illuminates It.  
Wherefrom then does it get this fire, this  
illumination? It shines by itself. Everything else  
shines only after this shining self; through its  
light only does everything get illuminated.  
(V. 15 English rendering mine)

Nibbana is Buddhism is a state where one, likewise, realises that which is unbecoming, uncompounded and unborn; which, like the Upanisadic Self, is beyond all change and the law of causality. Released from all avidya (ignorance), trishna (craving), and every sort of attachment (rag-dvesa), it is that sphere where,

There is neither earth nor water, light nor air,  
neither infinity of space or nor infinity of  
consciousness, nor nothingness; nor perception  
nor absence of perception, neither this world  
nor that world, both sun and moon. [18]

(Udana)

One can notice in both the Katha Upanisad as well as the Udana, the use of negatives and paradoxical language in order to describe the otherwise incommunicable. One can notice in both the passages the utter helplessness of the language to spell out in clear terms the nature of the final Reality. In both the language tends to become paradoxical, using only negatives to communicate the experience of the Incommunicable.

Finally, if nibbana literally means the "blowing out", the question then is, "blowing out" what? The most approximate answer would be the blowing out the flame of life, a natural result of the total extinction of all craving. But then what about the wisp of smoke that flies out even after the extinguishing of the flame? What is it? Where does it



disappear? The obvious answer is that the wisp of the smoke is the spirit that continues to outlive the death of the body; and like the smoke that merges into the infinite space, the unconditioned spirit (jiva), having liberated itself from the unceasing cycle of becoming, merges with the Being permeating the entire universe. This is what is meant by the state of Nirvana, for, as Dr. Coomarswamy maintains, "Nirvana is a kind of death, but like every death a rebirth to something other than what had been" [19]. Cessation of the cycle of becoming is thus not the extinction of one's self but its existence on a level different from the one experienced on an empirical level, escape from something being always an escape into something else.


### Notes

1. <sup>iiii</sup>Throughout the text I refer to Self (with capital s) as the eternal, unchanging higher self or Being of man, while referring to self (in lower case) as the ego or the empirical self of man, the one that is under constant change and therefore in the process of ever 'becoming'.
2. R. P. Chowdhury, 'Interpretation of the "Anatta" Doctrine of Buddhism: A new Approach', The Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. xxxi, No. 1, (March 1955) p.67. Italics mine.
3. Mahathera Nanada, The Buddha and His Teaching (Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Sri Lanka. 1988), p. 270.
4. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1932), p.145.
5. Ananda Coomarswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism (George G Harrop & Co., Ltd., London, 1928), pp. 106-07.
6. I. B. Horner, 'Atta and Anatta', The Middle way (November, 1952), Vol. XXVII, No.3. p.79. Italics mine. I refer the reader to this excellent article for further enlightenment concerning the passages culled by Ms. Horner from the various Pali sources; they point to the existence of Atta, the logical opposite of Anatta, and thus to Buddha's belief in the higher self (aparitto mahatta).
7. M. Hiriyanna, op. cit. p.146.
8. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1955), p.33.
9. *Ibid*, p. 31.
10. *Ibid*, p.21, Mrs. Rhys Davids quoted.
11. See Alan Watt's The Meaning of Happiness (Harper and Row, New York, 1970), p.208, n.9.
12. R. P. Chowdhury, op. cit., p.64.
13. *Ibid*, p. 53.
14. Edward Holmes, The Creed of Buddha, (The Bodley Head, London, 1957), p.119.



15. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1956), pp. 451-52. Emphasis mine.
16. H.H.Wilson, tr. Rig-veda-Sanhita, VI (Ashtekar & Co., Poona, 1928) p.236.
17. R.P. Chowdhury, op. cit., p. 59.
18. English translation by G. Strong. Quoted in Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's Gautam the Buddha, (Hind Kitabs, Bombay 1946), pp. 61-62.
19. Dr. Ananda Coomarswamy, Hinduism And Buddhism, (Philosophical Library, New York, n.d.) p.64.

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